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Abstract 
 
 
 Martin Heidegger was a central figure in 20th century Western philosophy. In 
evaluating his work from the perspective of the early 21st century it is clear that his 
influence crossed disciplinary lines. This work aims to address one area where 
Heidegger’s thinking has had tremendous impact – theology. Specifically, Heidegger’s 
later writings are selectively examined in order to determine the bearing they have on the 
issue of God. 
 The route to God, in a strict confessional sense, is neither easy nor direct in the 
Heideggerian corpus. As a result, the first methodological tack used throughout this study 
establishes Heidegger’s abiding thematic interests. Only after appreciating the continuity 
and context of his work can tentative and cautious theological applications be made as the 
second methodological tack. This approach simultaneously upholds the integrity of 
Heidegger’s thought and protects the theological discipline from speculative forays 
antithetical to its mission. The hope is that the later Heidegger will be seen as a 
productive and engaging dialogue partner for theology. His voice deepens theology’s 
traditional discourse about God as well as challenges modes of expression that are 
exclusivistic and ineffectual in the postmodern era. 
 The following structure exposes the outreach of the later Heideggerian oeuvre to 
theological thought regarding God. The first two chapters contextualize Heidegger. 
Chapter one situates Heidegger on the stage of Western philosophy with the distinction of 
having creatively raised the question of the meaning of Being to a new level of urgency. 
Chapter two identifies two formative influences from Heidegger’s very early career – 
phenomenology and a course load involving religious topics. 
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 The third and fourth chapters make connections between the later texts and God. 
Chapter three introduces the importance of poetry (Hölderlin and Trakl) and the 
dynamics of poetics. The venturesome poet inhabits the “between” and restores authentic 
human dwelling as measured against the Godhead. Chapter four further develops 
Hölderlin’s significance and introduces Nietzsche’s importance for exposing the 
challenge of godlessness (elusiveness and absence) during the needy time: the gods have 
fled and God is dead. 
 The Reprise recapitulates the salient themes presented and recommends 
promising areas for future research. 
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Introduction 
 
 
There is one problem, however, that we resolutely avoid the problem of 
God.  This is not because there is nothing to say about God in 
Heidegger’s thinking.  On the contrary, it is because there is too much 
to say… 
    — William J. Richardson, S.J. 
         Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought 
 
 
 William J. Richardson issues this disclaimer at the beginning of his classic work 
on Martin Heidegger.  At first glance this dissertation appears to ignore the warning that 
Richardson sounds. However this is not the case in the more flippant sense that 
everything that was ever said or referred to by Heidegger relative to the God question 
will now be fully exposed.  This verges on the absurd and would be a gross injustice to 
both the theology of God and the thinking of Heidegger.  Nonetheless this work takes a 
bold step. It selectively examines the later writings of Heidegger in order to discover 
what they say to the contemporary theology of God. 
 At many junctures where Heidegger’s philosophizing interfaces with theology’s 
God great caution will be exercised.  Once all due respect is paid to the integrity of 
Heidegger’s work and to the discipline of theology, well-grounded speculations will be 
advanced regarding what Heidegger offers for theology’s tentative embrace. This work 
will show that the assets that the later Heidegger has to offer to the God issue far 
outweigh any liabilities, especially in the postmodern era as Heidegger challenges 
theology to think deeply about its presuppositions concerning God. 
 To the attentive and patient ear, Heidegger invites theology to think about God in 
new ways.  Though the route from his later writings to theological application is always 
ponderous and indirect, the invitation to re-think God is not accomplished by adopting 
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any form of iconoclasm or obscurantism. Rather the overall approach consistently centers 
on the careful development of two issues germane to the theological enterprise. 
The first issue addresses the relationship between Being and God. Since this has a 
long-standing precedent throughout the course of Western theology and philosophy, it 
becomes a point of easy compatibility for initial attempts to join Heidegger’s concern for 
Being and theology’s discourse about God. While Heidegger demythologizes and 
deconstructs the metaphysical ways used to study the question of the meaning of Being, 
he does not destroy foundations aimlessly or maliciously.  Raising the Being question 
anew will have a salutary effect upon humanity as it forces a redirection of thought to the 
overlooked mystery of sheer “isness” (Being) and away from the entrenched, comfortable 
focus on “things” (beings) and their manipulation (Chapter One). Moreover, the attempt 
to reexamine the question of the meaning of Being in novel ways will impact upon the 
question of the meaning of God, since the study of God has been part of the metaphysical 
tradition. 
 The second issue relevant to theology which acts as a focal point entertains the 
elusiveness and absence of God. Among the many corollary issues that this raises, it 
speaks directly to the alienation resulting from humankind’s preoccupation with things in 
a scientistic-technological culture.  What happens to God, the Holy, or the Sacred in such 
an era?  God consciousness has somehow been compromised and the resultant feeling of 
God’s absence or indifference holds sway.  Thus, it is a “needy time” of seeking and 
yearning for a genuine understanding of God in order to quell the existential anxiety 
associated with a sense of godlessness. This anxiety finds expression in contemporary 
humanity’s widespread sense of homelessness. Efforts to restore a rooted sense of 
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dwelling will be achieved as humankind poetically measures itself against the Godhead 
(Chapter Three). 
Heidegger offers theology direction in this challenging epoch of God’s 
elusiveness and absence by recourse to Friedrich Hölderlin and Friedrich Nietzsche. This 
poet and philosopher, though atypical theological resources, do in fact confront God’s 
plight in meaningful ways. Heidegger points out the merit that Hölderlin and Nietzsche 
hold for theological dialogue, but due to the indirect and dense style of his commentary, 
an ample dose of patience and openness is necessary. In the end, however, God and 
God’s mysterious ways can be better glimpsed with the result that absence is greatly 
tempered and elusiveness is placed in a context of hope (Chapter Four). 
Before Heidegger relied heavily on the wisdom of Hölderlin and Nietzsche to 
address the issue of the gods’/God’s hiddenness and elusiveness, very early in his career 
he resorted to the event of the Parousia. The first Christians lived in a tensile time of 
God’s quasi-absence between Jesus’ resurrection/ascension and his Second Coming 
(Chapter Two). While this is a rare instance where Heidegger’s discussion of God is 
direct and relies on traditional theological sources, i.e., Paul’s letters to the Galatians and 
Thessalonians, there is never an attempt throughout the dissertation to baptize Heidegger 
for confessional or creedal purposes. Instead the consistent approach remains in the spirit 
of a hermeneutics of generosity (Paul Ricoeur), whereby Heidegger is first allowed to 
speak for himself and then theological extrapolations are attempted with great care and 
diligence. 
 It is hoped that this project will demonstrate that careful attention to the later 
writings of Heidegger on the Being question and on the elusive/absent gods/God dynamic 
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will serve to deepen and enrich the contemporary theological enterprise concerned with 
achieving relevant and credible discourse about God.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  The Later Heidegger and His Unique 
Philosophical Contributions to Western Thinking 
 
I do not wish to persuade anyone to philosophy: it is inevitable and 
perhaps also desirable that the philosopher should be a rare plant. 
 
 
 This intriguing quote from Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Will to Power is cited by 
Martin Heidegger at the outset of his Nietzsche, a four volume compilation of lectures 
and manuscripts from 1936-1946.  Though Heidegger limited his interpretation here to a 
single philosophical principle – the will to power – this significant work from his “later” 
period has been assessed as presenting the most comprehensive and self-enclosed 
interpretation of Nietzsche yet produced.1 
 While this dissertation humbly acknowledges its proper scope and makes no such 
similar claim to be a definitive interpretation of Heidegger, it nonetheless recognizes the 
wisdom of embracing such a quote to best situate Heidegger upon the scene of Western 
philosophy.  As Heidegger keenly perceived Nietzsche’s insightfulness regarding the 
quality of “rareness” that the philosopher should possess as a fitting start to his treatment 
of Nietzsche’s unique legacy to Western thought, so too this project begins with an 
appreciation of Nietzsche’s acumen by applying it to Heidegger. He was without question 
a “rare” plant who entered upon the stage of Western philosophy and with his thinking 
left a distinctive mark of hybrid proportion. 
 What is it that makes Heidegger such a rare plant?  There are as many answers to 
this question as there are commentators on Heidegger’s work, each one’s estimation 
directly influenced by the interests of their respective efforts.  Since both the resources 
and aim of this dissertation are by necessity finite, it is imperative that identifying and 
presenting Heidegger’s rareness be selective and purposeful. 
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 In order to be meaningfully discriminating in naming Heidegger’s contribution to 
Western philosophy, it will be important to not merely selectively canvass reputable 
authorities as to their informed opinions about Heidegger’s significance, rather it will be 
more effective and poignant to balance such interpretations with Heidegger’s own 
diagnosis of and prognosis for the philosophical scene he inhabits.  At first sight this tack 
may appear flawed and fraught with danger, since it runs the risk of inviting a more or 
less subjective autobiographical account to supplant the rigors derived from objective 
sources.  However, such a potential danger can be avoided if the motivation for such an 
approach is clearly set forth and openly accepted. 
 The aim of this entire work, and this chapter specifically with its goal to situate 
Heidegger on the scene of Western philosophy, is not to create an occasion where he is so 
glowingly fêted that his eventual contact with theology is then sanguinely viewed as a 
blissful marriage without any trace of an irreconcilable difference.  It is hoped instead 
that the motive at the beginning of this current project – and throughout as the focus 
shifts – will be one of allowing Heidegger to speak for himself in the primary texts. This 
will foster a genuine appreciation for what he is actually saying at a certain point about 
the condition of Western thought. With such an appreciation cultivated a better 
foundation will have been laid to evince possible positive implications for contemporary 
theologies of God. 
 Before Heidegger is cued to the mark to deliver his soliloquy about the 
vicissitudes of Western philosophy, it would be common courtesy to have a few worthy 
commentators act as moderators introducing the keynote speaker.  In the eyes of these 
interpreters, What makes Heidegger such a “rare” plant of a philosopher whose yield for 
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the discipline of philosophy is a bumper crop?  While the qualifications for each of the 
following three philosophers to competently judge Heidegger’s contributions could be 
readily established, the overriding reason for their selection here was the fact that each of 
them were associates of Heidegger who benefited from the effects of direct personal 
contact with him.  Their critical analyses of his rarity possess a unique level of credibility 
since each had the opportunity to engage Heidegger, the philosopher, on the issue of 
philosophy. 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer: The Meaning and Truth of Being Masterfully Thought 
 Hans-Georg Gadamer writing on Heidegger’s eightieth birthday in 1969 felt that 
it was the appropriate occasion to give thanks to the philosopher whose thought had been 
having impact for fifty years at that point in time.  Because of the immensity and 
diversity of Heidegger’s thought, Gadamer honestly admits of the perplexity surrounding 
the desire to arrive at a specific way to gratefully acknowledge Heidegger’s largesse.  
Nevertheless, he is enabled to reach a conclusion because he was an intimate of 
Heidegger’s: “A witness says what is and what is true.  So the witness, who is speaking 
here, is permitted to say what everyone who encountered Martin Heidegger has 
experienced: He is a master of thinking, of that unfamiliar art of thinking.”2 
 For Gadamer, therefore, Heidegger’s arrival upon the scene of Western 
philosophy ushered in a new level of “seriousness” for the business of thinking and for 
this Heidegger is owed a debt of gratitude.  This is not the proper place to delve into a 
detailed discussion of the rich nuances Heidegger offers about various modes of thinking, 
i.e., “meditative/essential” and “calculative” thought.  Rather, fostering an appreciation 
  
 4
for what specifically lies behind Gadamer’s claim that a new art of thinking is introduced 
by Heidegger is what is necessary at this point. 
 What is so distinctive about the kind of thinking that Heidegger initiated is that 
his was a thinking “that attempted to think the very beginning and beginnings.”3  
Gadamer is clear, however, that Heidegger’s thinking the beginnings maintains a 
uniqueness from many other philosophers who preceded him in their quest for 
beginnings. For instance, Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology and mentor to 
Heidegger, could also be credited for searching for a “‘beginning’ as an ultimate 
foundation that would allow for a systematic ordering of all philosophical propositions.”4  
According to Gadamer, however, Heidegger’s mission to think the beginnings was aimed 
at a much deeper originality. This is because Heidegger embraced the “haziness” of life 
in contrast with Husserl who wanted phenomenology to be methodologically 
foundational as a rigorous science that could ultimately advance the principle of the 
transcendental subject as the “beginning” of philosophy. 
 It is not so much that Heidegger’s genius as a thinker rests on his having secured a 
more primordial principle than Husserl, et al., that would then be the ultimate beginning 
to whom philosophy would pay homage to the thinker who finally arrived at true origin 
or ground.  As a matter of fact, this would be a thanksgiving recognition that would cause 
Heidegger to bristle!  Such a possible reaction is clearly evidenced in one of his seminal 
later writings entitled The Principle of Reason (1957), where Heidegger is found 
performing a methodical critique of the long-standing philosophical obsession to discover 
and ascribe grounds or reasons for everything (“Satz vom Grund”): 
 Without exactly knowing it, in some manner we are constantly 
addressed by, summoned to attend to, grounds and reason…We 
constantly have, as it were, the principle of reason in view: nihil est 
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sine ratione.  Nothing is without reason…What for us remains worthy 
of questioning is the principle of reason as the supreme fundamental 
reason.5 
 
Therefore, Gadamer concurs with his former University of Marburg professor when he 
speaks with qualifications about the rareness of Heidegger best identified as a 
philosopher who set a new standard for thinking about beginnings. 
 While Gadamer’s testimony is helpful and penetrating in the effort to better grasp 
Heidegger’s uniqueness, it nonetheless leaves the question begging, “What ‘beginning’ 
did Heidegger nudge philosophy to think?”  Because this question can be answered with 
such swiftness and ease, it almost borders on stating the obvious. Nevertheless, it is 
Heidegger’s own oft-stated mission, as well as the near unanimous opinion of his 
supporters and detractors, that it is the question of the meaning and truth of Being that 
must be thought anew.  Complementing Gadamer’s insight, it can be said that with 
Heidegger’s entrance upon the scene of Western thinking, there is a clarion call to 
radically rethink the origins of the Being question. 
 By thoughtfully examining the “beginnings” of the manner in which philosophy 
set out to understand Being, there is the promise of gaining a clarity and appreciation for 
the trajectory of the 2,500 year course of Western thought that brought it to its current 
state.  Herein lies yet another mark of Heidegger’s rareness as a standout philosopher in 
over two millennia of history and tradition.  His uniqueness, however, is not based on 
some facile notion that his promptings urge thinking to go back and rethink the beginning 
of the thought of Being in order to finally get it right.  This would be reminiscent of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s heremeneutical dictum that one should strive to understand 
the author’s text better than the author did.  Such a reading would be a gross 
misunderstanding of Heidegger as well as Gadamer’s testament to Heidegger’s rareness.  
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It is not thinking about the beginnings of Being but rather thinking about the beginnings 
of Being and ultimately better understanding where that has led today which is a genuine 
contribution without parallel among other Western European thinkers. 
 
Karl Löwith: Questioning Being with Piety in a “Needy Time” 
 Another esteemed associate of Heidegger’s, Karl Löwith, is now brought forth to 
further corroborate and fine-tune Gadamer’s suggestions about Heidegger’s 
distinctiveness.  Löwith offers a nuance that succinctly permits an appreciation of the rare 
plant that Heidegger was for philosophy vis-à-vis rethinking the meaning of Being.  
Writing on the occasion of Heidegger’s seventieth birthday as an apt time to critically 
evaluate his influence, Löwith is vexed not merely over the general ambiguity of 
Heidegger’s influence, but more specifically by his convictions to questioningly think 
Being, “Why does this highly exacting ‘thinking of Being’ have such a general 
appeal…?”6 
 This question at once builds upon Gadamer’s wisdom and at the same time 
reaches to the heart of the matter regarding Heidegger’s rare approach to the question of 
Being.  The real lure of the questioning thinking of Being lies in the fact that Heidegger 
invites thought about Being in terms of “time,” no pun intended toward his magnum 
opus, Being and Time.  For Löwith, this is not merely an invitation to abstractly juxtapose 
two key philosophical concepts such as Being and time with the hope of achieving a 
better understanding of each. Rather it is his contention that Heidegger’s genius in 
thinking the Being question resides in a thinking that responds to the perplexities of the 
current era.7 
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 Heidegger believed that the present age can be best described as a “needy time” 
(dürftige Zeit).  The “neediness” which permeates the spirit of the times is a destitution of 
sorts, whereby a twofold lack holds sway: “It is the time of the gods that have fled (fehl 
Gottes) and of the God that is coming.  It is a time of need, because it lies under a double 
lack and a double not: the no-more of the gods and the not yet of the God that is 
coming.”8  The obvious theological overtones coming through in this passage are 
manifest, but the actual parsing of this quote for possible implication redounding to the 
God question must be postponed to the last chapters of this dissertation when the due care 
that such an analysis requires can be fully exercised.  Right now it is important to 
appreciate Löwith’s attestation of Heidegger’s rareness for philosophy in general.  So far, 
Löwith is clear that to truly respect the novelty of Heidegger’s agenda to resurrect the 
Being question it must be contextualized within today’s needy time.  But to extrapolate 
even further, attention must also be paid to the religious reverberations that typify the 
neediness of today.  This for Löwith is what firmly secures for Heidegger the moniker of 
rareness in the annals of philosophy.  Therefore, in addition to Gadamer’s contention that 
Heidegger’s legacy is best noted by the new standard of thinking set forth for the age old 
question of Being comes Löwith’s belief that at the root of this program of artful thinking 
lies a religious motive.  It is not blatant or confessional, but Löwith maintains that the 
only reason why Heidegger receives a hearing and can uniquely capture imaginations 
with such an abstract topic like Being is that there is a “piety” that vivifies his musings. 
This can have a unique broad based appeal, whether or not it is consciously 
acknowledged: 
the basis that serves as the background for everything said by 
Heidegger, and permits many to take notice and listen attentively, is 
something unsaid: the religious motive, which has surely detached itself 
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from Christian faith, but which precisely on account of its dogmatically 
unattached indeterminacy appeals all the more to those who are no 
longer faithful Christians but who nonetheless would like to be 
religious.9 
 
 Ascribing piety to thought in general is not the doing of Löwith alone but in 
actuality is an association made by Heidegger.  In discussing the essence of technology in 
another key later text, “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger concludes the 
essay, after having laboriously examined the essence of both ancient and modern 
technology, with the lapidary statement, “…questioning is the piety of thought.”10  
Though a more complete exposition of Heidegger’s thoughts on thinking must wait, it is 
advantageous at this juncture to at least begin to perceive the reverential respect that 
Heidegger accords to human thinking.  Thought possesses a certain degree of piety for 
several reasons, yet one of the more telling summary expressions which indicates the 
rationale underlying the need to approach thinking with a due sense of respect points to 
recognizing the proper sequence by which thought wells up in the thinker, “We never 
come to thoughts.  They come to us.”11 
 With such an assertion there is no need to be misled into a feeling of 
bewilderment, since Heidegger’s suggestions about the true source for human thinking 
are not to be found in some ephemeral deus ex machina, but rather in the primary focus 
of his life’s work – Being.  It is Heidegger’s belief that at the initiative of Being a 
dynamic relationship is established between itself and human thought, “[t]hat Being 
itself, and the manner in which Being itself, strikes a man’s [sic] thinking, that rouses his 
thinking and stirs it to rise from Being itself to respond and correspond to Being as 
such.”12  A true indication of the health of the relationship between human thinking and 
Being is metered by the extent to which thought responds to the initial overtures of 
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Being.  If thought neglects to make Being its primary focus of interest, then a mark of 
infidelity and misdirection mars the relationship.  However, if thinking allows its energies 
to be wholeheartedly directed to an ever-refined attunement to Being, then a right 
relationship of harmony and accord obtains, “[T]hinking is not a means to gain 
knowledge.  Thinking cuts furrows into the soil of Being.”13 
 Therefore important strands of continuity are detectable in the effort to discern 
Heidegger’s rare status in philosophy by soliciting two of his prominent colleagues, 
Gadamer and Löwith.  Gadamer gives a nod to Heidegger’s uniqueness based on the 
qualitatively new level of thinking that his project introduced, while Löwith avers that 
this artful thinking is predicated by the Zeitgeist as an endeavor with overtones of piety.  
Explicit in both of these evaluations is the connection to Heidegger’s thoroughgoing 
energies to revisit the question of the meaning of Being.  The “master of thinking” 
artfully redirects the gaze of Western philosophy to think “the very beginning and 
beginnings” relative to the truth of Being (Gadamer) at a most apropos time of twofold 
“need” or destitution; since the gods have fled and the God who is yet to come forces a 
vigilant period of waiting and watching, thus coloring the entire reemergence of the 
Being question with a sense of piety (Löwith). 
 More implicit in the estimations of Gadamer and Löwith is the semblance that 
perhaps something has been awry in the manner of philosophy’s thinking about Being.  
After all, if Heidegger is to receive accolades of distinction as the person who masterfully 
rerouted the thinking of Being in an age of malaise, then this must have been necessary.  
So, hovering about the astute observations of Gadamer and Löwith is an indictment 
against Western philosophy and, for Heidegger, its alter ego Western metaphysics. 
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Walter Biemel:  The Legacy of Metaphysics and Rethinking Being 
 It will be more fully developed below that Heidegger was critical of the course 
that Western metaphysics had taken relative to its study of the truth and meaning of 
Being.  However, to avoid the likely implication here that Heidegger was a radical 
deconstructionist who iconoclastically jettisoned the entire tradition of Western 
philosophy, it is helpful to examine the observations of another interpreter of Heidegger, 
Walter Biemel.  Biemel, a former student of Heidegger’s, will be the final philosopher 
consulted to bring the objective refinement of Heidegger’s rareness to a completion.  
Rounding out the reason that Gadamer and Löwith advance regarding Heidegger’s 
distinctive contribution to philosophy is the perspicacious appraisal of Biemel. He will 
not merely present an additional verse in the song of praise, but will instead bring added 
clarity to the problematic of metaphysics, or the entire course of Western philosophy 
since Plato and Aristotle that has elusively been part of the previous estimations offered 
by Gadamer and Löwith. 
 Writing an essay for an anthology devoted to addressing both the complexity and 
simplicity of Heidegger’s thought and life, Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, Biemel 
admits the difficulty attendant upon speaking about the unique influence of any thinker, 
let alone a thinker of Heidegger’s magnitude.  Possible avenues to pursue that might 
alleviate the burden of inadequately representing Heidegger’s legacy would be to 
perfunctorily cite how his influence has spread geographically beyond Western Europe to 
all parts of the world.  In a similar vein, a case could be made to show how Heidegger’s 
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thinking has had influence intellectually upon the most diverse disciplines, from 
psychiatry, medicine and psychology to philosophy, art, history, and theology.14 
 However, Biemel protests that in both instances where recourse is either made to 
Heidegger’s transcontinental notoriety or to his interdisciplinary prowess, there is a 
falling short of actually reaching the heart of Heidegger’s authentic rareness.  Instead 
there must be a shift of the investigation away from concentrating on geographic or 
disciplinary conquests, since at their bases rests Heidegger’s diagnosis and prognosis for 
Western thinking, “…what will let us see the uniqueness of his [Heidegger’s] thought is 
the question: What is Heidegger’s position on metaphysics? and linked with this first 
question there is a second: What does Heidegger mean by saying that, in the future, 
thinking will no longer be philosophy?”15 
 Beimel’s commentary is pertinent at this point of the chapter on several scores.  
First, it neatly supplements the efforts of the foregoing observers who sought to answer 
the question, “What makes Heidegger a rare plant?”  Moreover, it does so in a manner 
that furthers the aim of fostering some sense of continuity.  Since Heidegger’s rare 
contribution to Western thought has innumerable facets, there must be some way to 
synthetically present the most salient features in order to manageably and intelligently 
arrive at an appreciation of Heidegger’s hybridism.  Gadamer claimed that philosophy 
should be most grateful to Heidegger because of his insistence that the timeless Being 
question must be the recipient of a new serious yet artful thinking.  To this, Löwith adds 
the nuance that Heidegger’s invitation to rethink the meaning of Being displays a rarity 
because of its timeliness.  To engage Being in a questioningly thoughtful way today 
assumes a connotation of piety because of the ambivalence surrounding the presence of 
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the gods or God.  Advancing questions about Being’s meaning along the lines of rigorous 
thought is suffused with an aura of piety and wonder. 
 Biemel comes to the fore to deepen the previous stances with his assertions that 
Heidegger’s uniqueness can best be gleaned from what he has left behind in his treatment 
of metaphysics.  Heidegger is clear on numerous occasions that since its classical 
inception with Plato and Aristotle, Western philosophy has delineated its inquiry in terms 
of the question “ti to on?” (“What is Being?”).16  This builds upon Gadamer and Löwith’s 
claims that the resurgence of the question of the meaning of Being with a posture of 
thoughtful piety is actually a variant continuation within a long line of tradition.  As 
intimated above, this tradition has been typically categorized under the broad banner of 
“metaphysics,” and Heidegger is most comfortable in making a straightforward equation 
between the Western philosophical tradition in toto and metaphysics, “to inquire into the 
archē – to ask the question “ti to on?” (“What is Being?”) – is metaphysics.”17 
 Care must be taken not to overlook the corollary statement that Biemel makes in 
conjunction with his main declaration that Heidegger’s rarity is best garnered from his 
position on metaphysics.  Biemel invites a further reflection on the meaning attached to 
Heidegger’s belief that philosophy has seemingly come to an “end,” “What does 
Heidegger mean by saying that, in the future, thinking will no longer be philosophy?”  
This helps to stress a point that has already surfaced and will receive a further 
elucidation; namely, that Heidegger feels called upon to diagnose the condition of 
Western metaphysics up to the point of his own involvement with it, as well as to make a 
prognosis about its future well-being.  In these evaluative efforts, it will become clear that 
Heidegger is going beyond the mere presentation of the history of philosophy, and 
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instead is striving for a new understanding of metaphysics in its totality.  This, for 
Biemel, is what truly distinguishes Heidegger’s position on metaphysics. 
 Biemel concedes that lurking behind Heidegger’s ability to render a novel 
appropriation of the entire course of philosophical tradition in the West was the question 
about Being: “What made it possible for Heidegger to offer this new interpretation of the 
whole of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche was the understanding which opened up to 
him along with the question about Being.”18  Again, there is a marked continuity among 
the various expert opinions sought out here to determine what makes Heidegger a “rare” 
plant of a philosopher.  While each one offers an estimation of what makes Heidegger 
unique, they can all be seen as important variations on the single theme of Being.  
Whether deference is given to Gadamer’s contention that it was Heidegger’s desire to 
encourage a new rigorous type of thinking, or whether an option is made for Löwith’s 
belief that the current era’s nihilistic tendencies require a dimension of piety when 
thinking, they are both surrounded and supported by Heidegger’s agenda to force a 
reexamination of the meaning and truth of Being.  Biemel then concludes along these 
lines after offering his own proposal that Heidegger’s legacy should be tied to the new 
understanding of metaphysics he put forth, “To show this referral to Being, to make man 
[sic] attentive to it – that was the one concern which moved Heidegger in everything he 
said and did.”19 
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Western Philosophy 
 Having surveyed three credible sources in order to better appreciate how 
Heidegger lives up to Nietzsche’s insistence that the philosopher should be a “rare plant,” 
the chapter is poised well to proceed further in the exposition of its overall aim – situating 
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Heidegger upon the scene of Western thought.  Gadamer, Löwith, and Biemel each 
served well in the capacity of “moderator” by offering informed suggestions as to what 
makes Heidegger’s entrée into the philosophical tradition distinctive.  However it is now 
appropriate to ask Heidegger to take to the dais alone, so as to allow him to speak in a 
concentrated and undivided way about his purpose and place in the centuries old tradition 
of Western philosophy.  Thus far, tangential snippets of Heidegger’s thought were 
interspersed throughout the earlier parts of the chapter as a means to bolster the positions 
of Gadamer, Löwith, and Biemel.  The remainder of the chapter, however, will be a 
reversal of this method.  It will be Heidegger’s thought itself that will be explicated in a 
very focused manner with reputable commentary from secondary sources used sparingly 
to refine certain complex points. 
“My whole work in lectures and exercises in the past thirty years has been in the 
main only an interpretation of Western philosophy.”20 Heidegger uttered these words 
during the course of an interview with journalists from the German magazine Der Spiegel 
on September 23, 1966.  The remark arose amidst the reporters’ questions concerning the 
changing role that philosophy plays in affecting human thought in an era dominated by 
technology and science.  Although this topic is really only a footnote to the overall 
significance of this rare interview, the admission by Heidegger serves as a lodestar for the 
course of this dissertation.  Most directly, toward the aim of the present chapter it accords 
Heidegger the opportunity to situate his work and himself upon the vast scheme of 
Western philosophy. 
 His efforts are to be seen as “an interpretation” of Western philosophy.  Though 
he does not attach the label of “unique” or “distinctive” to the interpretation he has 
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rendered, by sheer appreciation of the gravity of the Der Spiegel interview for Heidegger 
studies, it could be concluded that this was a self-disclosure of great moment.  According 
to Heidegger’s strictest instructions, the interview was not to be made public until after 
his death.  The main reason for this request centered on the fact that the primary purpose 
of the interview was to provide a forum for Heidegger to speak publicly about his ties to 
the Nazi party in the early 1930s while serving as Rector at the University of Freiburg im 
Breisgau.  Even though Heidegger grants the interview in the Fall of 1966, his voice on 
the matter is not known until nearly ten years later when he dies on May 26, 1976 and 
Der Spiegel subsequently prints the interview on May 31, 1976. 
 There is no attempt to be dismissive of the fact that Heidegger was a Nazi, as this 
topic will be delved into later at a more appropriate time, rather it is more of an effort to 
convey the bearing Heidegger’s remarks have for furthering the goal of the present 
chapter.  Because of Heidegger’s guardedness which meant that the contents of the 
interview would be published only post humously, he is no doubt carefully weighing his 
words realizing that what he says in the interview will serve as a broad based last will and 
testament of sorts, Der Spiegel by no means being an organ of communication restricted 
to the esoteric interests of the academic community.  To anyone who would be interested, 
Heidegger is stating the way he would like his work to be remembered within the grand 
scheme of philosophy, “in main only an interpretation of Western philosophy.” 
 To become more conversant with this “interpretation” will be the aim of the 
remainder of this chapter.  This will be respectful to Heidegger’s wishes of how best to 
capture his “rare” contribution to philosophy, as well as methodologically strategic for 
the advancement of the overall purpose of the dissertation, since there can really be no 
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responsible and competent exchange between Heidegger’s philosophy and the 
contemporary theology of God until some appreciation is had for his place in Western 
thought in general. 
 In a more remote way, this admission of Heidegger’s to the Der Spiegel reporters 
promotes the overall aim of the dissertation by sharpening the parameters of the period of 
Heidegger’s work that is to remain of central focus throughout, “My whole work in 
lectures and exercises in the past thirty years…” It is Heidegger’s own testimony that 
from 1936 to 1966 he has been working toward an interpretation of Western philosophy.  
This helps to validate the tack taken in this entire work as one that is firmly rooted in 
what can be called with qualifications the “later” period of Heidegger’s career.  A more 
careful analysis will take place concerning the implications surrounding the division of 
Heidegger’s work into the two broad temporal categories of “early” and “late.” But for 
the present moment it is essential to realize that the special focus on the “later” Heidegger 
is being heeded at the outset in trying to contextualize Heidegger and his interpretive 
analysis of philosophy into the tradition of Western philosophy. 
 
What Is Philosophy? 
 There are several ways to proceed in order to comprehend better the many aspects 
of Heidegger’s “interpretation” of Western philosophy, which he modestly reveals 
consumed most of his energies in the latter portion of his career.  However, the route 
selected here is one that not only serves the practical aim of beginning at a manageable 
point but also more profoundly resonates with Heidegger’s own bidding.  At certain 
instances within that thirty-year time frame of Heidegger’s arduous discernment toward 
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an interpretation of Western philosophy, he is seen in clear and certain terms posing the 
question, “What is philosophy?”  In other words, in trying to arrive at an interpretation of 
philosophy a point is reached where all sorts of sophisticated means are abandoned in 
favor of the candor that a direct question like “What is philosophy?” may produce. 
 Heidegger does not chronologically begin his quest for an interpretation of 
philosophy in such a broad manner, yet since he does punctuate his three decades of 
interpretive formulations with general definitions of philosophy, it is certainly in keeping 
with his spirit and also conducive for creating an accessible point of entry for the current 
efforts of this chapter to begin this way. 
 In 1935 at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger delivered a series of lecture 
courses that were eventually compiled for publication in 1953 under the title An 
Introduction to Metaphysics.  The author of a recent introductory monograph helps to 
highlight the significance of this work as Heidegger’s initial venture into his “later” 
phase.  According to Richard Polt, these lecture courses were so rich and fully 
constructed that Heidegger recommended their use as a preface to Being and Time, the 
1927 magnum opus capstoning his early period, in the event that a second and expanded 
edition were ever released.21  The lectures could act as prefatory material since they were 
most illuminating about the question of the meaning of Being, thus setting the proper 
tone for the genuine intent of Being and Time so often misconstrued as merely a 
sophisticated anthropological study. 
 In observing the definition of philosophy that Heidegger proffers in the initial 
pages of this important later work, it is clear that he invests philosophy with some rather 
lofty expectations: 
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What philosophy essentially can and must be is this: a thinking that 
breaks the paths and opens the perspectives of the knowledge that sets 
the norms and hierarchies, of the knowledge in which and by which a 
people fulfills itself historically and culturally, the knowledge that 
kindles and necessitates all inquiries and thereby threatens all values.22 
 
Because this definition, quasi mission statement, contains a welter of significant themes 
for better appreciating Heidegger’s overall project as well as philosophy’s outlook, only a 
thorough analysis could really do justice to all of its nuances with the result of steering 
this chapter completely off its course.  Dutifully respecting the present boundaries, 
however, it is still possible to acknowledge the germane aspects of this statement on 
philosophy. 
 On the one hand, by paying careful attention to the correlation that is established 
between thinking and philosophy, an earlier thematic thread is tugged upon suggested by 
Gadamer whereby Heidegger’s “rareness” is best identified by the masterful thinking he 
engendered for philosophy.  A proper thinking linked with philosophy can have far 
reaching effects according to Heidegger’s definition since it “breaks the paths and opens 
perspectives” that can define a people in a particular era in an unrestricted way. 
 On the other hand, this grand mission statement for philosophy allows Heidegger 
an opportunity to speak for himself about the promising realities of philosophy.  This 
balances the backward glancing weight of the previous insight by projecting forward to 
themes that often need this reminder to maintain their correctness and integrity.  For 
example, soon to appear out of the horizon of this chapter will be important topics such 
as Heidegger’s call to “destroy” the fundamental project of ontology, to “overcome” 
metaphysics, and his pronouncement that philosophy has reached its “end.”  Without the 
awareness of Heidegger’s belief that philosophy steeped in a genuine thinking can 
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achieve great ends, it would be easy to quickly label him as a rabid deconstructionist hell-
bent on relegating Western thinking to the wastelands of obsolescence.  Keeping this 
glowing statement of Heidegger’s about philosophy’s prospects issued as he launches 
into his later period will help to level off the connotative force expressions like 
“deconstruction,” “overcoming,” and “end” can exert when qualifying the plight of 
philosophy. 
 Having set forth Heidegger’s broad “working definition” of philosophy and what 
it is capable of accomplishing in grand style, it is now necessary to present Heidegger’s 
more circumscribed understanding of what lies at the basis of philosophy’s ability to 
attain such illustrious ends which redounds to the norms of knowledge typifying a 
generation.  Philosophy can only “break paths and open perspectives” of knowledge if its 
thinking retains an awe-struck attentiveness to Being. 
 This circumscribed yet essential definition of philosophy comes through in 
another key text of the later period entitled What Is Philosophy?  This lecture was given 
at a meeting of French philosophers in Cérisy-la-Salle, Normandy in August 1955, and so 
traverses nearly twenty years along the path of Heidegger’s later period in respect to An 
Introduction to Metaphysics’ broad based definition of philosophy.  George Kovacs, 
whose work in part has been focused on Heidegger’s relation to theology and the issue of 
God, has remarked that, “an insightful meditation on the meaning of philosophy for 
Heidegger can be found in his Was is das – die Philosophie? [What Is Philosophy?].”23 
 After discussing the origin of Western philosophy, its basic concern from the 
beginning, and its history from the pre-Socratics to Marx and Nietzsche, Heidegger 
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explains his conception of philosophy as an attuned correspondence with Being pervaded 
by a sense of wonder: 
Philosophia is the expressly accomplished correspondence which 
speaks in so far as it considers the appeal of the Being of being. 
[…insofern es auf den Zuspruch des Seins des Seinenden achtet].  The 
correspondence listens to the voice of the appeal.  What appeals to us 
as the voice of Being evokes our correspondence.24 
 
 True to his style, Heidegger’s definition of philosophy is laden with a great deal 
of dense qualifications; however, the main thrust rings out clearly that philosophy should 
be an endeavor that is in constant communication with Being which will in turn further 
an understanding of its truth and meaning.  Being speaks to listening thinkers through 
language as they philosophize, and as long as there are no major interferences or 
distractions in this communication dynamic, then the true mission of philosophy is being 
adhered to and advanced. 
 An important component to this attuned linguistic interchange between Being and 
the thinker is wonder or astonishment (das Erstaunen).  In one regard, Heidegger’s 
promotion of the necessity of wonder for philosophy could be seen as an act of homage to 
his Greek predecessor Plato, who made a similar claim that philosophy begins with 
wonder (to thaumazein).25  However, Heidegger’s persistent extolling of the role of 
wonder throughout his writings distinguishes his perception of wonder’s enduring 
significance: 
“astonishment (das Erstaunen) is archê – it pervades every step of 
philosophy. Astonishment is pathos…if we translate pathos with tuning 
(Stimmung), by which we mean dis-position and determination…Thus, 
astonishment is disposition in which the Being of beings (Sein des 
Seinenden) unfolds.  Astonishment is the tuning within which the 
Greek philosophers were granted the correspondence to the Being of 
beings.26 
 
  
 21
 Wonder as the motivating and sustaining force behind philosophy’s attuned 
correspondence with Being is reminiscent of Löwith’s assertions cited earlier concerning 
Heidegger’s “rareness.”  It was an unspoken “religious motive” that enabled Heidegger’s 
fixation on an otherwise abstract topic like Being to capture the imagination of so many.  
Heidegger nudges philosophy to think Being in the now wondrous “needy” time “of the 
no-longer” since the gods have fled, and “of the not-yet” since the God in its fullness is 
yet to come. 
Expanding upon Löwith’s claim that a religious motive is palpable in Heidegger’s 
insistence that philosophy only lives up to its purpose when it maintains a timely 
wonderstruck attuned correspondence with Being is the recognition that 
“correspondence” (Entsprechen) in other places of the later Heidegger is used to explain 
the exchange between humanity and the holy.  In developing the meaning of Being and 
the question of God in the thought of Heidegger, Jeff Owen Prudhomme recently showed 
the nuanced importance that correspondence plays in a 1944 writing by Heidegger that 
still awaits an English translation, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (Elucidations of 
Hölderlin’s Poetry).27  Correspondence is conceived here as human speaking 
corresponding to (Entsprechung) the greeting of the holy, “Das Fest ist das Ereignis des 
Grußes, in dem das Heilige grüßt und grüßend erscheint.” (“The festival is the event of 
the greeting in which the holy greets and in greeting shows itself [appears].”)28 
 While a more complete analysis of Heidegger’s concept of the holy and its 
relationship to the question of God and the meaning of Being will be undertaken in 
chapter four, it is valuable at this point to at least begin to see that Heidegger’s own grasp 
of the aim of philosophy may have theological overtones.  The operative word here is 
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“may,” since there is a real danger for the theologically disposed and religious minded to 
make hasty conclusions after hearing the way in which Heidegger discusses Being in 
seemingly religious tones.  For instance, it was just noted how “correspondence” serves 
the dual conceptual capacity of stressing the attentive listening required for thinkers as 
they attune to the appeal of Being or the greeting of the holy.  A tempting yet erroneous 
move would be to conjecture that in Heidegger’s thinking Being equals God.  While 
Heidegger himself emphatically denies such a facile equation and a theologically 
sympathetic commentator like John Macquarrie has called such an equation a “false 
move,”29 the urge to draw direct lines of connection between theology’s God and 
Heidegger’s Being will persist; and so the practice of extreme care and honesty will 
continually guide this work as it strives to explore how the God question in theology is 
impacted upon by Heidegger’s passion to ever cultivate the Being question in philosophy. 
 Now it is best to return to Heidegger’ self-presentation of where he fits into the 
Western philosophical tradition.  To that end, this chapter has so far presented two 
definitions of philosophy from the later Heidegger.  The initial definition with its quasi-
mission statement ambition and breadth sees philosophy as a trail blazing thinking that 
may set the tone for an entire era.  More circumscribed, though more telling for 
proceeding to unpack the various aspects of Heidegger’s project, is the second definition 
that philosophy is a vigilant listening for the appeal of Being in order to establish and 
maintain an attuned correspondence between itself and humanity. 
 Philosophy’s efforts to adequately maintain and nurture this communicative 
dynamic between itself and Being is no mere arcane exercise but a real duty of weighty 
consequence, since humanity, viz. the thinker, is charged to act in the capacity of 
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stewardship toward Being.  Heidegger is well known for his insistence that, “…man [sic] 
is the shepherd of Being (der Hirt des Seins)…,”30 and what is important to comprehend 
here is the onus that is placed on philosophy.  If philosophy fosters a thinking which 
attunes humanity to hear the appeal of Being, then it will have made progress in installing 
competent stewards to nurture the truth of Being.  However, if philosophy misses its cue 
and opts to embrace a thinking that is less than attentive to Being’s call, then it will be 
hampered in its abilities to advance the shepherding of Being’s truth and meaning, “…the 
sole kind of thinking is one that attunes [humanity] to hear the voice of Being.  It is a 
thinking that enables [humanity] to bend to the task of guardianship over the truth of 
Being.”31 
 
The Forgetfulness of Being 
 A natural question that arises in this context is one that puts philosophy on the 
spot.  In other words, has Western philosophy been successful throughout its long history 
in cultivating a thinking that is well attuned to Being’s appeal?  No one-word answer 
could serve as a just response to this question, however, Heidegger does offer a 
conceptual explanation as a response known as the “forgetfulness of Being” 
(Seinsvergessenheit).  This is a most intriguing feature of Heidegger’s thought and for 
some observers a shining point of his originality.32 
 As fascinating as the expression the “forgetfulness of Being” may be, it is not the 
intent here to pursue it so as merely to slake intellectual curiosity.  Instead, it is hoped 
that a proper grasp of its meaning will help to better locate Heidegger in the Western 
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philosophical tradition as well as expose his own unique evaluation of this long-standing 
intellectual enterprise. 
 The evaluation proceeds at first in a negative vein, and this is of no surprise due to 
the less than positive connotations which normally surround an activity like “forgetting.”  
Heidegger wastes no time in issuing a stinging indictment to Western philosophy and its 
alter ego metaphysics for their dereliction of duty, “…the truth of Being has remained 
concealed from metaphysics during its long history from Anaximander to Nietzsche.”33  
The reason why philosophy stands guilty as charged centers on the misplacement of its 
energies and focus.  Instead of tenaciously attempting to probe questions concerning the 
truth of “Being,” philosophy has channeled its efforts to the study of “beings.”  Even 
though the historical record of metaphysics indicates a thoroughgoing agenda to entertain 
questions about the meaning of Being, in reality it has all been a sham.  Human beings 
have been trapped in an “utter servitude” by metaphysics that has allowed them to 
become “duped too long by beings” and so “alienated by Being.”34 
 Despite the perennial acknowledgment and general agreement that the primary 
and proper task of philosophy, viz. “ontology,” was to find an answer to the question, 
“What is being?” (ti to on), there actually has been only a surfacy handling of this 
question: 
Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks 
and answers the question concerning Being.  In fact, metaphysics never 
answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks 
this question.  Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks 
Being only by representing beings as beings [beings as a whole]. It 
means all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being.35 
 
Therefore, there has been a diversion of philosophy’s attention away from Being 
proper to beings, and this Heidegger clarifies as a metaphysical forgetting rather than a 
  
 25
psychological forgetting.  In other words, because of the human philosophical proclivity 
to analyze and further delineate the scope of beings, entities or “things,” there has been a 
slippage into a state of forgetfulness or oblivion about Being itself, “The majority of men 
[sic] sink into oblivion of Being (in der Seinsvergessenheit), although – or precisely 
because – they constantly have to do solely with the things that are in their vicinity.”36  In 
lieu of metaphysics allowing itself to be claimed by the call of Being in accordance with 
Heidegger’s own definition of philosophy, it has been preoccupied with beings which has 
led to only a dim sense of the full meaning of Being, “Whatever matters to us and makes 
a claim on us here and now, in this or that way, as this or that thing, is – to the extent that 
it is at all – only a homoioma, an approximation to Being.”37 
The preceding makes clear how Heidegger bursts forth upon the scene of Western 
philosophy with a unique flair.  He assumes his position in a well-established institution 
by boldly claiming that philosophy has missed its mark.  Rather than listening attentively 
for the call of Being itself, the metaphysical machinations that have dominated 
philosophy for the past 2,500 years have concentrated mainly on the study of beings.  To 
avoid reaching the hasty conclusion that Heidegger is merely a nay-saying upstart as he 
debuts on the stage of Western philosophy, it must be borne in mind that “confusion” and 
“perplexity” have been the chief sources of distraction for philosophers of the West, not 
just sheer incompetence or worse yet malice. 
 Therefore, when Heidegger explicitly defines the concept “forgetfulness of 
Being,” a hint of clemency is detectable, “The forgetfulness of Being is the forgetfulness 
of the distinction between Being and beings.”38  Western thinkers have misdirected their 
efforts towards beings and away from Being per se, not as a result of some clumsy 
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glaring oversight, but because they missed a fine nuance – the dynamic between the 
distinction of beings and Being. 
 While no simple formula would truly capture the full essence of this complicated 
distinction, it does facilitate Heidegger’s attitude of reduced culpability toward 
philosophy to appreciate that beings are best associated with “what is present” and Being 
can be understood as an event of “presencing” (das Ereignis).  Understandably, the main 
stream of philosophers have opted to wholeheartedly embrace presence (physis) as the 
primary mode of access to Being, most overtly in the fixation on beings, the tangible 
“what is present” in the here and now.  But they have also done so more subtly in the 
manner that the “presencing” behind the “what is present” has found expression.  For 
even here there was a tendency toward reification as the beingness of beings (ousia) was 
attributed either to something most universal or a highest trait.  Heidegger dubs this two-
fold strategy of metaphysics with the neologism “onto-theo-logy.”39 
 If this expression is explained by pausing after each of the hyphens inserted by 
Heidegger, it is less intimidating and even enlightening.  Metaphysics is first “onto-logic” 
because in its treatment of the beingness of beings (the presencing of what is present) it 
wants to establish what are the most universal traits.  To borrow a concept from the 
discipline of mathematics, metaphysics tries to present the “lowest common 
denominator” or more crudely the generic “stuff” which characterizes and is possessed by 
all beings.  At the same time, metaphysics is secondly “theo-logic” in that by seeking to 
decipher what beings are in their totality a hierarchy arises where one being looms over 
the other beings as the highest or divine.40 
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 Thus, metaphysics’ “onto-theo-logical” methodology contributed to further the 
confusion surrounding the distinction between “what is present” (beings) and 
“presencing” (Being) by providing a quick means of egress to that which is most 
comfortable: the real, the manifest, the tangible, the manipulable.  While these 
characteristics are readily applicable to the “what is present” or the being side of the 
distinction, it is also possible to apply them to the more elusive “presencing” or Being 
half when a universal or highest trait is thought to be the ultimate foundation enabling 
any such presencing – onto-theo-logy.  Important to keep in mind is that the fallout from 
this blurred distinction between beings and Being emboldened the “forgetfulness of 
Being” so rife in Western philosophy. 
 It is under the rubric of the “ontological difference” in many places of the later 
Heideggerian corpus that attention is directed to philosophy’s further complicity in the 
confusion surrounding the distinction between beings and Being. By not acknowledging 
the distinction’s hidden foundational import philosophy missed its possible rich 
contributions to the furtherance of the meaning of Being.  The following excerpt from the 
fourth volume of the Nietzsche lectures shows the importance that this oft ignored 
distinction has for metaphysics and its sophisticated depth, since full articulation of the 
being/Being gradation and modulation requires several words for its expression, i.e., 
Untersheidung, Differenz, Austrag: 
The “distinction” (Unterscheidung) is more appropriately identified by 
the difference (Differenz), in which it is intimated that beings and Being 
are somehow set apart from each other, separated, and nonetheless 
connected to each other…Distinction as “difference” means that a 
settlement (Austrag) between Being and beings exists…The reference 
to the ontological difference identifies the ground and the “foundation” 
of all onto-logy and thus of all metaphysics.41 
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 The note of irony that Heidegger sounds regarding the importance of the dynamic 
interplay that ensues in the distinction between beings and Being is that philosophers, in 
fact all people, are immersed in this distinction yet totally benighted about its enabling 
power for fully encountering both beings and Being, “we stand in the distinction between 
beings and Being.  Such distinction sustains the relationship to Being and supports 
relations with beings.”42  However, it is Heidegger’s hope that if philosophy widens its 
peripheral vision and so more regularly takes notice of the distinction between beings and 
Being that is “already there,” then the result could be an alleviation of the chronic 
forgetfulness of Being condition, “Thus we think of Being rigorously when we think of it 
in its difference with beings, and of beings in their difference with Being.”43  It will be 
seen later in the section entitled “Overcoming Metaphysics: Heidegger’s Step Back” how 
a meditative immersion in the difference between beings and Being is integral in the 
project to overcome metaphysics. 
 A significant phrase worthy of more careful regard in the preceding paragraph is 
“could be an alleviation of the chronic forgetfulness of Being condition.”  The purposeful 
choice of the passive voice and rather suggestive terms such as “alleviate” and “chronic” 
signal something of consequence about Heidegger’s charge of forgetfulness of Being.  
There has already been a hint through the discussion of the mitigating circumstances 
which surround philosophy’s oversight of the distinction between “presencing” (Being) 
and “what is present” (beings); however, it will now become even more apparent that a 
realization of the true source of the forgetfulness of Being lies far beyond the control of 
any philosophical, metaphysical, or ontological system and their adherents. 
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 Initially, the discussion of the forgetfulness of Being was described in a somewhat 
negative vein due to the undertones that an act of “forgetting” typically evokes.  Armed 
with such negative implications, Heidegger was able to turn his interpretation of Western 
philosophy into an accusation that leveled the brunt of this state of amnesia upon the 
shoulders of philosophy’s metaphysical method, which contributed confusion and thus 
aided and abetted the forgetfulness of Being – even though extenuating circumstances 
could be cited to ameliorate any full responsibility. 
 However, Heidegger’s forgetfulness of Being in the course of Western philosophy 
also possesses a more positive dimension.  No longer are charged expressions like 
“forgetfulness” and “forgetting” declared in order to begin an immediate search for some 
culprit responsible for this negligence.  Rather, a more positive direction is given by the 
exoneration that Heidegger now bestows on metaphysics and its practitioners: 
oblivion of the distinction [between beings and Being] is by no means 
the consequence of a forgetfulness of thinking.  The forgetfulness of 
Being belongs to the self-veiling essence of Being.  It belongs so 
essentially to the destiny of Being that the dawn of this destiny rises as 
the unveiling of what is present in its presencing.  This means that the 
history of Being begins with the forgetfulness of Being, since Being – 
together with its essence, its distinction from beings – keeps to itself.44 
 
Therefore, the ultimate source for the forgetfulness of Being that has blighted philosophy 
from its earliest stages is Being itself rather than ineptitude on the part of philosophers!  
This is not to say that the thinkers in the Western metaphysical tradition had no 
complicity in exacerbating the condition of the forgetfulness of Being, since indeed they 
chose certain paths and developed particular systems at the behest of Being’s elusivity 
that compromised any true attuned correspondence with Being for at least 2,500 years. 
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“Being Loves to Hide Itself” 
– Heraclitus 
 
 Because there is some revelation about Being that arises from identifying Being 
itself as ultimately responsible for the perduring state of forgetfulness, a more positive 
aspect of this condition for Western philosophy can be gleaned.  A dimension of Being is 
discovered that was (and still is) mostly neglected: Being conceals itself, holds itself 
back, refuses itself, stays away, defaults.  Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the 
reigning concept of choice used to elaborate Being was presence (physis) which could be 
found in every articulation of Being. This was clearly evident above when the 
forgetfulness of Being was defined as a confusion between the distinction between beings 
and Being, between what is present and presencing. 
 It is helpful at this point to be cognizant of Heidegger’s special affinity for the 
pre-Socratic or early Greek philosophers, i.e., Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander.  
One of the recurring themes throughout the later Heidegger is a special bias accorded to 
early Greek thinking.  According to Heidegger, these thinkers had a relationship with 
Being that was qualitatively different than their many successors.  Unlike Plato and every 
subsequent professional Western philosopher, the pre-Socratics maintained a reverential 
relationship with Being.  They would have been laudable adherents to Heidegger’s 
definition of philosophy discussed previously, since they would have been more passive 
in their respectful listening for the call of Being. 
 It is specifically to Heraclitus that Heidegger turns in order to demonstrate that an 
attuned correspondence with Being can reveal something awesome about its meaning and 
truth. In at least two places of his later writings, Heidegger pays tribute to Heraclitus’ 
receptive attentiveness to Being’s appeal which afforded him a privileged insight about 
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Being’s self-concealment, refusal, defaulting, staying away, “Already before Plato and 
Aristotle, Heraclitus – one of the early Greek thinkers – had said: physis kruptesthai pilei: 
Being loves (a) self-concealing (Sein liebt (ein) Sichverbergen).”45 
 But if Heraclitus were closer to something revelatory about Being due to Being’s 
own bidding, it was quickly lost or ignored with the establishment of metaphysics proper.  
Again, this is not ultimately the result of some defective thinking but Being’s own refusal 
to approach and so point the metaphysician’s thought in a specific direction: 
metaphysics asserts and knows itself as a thinking that always and 
everywhere thinks “Being,” although only in the sense of the being as 
such.  Of course, metaphysics does not recognize this “although only.”  
And it does not recognize it, not because it repudiates Being itself as to-
be-thought, but because Being itself stays away (sondern weil das Sein 
selbst ausbleibt).  But if that is so, then the “unthought” does not stem 
from a thinking that neglects something.46 
 
The full breadth of Being remains unthought in philosophy because of the constitutive 
nature of Being itself to stay away, to default, and so it fails to gain a full articulation in 
the history of metaphysics.   
 Heidegger is certainly aware that any suggestion about Being deliberately 
concealing itself will be quite unsettling and disconcerting yet far reaching for 
philosophy.  He employs such forceful expressions like “dread” (die Angst) and even 
“horror” (das Schrecken) to describe the philosopher’s distress that may prove 
debilitating for future attempts at thinking: 
Would there still be occasion for a thoughtful person to give himself 
[sic] arrogant airs in view of this fateful withdrawal with which Being 
presents us?…If the oblivion of Being which has been described here 
should be real, would there not be occasion enough for a thinker who 
recalls Being to experience a genuine horror? (in den Schrecken)  What 
more can his thinking do than to endure in dread (in der Angst) this 
fateful withdrawal while first of all facing up to the oblivion of 
Being?47 
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This statement is at once sobering in the context of the current discussion and synthetic 
for what has immediately preceded.  Not only does it convey the panic that can be created 
by Heidegger’s assertion concerning Being’s self-withdrawal, but it also establishes the 
important link between Being’s “forgetfulness” or “oblivion” and its self-concealment, 
thus accentuating the true source of the amnesia that has vexed Western metaphysics 
from its very beginnings with Plato and Aristotle. 
 While the expression “dread” (die Angst) carries considerable connotative freight 
in the parlance of existential-phenomenological philosophy and psychology, and more 
specifically is notably embraced by Heidegger in both his early and late periods, it would 
move far beyond the boundaries of this chapter to attempt the full explication that this 
concept deserves. Thus, a fuller treatment will take place in chapter four. In the meantime 
it will be pertinent to muse over why such states of dread and horror are induced by the 
revelation that Being “loves to hide itself.” 
 The basis for such trauma is that which is associated with most drastic paradigm 
shifts.  In this particular instance, there has already been an indication about the extent to 
which “presence” has enjoyed an unrivaled place of honor as philosophy’s chief 
conceptual means to understand and explain Being.  John D. Caputo chronicles the 
hegemony of “presence” in Western metaphysics that even ensnares Heidegger’s beloved 
pre-Socratics, who predate metaphysics proper, “Every attempt to think Being from 
Anaximander to Husserl has understood Being in terms of ‘presence’ (Anwesen).”48  In 
line with Heidegger, Caputo extends leniency to the pre-Socratics, since the true 
conceptual entrenchment of presence favoring the real, the material, the actual, the 
manifest, etc. came with Plato and Aristotle: 
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The gift of Anwesen [presence] which was bestowed upon the early 
Greek thinkers was of primal and pristine quality…After the early 
Greek thinkers, the primal sense of Anwesen [presence] congealed into 
“permanent presentness” in Plato and Aristotle.  Instead of 
experiencing its [Being’s] rising up, lingering, and sinking away, 
Western metaphysicians identified Being as that which clings 
steadfastly to actuality.49 
 
 Heidegger obviously adumbrates Caputo’s remarks in a way that is a bit more 
telling insofar as he addresses the ultimate consequences of a thinking that established a 
toehold many centuries ago.  In other words, Being as presence/presencing began with 
the Greeks and had a binding force on Western thinking to the point of reaching a zenith 
in the current technological age,  
Now that modern technology has arranged its expansion and rule over 
the whole earth, it is not just the sputniks and their by-products that are 
circling around our planet; it is rather Being as presencing (Anwesen) in 
the sense of calculable material (des berechenbaren Bestandes) that 
claims all the inhabitants of the earth in a uniform manner…50 
 
 As indicated by Caputo, such a precarious zenith need not have been reached had 
the more primal and pristine qualities of presence or Anwesen expounded by the pre-
Socratics been better heeded.  Heidegger used the German word Anwesen to translate the 
early Greek word physis in several of his later interpretations, particularly in fragments of 
the pre-Socratic philosophers.51  The rendering of physis into Anwesen in these instances 
was meant to capture the active and creative aspect of presence/presencing.  For this 
reason, to appreciate the strength of the word physis in an unadulterated way is to realize 
that: 
It denotes self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), 
opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding 
and preserves and endures in it; in short, the realm of things that 
emerge and linger on…Physis means the power that emerges and the 
enduring realm under its sway.52 
 
For the early Greeks, then, the word physis as “presencing/presenting” to describe the 
meaning of Being was full of rich connotations.  However, physis soon lost its ability to 
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convey the more dynamic aspects of presence as a presenting rising and upsurging when 
it became more readily known by its Latin rendering of “nature” (natura).  With the 
popularization of this Latin translation in Medieval philosophy, the original meaning of 
the Greek word physis is “thrust aside,” according to Heidegger, and the actual 
philosophical force of the Greek word is “destroyed:” 
But if as is usually done, physis is taken not in the original sense of 
power to emerge and endure, but in the later and present signification 
of nature; and if moreover the motion of material things (stofflichen 
Dinge), of the atoms and electrons, of what modern physics 
investigates as physis, is taken to be the fundamental manifestation of 
nature, then the first philosophy of the Greeks becomes a nature 
philosophy, in which all things are held to be of a material nature (zu 
einer Vorstellung aller Dinge, gemäß der sie eigentlich stofflicher 
Natur sind).53 
 
 It should be clearer now why twinges of dread and horror initially overcome the 
thinker listening to Heidegger’s promptings that Being loves to hide, withdraw, self-
conceal.  Under the dominance of a rather stilted notion of physis as the reigning 
conceptual means to comprehend Being, the penchant arose and took hold for “what is 
present” – beings, entities, materiality, the real, “stuff.”  As a result, any inkling that 
access to the truth and meaning of Being should also be acquired through recourse to its 
more elusive tendencies which obviously disclose “nothing” real and tangible would 
certainly be a daunting paradigm shift in the customary manner of thinking about Being.  
It is not just a matter of surmounting an impaired notion of physis that has so infected the 
comprehension of Being as “permanentized presence,” but it is also fighting ancillary 
concepts which reign havoc upon the philosopher’s comfort zone.  Not only was physis’ 
active dynamism bastardized in the course of metaphysics, but so too was Aristotle’s 
energia by its successor actualitis (actuality), “Ever since the transformation of energia 
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to actualitis (reality, Wirklichkeit), the real (das Wirkliche) is truly what is in being[s] 
(Seiende) and thus decisive for everything possible and necessary.”54 
 A brief yet important aside is necessary before proceeding.  The mention that 
Aristotle’s forceful conceptualizations about the Being of beings were also diminished as 
the history of Western philosophy ensued demonstrates the gradual nature of the 
forgetfulness/oblivion of Being over time.  Richard Rojcewicz, who has translated 
numerous later Heideggerian works into English and published widely in the field of 
phenomenological philosophy committed to the Husserlian tradition, makes an astute 
observation in The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger. With the encomia 
that Heidegger lavishes upon the pre-Socratics for their attuned attentiveness to Being’s 
appeal during a special era of Being’s full approach, followed by his disparagement for 
the inabilities of succeeding generations of philosophers to follow a suit, a caricature 
could develop that there was a clear line of demarcation: the pre-Socratic philosophy and 
all the rest of philosophy beginning in earnest with Plato and Aristotle.  However, the fact 
that Being “loves a self-concealing” is an event that gradually unfolds in the expressions 
of Western philosophy.  Being more and more hides itself or withdraws and philosophy 
in turn unknowingly accommodates this through articulations about Being that are 
deficient.55 
 An example of this gradualism in philosophy’s inability to clearly parse out the 
meaning of Being that continues to elude any true clarification is seen in the above 
mention of Aristotle. Still basking in the immediacy of the pre-Socratic heyday to make 
the most of Being’s clarion call, Aristotle found his penetrating notion of energia for 
Being’s truth later denigrated in the period of the “Romans” or Medieval philosophy.  It 
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is interesting that Heidegger casts his net widely enough to include theology as 
corroborative in sullying the pristine force that Aristotle’s energia once conveyed about 
the meaning of Being: 
a transition from the Greek to the Roman conceptual language has 
come about.  But in order to realize sufficiently even merely 
historically the scope of this transition, the Roman character must be 
understood in the full wealth of its historical developments, so that it 
includes the politically imperial element of Rome, the Christian 
element of the Roman church, and the Romantic element as well.56 
 
The full implications that the bias for the “real” in explaining Being from a theological 
perspective will have to wait until the relationship of Being and God is more fully 
explicated in later portions of this dissertation. 
 It is now fitting to resume discussing the dread and horror brought upon with 
Heidegger’s bold reassertion that Being “withdraws.”  The state of anxiety that 
philosophy is thrown into is understandable in light of the degenerations that key 
conceptual terms underwent in the course of Western metaphysics.  Physis was relegated 
to describing only the present/presence aspect of Being (Anwesen), while energia was 
consigned to detailing the Being of beings as that which is actual or real (die 
Wirklichkeit). 
 However, the dread that consumes the philosopher as she is challenged to think 
Being in new directions that veer away from the tried and true concepts of what is 
present, real, and material need not be incapacitating.  Rather for Heidegger, the initial 
dread that naturally accompanies most challenges to established ways and patterns of 
thought can actually become a revelatory mood of unprecedented disclosure.  It is well 
known that in Division One of Being and Time, there is a rather broad treatment of 
anxiety as one of Dasein’s basic states of mind (die Grundbefindlichkeit) which proves to 
be a distinctive means of disclosure for the being of human existence.57  But on the 
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occasion of Heidegger’s inauguration as Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1929 he 
delivers an essay entitled “What Is Metaphysics?,” which presents a very focused 
handling of anxiety’s disclosive potential.  The fact that this lecture was not intended to 
be a clear statement of doctrine but more of a controversial challenge to philosophy is 
evidenced by Heidegger’s felt need for clarity’s sake to add a Postscript in 1943, 
“Nachwort zu ‘Was Ist Metaphysik?,’” and a subsequent Introduction in 1949, 
“Einleitung zu ‘Was Is Metaphysik?’.” 
 Dread or anxiety can be revelatory not only about and for the human being in the 
world, an interest more in keeping with the aim of the early Heidegger per se in Being 
and Time, but also about Being itself! The only hurdle is whether or not the human 
person, namely the philosopher or thinker, will be willing to forgo the comfortable 
surroundings that well established and accepted conceptual analyses of Being provide in 
order to dwell in the dread that is symptomatic of the entertainment of novel expressions 
about the meaning and truth of Being – “Being loves to hide itself.” (“Das Sein liebt es, 
sich zu verbergen.”)  Heidegger counsels that a willingness to approach and embrace 
rather than avoid and shun the anxiety brought about by a radical insight about Being will 
turn out to be beneficial in deepening and enhancing the truth of Being, “The clear 
courage for essential dread guarantees that most mysterious of all possibilities: the 
experience of Being.”58 
 Commenting on Heidegger’s work from a theological perspective, Robert P. Orr 
explains the significance of “What Is Metaphysics?” in the evolving later Heideggerian 
corpus for fine-tuning anxiety as a promising mode of awareness that complements 
observations so far advanced regarding the necessity to surmount the stifling concepts of 
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presence and reality so as to better grasp the meaning of Being: “ ‘What Is Metaphysics?’ 
seeks to uncover a mode of awareness that is inherently non-scientific, one that is aware 
beyond the particularities of what-is.”59  Orr proceeds to make an important point about 
the original German Heidegger uses to express this distinctive “mode of awareness.”  The 
German term employed is die Stimmung, whose ordinary sense is equivalent to the 
English “mood.”  However, the word Stimmung does not mean “feeling” in the ordinary 
sense of some interior or subjective sensation.  Instead, according to Heidegger, die 
Stimmung names an affective state of being attuned to something, being in tune with a 
voice in which something declares itself.60 
 Of course this nebulous vociferous “something,” to use Orr’s expression, is none 
other than the appeal of Being!  This manner of speaking is most reminiscent of an earlier 
discussion in this chapter concerning the more circumscribed Heideggerian definition of 
philosophy as an attuned correspondence to the appeal of Being.  This definition was 
extracted from the later piece entitled What Is Philosophy?, and a close reexamination in 
light of the present discussion about the special “attuning” power of anxiety vis-à-vis 
Being lends a greater specificity to Heidegger’s seemingly broad charge that philosophy 
should tune into Being’s call.  The same German word die Stimmung and its verbal and 
adjectival cognates are used in both What Is Philosophy? and “What Is Metaphysics?” – 
“bestimmt,” “gestimmtes,” “Ge-stimmtheit,” “Be-stimmtheit.”  But it is in the latter work 
that the attunement to Being is facilitated by the mood of anxiety. Thus, the later 
ambitious promptings of Heidegger for philosophers to maintain an attuned 
correspondence with the appeal of Being is given some helpful direction by recourse to 
an earlier text.  Though few will gleefully embrace the state of anxiety, for Heidegger it is 
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the privileged means offered by Being to hone the attunement of its call to the receptive 
thinker. 
 So, what experience of Being may be had if there is a willingness to accept the 
anxiety attendant upon the initial realization that Being loves to hide itself, to withdraw, 
to stay away?  As Heidegger has already presaged, the courage to take up the dread will 
assure a mysterious possibility for the experience of Being.  In other words, anxiety 
provoked by an introduction to Being’s desire to conceal itself is not alleviated, but rather 
staying the course with this dread leads to an even greater profundity in regards to the 
meaning and truth of Being: 
An experience of Being as sometimes “other” than everything that “is” 
comes to us in dread (die Angst), provided that we do not, from dread 
of dread, i.e. in sheer timidity, shut our ears to the soundless voice 
which attunes us to the horrors of the abyss (des Abgrundes).”61 
 
 
Being and the Embarrassment of the Nothing 
 
 The awareness that Heidegger terms die Angst is an awe-inspiring awareness that 
transcends the typical forms of perceptual and intuitive disclosedness.  Harnessing upon 
the stirrings of dread will not lead to a regressive experience of Being encapsulated in 
concepts related to presencing (Anwesen) or the reality of particular things (Wirklichkeit).  
Rather, as noted by Orr, the awareness is one that goes beyond the disclosedness of all 
that is to a realm of the primordial other of the totality of what is.  The one term that can 
name such a realm is “nothing,” “das Nichts.”62  The full force of anxiety as a moodful 
attunement to an experience of Being is that it reaches out into the nothing.  Heidegger is 
most direct and emphatic on this score as he concludes, “Anxiety reveals the nothing.” 
(“Die Angst offenbart das Nichts.”)63  
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When Heidegger assumes his new position of Rector at the University of 
Freiburg, he is not seeking to directly answer the question that entitles his address with 
the usual pabulum familiar to the Western philosophical world.  Instead, the radically 
new and main theme of “What Is Metaphysics?” is the development of the problem of 
Being as one with and in terms of the problem of nothing or non-Being (das Nichts).64  
Intriguing at a different yet related level than the meaning of Being is the way in which 
Heidegger turns to the nothing as a key conceptual means in the project to “overcome” 
metaphysics.  This additional unique challenge that Heidegger contributes to Western 
philosophy will serve as an appropriate discussion later to bring this chapter to a close. 
 Observable now is a progression in the levels of intensity as the question of the 
meaning of Being is broached.  At the outset and at the lowest tier, Heidegger lauded the 
pre-Socratics, viz. Heraclitus, for their receptivity that allows for their sagacious 
observation that Being loves to hide itself.  This is indeed provocative in light of the fact 
that the subsequent typical philosophical means to articulate the truth of Being were one-
sidedly expressive along the lines of presence or the real.  The level of intensity soars to a 
fever pitch, however, when Heidegger invites philosophy to stay with and dwell in the 
anxiety caused by the realization that Being loves a self-concealing in order to discover 
that Being is intimately related to non-Being or nothing. Coming to terms with the fall 
out that this portends for the meaning of Being is indeed disconcerting because of the 
plain fact that the thinker is being asked to directly confront the full weight of 
nothingness, “the horrors of the abyss.”  However at the same time, there is in the depth 
of this mystery the possibility of having an unprecedented experience of and appreciation 
for Being. 
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 Steering away from the more frightening aspects surrounding the engagement 
with the nothing, yet nonetheless expressing feelings of unease amidst philosophical 
circles is Gadamer in his masterful work on hermeneutics, Truth and Method.  When 
Heidegger invites philosophy to juxtapose Being and non-Being to further the disclosure 
of the meaning and truth of Being, it is a source of “embarrassment” in Gadamer’s mind,  
Heidegger revealed the essential forgetfulness of Being that had 
dominated Western thought since Greek metaphysics because of the 
embarrassing problem of nothingness.  By showing that the question of 
Being included the question of nothingness, he joined the beginning to 
the end of metaphysics.  That the question of Being could represent 
itself as the question of nothingness postulated a thinking of 
nothingness impossible for metaphysics.65 
 
Here, Gadamer is found adroitly synthesizing several ponderous topics, some of which 
have already been discussed earlier, i.e. the “forgetfulness of Being,” and others like the 
“end of metaphysics,” which is set to receive a fuller analysis in the closing section of 
this chapter.  The nub of his insight at this point, however, is to comprehend the 
magnitude of Heidegger’s insistence for philosophy to take full cognizance of the 
nothing, non-Being, das Nichts in its discernments over the meaning of Being. 
 Be it the awkwardness of “embarrassment” (pace Gadamer) or the fright from 
terror, these feelings though necessary when integrating non-Being and Being need not 
prove debilitating.  A thorough examination of the passages in Heidegger’s “Postscript to 
‘What Is Metaphysics?’” shows the potential that these feelings can bestow when their 
proximity to other crucial disclosive feelings is realized.  For instance, the importance of 
wonder (Erstaunen) was presented earlier as an essential component for the philosopher’s 
attitude of receptivity in welcoming an attuned correspondence with the voice of Being.  
To wonder can now be added the complementary feeling of “awe” when in the throes of a 
profound experiential encounter with Being and the nothing.  A credible endorsement for 
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the coupling of awe and wonder could be elicited from Rudolf Otto (d. 1937), 
Heidegger’s senior colleague during his time at the University of Marburg (1923-1929).  
Otto’s well known expression mysterium tremendum et fascinans to describe the 
vicissitudes of an experiential encounter with the holy (the “numinous”) is analogous to 
the awe and wonder that surrounds and sustains a meaningful encounter with Being and 
its more daunting dimension of the nothing.66 
 A more recent English translation of Heidegger’s “Postscript to ‘What Is 
Metaphysics?’” than Walter Kaufmann’s used thus far is particularly helpful in showing 
the promise hovering about anxiety when appreciated for its relationship to awe, “The 
lucid courage for essential anxiety assures us the enigmatic possibility of experiencing 
Being.  For close by essential anxiety as the horror of the abyss dwells awe.” (“Denn 
nahe bei der wesenhaften Angst als dem Schrecken des Abgrundes wohnt die Scheu.”)67  
This translation by William McNeill more clearly conveys Heidegger’s inviting Western 
philosophy to assume a wonderfilled, awestruck posture in the face of nothing.  This is 
actually not that surprising when it is recalled how pervasive the following question is 
throughout the later Heideggerian corpus: “Why are there beings at all, and not rather 
nothing?” Acting as an Ariadne’s thread for finding one’s way through the later texts, 
Macquarrie has gone so far as to call this question emblematic for the later Heidegger.68  
Macquarrie is led to such a strong statement because of the sheer prevalence and strategic 
placement of this question in the later writings.  Of special relevance for recognizing its 
“emblematic” quality is the fact that Heidegger uses this question with full rhetorical 
force to close the address that currently has been undergoing a careful study, “What Is 
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Metaphysics?,” as well as to begin the 1935 essay cited earlier, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics. 
 Heidegger respectfully acknowledges that the question “Why are there beings at 
all and not rather nothing?” is not original to him, since esteemed philosophical 
predecessors like Friedrich Schelling and Gottfried W. Leibniz have also used this 
question as a means to better understand “…the highest reason and the first existing cause 
for all being(s).”69  However, Heidegger co-opts the famous question with a novel rigor 
detectable by the emotive aura of awe and wonder that should accompany the very asking 
of the question: 
“Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather nothing?”  Many 
men [sic] never encounter this question, if by encounter we mean not 
merely to hear and read about it as an interrogative formulation but to 
ask the question, that is to bring it about, to raise it, to feel its 
inevitability.  And yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more 
than once, by the hidden power of this question, even if he is not aware 
of what is happening to him.70 
 
Heidegger then goes on in the remaining opening pages of An Introduction to 
Metaphysics to point out that the question arises in a variety of existentially charged 
situations, from moments of “despair” when life is falling apart, to moments of 
“rejoicing” when life seems transfigured, and even to moments of “boredom” when 
everything in life has lost significance. 
 Aside from the way in which this question hauntingly “grazes” human beings at 
watershed times of their lives, there is another important aspect of Heidegger’s use of this 
question that distinguishes his from other uses.  The evocative power that it possesses 
stems from the reality that it forces a direct confrontation with the Being question on the 
playing field of nothingness – “Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather 
nothing?”  Integrating the question of the nothing with the question of Being is not a 
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mere intellectual nicety for Heidegger, rather it is an imposing force to be contended with 
for any true advancement in the truth and meaning of Being.  This is made clear as 
Heidegger draws to a close the Rectorial address, which has been very helpful in the 
development of the current discussion, “it swings back into the fundamental question of 
metaphysics that the nothing itself compels (die das Nichts selbst erzwingt): Why are 
there beings at all, and why not far rather nothing?”71  It will be developed in the next 
section how Heidegger’s challenge to approach this question in a “transformed” way can 
militate against fostering nihilism in its usual “inauthentic” understanding. 
 The originality of Heidegger’s use of this question not only distinguishes him 
from prior uses by fellow philosophers, viz. Schelling and Leibniz, but moreover it shows 
his intriguing affinity with and fascination for the Christian mystical tradition.  In The 
Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, John Caputo analyzes Heidegger’s 
relationship to the Rhineland mystic and Dominican preacher Meister Johannes Eckhart 
of Hochheim (d. 1327). The thematic challenge to factor in the nothing, the non-Being 
when posing the question of the meaning of Being moves Heidegger out of the 
neighborhood of philosophy and into the proximity of mysticism, as Caputo observes: 
For like the mystic and unlike the philosopher, Heidegger calls for a 
non-representational experience of Being, and not, as in Being and 
Time, for a new conceptual determination of it.  Like the mystic, 
Heidegger thinks his way through not to a first cause or ground – for 
Aristotle, philosophy is a search for grounds (aitiai) – but to an “abyss” 
(Abgrund) or “nothingness.” Like the mystic Eckhart, Heidegger’s 
“way” to Being is not the way of “discursive” reason, but the way of 
meditative stillness and total openness to that which is wholly other 
than beings, to the “simply transcendent.”72 
 
 Of course Eckhart as a Dominican friar would have no grave reservations in 
permitting his penetrating correlations of Being and the abyss or nothingness to find 
theological applications in the discussion of God.  Heidegger, on the other hand, as stated 
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previously emphatically disallows any immediate and direct connection between the 
Being question and concerns over the God issue.  Nonetheless what Caputo has done, and 
what it is hoped that this study will also do in its own way, is to show that despite 
Heidegger’s nullification of any simple equation between God and Being there is still 
ample room for Heidegger to enrich the theology of God with his philosophy of Being.  
And the very emergence of “nothingness” in Heidegger’s wrestling with the meaning of 
Being is a case in point.  
In an overt way, striving to bring about clarity in confronting the truly divine God 
(der göttliche Gott), Eckhart is genuinely a “great master of disruption,” according to 
Caputo in a later volume entitled Radical Hermeneutics, because he went against the 
grain of everyday theological concepts by saying that God is a “pure nothing.”73  This is 
certainly a startling claim, especially in light of the fact that Eckhart would be seen as not 
carrying the conceptual torch with much loyalty when it was his turn to occupy the same 
Dominican chair at Paris that Thomas Aquinas had held some twenty-five years earlier.  
Aquinas was indeed a staunch proponent of wedding the concepts of Being and God, and 
therefore did much to embolden and advance Being itself and all its regnant qualities as 
acceptable means towards understanding God.  For instance, Caputo points out in yet 
another work, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay in Overcoming Metaphysics, that in the 
Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 4 it becomes clear for Aquinas that, “the highest and most 
proper designation for God is expressed in terms of esse (Being) rather than ens (a 
being)…It says more about God to say esse than to say ens.”74 
 In a similar vein, Heidegger can be called a “great master of disruption” as he 
thinks through and thinks against the grain of everyday philosophical conceptions by his 
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challenge that Being must come to terms with nothing or non-Being – “Why are there 
beings at all, and why not far rather nothing?”  And as Eckhart would be resisting a long 
theological tradition that propounded God as Being with his assertion that God is a pure 
nothing without even the smallest trace of Being, so too would Heidegger be threatening 
the well entrenched system of Western philosophy and its understanding of Being in 
terms of presence (Anwesen) and the real (Wirklichkeit) with his promotion of nothing. 
 The irony being capitalized upon here by both mystic and philosopher alike is the 
belief that a willingness to approach the depths of the nothing in order to better 
understand the mystery of the Godhead or Being touches upon a very similar depth of 
nothingness in the recesses of the human person.  Here is where Caputo’s analysis of 
comparison throughout several places in his writings is most helpful in showing an 
accord between Heidegger and Eckhart.  One formulation that Eckhart develops to 
discuss the mystical union with God is called “the breakthrough to the Godhead” (der 
Durchbuch zur Gottheit).75  Contact with the profound mysteriousness of God, namely 
God’s nothingness, is occasioned because at a certain deep spot in the human soul, what 
Eckhart called the “ground of the soul,” there is a cognizance of its very own abysmal 
nothingness.  In other words, an encounter with the truly divine God, der göttliche Gott, 
(interestingly enough an encounter that also captivates Heidegger as will be shown later 
in this study) is likened to a “breakthrough” to another, altogether more strange and 
forbidding region. 
 However, the soul just does not wantonly leap headlong into this point of contact 
without having had the proper preparation that would at least give way to a positive 
outcome; instead, the very desire and willingness of the spiritual sojourner to plunge into 
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the deep and strange waters of the ground of her own soul acts as an initiation of sorts to 
ease the eventual encounter with the mysterious nothingness of the Godhead.  Caputo 
adds that such a “breakthrough” would mean a concomitant “breakdown” as all the 
comfortable and familiar conceptions about God are challenged to varying degrees: 
There was a point, in short, of what Eckhart called “breakthrough” 
(Durchbauch), where one got to understand the utter intractability of 
God to what theologians, priests, and common sense said was “God.”  
At this point, he said, we have the sense of not being flooded with light 
but of having fallen into an abyss (Abgrund)…76 
 
Thus in concert with the plaintive yearnings of Psalm 130, “Out of the depths I cry to 
you, O Lord, hear my voice!,” a mutually reciprocal relationship is forged between the 
mysterious abysmal nothingness of the soul and the profound nothingness of God. 
 While Heidegger was not a theologian in the formal sense nor a cleric as was 
Eckhart, he nevertheless discussed the “heart’s core” (der Herzensgrund) as that deep 
spot in the mind that puts a thinker in touch with her own deep mysteriousness, which in 
turn is the means that allows Being to be “kept in mind” replete with its mysterious 
nothingness.  Caputo remarks, “Whether one is a Dominican friar or not, there is a fine 
point in the mind where one is brought up short, a moment of midnight reckoning where 
the ground gives way and one also has the distinct sense of falling into an abyss. It is 
found…in Heidegger quite pervasively in the Nichts…”77 
 Heidegger treats this “fine point in the mind,” the heart’s core, in his post-war 
lecture published in 1954 as What Is Called Thinking?  Here, Heidegger meditates on the 
senses of thinking by dialoguing with Nietzsche and the pre-Socratics.78  Always eager to 
experiment with neologisms that stem from re-examining the etymological and 
philosophical richness of words that may have gone unnoticed, Heidegger maintains that 
the perfect way to express the word “thinking” is by the Old High German expression 
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“gidanc,” rendered “der Gedanc” in modern German and “thanc” in English.  According 
to Heidegger, this “thanc” pertains to the thinker’s very depths, much akin to the deep 
spot Eckhart dubbed the “ground of the soul,” “The thanc means man’s [sic] inmost 
mind, the heart, the heart’s core, that innermost essence of man…(Der Gedanc bedeutet: 
das Gemüt, das Herz, den Herzensgrund, jenes Innerste des Menschen…).”79 
 The immediate benefits of appreciating thinking in terms of “thanc” as a dynamic 
capacity at the very recesses of a person’s being is that it enables a near boundless 
transcendence out of the depths, “…that innermost essence of man which reaches 
outward most fully to the outermost limits…”80  Moreover, thinking from the heart’s core 
functions in a synthesizing fashion to balance the initial functioning of transcendence and 
its seeming “sense and taste for the infinite,” to borrow a phrase from Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (d. 1834), the father of Liberal Protestant theology.  So for Heidegger, 
the “thanc,” the heart’s core is also, “…the gathering of all that concerns us, all that we 
care for, all that touches us insofar as we are, as human beings.”81 
 Most important for the present purposes of this study, however, is to respect that 
the thinking which wells up from a thinker’s profound depths, the “heart’ core,” 
possesses a certain degree of piety.  This is because Heidegger contends that the latter 
gathering/synthesizing function of thinking out of the depths is related to the more 
common understanding of thinking involving memory and recollection. But for 
Heidegger and his penchant to go back and rediscover overlooked meanings in words, 
memory not only means the capacity to retain and recall events from the past, it also 
conveys pious devotion: 
 In its original telling sense, memory (Gedächtnis) means as much as 
devotion (die Andacht).  This word possesses the special tone of the 
pious and piety (des Frommen und der Frömmigkeit), and designates 
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the devotion of prayer (des Gebetes), only because it denotes the all-
comprehensive relation of concentration upon the holy and the gracious 
(auf das Heile und Huldvolle).82 
 
 A more recent scholarly endeavor in line with Caputo’s pioneering work in 
English on Heidegger and Eckhart is that undertaken by Sonya Sikka, who casts her 
glance even wider to include analyses of Heidegger and other mystics besides Eckhart.  
In her work Forms of Transcendence: Heidegger and Medieval Mystical Theology, Sikka 
is hard at work comparing and contrasting Heidegger with Eckhart, Johannes Tauler, and 
Jan van Ruysbroec.  It is specifically in her treatment of Tauler’s notion of contemplative 
devotion that Sikka comments on the above-cited passages from Heidegger’s What Is 
Called Thinking? and believes that Heidegger is clearly establishing an important nuance 
in the relationship between thinking and Being.  When the thinker is so submerged and 
deeply in touch with her inmost mind, (das Gemüt), her heart (das Herz), her heart’s core 
(der Herzensgrund), in short her innermost essence (jenes Innerste des Menschen), then 
thinking assumes a devotional tone characterized not by clear logical reasoning, but by 
memory (Gedächtnis), remembering and commemorating (Andenken), thanking 
(Danken) and devotion (Andacht).83  The focus of this concentrated commemorative 
remembrance is that which for Heidegger is “most worthy of thought” – Being.  This 
meditative remembrance at one’s very core is a devotion to Being in all of its utter 
profundity, which includes its mysterious abysmal nothingness.  Only by a willingness to 
travel deeply within himself to the point of a seeming scary abyss that teeters on an 
empty void of nothingness can the thinker then be piously disposed to comprehend in a 
partial sense Being and all its depths vacillating toward the nothing.  Sikka contends that 
out of the depths of such devotional thinking is remembrance of Being, a giving thought 
to Being.  However, she is quick to point out that this type of thinking is not some clinical 
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exercise of detached speculation about the abstract nature of Being.  It is instead a pious 
meditative thinking that keeps Being in mind in order to deliver thought over to Being.  
Simply put, it is a dedication to Being.84 
 It should be no great surprise that such deep thinking which goes to the very 
mysterious depth dimensions of the human person would be integral in establishing a 
disclosive opportunity about Being at its own mysterious depths, since as was referred to 
previously Being is always to be credited for motivating human thinking.  In the words of 
Heidegger, “We never come to thoughts. They come to us.”  Therefore, if the mysterious 
nothing has been a long neglected deep aspect of Being by most practitioners of Western 
philosophy and now there is a call by Heidegger to value the nothing as revelatory for the 
meaning of Being, then it is really Being itself making the overture to the thinker at her 
inner most depths that may lead to a new discovery about the truth of Being. As it were, 
Being takes the initiative and issues that “call” to which philosophy is supposed to be 
attuned. It does this by stirring the attentive listening thinker at his innermost mysterious 
depths in a quiet and deserted place of “nothing” to fall back on or be distracted by in 
order to draw him to appreciating the ineffability of Being’s most profound yet neglected 
expression: the nothing. 
 Two questions may arise.  First, can the typical Western thinker, conditioned as 
she may be, endure the specter of nothingness as it applies to Being and self?  It is not 
just a matter of surmounting the noted initial anxiety and dread that naturally accompany 
any honest confrontational brush with nothing, but even more challenging is the ability to 
withstand a sustained relationship with or immersion into the nothing so as to be able to 
genuinely come to terms with what it may impart about the meaning and truth of Being 
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and self.  Even if the thinker has the mettle to fully embrace the mysterious depths of 
nothingness, the second question is whether or not she wants to do so.  In other words, to 
reverse the popular aphorism, she may be “more able than willing.”  The main reason for 
not wanting to plunge into the deep fathoms of the nothing is that such a leap seems to be 
none other than an invitation to a comprehensive program of nihilism.  But, is nihilism 
the only possible outcome when philosophy revisits the question of the meaning of Being 
via the route of the nothing? 
 
Authentic and Inauthentic Nihilism 
 Heidegger was quite used to fending off such sweeping charges that his 
promptings to rethink the nothing in order to better examine the Being question was a 
programmatic cultivation of nihilism.  In 1955 he wrote a lengthy letter to Ernst Jünger, a 
German essayist and novelist, entitled “Über ‘Die Linie.’”  Published a year later as Zur 
Seinsfrage ([On] The Question of Being), this work offers one of Heidegger’s clearest 
explorations of the positive aspects of the relation of Being to nothing and to nihilism.85  
At one place in this public letter, Heidegger is found explicitly defending himself against 
claims that he is a maudlin naysayer espousing a rampant agenda of nihilism.  Referring 
to his 1929 inaugural address to the Freiburg academia, already much alluded to above, 
Heidegger is well aware that his suggestions that philosophy should make forays into the 
nothing in order to gain a greater comprehension of Being will undoubtedly implicate 
him as a nihilist, “people have seized upon and extracted ‘the’ nothing and made the 
lecture [“What Is Metaphysics?”] into a testament of nihilism.”86 
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 However with the passage of nearly thirty years as Heidegger corresponds with 
Jünger, he believes that a fresh and more informed approach to the nothing, once 
seemingly maverickly broached, will reveal that it was never a matter of presenting 
nothing in the sense of a negative nothing (des nichtigen Nichts) to be seen as the first 
and last goal of all representation and existing.87  Instead, Heidegger calls attention to the 
particulars of the “emblematic” question discussed above used to close the lecture with 
the hope of showing that his invitation in 1929 as well as in 1955 to incorporate the 
nothing with the Being question need not degenerate into a negative nihilism.  Revisiting 
this question and carefully reviewing the way in which Heidegger wrote the final line of 
“What Is Metaphysics?,” “Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing 
(Nichts)?” shows that he deliberately capitalized the word “Nothing.”  While it has 
already been mentioned that Heidegger does not lay claim to being the only philosopher 
to have used this question for the furtherance of philosophical inquiry, there is 
nonetheless a further distinguishing quality to his usage now evidenced by the conscious 
choice to write the first letter of the word “Nothing” in the upper case. 
 Pöggeler comments on the positive aspect of “destruction” which permeated 
Heidegger’s philosophy from its outset. For him a clear indication that Heidegger was 
embarking on entirely new paths comes through in the lecture “What Is Metaphysics?” 
and its closing sentence, “Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing?”  
The capitalization of the term “Nothing” only serves to further enunciate the unique 
direction of Heidegger’s new paths, “since he is not just repeating Leibniz’ question, 
which only sought to show the superiority of Being over Nothing.”88  In fact, for 
Heidegger, any use of this question that does not focus upon the Nothing, so indicated by 
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the deliberate choice to capitalize the very word, could be seen as an effort toward 
“restoring” the typical concerns of Western philosophy, more precisely known as 
metaphysics.  Even as Heidegger was writing to Jünger in 1955 there were apparently 
efforts afoot to maintain the status quo of metaphysics by the usual use of the question, 
“Why are there beings at all, and why far rather Nothing?,” as Heidegger observes, “The 
contemporary attempts to restore metaphysics (die Metaphysik zu restaurieren) are fond 
of addressing the said question.”89 
 But it is of the utmost importance to realize when attempting to situate Heidegger 
on the stage of Western philosophy and to appreciate the unique role he played that he 
was in no way, shape, or form advocating a “restoration” of metaphysics in the sense of 
merely repeating and maintaining the conventional dictates begun by Plato and brought to 
a zenith by Nietzsche.  Rather than “restoration,” concepts like “destruction,” 
“overcoming,” and “end” pervade the Heideggerian vocabulary when describing his 
relationship to and vision for Western thinking.  Incidentally these concepts, and so too 
the concerns they spawn in varying ways, cut furrows across the entire field of 
Heidegger’s lengthy career. The early phase, before “the turn” in Being and Time, shows 
Heidegger committed to a project of “destroying fundamental ontology.”  After “the 
turn” in the later period proper, he is seen as repeatedly emphasizing the need to 
“overcome metaphysics” and also continually decrying the “end of philosophy.” 
 It is imperative, then, to pay close attention to Heidegger’s novel use of the well 
known philosophical refrain, “Why are there beings at all, and why not rather Nothing?,” 
and most specifically to the subtlety of capitalizing the very word “Nothing,” in order to 
fully appreciate the positive ramifications intended for philosophy and all Western 
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thinking, including theology.  This requires on the part of philosophy a willingness to 
embark along with Heidegger upon untrodden paths whereby the nothing is honestly 
confronted and then integrated into its thinking.  The bold assertion to focus on the 
nothing and its related collaborative concepts of “destroying” fundamental ontology, 
“overcoming” metaphysics, and the “end” of philosophy are not guide posts along 
Heidegger’s new paths that have as their final destination a bleak state of nihilism.  The 
desire to avoid traveling on such a path that leads ultimately to a disorienting and 
alienating point of nowhere was brought to poignant expression by Nietzsche: 
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun?  
Whither is it moving now?  Whither are we moving?  Away from all 
suns?  Are we not plunging continually?  Backward, sideward, forward, 
in all directions?  Is there still any up or down?  Are we not straying as 
through an infinite nothing?  Do we not feel the breath of empty space?  
Has it not become colder?  Is not night continually closing in on us?90 
 
 However, to accept Heidegger’s invitation to take uncharted paths that will indeed 
mean encountering the nothing foremost, as well as destruction, overcoming, and endings 
along the way does not necessarily entail a call to stray aimlessly toward a nothingness of 
confining emptiness.  When Heidegger summons Western thinking to ask anew, “Why 
are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing?,” with special emphasis on 
“Nothing,” it is not his aim to hypostatize the nothing,91 rather it is an invitation to take a 
“differently construed path through another realm” (“andersgearteten Weg durch einem 
anderen Bereich”).92  Concomitant with traversing this virgin territory leading to new 
places without the threat of circuitous windings to eventual vacuity is the suggestion to 
think the tried and true philosophical question – “Why are there beings at all, and why 
not far rather Nothing?” – in a “transformed” manner.  When Heidegger gave a subtle 
hint about the need to approach the question with renewed rigor by the capitalization of 
Nothing, he now explicitly states that the question should be asked in this “transformed” 
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way:  “Why is it that everywhere only beings have priority, without our giving thought to 
the ‘not’ of beings, to ‘this nothing,’ i.e. to Being with regard to its essence?”93 
 The upshot of transforming this classic question is therefore not to dwell on the 
nothing in order to take part in an absurd meandering that eventuates in an abyss.  Rather, 
it is an admonition by Heidegger to let the wonder for the nothing “strike” the thinker and 
lead her to the meaning of Being in all its profundity.  Along these lines of positive 
prospects that this question signals for Western thought on the Being question, Pöggeler 
offers the following paraphrase of Heidegger’s transformed question, “Why does Being, 
its fullness with the multiplicity of modes of being, move us, but not the Nothing, 
namely, that which withdraws and withholds itself in all this fullness and multiplicity.”94 
 Despite the fact that it should be clearer that Heidegger’s true motivation for 
urging a sustained musing over the nothing was to advance the study of Being in 
dimensions that have long been neglected and not to promote a state of hopeless nihilism, 
it cannot be denied that the very suggestion to meditatively focus upon nothing 
automatically engenders some need to address the question of nihilism.  While it is 
beyond the scope of this study’s parameters on several scores to engage in a full 
investigation of the phenomenon of nihilism, it is fitting nonetheless to examine the 
qualified manner in which the later Heidegger understands nihilism, especially as it 
relates to the nothing and most importantly to the question of Being.  This will serve as 
an apt way to close this first chapter, since it will round out the ongoing attempt here to 
situate Heidegger on the stage of Western philosophy as a unique player. 
 That he in fact assumes such a unique and unprecedented role will be seen in the 
way that his special understanding of nihilism implicates the status of Western thinking 
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as being at a critical stage, so tellingly conveyed by the already briefly mentioned 
Heideggerian concepts of “the destruction of the fundamental project of ontology,” “the 
overcoming of metaphysics,” and “the end of philosophy.” Each of these expressions has 
a richness of its own for revealing Heidegger’s relationship to and evaluation of Western 
philosophy, but a concentrated attention will be paid to the ramifications surrounding the 
“overcoming of metaphysics,” since it relates most directly to achieving an authentic 
understanding of nihilism.  As will be shown, the need for Western thought to overcome 
metaphysics is mutually conditioned by the need to overcome nihilism.  Overcoming in 
both these aspects will lead not to a “restoration” (restaurieren) of thinking as usual, but 
rather to a more radical “recovery” (die Verwindung) of Western thinking to its true 
vocation, an attuned correspondence with the call of Being: “The recovery of 
metaphysics calls thinking into a more originary calling.”95 
 Despite the rather ethereal tone that accompanies the dual projects of overcoming 
and the rather ambitious goals they are intended to achieve, there is on Heidegger’s part a 
frank recognition that the very mention of nihilism, let alone including its overcoming or 
recovery within the grand scheme of an overcoming or recovery of metaphysics, will 
conjure up negative images that first must be honestly addressed if there is to be any 
movement whatsoever toward more lofty ends.  In an effort to confront the negative vibes 
that are stirred by contemplating nihilism, Heidegger swiftly points out the source for 
such disquiet, 
 …according to the concept of the word, nihilism is concerned with the 
nothing and therefore, in a special way, with beings in their nonbeing.  
But the nonbeing of beings is considered to be the negation of beings. 
We usually think of the “nothing” only in terms of what is negated.96 
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Unsettling enough as it might be to realize that nihilism in a very confined sense concerns 
the nothing of a particular entity – its not being present – the real force of nihilism’s 
negative connotation and the ensuing feeling of discomfort lies in the fact that the nothing 
invokes and assumes much broader and more inclusive parameters, “The nothing here 
[that nihilism is concerned with] signifies, not the particular negation of an individual 
being, but the complete and absolute negation of all beings, of beings as a whole.”97 
 It is an understanding of nihilism on this far reaching scale that proves to be most 
disturbing and so has lead to an avoidance on the part of most Western thinkers.  Yet, 
Heidegger firmly maintains that the first step in overcoming such a jaded notion of 
nihilism in order to arrive at an authentic, appropriate, or “recovered” sense of nihilism is 
to confront it head-on as opposed to the typical tendency to flee from it: “Instead of 
wanting to overcome nihilism (statt den Nihilismus überwinden zu wollen), we must 
attempt to first turn in toward its essence.  Turning into its essence is the first step 
through which we may leave nihilism behind us.”98 
 Some of this initial discussion about nihilism should have a ring of familiarity to 
it, since to a degree it is reminiscent of comments made in the previous section about the 
nothing, and how the very mysterious depths of Being (der Abgrund) can interface with 
the willing thinker at her very depths in the “heart’s core” (der Herzensgrund).  
Heidegger admits of the natural reciprocity that obtains between discussions of nihilism 
and the nothing, “Language demands that in the word nihilism we think the nihil, the 
nothing…”99  While the question, “Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather 
nothing?” inspired both concerns for the nothing, the primary emphasis here will center 
upon the nothing of nihilism at a more systemic level that impinges upon the fate of 
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Western philosophy or metaphysics.  The prior emphasis, by contrast, was primarily 
concerned with the individual level and the nothing described as the possible point of 
contact for the thinker and Being.  Therefore, the earlier focus tried to indicate 
Heidegger’s mystical leanings, while the current effort is an attempt to show his broad 
based concern for the plight of Western thinking overall.  In this vein, what Heidegger is 
hoping for is that the nudge of Western thinking to turn toward the essence of nihilism 
will lead to the realization that there are two kinds of nihilism – authentic and inauthentic 
– with the former being an indispensable component in furthering the meaning and truth 
of Being. 
 Philosopher Joan Stambaugh, who for decades has translated several of 
Heidegger’s later works and most recently in 1996 gave the English speaking world an 
alternative translation of Being and Time to rival Macquarrie and Robinson’s 1962 
standard, states that, “what Heidegger calls true [authentic] nihilism has two aspects or 
factors: (1) that Being remains absent, and (2) that thinking leaves out, omits, neglects to 
pay heed to this remaining absent.”100 
 Nihilism taken in its essential and most appropriate light is not merely the 
negation of a particular being or all of beings in toto, rather it is the simple yet often 
overlooked fact that Being has a dimension of nothingness, whereby Being withdraws, 
conceals itself, defaults, remains absent. Mention was made earlier in this study that early 
Greek thinking did have the opportunity to exist at a privileged time when Being more 
fully disclosed itself, thus enabling Heraclitus to make the astute observation that, “Being 
loves a self-concealing.”  However, the onset of Western thinking proper in the writings 
of Plato and Aristotle also marked the beginning of an era when Being became less 
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revealing about itself, and so the self-concealing, absenting, defaulting, hiding aspect of 
Being was easily ignored and overlooked. Authentic nihilism, the essence of nihilism in 
its most appropriate sense, owns up to the fact that there is a nothing dimension to Being 
itself,101but is eclipsed by an inauthentic or inappropriate nihilism out of 
“embarrassment” (pace Gadamer) that Being and nothing might have a certain degree of 
affiliation.  As a result, traditional metaphysics dispenses with the nothing as not worth 
taking seriously and rushes to focus only on present and real beings. 
Therefore, nihilism in its inauthentic or inappropriate from has been very much 
intertwined with and entrenched in Western metaphysics since its inception and thus 
influential upon the manner in which the meaning and truth of Being was articulated.  
Heidegger goes so far as to equate metaphysics with this inappropriate nihilism, 
“Metaphysics as metaphysics is nihilism proper.”102  Aware that such a claim is 
“disturbing” and prone to misunderstanding, Heidegger attempts in several places to 
clarify his aim of wedding traditional metaphysics and inauthentic nihilism in what 
proves to be a problematic relationship: 
This opinion has long been endemic to Western metaphysics.  It co-
constitutes the ground on which all metaphysics rests.  Most often, 
therefore, one dispenses with “the nothing” in a brief paragraph.  It 
seems to be a universally convincing fact that “nothingness” is the 
opposite of all being.…Perhaps the essence of nihilism consists in not 
taking the question of the nothing seriously.103 
 
But where is nihilism really at work?  Where men [sic] cling to familiar 
essents and suppose that it suffices to go on taking essents as essents, 
since after all that is what they are.  But with this they reject the 
question of Being…To forget Being and cultivate only the essent – that 
is nihilism.104 
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Overcoming Metatphysics:  Nietzsche’s “Will to Power” 
 
 Mired down in an inauthentic nihilism the Western philosophical tradition has not 
embraced the nothing, but rather opted to channel its efforts and resources to the study of 
beings; all of which lead to a further impoverishment of the understanding of Being.  
Metaphysics that continues along these lines must therefore be “overcome,” since it 
cannot help philosophy to move away from this inauthentic nihilism toward an authentic 
nihilism.  Because Heidegger perceives such a deep-seated complicity and collusion 
between metaphysics and inauthentic nihilism, the route to an authentic nihilism is 
impossible via the paths of typical thinking: 
Nihilism – that there is nothing to Being itself (mit dem Sein selbst) 
means precisely this for metaphysical thought: there is nothing to being 
as such (mit dem Seinenden als solchem).  The very path into the 
experience of the essence of nihilism is therefore barred to 
metaphysics.  Insofar as metaphysics in every case decides for either 
the affirmation or the negation of the being as such, and sees both its 
beginning and its end in the corresponding elucidation of the being 
from the existing ground, it has unwittingly failed to notice that Being 
itself stays away in the very priority of the question about the being as 
such.105 
 
 How is Western thinking ever to assume such a daunting task as the overcoming 
of metaphysics and its feeble corollaries of thought like inappropriate nihilism that are 
such formidable obstacles in arriving at a better understanding of the meaning of Being 
itself?  One facile answer would be to turn to the work of Nietzsche, who before 
Heidegger believed that “European” nihilism was deserving of a close philosophical 
scrutiny, since it characterized a crisis in Western culture whereby the highest religious 
and moral bases of society had been undermined.106  Specifically, the devaluation of and 
loss of meaning for the highest value as expressed in the “death of God” means that there 
is no longer a unifying foundation for Western values and the onset of a crisis of long 
duration and uncertain resolution.  Understandably then, Nietzsche sees the necessity for 
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his philosophical work to become engaged in an historical effort to “overcome” what he 
sees as a rampant and insidious nihilism marked by a sense of meaninglessness and 
resignation.107 
 From the previous discussions set forth it is clear that Heidegger’s view of 
nihilism is considerably different from Nietzsche’s.  However, it was Nietzsche who 
moved Heidegger to reflect on nihilism and to appreciate that Nietzsche’s insights were 
essential to any proper understanding of it. A closer examination of the impact of the 
declaration “God is dead,” which occasioned Nietzsche’s interest in nihilism and also 
gave rise to one of Heidegger’s key later texts for theology, “The Word of Nietzsche: 
‘God Is Dead’” (1950), will have to wait until chapter four.  Nevertheless, it is important 
at this time to recognize how Heidegger’s suggestions for overcoming nihilism involve 
an overcoming of metaphysics that markedly distinguishes him from Nietzsche’s similar 
interests, thus allowing Heidegger to retain on another score his unique place on the 
scene of Western philosophy. 
 Rather than delving into the fine distinctions that Nietzsche makes among the 
various kinds of nihilism which Heidegger extracted and showcased from the 
Nietzschean corpus, e.g. “incomplete,” “consummate,” “active,” “passive,” it is more 
meaningful to understand that the concept of “will” is integral in Nietzsche’s program to 
overcome nihilism.108  This is not shocking once it is recalled that Heidegger’s Nietzsche 
interpretations all hinged upon the “will to power.”109  Other well known Nietzschean 
philosophical principles such as the “eternal recurrence of the same” and the “Overman” 
are indeed treated by Heidegger, but only as filtered through the lens of the “will to 
power.”   
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The fixation Heidegger exhibits for Nietzsche’s will to power is most ironic at 
this particular juncture in the current project; since, as the will to power permeates all of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy it obviously becomes requisite in the effort to overcome nihilism.  
However, Nietzsche’s tack to deploy the will to power to overcome nihilism is at 
complete loggerheads with Heidegger’s own strategy to do the same!  And the very locus 
upon which these two thinkers diverge is the differing sources each one emphasizes as 
the primary motivating force in overcoming nihilism.  For Nietzsche, nihilism will be 
overcome, as well as metaphysics, by the initiative and under the auspices of humanity.  
Heidegger, on the other hand, believes that Being itself must take the initiative if nihilism 
and metaphysics are ever to be truly overcome. 
Nietzsche’s standpoint makes perfect sense if it is remembered at the very start 
that his understanding of nihilism is at variance from Heidegger’s.  The nihilism that 
Nietzsche inveighs against is the result of the highest and most cherished values having 
become compromised and so no longer able to provide means of guidance and stability 
for Western society, “value must therefore be thought of as that which supports, furthers, 
and awakens the enhancement of life. Only what enhances life, and beings as a whole, 
has value – more precisely, is a value.”110  Most poignantly then, if “God is dead,” as 
declared by the screaming madman in the town square of Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, 
then the traditional highest principle or value is defunct and the other lesser values will 
also be rendered ineffectual. 
 What are needed, therefore, are new values that would restore some semblance of 
hope and purposeful direction, which would in turn neutralize the pessimism and 
meaninglessness of nihilism.  Thus in Heidegger’s estimation, it was the doctrine of the 
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will to power that led Nietzsche to propose the possibility of a rather sophisticated 
mechanism devoted to the promotion and maintenance of much needed new values, as 
observed by Laurence Lampert: 
For Heidegger it is the metaphysical doctrine of will to power that 
enables Nietzsche to account for the positing of values, the devaluation 
of values and that further permits Nietzsche to develop a program…for 
the revaluation of values.  In the history of Western thought, as seen by 
Nietzsche, the will to power of man [sic] expresses itself as value 
bestowing, as value destroying and finally as value bestowing in a new 
sense based upon the recognition of the will to power as the essence of 
things.111 
 
 These comments by Lampert help to cast the contrast between Heidegger and 
Nietzsche in a sharp relief.  The onus to discern and install new values for the 
enhancement of life and beings as a whole falls primarily on the shoulders of humankind 
and its resources.  Helping to refine this distinction from Heidegger of how the primary 
role is given to the human person and at the same time showing the continuity in 
Nietzsche’s thought is Phillip Fandozzi who remarks, “what was needed was a new 
being, an ‘Overman,’ who would authentically respond to the will to power and complete 
the revaluation process.”112  All that would be needed now to show continuity at its 
utmost would be to include the “eternal recurrence of the same” into the current 
discussion, thus rounding out with precision what Heidegger believes to be Nietzsche’s 
conceptual triumvirate: the will to power, the Overman, and the eternal recurrence of the 
same.  However, to adequately explain the role that the eternal recurrence of the same 
does play in the plight of Western philosophy would require quite a detour and distract 
from acknowledging the essence of the divergence between Heidegger and Nietzsche vis-
à-vis the overcoming of metaphysics. 
 According to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s approach is doomed to failure; it will not 
succeed in the dual mission to overcome nihilism and metaphysics.  If anything, nihilism 
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will actually be furthered and the status quo of metaphysics will be guaranteed.  At the 
root of this flawed strategy is Western philosophy’s 2,500 year history of sidestepping the 
study of Being itself in order to study the Being of beings manifested in the permanent, 
the present and the real.  When this abiding practice is coupled with the emphasis of 
modernity that it is completely incumbent upon the rational thinking person and her 
initiative, then the die is cast for nihilism and metaphysics to reach an apex rather than 
being overcome.  Stambaugh is able to deftly summarize how Nietzsche unwittingly 
embraces key aspects of the very system he wanted to surmount,  
Since for Heidegger Nietzsche conceived of Being as value, he remains 
stuck within the framework of subjectivity and nowhere gets near the 
dimension of what Heidegger calls Being.  Nietzsche wanted to 
overcome nihilism by “affirming” life; Heidegger claims that Nietzsche 
completes nihilism (by conceiving Being as value and thus entrenching 
himself in the unconditional dominance of beings without the remotest 
possibility of questioning Being).113 
 
 Thus, any careless turn to Nietzsche for assistance in the project of overcoming 
nihilism and metaphysics is dashed.  Even though Nietzsche moved Heidegger to reflect 
on nihilism, the initial understanding Nietzsche brought to the condition of nihilism (the 
demise of once vaunted values that enhanced life and beings as a whole) and its cure (the 
“will to power” exercised by rational “Overmen” to install new and improved values) 
quickly entangled him in metaphysics and two of the most basic tendencies of that 
tradition: the advocacy of the priority of humanity and the neglect of Being.114   
By extolling these quintessential categories of metaphysics, Nietzsche does not 
merely fail to make strides in overcoming metaphysics and its ancillary concern of 
nihilism, but ironically he actually brings metaphysics to an unprecedented place, “With 
Nietzsche’s metaphysics, philosophy is completed (vollendet).”115  With this striking 
assertion Heidegger is not implying that philosophy or metaphysics is completed, 
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finished, or at an end in the sense that it has stopped or ceased.  While metaphysics per se 
may have attained a point of impasse as far as its ability to cogently address the only 
matter that is worth questioning – the meaning of Being – it nonetheless is not at a 
terminal stage of despair.  In fact, Heidegger sees only possibility and hope for another 
beginning looming at this critical juncture of completion or ending where philosophy and 
metaphysics now find themselves: 
The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of 
philosophy’s history is gathered in its most extreme possibility.116 
 
But with the end of philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in 
transition to another beginning.117 
 
 It is Heidegger’s recommendation, therefore, that philosophy not turn to 
Nietzsche in order to overcome metaphysics and nihilism. Despite his enticing self-
proclaimed ambitions to overcome metaphysics, Nietzsche too must be “overcome”118 
because of his complicity in formulating concepts that actually brought philosophy to a 
point of metaphysics par excellence.  But at this point, philosophy is poised for a “most 
extreme possibility” and “another beginning” to which Nietzsche is owed a debt of 
thanks. 
 
Overcoming Metaphysics:  Heidegger’s Meditative “Step Back” 
 This new possibility and other beginning that await philosophy will be 
approached in a manner that dramatically shows how keen the differences were between 
Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s philosophical projects, otherwise the contrast could be 
easily overlooked.  Where Nietzsche is found on the one hand touting the will to power 
of the reasoned human subject as the aggressive means to re-institute lost or anemic 
values so as to dispel the blight of nihilism; on the other hand is found Heidegger who 
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enjoins Western thought to a more humble and meditative “step back” (“Schritt zurück”) 
as the only efficacious way to move toward the realization of philosophy’s other 
beginning and new possibility that overcome metaphysics and inauthentic forms of 
nihilism. 
 The introduction of Heidegger’s “step back” in tandem with Nietzsche’s will to 
power quickly promotes a sense of stark contrast between these thinkers over their 
specific mutual concerns to overcome metaphysics and nihilism.  More generally 
however, the step back is indicative of the methodology of the later Heidegger regardless 
of his philosophical dialogue partner.  Though Heidegger himself and most commentators 
insist on a continuity between the broad concerns found in the earlier and later 
Heideggerian writings, there is also a consensus that a marked shift in emphasis is 
noticeable after the publication of Being and Time. 
 In spite of the explicitly stated broad thesis of Being and Time to address the 
question of Being, “Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the 
meaning of Being and to do so concretely.,”119 this can be easily overlooked or forgotten 
because of Heidegger’s choice to focus on personal human existence as the privileged 
means of access to the study of Being, “Thus an analytic of Dasein must remain our first 
requirement in the question of Being.”120  However, the period after Being and Time 
shows Heidegger’s preoccupation with Being now furthered along without the heavy 
reliance on his early analyses of human existence. 
 This “turn,” “shift,” or “reversal” (die Kehre) finds a most pointed 
articulation amidst the current discussion where Nietzsche’s will to power is juxtaposed 
with Heidegger’s step back as alternative means to better the fortunes of Western 
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philosophy, viz. the overcoming of metaphysics and nihilism.  The will to power, as has 
been seen, is immediately ensconced with the capabilities of human existence to initiate 
and carry through a program that will eradicate philosophy’s woes of having “forgotten 
Being.”  By contrast, the step back automatically conveys that a different role is to be 
played by the human person in the recovery of philosophy to its more originary task – an 
attuned correspondence with Being.  To take a step back is not an invitation to passive 
resignation or quietism on the part of the thinker, but it is an indication of participation 
which acknowledges that the initiative and sustaining capacities to overcome metaphysics 
and nihilism rest with Being itself and not with the human and the resources of her 
personal existence.  The French philosopher Dominique Janicaud adroitly synthesizes the 
importance of understanding the implications of Heidegger’s “turn” as well as its 
timeliness, “The overcoming is not the unilateral act of the thinker, it originates in Being 
itself, insofar as Being still emerges for us as worthy of thought in this epoch where 
metaphysics has run out of reserves and possibilities.”121 
Mindful that Heidegger’s step back suggests a different degree of participation 
between the thinker and Being than Nietzsche’s will to power in the project to overcome 
metaphysics and nihilism, it is now possible to more painstakingly investigate the step 
back.  While this conceptual strategy surfaces in various places throughout Heidegger’s 
later works to perform different duties, it will be the focus here to show its merit for 
overcoming metaphysics and inauthentic nihilism. This will allow for closure in the 
ongoing effort to foster an appreciation for Heidegger’s position in Western philosophy 
and his vision for its revitalized future. 
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A key aspect in the preliminary phase of getting acquainted with the dynamics of 
the step back is to realize that despite its having a less assertive tone than Nietzsche’s will 
to power, it still entails a degree of arduousness for the thinker, “the step back out of 
metaphysics into its essential nature requires a duration and endurance whose dimensions 
we do not know.”122 One of the greatest fears is the fear of the unknown, and here again 
Heidegger is found goading Western thinking onto paths that are anxiety producing 
because of a lack of familiarity, “The step back points to the realm which until now has 
been skipped over…our thinking in a way leads us away from what has been thought so 
far in philosophy.”123  What is it that has been thought in philosophy away from which 
the step back guides thinking?  As has been discussed above, philosophy has been most 
comfortable in entertaining the question of Being in light of beings that are present and 
real.  For Heidegger, this approach tacitly acknowledges that there is a difference or 
distinction between beings and Being itself – the so-called “ontological difference” in 
accepted philosophical jargon already mentioned in the earlier section on the 
“forgetfulness of Being” – but it fails to truly engage the depths of the difference as such: 
We speak of it, tentatively and unavoidably, in the language of the 
tradition. We speak of the difference (von der Differenz) between Being 
and beings.  The step back goes from what is unthought, from the 
difference as such, into what gives us thought.  That is the oblivion of 
the difference.124 
 
 Careful consideration of the German word Heidegger uses here for “difference” 
(“die Differenz”) in discussing the tried and true philosophical recognition that a 
distinction obtains between beings and Being leads Caputo to a greater precision about 
the implications of Heidegger’s step back, “Every metaphysics offers us some version or 
another of the difference (Differenz) but no metaphysics manages to think the differing 
itself.”125  However, when Heidegger encourages Western thought to overcome 
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metaphysics by taking a step back, it is not a step back into the customary ontological 
difference, (Differenz), but into the “differing” in the difference. 
 In order to make this fine distinction Heidegger introduces the term der Austrag, 
which is found to have various English renderings depending upon the translator.  For 
example, Caputo translates der Austrag as “dif-ference,” while Krell, Stambaugh, and 
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann render it as “settlement,” “perdurance,” and “contest” 
respectively.  In any event, what is most important according to Caputo is to appreciate 
how the nuance in Heidegger’s word choice is expressive of the far reaching 
ramifications involved in the step back: 
Dif-ference (Austrag) names what is differing in the difference 
(Differenz), the way in which Being and beings are borne or carried 
outside of one another yet at the same time borne toward one another.  
The dif-ference is thus somehow deeper than the more straightforward 
ontological difference, or, better, is the depth dimension in it.126 
 
 Therefore, in one fell swoop Heidegger’s step back into the “dif-ference” can lead 
to marked progress in the efforts to overcome both metaphysics and inauthentic nihilism.  
Metaphysics has labored hard over the centuries to think the difference between Being 
and beings.  It understands Being vis-à-vis beings in conceptualizations that are most 
comfortable, i.e. the permanentized presence of real things.  Yet, metaphysics did not 
gain access to the origin of this difference, the “dif-ference,” which directly enables the 
very event of appropriation – das Ereignis.  But for Heidegger the step back does venture 
forth into this uncharted and rather mysterious territory, “The step back goes from what is 
unthought, from the difference as such, (von der Differenz als solcher) into what gives us 
thought (in das zu-Denkende).127 
 While the main thrust of the preceding has been to clarify the significance of the 
dif-ference into which Western thinking is to step back in order to overcome 
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metaphysics, it cannot go unnoticed that some very characteristic Heideggerian terms 
were passingly introduced and hinted at in the process: “das Ereignis” (the event of 
appropriation) and “Es gibt Sein” (It gives Being).  Because of the complexity of these 
concepts and the pivotal role they play in the later Heidegger’s understanding of Being, 
they are deserving of a fuller exposition.  At this point however, what is most 
indispensable is a realization that in situating Heidegger on the stage of Western 
philosophy he is found desirous of overcoming metaphysics proper that has been so 
influential upon the philosophical tradition.  This requires a radical and brave step back 
into a mysterious zone long overlooked called the “dif-ference,” which touches upon the 
appropriative event of Being itself and further points to the donative dialectic of active 
differing between beings and Being – a difference that has for the most part been 
recognized in only its most superficial sense as a static distinction between beings and 
Being. 
 That there is a donative, granting, or bestowing activity worthy of notice in the 
differing difference between beings and Being is evident by a careful analysis of 
Heidegger’s exploitation of the German idiom “Es gibt.”128  Instead of translating the 
expression “Es gibt” as “There is,” as is customary, Heidegger chooses a literal 
rendering, “It gives,” as a helpful tool in discussing the meaning of Being,  
In order to get beyond the idiom and back to the matter, we must show 
how this “There is” (Es gibt) can be experienced and seen.  The 
appropriate way to get there is to explain what is given in the “It gives” 
(“Es gibt”), what “Being” means, which – It gives,…129 
 
Heidegger capitalizes upon the literal significance of an otherwise commonplace German 
idiom to stave off any clumsy attempt to understand Being by saying that it is 
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“something,” which would be yet one more compromise of Being’s dynamic mysterious 
depth for a more static understanding of Being as a being, 
We say of beings: they are.  With regard to the matter of “Being” and 
with regard to the matter of “time,” we remain cautious.  We do not 
say: Being is, time is, but rather: there is Being (es gibt Sein) and there 
is time.130 
 
 Heidegger offers a most sophisticated explication of the “It gives Being” that 
eventuates in his identifying the “It” with “the event of appropriation” or das Ereignis, 
“Accordingly, the It that gives in ‘It gives Being,’…proves to be Appropriation (als das 
Ereignis).”131  What is crucial at this point is not so much a thorough grasp of all the 
intricacies that enable Heidegger to arrive at the all important concept of Ereignis as it is 
to acknowledge that the step back into the differing difference between beings and Being 
leads to an awareness that Being does in fact possess a giving, granting, and bestowing 
quality.  Moreover, the prime opportunity that this step back offers for the possibility of 
overcoming metaphysics and inauthentic nihilism is to foster an even deeper appreciation 
of the full nature of this giving quality of Being. 
 To begin with, to see Being within the dynamics of giving, granting, or bestowing 
helps to shed light on the long-established prejudice about Being’s relationship to 
presence.  As has been discussed, Heidegger was often critical of the Western 
philosophical bias given to permanentized present beings over Being itself.  Stepping 
back into the dynamism of the differing between beings and Being, however, accentuates 
the need to reorient the focus of philosophy away from static present beings and to the 
active coming-to-presence of Being itself: 
Being, by which all beings as such are marked, Being means 
presencing.  Thought with regard to what presences, presencing shows 
itself as letting-presence.  But now we must try to think this letting-
presence explicitly insofar as presencing is admitted.  Letting shows its 
character in bringing into unconcealment.  To let presence means: to 
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unconceal, to bring to openness.  In unconcealing prevails a giving, the 
giving that gives presencing, that is, Being, in letting-presence.132 
 
 Undoubtedly, Heidegger’s desire to refocus attention upon the active engagement 
of Being in a giving process that lets beings emerge into a state of presence and 
unconcealment is rife with rich imagery that can go far in shifting interest to the dynamic 
meaning of Being itself and away from static beings.  However, of greater pertinence in 
illustrating the methodology of the step back as a way to overcome metaphysics and 
inauthentic nihilism is to heed another aspect of Being’s fundamental trait of giving.  
Amidst the activity of Being’s donative presencing that enables beings to come to 
presence and so be manifestly unconcealed, there is also that aspect of Being’s granting 
that was long ago uttered by the early Greek thinker Heraclitus, “Being loves a self-
concealing.”  As much as Western philosophy through its metaphysical tradition since 
Plato and Aristotle may have ignored or been unable to tap into the full significance of 
this realization, as discussed above this pre-Socratic philosopher nonetheless keenly 
perceived that, “to Being there belongs a self-concealing.”133 
 To accept Heidegger’s invitation to step back into the differing dif-ference (der 
Austrag) that obtains between beings and Being in order to overcome metaphysics and 
nihilism is to usher philosophy toward its other beginning and most extreme possibility, 
which interestingly enough resonates with the early Greek philosophers who had a finely 
tuned correspondence with the appeal of Being.  Being gives, none too many would deny, 
and even if most philosophical ink has been spilled to discuss the gifts of Being – beings, 
entities, things – there has also been the tendency to narrowly misrepresent the giving of 
Being as some kind of metaphysical cause or transcendental condition,134 which actually 
furthered the presencing, unveiling, unconcealing fixation to the detriment of 
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appreciating the absenting, veiling, concealing tendency of Being.  Heidegger gives 
expression to the time honored practice of Western metaphysics to haphazardly take note 
of only one dimension of Being’s giving, 
 In the beginning of Western thinking [with Plato and Aristotle], Being 
is thought, but not the “It gives” (Es gibt) as such.  The latter withdraws 
in favor of the gift which It gives.  That gift is thought and 
conceptualized from then on exclusively as Being with regard to 
beings.  A giving which gives only its gift, but in the giving holds itself 
back and withdraws, such a giving we call sending (das Schicken).135 
 
 Caputo makes the most out of the “sending” image introduced here by Heidegger 
in order to relate a metaphor about sending a letter which greatly serves to demonstrate 
how a tremendously profound aspect of Being’s giving has for too long been overlooked 
and neglected.  If Being in its letting be that gives presence to beings is likened to 
someone who composes and sends a letter, it must be realized that in this process the, 
“One who ‘sends’ a letter remains behind and in a sense is still concealed by the letter.  
The letter never adequately expresses his mind and may even more serve to conceal the 
real truth.”136 
 The step back into the “dif-ference” between beings and Being is therefore a plea 
by Heidegger to meditatively recollect or remember the full range of activity implicit in 
the appropriating event of Being (das Ereignis) as It gives (Es gibt).  Extremely 
important in this genuine recollection is a consciousness of the concealing event of 
Being.  That this involves more of a meditative rather than a calculative type of thinking 
(to employ a vintage Heideggerian contrast) is evidenced by the fact that it requires a 
calm resignation on the part of the thinker that prior to this entity, being, or gift that 
stands before her, which may readily become the focus of an intricate analysis of reason, 
there is a giving that enables that which is present to be present as well as a withholding 
withdrawal.  Fell calls this meditative remembering a “deference,” whereby the thinker 
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ceases to insist by virtue of her reason alone that what is is only what can be present and 
recollects deferingly to an event that has made the present entity possible.  This giving 
event of Being, which always simultaneously holds back, is “prior to and a condition for 
our subjective willing, representing, proposing, imposing, reasoning about and 
calculating.”137 
 Heidegger expends a great deal of energy at various points and for different 
purposes in his later writings on comparing and contrasting meditative or essential 
thinking with calculative thinking.  While meditative/essential thinking is typically 
painted in a more positive light for its ability to enable philosophy to better grasp the 
meaning and truth of Being, it is not necessarily Heidegger’s attempt to uphold this type 
of thinking as a foil for the utter disparagement of calculative thinking.  Instead, it is one 
more way to substantiate the overall thrust of Heidegger’s “turn” (die Kehre) which 
inaugurated and guided the latter portion of his career.  In short, it is Being and not the 
reasoning human subject that initiates and sustains any genuine understanding of Being.  
As a result, the comportment of meditative recollection and remembering is respectful of 
Being’s primacy. To acknowledge Being’s primacy is in no way a suggestion by 
Heidegger for the thinker to assume an attitude of passive indifference.  Rather, to 
meditatively step back and dwell within the depths of the differing dif-ference between 
beings and Being is the only way to respectfully follow Being’s lead and so move along 
the path toward a better understanding of Being’s truth and meaning. 
 Calculative thought, by contrast, is not consonant with the comportment of the 
step back, since “[It] races from one project to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, 
never collects itself.”138  By this frenetic activity, that so typifies the thinking associated 
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with the current technological era, it is unlikely that Being will be carefully thought 
through in all its mysterious depth.  Instead, the focus will be upon the present entities, 
the beings, the what-is that easily lend themselves to computation, calculation, and 
manipulation, “such thinking lets all beings count only in the form of what can be set at 
our disposal and consumed.”139  Accompanying this busied activity on things and their 
manipulation can be an exacting attitude of superiority and domination that is in stark 
contrast with the attitude of humility fostered by a meditative thinking that steps back, 
“Calculative thinking compels itself into a compulsion to master everything on the basis 
of the consequential correctness of it procedure.”140 
 Therefore, the best hope of ever breaking out of the vicious cycle of calculative 
thought and the aggressive hubris that goes along with it is to embrace a meditative or 
essential thinking.  It is this type of thinking that will engender a genuine recollection 
(Andenken), not just of Being’s primacy but also of the full nature of Being’s giving 
event of appropriation that lets what-is (beings) be present, “meditative 
thinking…contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is.”141  In 
contemplating the deeper meaning that resides in every being that is real and present in a 
recollective way, meditative/essential thinking “responds to the claim [or demand] of 
Being” (dem Anspruch des Seins).142 
 Such a meditative and recollective disposition fulfills the requirement of 
Heidegger’s definition of philosophy discussed earlier.  Philosophy is listening for the 
call of Being in order to achieve an attuned correspondence with Being.  The step back 
into the differing dif-ference between beings and Being that coincides with a recollective 
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posture of meditative thinking can lead philosophy to its “other beginning,” “its most 
extreme possibility” and so overcome metaphysics and inauthentic forms of nihilism. 
Traditional metaphysics and its corollary of inappropriate/inauthentic nihilism 
have been in alliance with calculative thought to compromise philosophy’s response to 
Being’s appeal.  As a result, Being has been understood mainly in light of beings that are 
actual and present with little acknowledgment of the dynamic event of appropriation 
whereby Being simultaneously gives beings into unconcealment and withholds itself in a 
concealed nothingness.  To overcome metaphysics’ bias for beings and restricted notion 
of Being relative to beings, as well as inauthentic nihilism’s pejorative notion of nothing, 
requires a recollective step back into the depths of the dif-ference between beings and 
Being.  And for Heidegger what becomes of primary interest in this comportment of a 
meditative-recollective step back is the concealing, defaulting, absenting dimension of 
Being’s activity, which also encompasses the “embarrassing” issue of the nothing: 
Recollective thinking (Andenken) has the task of attending to this 
concealment (Verborgenheit), in which unconcealment 
(Unverborgenheit) is grounded.143 
 
In the step back, thinking (Denken) has already set out on the path of 
thinking to encounter Being itself in its self-withdrawal 
(Sichentziehen).144 
 
According to Caputo, it is a “humble” step back145 accompanied by a meditative-
recollective thinking that Heidegger urges for philosophy as the disposition of active 
response to Being’s appeal.  To be party to philosophy’s “new beginning” and “most 
extreme possibility,” traditional metaphysics and its penchant for beings and limited 
appreciation of Being as disclosive revealing as well as inauthentic nihilism’s disdain of 
nothing must be overcome.  As Heidegger recommends, this can get underway 
successfully if at the outset the thinker is receptive to the call of Being on Being’s terms, 
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which entails an openness to follow Being’s lead down otherwise strange, unfamiliar, 
even embarrassing paths, “But how can he do so without first being struck (betroffen) by 
what is authentic – by the default of Being (vom Ausbleiben des Seins) in its 
unconcealment?”146  Reminiscent of Plato’s dictum that all philosophy in general begins 
with wonder, it is Heidegger’s stance that philosophy may begin yet again with an 
entirely new epoch of promise by being “struck” (betroffen) by the nothing dimension of 
Being that holds itself back, absents itself, defaults. 
After being “struck” with amazement that Being withdraws and “loves a self-
concealing,” the philosopher must continue the overcoming process in philosophy’s new 
beginning and exciting possibility by a serious willingness to engage the depth of the 
meaning that Being in large part remains absent.  Again, this is not done by the 
philosopher’s sole initiative or on her own terms, but rather Being itself sustains any 
confrontation with its mysterious depths:  
Instead of such overcoming [yoked to the thinker’s pure willing], only 
one thing is necessary, namely, that thinking, encouraged by Being 
itself (vom Sein selbst angemutet), simply think to encounter Being in 
its default as such.  Such thinking to encounter (das Entgegendenken) 
rests primarily on the recognition that Being itself withdraws…147 
 
 Fully aware of the strong possibility for philosophy to slip back into its familiar 
interests and accustomed ways after the initial stages of wonderment for and shallow 
wadings into Being’s self-concealing, Heidegger advises a tenacity that gives dramatic 
expression to the very gesturing involved in the recollective step back, “Instead of 
rushing precipitously into a hastily planned overcoming…thinking…lingers a while in 
the advent of the default, awaiting its advent in order to learn how to ponder the default 
of Being in what it would be in itself.”148  A willingness, therefore, to stay the course and 
patiently step back and meditatively ponder will lead to a better understanding of the 
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meaning of Being’s absenting into nothingness.  For Fell, an important part of the lesson 
that accrues to the actively engaged yet docile philosopher is the realization that, “The 
present is made possible by what is absent from the present…”149 
 Heidegger prefers the terms “promise” and “treasure” when referring to what 
awaits the “lingering” recollective thinker so as to encounter the full significance of 
Being’s absence or hiddenness:  
Addressing in this way, while withholding itself in default, Being is the 
promise of itself (das Verspruchen seiner selbst).  To think to encounter 
Being itself in its default means to become aware of the promise, as 
which promise Being itself “is.”  It is, however, in staying away; that is 
to say, insofar as there is nothing to it.150 
 
Correctly thought, oblivion, the concealing of the as yet unrevealed 
essence (in the verbal sense of essential unfolding) of Being, shelters 
untapped treasures (birgt ungehobene Schätze) and is the promise of a 
find (das Versprichen eines Fundes) that awaits only the appropriate 
seeking.151 
 
 Because Heidegger neglects to specify with any exactness what this promise and 
these treasures might eventually entail, a forceful objection could be leveled that 
Heidegger and his meditative-recollective step back fail to lead philosophy to another 
beginning or radical possibility.  On one level this may be true if Western thinking is to 
rejuvenate itself by merely latching on to some definite promise or treasure that it can 
once again manipulate, control and dominate through the exercise of subjectively willed 
reason.  However at another level, if an awareness is maintained that Heidegger’s 
guidance leads not so much to a tangible or quantifiable promise or treasure but rather to 
a renewed appreciation for the mystery of Being, then the centuries old history of 
metaphysics and inauthentic nihilism may be gradually and eventually overcome.  Fell 
bolsters this claim by his suggestion to realize that when led by Heidegger to the ultimate 
destination of his meditative-recollective step back, philosophy is forced to recognize that 
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it bumps up against “the limit of intelligibility, an abyss, a mystery: nothing 
ascertainable.”152 
 Therefore, strides are made in overcoming metaphysics because thinking is now 
directed away from the usual preoccupation with beings and deficient grasps of Being’s 
dynamism to the fullness of Being itself.  This for Heidegger was never meant to be seen 
as a surmounting or transcending of metaphysics so as to “disparage” or “eliminate” its 
contributions to Western thinking.  Rather according to Biemel, it is “by thinking through 
metaphysics [that] we should be brought to the point of thinking upon Being.”153  And 
this meditative-recollective thinking embodied in the step back into the dynamic depths 
of the differing dif-ference between beings and Being leads ultimately back to a clearer 
resonance with the early Greek, pre-Socratic thinkers and their experience of Being, 
which “loves a self-concealing.”  The overcoming of metaphysics is not a destruction or 
deconstruction but a retrieval and resourcement. 
 Strides are also made in overcoming inauthentic forms of nihilism, because in the 
process of being led back to the original thinkers and their more originary experience of 
Being that includes a hiding, defaulting, absenting dimension, there is a forced 
confrontation with the nothing.  In Pöggeler’s estimation, “Heidegger believes that the 
nothing in non-Being – truth as concealing and as non-ground – must be thought as 
belonging to Being.”154  So nothing is not to be seen in its usual sense as the complete 
and absolute negation of all beings or of beings as a whole (nihilatve nothing), since this 
would be inauthentic or inappropriate nihilism.  Rather, the progress in the overcoming of 
this brand of nihilism is achieved when an appreciation is had for Heidegger’s insistence 
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that Being and nothing mutually employ one another “in a kinship whose essential 
fullness we have yet scarcely pondered.”155 
 In the meditative-recollective step back that overcomes metaphysics and 
inappropriate nihilism Heidegger is challenging philosophy to think about the heretofore 
unthinkable.  However, while thinking about such unthinkables – Being loves a self-
concealing within the nothing – is a move out of the confines of traditional metaphysical 
thought, it nevertheless has a marked affinity with religious thinking.  This leads 
Gadamer to make the perceptive observation of how the original German words used by 
Heidegger to explain the meditative-recollective step back for philosophy have 
connections to standard expressions of religious experience: 
 Is there a way of thinking that brushes against this unthinkable?  
Heidegger calls it “remembrance” [Andenken] and the dubious echo of 
“reverence” [Andacht] may well have been intended, in as much as the 
religious experience touches the unprethinkability [Unvordenkliche] of 
Being more than metaphysical thinking.156 
 
 The cautious tone of Gadamer’s remarks helps to underscore the complexity that 
surrounds Heidegger’s relationship to religion in general and its more specific 
articulations in mysticism and theology.  While his relationship to Christian theology will 
be studied in greater detail in the next chapter and andenken’s theological merit will be 
treated in chapter four, at this point the seeming affinity that Heidegger possesses with 
religion in his project to overcome metaphysics is invaluable.  In the effort to situate 
Heidegger on the stage of Western thought, it is noticeable that the uniqueness of his role 
causes him to veer in directions that are shared more explicitly by religious traditions and 
their areas of related concern.  Heidegger’s agenda to push philosophy to rethink the 
meaning and truth of Being outside the established parameters of traditional metaphysics 
takes him into mysterious and uncharted regions – the revealing yet concealing 
  
 81
nothingness of Being – which need not signal an endorsement of religion, mysticism, and 
theology; but which nonetheless is on common ground with the perennial interests and 
efforts of these traditions. 
 At times Heidegger does show in passing yet meaningful ways that the depth 
dimensions that encompass the Being question cannot help but wash over into religious 
concerns like the question of God.  Most specifically, it has been borne out how the effort 
to overcome metaphysics and inauthentic nihilism requires a meditative-recollective step 
back into the differing dif-ference between beings and Being that ultimately leads to a 
frank encounter with the nothing dimension of Being’s self-concealing.  This is indeed a 
foray into the realm of the “unthinkable,” in Gadamer’s words, that simultaneously offers 
a formidable challenge to the typical metaphysical categories of expression while making 
a tenuous alliance with the usual categories of religious expression. 
 However in a passage of “What Is Metaphysics?” concerning the issue of the 
nothing in the course of metaphysical thinking, Heidegger points out how often times 
Western religion, so influenced by the force of metaphysics, has compromised its more 
natural abilities to plumb the depths of a mysterious region (an “unthinkable”) like the 
nothing.  While it has been discussed how philosophy, under the guise of metaphysics 
and inauthentic nihilism, relegated nothing to nihilative non-Being – “the complete and 
absolute negation of all beings, of beings as a whole” – religion, specifically Christian 
Patristic theology, failed to broach the possible “promise” and “treasure” of the nothing 
and chose rather to reinforce the standing philosophical understanding (ex nihilo nihil fit) 
with an added nuance of God.  Heidegger observes that, “Christian dogma…bestows on 
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the nothing a transformed significance, the sense of complete absence of beings apart 
from God: ex nihilo fit-ens creatum (From nothing comes-created being).”157 
For Heidegger the lost opportunity for both philosophy and theology was that, 
“The questions of Being and of the nothing as such are not posed,”158 with the result that 
the “promise” and “untapped treasures” possible for the lingering thinker dwelling in the 
nothing dimension of Being were forgone.  But had theology seized upon its natural 
inclinations and sensibilities to encounter something mysterious like the nothing, then it 
would have been “bothered” by or curious about the nothing and not so eager to dismiss 
it as a mere counter-concept of God.  It is not only that God and nothing are juxtaposed 
as opposites to prove a point of contrast, but if theology were to pause and realize under 
the auspices of a well accepted theological doctrine that it is out of the nothing that God 
creates (ex nihilo), then perhaps the “promise” and “untapped treasures” of the nothing 
could have been a gem that leads to a greater understanding of the mystery of God.  
However for Heidegger, “no one [was] bothered by the difficulty (Daher bekümmert 
auch gar nicht die Schwierigkeit) that if God creates out of nothing precisely he [sic] 
must be able to relate/comport himself to the nothing.”159 
While Heidegger could be diagnosed as having 20/20 hindsight with his assertion 
that philosophy’s ineptitude and indifference toward the question of Being in light of the 
question of the nothing led to a crippling of theology’s abilities and alertness to probing 
the meaning of God by means of the nothing, his insights still stand as a viable challenge 
for both disciplines as well as tentatively introducing the possible application of the 
concerns of the later Heidegger for theology on the question of God.  Heidegger, the 
philosopher, assumes his unique place on the scene of Western philosophy with the 
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agenda to ask the question of the meaning and truth of Being anew.  This will require an 
overcoming of traditional metaphysics and inauthentic nihilism by taking a meditative-
recollective step back into the mysterious region of the differing dif-ference between 
beings and Being that ultimately includes a brave encounter with the self-concealing 
dimension of Being within the nothingness. 
 Although no hasty transposition can be performed on this agenda in order to 
make it more theologically compatible, it nonetheless has ramifications for contemporary 
theology and its discernments of the God question.  The “unprethinkable” (pace 
Gadamer) nature of the Being question requires an attitudinal humility to meditatively 
and recollectively step back into mysterious regions untrod by customary systems of 
thought with the hope of finding the “promise” and “untapped treasures” of illumination.  
Likewise, the “unprethinkable” nature of God requires a reflective lingering pause and 
humble willingness to encounter the mysterious depths that may prove to be newly mined 
conceptual gems in furthering the understanding of God. 
Therefore, it was Heidegger, the “masterful thinker,” who encouraged Western 
thought to a new artful and reverential thinking about the meaning of Being and so 
distinguished himself from other philosophers and their contributions to the discipline.  
Since Christian theology and its many concerns also fall under the umbrella of Western 
thinking, then this may also prove to be Heidegger’s distinctive contribution to a related 
field.  However, what ultimately made Heidegger a “rare plant,” as recommended by 
Nietzsche for the résumé of any philosopher, is that he remained a thinker.  For Caputo 
this is what allowed Heidegger to remain unto himself and so retain his unique status in 
philosophy, as well as enabled him to reach out and contribute with distinction to any 
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receptive area of Western thinking, “Heidegger has remained his own man, neither 
mystic nor metaphysician, but rather, as he puts it himself so simply, a thinker.”160  
  
 85
Notes
                                                          
1 Ernst Behler, Confrontations: Derrida/Heidegger/Nietzsche,  trans. Steven Taubeneck  (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 17.  
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Thinker Martin Heidegger (1969),” chap. 6 in Heidegger’s Ways, trans. John 
W. Stanley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 61.  
3 Ibid., 63. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1991), 3, 9. 
6 Karl Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, ed. Richard Wolin and trans. Gary Steiner (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 131. 
7 Ibid., 132-133. 
8Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” in Existence and Being, trans. Douglas Scott 
and ed. Werner Brock (Chicago: Henry Regenry Co., 1968), 313. 
 
9 Löwith, 133. 
10 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 35. 
11 Martin Heidegger, “The Thinker as Poet,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971), 6. 
12 Martin Heidegger, “The Way back into the Ground of Metaphysics,” in Existentialism: From Dostoevsky 
to Sartre, ed and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: NAL Penguin, Inc., 1975), 267.  
13 Martin Heidegger, “The Nature of Language,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971), 70. 
14 Walter Biemel, “Heidegger and Metaphysics,” in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. and trans. 
Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 164. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Martin Heidegger, “The Essence of a Fundamental Metaphysical Position; The Possibility of Such 
Positions in the History of Western Philosophy,” in Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 188. 
17 Ibid., 189. 
18 Biemel, “Heidegger and Metaphysics,” 165. 
19 Ibid., 171. 
20Martin Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel’s Interview with Martin Heidegger,” trans. 
Maria P. Alter and John D. Caputo, Philosophy Today 20 (winter 1976): 279. 
 
21 Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 130. 
22 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1978), 10 (emphasis added). 
23 George Kovacs, The Question of God in Heidegger’s Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1990), 7, note 1. 
24 Martin Heidegger, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven, CT: 
College and University Press, 1958), 75-77. 
25 Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Knowledge (New York: Shed and Ward, 1964), 3. 
26 Heidegger, What Is Philosophy?, 83-85. 
27 Jeff Owen Prudhomme, God and Being: Heidegger’s Relation to Theology (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1997), 47. The English translation of Heidegger’s Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung 
is now available: Heidegger, Martin. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry. Translated by Keith Hoeller. 
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000. 
28 Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1963), 99. Author assisted in translation by Richard Rojcewicz, Ph.D. 
29On this point see Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 234: “It is itself…Being – that is not God and not a cosmic ground. 
  
 86
                                                                                                                                                                             
Being is farther than all beings and yet it is nearer to [humanity] than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a 
work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God.”  See also John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian 
Theology, 2d ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), 115: “…although [Heidegger] talks of Being 
in a religious or quasi-religious language, he has always made it clear that Being is not God.” 
30 Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 234, 245.  
31 Martin Heidegger, “The Eternal Recurrence of the Same and the Will to Power,” in Nietzsche Volume 
III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and 
Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 183. 
32 Dorothea Frede, “The Question of Being: Heidegger’s Project,” chap. 1 in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, ed. Charles B. Guignon (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 57.  
33 Heidegger, “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics,” 268. 
34 Heidegger, “The Eternal Recurrence of the Same and the Will to Power,” 182. 
35 Heidegger, “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics,” 268-269 (emphasis added). 
36 Martin Heidegger, “Plato’s Phaedrus: Beauty and Truth in Felicitous Discordance,” in Nietzsche Volume 
I: The Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 194. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Martin Heidegger, “The Anaximander Fragment,” in Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western 
Thinking, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1984), 50.  
39 Prudhomme, 104-110. 
40 Heidegger, “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics,” 275. 
41 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Metaphysics,” in Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism, trans. Frank A. 
Capuzzi (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 155. 
42 Ibid., 153.  
43 Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and Difference, ed. 
J. Glenn Gray and trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 62. 
44 Heidegger, “The Anaximander Fragment,” 50 (emphasis added).  
45 Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, 64; and Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence and Concept of Physis 
in Aristotle’s Physics B, I,” trans. Thomas Sheehan, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 229. 
46 Martin Heidegger, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in 
Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 213.  
47 Heidegger, “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics,” 269 (emphasis added).  
48 John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay in Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1982), 181.  
49 Ibid., 181-182 (emphasis added). 
50 Martin Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1972), 7. 
51 Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1971), 139. 
52 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 14.  
53 Ibid., 15.  
54 Martin Heidegger, “Metaphysics as History of Being: Whatness and Thatness in the Essential Beginning 
of Metaphysics: idea and energia,” chap. 1 in The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1973), 13. 
55 Richard Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2005), in press. 
56 Heidegger, “Metaphysics as History of Being: Whatness and Thatness in the Essential Beginning of 
Metaphysics: idea and energia,” 12. 
57 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1962), ¶40, 228-235. 
58 Martin Heidegger, “Postscript to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’,” in Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, 
ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: NAL Penguin, Inc., 1975), 261. 
59 Robert P. Orr, The Meaning of Transcendence: A Heideggerian Reflection (Ann Arbor, MI: Edwards 
Brothers, 1981), 94. 
60 Ibid. 
  
 87
                                                                                                                                                                             
61 Heidegger, “Postscript to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’,” trans. Kaufmann, 260. 
62 Orr, 95-96. 
63 Martin Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?,” trans. David Farrell Krell, in Basic Writings: From Being 
and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 
1977), 101. 
64 Kovacs, 153. 
65 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd and rev. ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 257 (emphasis added). 
66 John Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity: A Theological and Philosophical Approach (New York: 
Crossroad, 1983), 202-205.  
67 Martin Heidegger, “Postscript to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’,” trans. William McNeill, in Pathmarks, ed. 
William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 234.  
68 John Macquarrie, interview by author, tape recording, Richmond, Virginia, 24 January 1998.  
69 Martin Heidegger, The Question of Being, trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wild (London: Vision  
Press, 1959), 99.  
70 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 1. 
71 Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?,” trans. Krell, in Basic Writings, 110. 
72 John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, rev. ed. (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1986), 29.  
73 John D. Caputo, “Openness to the Mystery,” chap. 10 in Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, 
Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 268.  
74 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay in Overcoming Metaphysics, 130.  
75 Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, 128. 
76 Caputo, “Openness to the Mystery,” 268-269. 
77 Ibid., 269. 
78 William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th ed. (Fordham University 
Press, 2003), 595.  
79 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 
144. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid., 145. 
83 Sonya Sikka, Forms of Transcendence: Heidegger and Medieval Mystical Theology (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997), 222.  
84 Ibid., 223.  
85 Joseph P. Fell, “The Crisis of Reason: A Reading of Heidegger’s Zur Seinsfrage,” Heidegger Studies 2 
(1986): 41.  
86 Martin Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” trans. William McNeill, in Pathmarks, ed. William 
McNeill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 317.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Otto Pöggeler, “Destruction and Moment,” chap. 8 in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His 
Earliest Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), 151.  
89 Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” trans. McNeill, 317. 
90 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 181. 
91 Pöggeler, “Destruction and Moment,” 151. 
92 Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” trans. McNeill, 317. 
93 Ibid., 317-318. 
94 Pöggeler, “Destruction and Moment,” 151 (emphasis added). 
95 Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” trans. McNeill, 320. 
96 Martin Heidegger, “Nihilism, Nihil, and Nothing,” trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Nietzsche Volume IV: 
Nihilism, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 19.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” trans. McNeill, 319.  
  
 88
                                                                                                                                                                             
99 Heidegger, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” 200.  
100 Joan Stambaugh, “Nihilism and the End of Philosophy,” Research in Phenomenology 15 (1985): 85.  
101 Heidegger, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” 201.  
102 Ibid., 205. 
103 Heidegger, “Nihilism, Nihil, and Nothing,” 20-21. 
104 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 203. 
105 Heidegger, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” 220. 
106 Phillip R. Fandozzi, Nihilism and Technology: A Heideggerian Investigation (Washington, DC: 
University Press of America, 1982), 5. 
107 Laurence Lampert, “Heidegger’s Nietzsche Interpretation,” Man and World 7 (November 1974): 363. 
108 Fandozzi, 9. 
109 Behler, 17. 
110 Martin Heidegger, “The Will to Power as Principle of a New Valuation,” trans. Joan Stambaugh, David 
Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi, in Nietzsche Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as 
Metaphysics, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1987), 15-16.  
111 Lampert, 365.  
112 Fandozzi, 23. 
113 Stambaugh, 84. 
114 Lampert, 367. 
115 Martin Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1973), 95. 
116 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in On Time and Being, trans. 
Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 57. 
117 Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” 96. 
118 Michael Gelven, “From Nietzsche to Heidegger: A Critical Review of Heidegger’s Works on 
Nietzsche,” Philosophy Today 25 (Spring 1981): 77. 
119 Heidegger, Being and  Time, 1. 
120 Ibid., 37. 
121 Dominique Janicaud, “Overcoming Metaphysics?,” chap. 1 in Heidegger from Metaphysics to Thought, 
Dominique Janicaud and Jean-François Mattéi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 6. 
122 Heidegger, “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” 51. 
123 Ibid., 49-50. 
124 Ibid., 50.  
125 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay in Overcoming Metaphysics, 148. 
126 Ibid.  
127 Heidegger, “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” 50. 
128 John D. Caputo, “Time and Being in Heidegger,” The Modern Schoolman 50 (May 1973): 328. 
129 Heidegger, “Time and Being,” 5. 
130 Ibid., 4-5. 
131 Ibid., 19.  
132 Ibid., 5. 
133 Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, 64-65. 
134 Orr, 77. 
135 Heidegger, “Time and Being,” 8. 
136 Caputo, “Time and Being in Heidegger,” 329. 
137 Fell, 60. 
138Martin Heidegger, “Memorial Address,” in Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans 
Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 46. 
139 Heidegger, “Postscript to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’,” trans. McNeill, 235. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Heidegger, “Memorial Address,” 46. 
142 Heidegger, “Postscript to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’,” trans. McNeill, 236. 
143 Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” trans. McNeill, 314. 
144 Heidegger, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” 227. 
145 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay in Overcoming Metaphysics, 149. 
  
 89
                                                                                                                                                                             
146 Heidegger, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” 225. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., 225-226. 
149 Fell, 56. 
150 Heidegger, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” 226. 
151 Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” trans. McNeill, 314.  
152 Fell, 61.  
153 Biemel, “Heidegger and Metaphysics,” 170.  
154 Otto Pöggeler, “Metaphysics and the Topology of Being,” in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. 
Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 178.  
155 Heidegger, “On the Question of Being,” 317.  
156 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Martin Heidegger – 75 Years (1964),” chap. 2 in Heidegger’s Ways, trans. John 
W. Stanley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 27. 
157 Martin Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?,” trans. David Farrell Krell, in Pathmarks, ed. William 
McNeill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 94.  
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 John D. Caputo, “The Poverty of Thought: A Reflection on Heidegger and Eckhart,” in Heidegger: The 
Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 210. 
CHAPTER TWO:  The Abiding Influence of Heidegger’s Early 
Theological Interests: “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” 
 
Martin Heidegger can, I dare say, be understood adequately only from 
out of his beginnings in which, I want to assert, he always remained 
and into which he was later to penetrate even further.
1 
 
 This observation was made by Hugo Ott, a professor of economic and social 
history at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau.  There is a certain degree of credibility 
and relevance that should be accorded to Ott’s remarks that otherwise could be seen as a 
normal strategy toward understanding any historic personage.  While Ott has published 
numerous articles on Heidegger, it was his biography, Heidegger: A Political Life (1993), 
which gained him the most recognition by placing him in the center of the ongoing 
debate concerning Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism.  If it is Ott’s 
conclusion, after doing extensive research to better comprehend the more controversial 
aspects of Heidegger’s life and thinking, that “only from out of his beginnings” can 
Heidegger be adequately understood, then there is a special merit in following Ott’s 
wisdom in the current study dealing with less inflammatory yet still complex dimensions 
of Heidegger’s thought. 
 The overall aim of the project at hand is to study the writings from the later phase 
of Heidegger’s career with the hope of discovering what these may offer to the 
contemporary theology of God.  To that end, the previous chapter broadly situated the 
later Heidegger upon the scene of Western thought by noting some of his unique 
concerns which distinguished him from many others who have also assumed roles on the 
philosophical stage.  The chapter concluded in a very economical and modest fashion by 
suggesting that the title of “thinker” would be the best way to appreciate the role 
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Heidegger played in the tradition of Western philosophy.  Because of Heidegger’s oft 
stated interests to promote an appreciation for genuine philosophical thinking, the label of 
thinker being immediately associated with his name would be acceptable even to him as a 
respectable way to sum up who and what he was for twentieth century Continental 
philosophy. 
 However such a concluding statement is also lacking in its very economy and 
modesty, particularly for many who are unfamiliar with all the niceties associated with 
the art of “meditative” thinking in Heideggerian jargon.  To call Heidegger a thinker and 
to assign this role as his legacy to Western philosophy creates a yearning to want to learn 
more about this thinker, and more specifically his thinking to which an intellectual debt 
of gratitude is owed.  It is precisely at this juncture of a desire for greater clarity where 
the insights of Ott become most apt and acute concerning the necessity of first examining 
Heidegger’s beginnings in order to arrive at a suitable grasp of the thinker and his 
thinking.  Therefore, it is the hope of this chapter to build upon the somewhat terse 
conclusion of the previous chapter.  If Heidegger “remained a thinker,” in the words of 
John Caputo, throughout his appearance on the scene of Western philosophy, then to 
truly understand the innovative contributions this thinker made there is a compelling need 
to go back to his “beginnings.” It is only from there that an adequate understanding of his 
noteworthy achievements can be attained. 
 But it is not to Heidegger’s “beginnings” in any generic or broad sense upon 
which the gaze will focus in the following pages, since such a tack would prove unwieldy 
and nonproductive for the parameters and goals of this chapter.  Instead, there will be a 
very purposeful and discerning choice of Heidegger’s origins that will serve not only the 
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aims of the current chapter, but will also forge a continuity with the previous chapter and 
the chapters to follow.  It is the theological and phenomenological “beginnings,” which 
clearly punctuate Heidegger’s early intellectual development, upon which this chapter 
will concentrate its efforts.  
 
Theological Beginnings: Personal and Professional Ambiguity 
 
 While the selection of the theological beginnings in order to obtain an adequate 
understanding of Heidegger (the thinker and his thinking) fits neatly within the overall 
scope of this dissertation, it is by no means a purely arbitrary or prejudicial choice.  In 
fact, Heidegger himself has expressly acknowledged the special prominence that his 
theological origins or background (die Herkunft) should retain in comprehending his 
intellectual development.  It is well within the later period of Heidegger’s career that a 
well-known explicit autobiographical remark in this vein is made.  Joseph J. Kockelmans 
relates that in the early 1950s Professor Tezuka from the University of Tokyo paid 
Heidegger a visit so that both philosophers could discuss a number of issues of mutual 
interest.  By 1953-54, Heidegger wrote a dialogue in which he touched upon the most 
important topics covered in these discussions.  This dialogue was subsequently published 
in Unterwegs zur Sprache in 1959, and later translated into English as On the Way to 
Language in 1971.2 
 At one point in their exchange the issue of Heidegger’s interests in hermeneutics 
arises, to which Heidegger credits his previous theological studies and their specific 
concerns of interpreting the scriptures.  Professor Tezuka admits that he knows too little 
of Christian theology to appreciate the link between hermeneutics and Heidegger’s 
seminary education, however he makes the telling observation that Heidegger is “at home 
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in theology.”  And it is in response to this perceptive comment that Heidegger makes the 
glowing acknowledgment, “Without this theological background I should have never 
come upon the path of thinking. But origin always comes to meet us from the future.” 
(“Ohne diese theologische Herkunft wäre ich nie auf den Weg des Denkens gelangt. 
Herkunft aber bleibt stets Zukunft.”)3 
 While due caution must be exercised so as not to over romanticize this 
acknowledgment in order to promote a theological agenda, it nonetheless has been 
interpreted by a wide range of scholars as a legitimate testament having special self-
revelatory force for Heidegger.  Theodore Kisiel goes so far as to identify this as one of 
three important “experiential parameters” coming as it does near the end of Heidegger’s 
career. He believes that it is helpful on two scores. First, it shows that a true 
understanding of Heidegger derives from an appreciation for the “reciprocity between 
biography and philosophy.” Secondly, and with more biographical specificity, it 
illustrates Heidegger’s “personal engagement with his Christianity.”4 
 This later self-disclosive “experiential parameter,” as well as two earlier ones to 
be subsequently discussed that hedge Heidegger in at the start of his career, serve not 
only the purpose of justifying the necessity to play close attention to Heidegger’s 
theological beginnings, but they also help to point out the limited scope of his religious 
and theological interests.  For Heidegger, religion and theology are Christianity.  Caputo 
even calls this tendency of Heidegger’s reductionistic, “Under Heidegger’s hand, religion 
undergoes a double reduction: it is first of all reduced to Christianity, to the Greek New 
Testament, and then Christianity itself is reduced to and identified with ‘faith.’”5  
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Therefore, as the careful examination of Heidegger’s theological origins unfolds, it is 
helpful to bear in mind that these are very circumscribed. 
 Not only are Heidegger’s roots circumscribed in an academic or intellectual sense, 
it is also noteworthy and more important at this point to realize that these origins display 
a tumultuousness and tentative ambiguity on a deeply personal and existential level.  
Appreciating this dimension of Heidegger’s background was previously touched upon in 
a passing way by Kisiel’s astute remarks surrounding the later self-disclosive 
“experiential parameter” when he stated that in understanding the beginnings of 
Heidegger’s “way” there is a need to be conscious of the “reciprocity between biography 
and philosophy,” with especially attuned attention to Heidegger’s peculiarly personal 
engagement with his Christianity.” 
 The tumultuousness and ambiguity that mark the “peculiar” engagement that 
Heidegger has with “his” brand of Christianity can be seen by referring to the two earlier 
autobiographical experiential parameters.  First, in 1919 Heidegger wrote a letter to 
Father Engelbert Krebs, professor of Catholic dogmatic theology at the University of 
Freiburg.  In this letter Heidegger officially announces his confessional turn to 
Protestantism,  
Epistemological insights, extending to the theory of historical 
knowledge, have made the system of Catholicism problematic and 
unacceptable to me – but not Christianity and metaphysics, these 
though in a new sense…I have not, by reason of the transformation of 
my fundamental standpoint, been driven to set aside the high 
assessment and deep esteem of the Catholic life-world for the vexing 
and barren polemic of an apostate…I believe I have an inner calling for 
philosophy, and that by answering the call through research and 
teaching I am doing everything in my power to further the spiritual life 
of man [sic] and work in the sight of God.6 
 
Because this is a letter to a long-time personal friend and enthusiastic supporter, there are 
obviously layers upon layers of motivations and intentions that could be peeled away to 
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fully explicate the meaning of this correspondence.  However this would steer the current 
chapter way off course.  As long as the tone of honest and tactful struggle is detected 
relative to Heidegger’s relationship to Christianity and further how this redounds to his 
professional philosophical career, then an appreciation will be fostered for the extent of 
the tumultuous and ambiguous character of the “peculiarly personal” relationship he had 
with “his Christianity.”  Such a spiritual conversion to the Protestant tradition from 
Catholicism and such a professional change from theology to philosophy for a man at age 
thirty, who from very early on was steeped in the Catholic faith and entered the Jesuit 
novitiate, explain the detectable tone of struggle. 
 The second earlier autobiographical experiential parameter that further heightens 
the pitch of tumultuousness and ambiguity to the point of contradiction surrounding 
Heidegger’s “peculiar” relationship to “his” Christianity surfaces in a 1921 letter to his 
student Karl Löwith.  After having taken two courses with Heidegger, Löwith writes to 
Heidegger to express the philosophical gains he has acquired under Heidegger’s tutelage.  
Heidegger responds in a way that is at once revealing and puzzling when he says, “I am 
no philosopher.  I do not presume even to do something comparable; it is not at all my 
intention…I am a Christian theologian.”7 
 Even a cursory glance at this early autobiographical remark, when thrown in 
comparative relief with the immediately preceding remark, firmly establishes the 
peculiarity of Heidegger’s relationship with Christianity – marked not only by an 
acceptable wrestling with conscience that leads to shifts in paradigms but also by a more 
troubling indication of conflict that ends in glaring inconsistency.  Respect can be had for 
the Heidegger in 1919 who relates that a heartfelt period of discernment has led him 
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away from Catholicism to Protestantism as the better way to articulate his Christianity, 
and how professionally this also lends to a shift from theology to philosophy.  However, 
when within the span of two years it is recorded that Heidegger refutes a doting student’s 
accolades by saying that he is not a philosopher but a Christian theologian, then easily 
granted respect is compromised to doubt and even suspicion. 
 But too severe of a judgment of Heidegger’s apparent conflictedness could be 
misplaced.  As it was in the case of the first letter to Father Krebs, this second letter is 
also freighted with all the typical baggage that coincides with any personal 
correspondence.  Was Heidegger really aligning himself with theology over and against 
philosophy, or was he merely resonating with the themes of the first chapter of this work?  
In other words, it was shown in situating Heidegger upon the scene of Western 
philosophy that he enters and remains there with critical evaluations of philosophy’s past 
and present state (“forgetfulness of Being,” “end of philosophy”), which will require 
some radical overhauling if it is to ever fully realize its authentic mission to think the 
question of Being in the future (“overcoming metaphysics,” “stepping back”).  This 
would be the sympathetic sentiments of yet another student, Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
commenting on the blatant irregularity of Heidegger’s assertion to Löwith that he is not a 
philosopher but a Christian theologian, “the young Heidegger himself had turned the 
phrase destruction of metaphysics into a password and warned his own students not to put 
him in the ranks of the ‘great philosophers.’”8 
 The pattern that is hopefully emerging here validates Kisiel’s observations that to 
truly comprehend the very early Heidegger and the thought path upon which he 
embarked necessitates an appreciation for the reciprocal relationship that obtains between 
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Heidegger’s philosophy and his biography.  This reciprocity means that each aspect 
necessarily mutually conditions and influences the other.  A point at which this 
interdependence is most striking and germane is in the “peculiarly personal” relationship 
Heidegger has to “his Christianity,” a peculiarity distinguished on the one hand by a very 
tidy delineation, whereby Christianity is theology and theology is Christianity.  On the 
other hand, the peculiarity is marked by restlessness, tentativeness, and even reversal.  
Thus, when Heidegger near the cusp of his career pays homage to his theological origins 
as being determinative of the shape that the path of his thinking took, it is an exciting 
invitation to go back to these beginnings with hopes of achieving a thoroughgoing 
understanding of his thought. 
Nevertheless there is a need to proceed with caution, since a temptation in an 
endeavor such as the one at hand could be to a rushed judgment.  After quickly noting the 
influence of theology present during Heidegger’s period of “juvenilia,” a seeming easy 
step based on a tenuous correlation could be made to then formulate conclusions that 
enumerate Heidegger’s influence on theology, specifically the theology of God.  This, 
however, will not be the course taken in this dissertation.  Beginning with this chapter 
and its careful study of the complexities surrounding theology’s influence on Heidegger’s 
early period vis-à-vis his peculiarly circumscribed and erratic relationship with 
Christianity, a more deliberate method will be embraced which will eventually lead to 
more well grounded conclusions concerning the later Heidegger’s contributions to 
contemporary theologies of God.  This same methodological observation was made by 
István Fehér in an essay studying Heidegger’s unique notion of “atheism” as it applies to 
philosophy, “the relation between Heidegger and theology, far from being one-sided, is 
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rather reciprocal, not conceivable purely in terms of the question of how Heidegger 
influenced theology, but equally to be treated in terms of the decisive influence theology 
exercised on Heidegger’s path of thinking.”9 
 Therefore, it is with firm footing that a careful analysis of Heidegger’s influential 
theological origins may proceed, well aware that these were always filtered through two 
important qualifiers that touch upon different levels of his existence.  First, there is the 
more intellectual and academic manner by which Heidegger confines theology to 
Christianity.  Second, and potentially more problematic, is Heidegger’s peculiar 
relationship to Christianity that is actualized through his personal faith convictions. While 
this has been painted thus far as unsettled and even unsettling, it should be borne in mind 
that these fragile beliefs are nonetheless those which mutually propel Heidegger’s 
thought early on, and, for some commentators, sustained his thought throughout, though 
with mixed success at his being able to authentically integrate these faith stances with his 
life’s work and choices.  For example, Ott maintains that in writing Heidegger’s 
biography in order to investigate his “mentality” and so understand him “from inside,” a 
point of recurring fascination was the “things” that Heidegger clung to, for instance “the 
fact that he clearly never broke free from the faith of his birth, [and] that he lived all his 
life in the shadow of this conflict.”10 
 Likewise Gadamer, devoting extended commentary to Heidegger’s curious 
declaration “I am a Christian theologian,” concludes that from this strange statement it 
may be deduced that, “it was Christianity once again that challenged the thought of this 
man and held him in suspense.”11  Although Heidegger never actually was a theologian in 
the professional sense, he nonetheless remained a “frustrated” theologian.  According to 
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Gadamer, if being a theologian were to mean expending one’s energies solely toward the 
explication of the vicissitudes of faith, of what it might mean to speak of God, then 
Heidegger would have been more at home in practicing theology per se.  But because 
theology proper speaks directly about God, this made Heidegger keep the distance of a 
detached yet deeply interested observer, since, as Gadamer says, “It was clear to 
Heidegger that it would be intolerable to speak of God like science speaks about its 
objects; but what that might mean, to speak of God [faith] – this was the question that 
motivated him and pointed out his way of thinking.”12 
 The precise nature of the relationship that Heidegger feels exists among faith, 
theology, and philosophy deserves greater explanation but is beyond the spatial 
allowances of this chapter. It is essential now as this study enters seriously into the initial 
phases of Heidegger’s trajectory of theological origins to realize that the “peculiarly 
personal relationship” that Heidegger has to “his Christianity” centers on faith – what it 
might mean to speak about God – and all the precariousness by which he possessed it and 
all the seriousness by which he acknowledged it. 
 While there are several places along the trajectory of Heidegger’s theological 
origins where an initial entry could be made, this chapter will proceed by selecting the 
period encompassing his early Freiburg years.  From 1919 to 1923, Heidegger taught 
philosophy at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau as a Privatdozent and assistant to 
Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology.13  It is specifically the course entitled 
“Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” (hereafter the “IPR” course) from the 
winter semester of 1920-21 that will receive a close investigation in the following pages.  
This course will provide a fitting starting point for becoming familiarized with 
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Heidegger’s theological origins, not just because it is a clear forum where Heidegger 
explicitly presents his more mature theological interests, refined after a gestation period 
of nearly twenty years; but also because the “IPR” course underscores the peculiarly 
personal relationship he had with Christianity.  Regardless of the noted element of 
struggle present in this relationship, ranging from tumultuousness and ambiguity to 
inconsistency, it nevertheless was a relationship that was undergirded by faith. 
Heidegger’s emotional and personal possession of faith was clearly more prone to 
fluctuations than was his intellectual acknowledgment of its appropriate place in 
theology. Faith in this regard remained more constant.  
 
The Early Freiburg Period: 1915-1923  
 Before moving directly into an analysis of the religion course which punctuates 
this phase of Heidegger’s career and provides an invaluable resource for appreciating the 
theological origins which Heidegger at times reminisced about so glowingly, it is 
imperative to first negotiate yet another conundrum relative to his treatment of the “IPR” 
course as well as several other early lectures. The intrigue involves the editorial process 
used to select the manuscripts to be incorporated into the multi-volume collection of 
Heidegger’s works better known as the Gesamtausgabe. 
 Because the editorial machinery and machinations that initiated the process for 
compiling the Gesamtausgabe are significant and interesting, and because they will 
continue to influence its compilation until the projected completion date in 2006, they 
could easily become lengthy topics unto themselves.  As a result, the interests of this 
chapter and those of the dissertation overall will be most efficiently addressed by 
mentioning briefly a few recent scholarly revelations. These will bear directly on how the 
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early lecture courses at Freiburg with overt religious themes were part of the project to 
assemble Heidegger’s collected works.  Awareness that intrigue surrounds the editorial 
work of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, some of which is the direct result of his own doing, 
helps to appreciate the tone of caution that has been consistently advanced regarding the 
approach to and integration of Heidegger’s theological origins.  Specifically, how is it 
possible to reconcile the well known magnanimous gesture Heidegger makes concerning 
the influence of his theological origins (“Without this theological background I should 
have never come upon the path of thinking.”) with the recently documented reluctance on 
his part to specifically acknowledge the theological traditions that were so prevalent and 
readily identifiable in this early Freiburg period? 
 Heidegger’s hesitancy to go one step farther and specify the “theological origins” 
to which he claims a debt of gratitude is easily manifested by his refusal to make all of 
his early Freiburg writings immediately available so as to ensure their inclusion in the 
final edition of his collected works.  Most of the pioneering scholarly work in English 
that recently discovered this strange maneuver is to be credited to John van Buren, who 
catches Heidegger in yet another inconsistency by discussing the deliberate downplaying 
of the blatant theological origins during this first Freiburg era: 
Though maintaining that ‘thinking’ is really ‘thanking,’ the later 
Heidegger was…often puzzlingly reluctant to acknowledge his 
profound indebtedness to those philosophical traditions that originally 
helped to put him on the way of the Being question in his early 
Freiburg period, such as the young Luther, Kierkegaard, Jaspers, 
Aristotle’s practical writings, Husserl’s Sixth Investigations, and 
Dilthey.14 
 
 In contradistinction to the emphatic and fervent admiration that Heidegger 
lavishes upon his theological origins in the early 1950s, there is ambivalence and 
wavering toward this background in the 1970s when the rhetoric could have been 
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actualized by a decision to include the manuscripts of all early materials that could then 
permanently substantiate an otherwise passing quip of praise.  While Kisiel concurs with 
the ambivalence in Heidegger’s evaluation of his “youthful thoughtpaths,” he also goes 
further by stating that Heidegger looked “unfavorably” on these origins.  This sort of 
estimation is diametrically opposed to Heidegger’s positive assertion that, “Without this 
theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking.”  Kisiel 
points out that the unfavorable assessment of these once lauded youthful thoughtpaths –
judged to have rightly guided the overall direction of the thoughtpath with continuity – 
comes through in the negative expressions Heidegger used when referring to them, “as 
mere byways (Umwege), errant ways (Abwege), blind alleys (Irrgänge), and a trace of the 
way (Wegspur)”15 through the history of Western philosophy. 
 Instead of moving directly on the straight and narrow of the way or path by the 
good offices of the theological traditions Heidegger was exposed to and nourished by, he 
was detoured on to some back roads by these traditions which merely distracted him at 
certain points in his formative years.  Amazingly, such specifically identified theological 
perturbations sidetracking Heidegger included the New Testament and the young 
Luther!16  The dismissal of Luther’s influence by Heidegger, so indicated by Kisiel, as 
just an unfortunate diversion is most remarkable from the perspective of this chapter and 
its efforts to expose the impact of Heidegger’s theological origins.  However, as it has 
become more apparent that Heidegger had a decreased appreciation for his theological 
background in the final days of supervising the shape of his collected works, then perhaps 
the slighting of Luther’s contributions was actually a purposefully placed degradation to 
cause not only confusion about the influence that theologians of Luther’s stature had on 
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his work, but also to destroy completely any ability to neatly trace the line of his 
development back to theology. 
 Such an alleged strategy on Heidegger’s part would allow him the opportunity to 
effectively disinherit his theological origins, since the downplaying of Luther would be 
tantamount to removing a key structural beam supporting the very topics covered in the 
two Freiburg religion courses. It is Pauline theology which factors heavily in the “IPR” 
course and obviously Augustine in the summer 1921 “Augustine and Neoplatonism” 
course, and so to disavow Luther’s presence would be essentially to rob them of their 
ultimate vivifying theological source.  Caputo helps to highlight the foundational 
significance that the theology of Luther exerted whenever Heidegger delved into the 
thought of Paul or Augustine: “He took his lead not from scholastic theologians like 
Aquinas, Scotus, and Suarez but from Pascal, Luther, and Kierkegaard, who in turn lead 
him back to Augustine and Paul.”17  The extent of Luther’s felt presence in Heidegger’s 
musings over Paul in the “IPR” course will become more apparent when the foregoing 
analysis unfolds; however, what is important at this time is a recognition that Heidegger 
was glaringly inconsistent at various levels when appraising his theological origins.  At 
one level, he was loath to approve the inclusion of courses he taught with clear religious 
thematic orientations into his Gesamtausgabe.  At another level, Heidegger deals a more 
crippling blow to his theological background.  Leaving nothing to chance that perhaps 
unapproved manuscripts of these religion courses would surface in the form of credible 
student notes or protocol minutes, Heidegger purposefully goes on record (in various 
ways) denouncing the importance theological traditions, i.e. Luther, had upon his 
thought.  Therefore, the early Freiburg religion courses were merely detours away from 
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the true philosophical paths, and furthermore could lay no real claim to having been 
motivated and sustained by thought steeped in rich theological questions spawned by a 
prodigious religious thinker like Luther. 
 With all the efforts to cover his theological tracks, it is obvious that there was 
something troubling Heidegger at a deeper level as he performed one of his final 
scholarly acts of putting his imprimatur on the collected writings.  The only way that 
these early Freiburg lectures were to be included would be as supplements, and this 
decision was not finalized until 1984, eight years after Heidegger’s death.  Were they 
being relegated to supplemental status for the sanguine academic reason that Gadamer 
offers, namely because Heidegger did not think that they belonged to his authentic corpus 
since they did not yet make the real breakthrough to the Being question?18 Or, was the 
source of Heidegger’s guardedness about these writings indicative of something stirring 
at a deeper level?  For instance, van Buren has dubbed some of the early Freiburg 
lectures the “dangerous supplement,”19 so as to infer that granting these early works a 
more legitimate status suitable for a greater public dissemination and access might reveal 
a source for Heidegger’s thinking that would somehow be embarrassing or damaging to 
his legacy of thought.  Van Buren is quick to argue that such motivations would not come 
only as the last wishes of Heidegger himself, but would also find support among many 
commentators of Heidegger who themselves wish to monitor the ongoing formation of 
the Heidegger canon by eliminating early sources that could be deemed “apocryphal” if 
their inclusion might compromise the officially sanctioned methods to study and interpret 
Heidegger. 
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Likening the clamor brought about by the recent attention to the scholarly 
potential of these early works to the uproar occasioned by the exposure of Heidegger’s 
deep Nazi affiliation, van Buren states: 
There has been much talk of a type of “damage control” exercised by 
orthodox Heideggerians on Farias’ and Ott’s documentation of 
Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism, but what about the 
possibility of the damage control on the discovery of the dangerous 
“supplement” of his youthful writings that threatens to upset the 
Official Story?…This study of Heidegger’s youthful writings takes up 
the challenge of infiltrating Heidegger, Inc., demythologizing the 
mython of the Official Story about the early development of his 
thought, and telling a version of the unofficial story that has been 
rumored for years.20 
 
 While van Buren’s tone may be too fiery and polemical to embrace wholesale in 
this current study, his insights nonetheless can provide a wise reference point for 
endorsing the merit of this chapter in the overall scope of the dissertation.  As this chapter 
devotes time and energy to the very early phase of Heidegger’s career, it might initially 
appear incongruous, since the stated long term goal is to decipher what the later 
Heidegger has to offer to the contemporary theology of God.  However, van Buren offers 
support for the need to approach the early works with excitement and due caution 
(already stressed) as a hopeful means to better understand the reason why certain issues 
preoccupy the later Heidegger and how these may redound to theology.  And if a link can 
be made specifically between blatant early theological interests and later more veiled 
points of theological contact, then success will have been achieved in van Buren’s 
recommended strategy – polemics aside – of obtaining a better understanding of 
Heidegger by “playing off” the youthful works against the later Heidegger: “The young 
Heidegger – this Heidegger earlier than the early Heidegger [of Being and Time] – can be 
of service in finding the Heidegger or better, the Heidegger later than the later Heidegger, 
as well as ways of thinking that no longer directly bear Heidegger’s seal.”21 
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 However, it is not the aim to establish a direct and facile correlation between the 
very early Heidegger’s overt dabblings in theology and the later Heidegger’s 
philosophical concerns that have theological application.  This would defy the approach 
assumed in this work to always maintain an appreciation for Heidegger and his work as 
an evolving organic whole.  Instead, it will speak more loudly with resonances across 
disciplinary lines if these early theological interests are perceived to be foundational in 
the sense that they continued to exert a quiet yet profound influence on Heidegger, thus 
validating his encomium, “Without this theological background I should never have come 
upon this path of thinking.”  In other words, it is appreciating the overall effect that 
theology had on Heidegger’s way of thinking and approaching philosophical issues that 
lingered forcefully throughout his career. 
 Therefore, the hope here is to be able to dwell comfortably within the throes of a 
seeming irreconcilable tension between the conflictual ways that Heidegger views his 
interface with theology during the early Freiburg period.  This contradictory tension is 
articulated on the one hand by Heidegger’s much referred to emphatic declaration 
crediting theology for the perduring influence it has had upon his overall path of thinking 
(“Without this theological background I should never have come upon this path of 
thinking.”).  While on the other hand, there has been a calculated effort on Heidegger’s 
part to minimize the effects that his early theological interests had upon his work, so 
much so that Heidegger’s one time interest in a figure like Luther was dismissed as a 
mere distraction that detoured him away from his genuine and sole path of thought – the 
question of the meaning of Being. 
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 Appeal is again made to Luther, since learning to dwell comfortably in this 
otherwise tensile environment of opposing perspectives leads to the discovery that a 
prominent theologian did in fact have a lasting impact on the spirit of Heidegger’s work, 
which has been brought forth in another place of van Buren’s scholarship.  Gadamer was 
cited earlier as offering a reason why Heidegger may have been reluctant to immediately 
incorporate into his collected works certain writings from the early Freiburg period, such 
as the “IPR” course, because Heidegger was not certain that these lectures had made any 
substantial contribution to the Being question.  In a direct refutation of Gadamer’s 
explanation, van Buren offers the observation that Luther’s animating influence actually 
spills over pronouncedly from the religion courses into a philosophy course during that 
time in Freiburg with the effect of helping promote the Being question in a manner that 
strikingly presages the tack widely employed by the later Heidegger. 
 It can be recalled how in chapter one’s efforts to situate the later Heidegger upon 
the scene of Western philosophy, the overall mission statement of philosophy was put 
forth.  For the later Heidegger, philosophy’s main objective should be to strive for an 
“attuned correspondence with Being.”  Essential to advancing the question of Being by 
means of such a careful and receptive listening for the call of Being is to break out of the 
misguided categories of metaphysics, which have dominated the way Western philosophy 
has approached the meaning of Being since Plato and Aristotle. So part and parcel of the 
later Heidegger’s more meditative and passive approach to the study of Being is a related 
need to “overcome” metaphysics and thus realize that philosophy, as it has been practiced 
for over two millennia, has come to an “end.” 
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 This revisionist and “destructive” tendency, so operative in the later Heidegger’s 
philosophical wranglings, was also detectable in some philosophical projects of the early 
Freiburg era.  What is most important to comprehend is that this deconstructive spirit that 
vivifies the more proper philosophical concerns of both the juvenile and mature 
Heidegger owes its basis to the fruits of Heidegger’s theological interests, which found an 
opportunity for expression in the early 1920s religion courses taught at Freiburg.  This is 
a significant contribution made by van Buren’s research, but not in a generic way or with 
a general reference to Heidegger’s early theological preoccupations.  Rather, with a high 
degree of precision and specificity, van Buren pinpoints the influence of Luther upon the 
young Heidegger.  At first this may seem to be of little consequence, since it is fairly 
understandable that Luther could be a logical driving force behind courses focusing on 
Paul and Augustine.  However, van Buren’s unique discovery about the influence of 
Luther is that it goes beyond the boundaries of the early religion courses and can also be 
seen giving impetus to a subsequent philosophy course on Aristotle.  Granted that this is 
not an impetus that would be as readily detectable as it would be in the religion courses 
where Heidegger’s topical expositions of Paul and Augustine intersects neatly with 
Luther’s topical interests on the same.  Instead it is a more subtle influence, not 
attributable to topical overlay but to a dispositional style and spirit.  Where Heidegger 
once relied upon the theological acumen of Luther to inform his religion courses on Paul 
and Augustine, he now widens his embrace of Luther by adopting his methodology in the 
service of philosophy.  For van Buren, Heidegger’s development of a theologian’s 
methodology to advance philosophy is of great moment, since it not only guides the 
efforts of a few philosophy courses offered in the early 1920s, but also anticipates the 
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main philosophical agenda that will consume the efforts of the later Heidegger well into 
the 1970s.  As van Buren observes: 
The young Heidegger saw himself at this time as a kind of 
philosophical Luther of western metaphysics.  In WS [winter semester] 
1921-22 and in his other courses on Aristotle, Heidegger modeled his 
project on Kierkegaard and especially on Luther’s destructio, from 
which he derived his odd philosophical term “destruction” 
(Destruktion)…After the quasi-Lutheran destructions back to primal 
Christianity in his two religion courses of WS 1920-21 and SS 
[summer semester] 1921, it was in his first lecture course on Aristotle 
in WS 1921-22 that Heidegger now ventured the more ambitious 
project of a quasi-Lutheran destruction of 1) the entire philosophical 
tradition based on Aristotle…and 2) Aristotle’s metaphysics itself, so 
as to effect what he already in WS 1921-22 called “the end of 
philosophy”…Again following Luther’s…appreciative readings of key 
Aristotelian concepts…Heidegger’s destruction prepared the way for 
uncovering and repeating on an ontological level the historicity of 
factical life in 1) primal Christianity and 2) Aristotle’s own practical 
writings, so as to effect what he called a new “genuine beginning” for 
the question about Being.22 
 
 Though multifaceted, these remarks from van Buren actually convey a succinct 
synthesis that allow for a well informed segue to the next portion of the chapter devoted 
to a fuller analysis of one of the two religion courses Heidegger taught at Freiburg.  It 
provides for a “well informed” movement, since it stresses the ongoing observations that 
despite the erratic posture that Heidegger assumed in relationship to his early theological 
background, it was nonetheless real: he was a Jesuit candidate for the priesthood and a 
theology student who was steeped in and intrigued by a wide array of theological 
traditions ranging from Paul to Eckhart; he did teach courses with religious themes where 
his previous theological exposure could find expression in a public forum.   
However, despite these verifiable and objective résumé like facts, van Buren’s 
conclusion also lends to a smooth segue because it captures the more intangible effect 
that theology had upon Heidegger.  Luther becomes a very specific reference in this 
regard.  It is not just Luther’s “theology of the cross” that becomes a topical content piece 
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that helps Heidegger design his syllabi for the two religion courses; instead, it is the 
elusive yet lasting attitudinal stance toward theological method which Heidegger admires 
in Luther.  While this methodological spirit is described as “destructio,” it has been 
discussed in the previous chapter that the actual goals sought after in the implementation 
of this or related strategies by the later Heidegger are very nuanced. Nevertheless, it is 
important here to conceive that the animating force of Luther’s revisionism in theological 
circles pervaded Heidegger’s later philosophical interests in a very pronounced way.  
Thus the truly distinctive refrains of the later Heidegger to “overcome” metaphysics, and 
to “destroy” fundamental ontology have unmistakable resonance with Luther’s 
destructio. 
Therefore, in proceeding to examine more closely the content of Heidegger’s 
early lectures on Paul, there is now an appreciation for the need to carefully maintain a 
discerning glance in order to better determine what it is about Heidegger’s theological 
background that truly affected him in a sustained manner.  This will avoid passing off 
Heidegger as a “closet theologian,” while simultaneously leaving open the possibility that 
the later Heidegger does offer insight into religious matters and more specifically can 
have implications for contemporary theologies of God in a postmodern climate.23 
 
“Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” (Winter Semester 1920-21): The 
Confluence of Phenomenology and Theology 
 
 Equipped with an appreciation that the early Freiburg period was a point in 
Heidegger’s career where theology very openly played an important role, it is now 
possible to focus directly on the specific content of these theological interests.  Because 
Heidegger only taught two courses in the early 1920s with patent religious themes, the 
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challenge to decipher his theological preoccupations is greatly lessened.  By completing a 
diligent and selective analysis of Heidegger’s lectures for the “IPR” course, a meaningful 
grasp of the specific content of Heidegger’s theological interests will be achieved.  
However, it is not just a matter of being able to identify and list Heidegger’s specific 
theological pursuits.  Such a fragmented approach would only isolate Heidegger and lock 
him into a small phase of his overall path of thinking.  Rather keeping in mind the thesis 
of the dissertation to discover whether the later Heidegger contributes or detracts from a 
theology of God, these early theological themes are unearthed and then used as continual 
points of reference to see if their influence continued and thus resurfaced in some form, 
or if they were simply episodic and never again detectable. 
 One further caveat should also be borne in mind before proceeding.  As it was 
previously noted, a ground swell of intrigue and debate accompanied the editorial process 
deciding whether or not to include these particular lectures in the final edition of 
Heidegger’s Collected Works.  However in April of 1984, the fifth prospectus of the 
editorial compilation project stated that the literary executor, Hermann Heidegger, had 
given the nod to publish the extant manuscripts of these courses as a “supplement.”24  
Subsequently in 1995, the two religion courses (“Introduction to the Phenomenology of 
Religion” and “Augustine and Neoplatonism”) were included in volume sixty of the 
growing Gesamtausgabe under the title Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens.  Because 
at the time of writing this chapter there had yet to be a full English translation of these 
texts,  the following analysis relied on the original German as well as an extensive and 
complete English paraphrase of the “IPR” course rendered by Theodore Kisiel.  His 
translation and commentary as well as the insights of Thomas Sheehan and Otto Pöggeler 
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are critical, since for many years they were the only scholars allowed access to the 
manuscript material associated with the religion courses.25 
 It is noteworthy that reaching a final form of the “IPR” course was especially 
challenging, not only for Kisiel’s English rendering and Sheehan’s and Pöggeler’s 
analyses, but also in the editorial efforts striving to develop a suitable German version.  
This is the result of the fact that only eight of Heidegger’s own manuscripts from the 
thirteen courses he taught during this time at Freiburg are extant.26 The missing 
manuscripts for the “IPR” course and five other courses meant that the published 
German, as well as the paraphrased renderings and commentaries in English, were based 
on transcripts of student notes.  Whether or not these missing lectures were intentionally 
destroyed by Heidegger himself or others, or simply perished in less dramatic ways, it is 
essential to realize that the following treatment makes recourse to the primary sources in 
a very different manner than usual. 
 A survey of the “IPR” course outline in Appendix-1 helps to quickly establish the 
content parameters of Heidegger’s theological foray. Synthesizing Parts One and Two of 
the course leads to the reasonable hypothesis that the main objective here is to discover 
what is “primal” or “original” Christianity as expressed in the factical faith lives of the 
first Christian communities, viz. Paul’s Galatia and Thessalonica.  While this is a fair 
gleaning from a cursory study of the outline’s topical headings, it remains the work of the 
following pages to convert this hypothesis into an informed conclusion in order to further 
establish continuity with what lays behind in chapter one (the unique role that the later 
Heidegger played on the stage of Western philosophy) and with what lies ahead in future 
chapters (the possible contributions the later Heidegger makes to the theology of God). 
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 Earlier in this chapter it was brought forth that Heidegger’s very circumscribed 
notion of religion and theology as Christianity was to be heeded as a cautionary point 
when beginning a study of the effects of Heidegger’s theological origins.  It was even 
pejoratively suggested to be a “reductionist” tendency.  However at this point, with all 
due respect for the need to acknowledge Heidegger’s limited exposure and appreciation 
for matters theological, it is now possible to see a more positive aspect to this seeming 
negative delimitation.   
For instance in Heidegger’s very desire to understand and explicate “primal 
Christianity” (Urchristentum), there is a marked resonance with a distinctive attribute of 
his later philosophizing.  It was stated in the first chapter that Heidegger had a special 
respect and fascination for the early Greek or pre-Socratic philosophers (Heraclitus, 
Parmenides, Anaximander), because they possessed the keen ability to foster and 
maintain an attuned correspondence with Being.  Subsequent philosophers, beginning 
with Plato and Aristotle, became practitioners of metaphysics and lost this pristine and 
incisive ability, which resulted in altering the course of Western philosophy from its 
genuine mission – the Seinsfrage.  But Heidegger came along to announce the “end” of 
philosophy and a concomitant need to “overcome” metaphysics with the hope of again 
allowing the meaning of Being to be conveyed to philosophers receptive to Being’s 
promptings, thus recapturing the privileged philosophical style of the pre-Socratics. 
In a similar vein, the very early Heidegger is found in the “IPR” course desirous 
of gaining access to Christianity in its most pristine and incisive expression, since it too 
has undergone serious sullying and compromise by: “Aristotelian and Neoplatonic 
conceptuality of both Catholic and mainstream Protestant theology [that] amounted to a 
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foreign infiltration of and distortion of the concrete historicity of the primal Christianity 
of the New Testament.”27  In an attempt to retrieve the true essence of this primal 
experience, Heidegger is thus seen returning to the very earliest Christian documents, to 
Paul’s two letters to the Thessalonians.  Caputo remarks that Heidegger: “set out to 
explore a radical Christian ‘dawn’ (eine Frühe) before it had vanished in the harsh light 
of Greek philosophical theology.”28  This has a definite parallel with the later 
Heideggerian recommendation to return to the earliest texts of Greek philosophy found in 
pre-Socratic thinking, to a radical Greek dawn before it vanished under the harsh light of 
metaphysics. In either instance, there is in Heidegger a “love or privileging of the early,” 
according to Caputo.29 
If time and space permitted it could be shown in this chapter that Heidegger’s 
fixation on Paul’s correspondence to the neglect of the Gospels meant that his notion of 
primal Christian experience was severely impoverished.  However, it is more manageable 
and important at this point to discern the positive aspects that this particular “love and 
privileging” of the earliest Christian documents reveals about the primitive Christian 
experience. 
Focusing on the early as means to uncover the full meaning content of an 
experience is not the work of a romantic luddite seeking asylum in the idyllic past, but 
rather it is better seen as the work of the phenomenologist getting “to the matter itself” 
(“zu den Sachen selbst”).  Therefore, it is important when grappling with this early phase 
of Heidegger’s career not to lose sight of the major impact of phenomenology and 
Husserl.  Accordingly, as the close analysis of the “IPR” course ensues, there will be a 
concerted effort to investigate and incorporate the extent and meaning of this impact.  
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Herbert Spiegelberger notes that any vacillations toward phenomenology on Heidegger’s 
part is due mainly to the fact that, “The history of Heidegger’s association with 
phenomenology is almost entirely that of his association with Edmund Husserl.”30 And 
this period when Heidegger is delivering lectures for religion courses can easily be 
recognized as the high mark in that relationship.  Evidence of the mutual respect and 
affinity that prevailed between Husserl and Heidegger at this time comes forth in the way 
that each philosopher pays tribute to the other.  Husserl would often say to Heidegger, 
“You and I are phenomenology,”31 while Heidegger in discussing the seminal figures in 
his philosophical quest accords Husserl the lofty stature as the thinker who “opened my 
eyes.”32 
Indeed what Husserl did to open up Heidegger’s eyes was to provide a 
phenomenological lens that refracted light which illuminated the way to return to the 
origins of experience.  Phenomenology aims to think “the matters themselves,” and even 
more emphatically to encounter them in their presuppositionless originality.  According 
to Robert Sokolowski, “The most important contribution phenomenology has made to 
culture and the intellectual life is to have validated the truth of prephilosophical life, 
experience, and thinking.”33 So it was not Heidegger, the hopeless romantic, who loved 
and privileged the “early,” rather it was Heidegger the phenomenologist who saw the 
early as having special disclosive potential.  Therefore, Heidegger applies the rigors of 
the phenomenological method to “religion,” specifically to two of Paul’s letters in order 
to expose the depths of primal Christianity – Urchristentum. 
Besides fostering a general appreciation for the place of phenomenology in 
Heidegger’s thinking, the preceding discussion of phenomenology also helps to 
  
 116
underscore an emphasis that bears periodic reiteration; namely, that Heidegger was and 
remained a philosopher, not a theologian.  This reminder assumes a particular urgency at 
this point of delving into an early Freiburg course that has an overt religious content.  
Kisiel concurs with this cautionary reminder as he begins discussing a portion of 
Heidegger’s “IPR” course: 
 Methodologically, this [the second part of the course] does not aim to 
be a dogmatic or theological interpretation, nor an interpretation based 
on the history of religions, nor a religious meditation, but a 
phenomenological interpretation.  The peculiarity of such an 
interpretation is the attempt to arrive at a preunderstanding as an 
original way of access to the Christian lifeworld of the New 
Testatment.34 
 
In an even more comprehensive way, Kisiel warns elsewhere that any true evaluation of 
the impact that this course had upon Heidegger’s thinking must be leveled from within a 
philosophical context only: “the real contribution of this academic year [1920-21] to 
Heidegger’s development is not…religious content but rather the abstrusely formal 
elaboration of his hermeneutic phenomenology.”35 
 In a certain sense Heidegger himself admits that the true motivations and 
intentions behind his “IPR” course are more philosophical than theological.  While the 
course strives to penetrate the religious lifeworld of the first Christian communities and 
thus to find a more adequate conceptuality for it with the help of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, Heidegger acknowledges that there have been others before him with 
more decidedly religious interests and motivations who have already discovered the 
primal Christian experience and its importance without the assistance of phenomenology 
per se.  Theologian and Heidegger translator John Macquarrie bolsters and broadens 
Heidegger’s insight that the phenomenological method was influential in the work of 
many theologians, though in a very inchoate way: 
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Although the term [phenomenology] is chiefly associated with Husserl 
and the difficult philosophical method which he constructed, there were 
thinkers both before Husserl and contemporary with him, and 
especially philosophers of religion, whose methods were to all intents 
and purposes phenomenological, even if they did not call them such 
and were not acquainted with Husserl directly or conversant with the 
niceties of his method.36 
 
 The theologian who best exemplified a “proto-phenomenology” with the specific 
agenda to investigate the depths of the early Christian experience was Friedrich 
Schleiermacher.  This conclusion can be extracted from sources predating the 1920-21 
“IPR” course.  Concentrating on the problem of the religious in Schleiermacher’s 
Discourses on Religion, Heidegger gave a private lecture on August 2, 1917.37 The 
second portion of this work by Schleiermacher, “On the Essence of Religion,” is for 
Heidegger a prime example of a proto-phenomenology of religion leading back to the 
primal Christian experience, because it expresses a pre-philosophical or 
“antimetaphysical regress to a feeling of absolute dependence.”38 
 Heinrich Ochsner, an early associate of Heidegger’s, was among the select few in 
attendance at this talk and recounts the rationale upon which Heidegger based his 
conviction that the work of Schleiermacher, unknowingly yet wholeheartedly, embraced 
an informal phenomenological method in order to arrive at the essence of religious 
experience in general and Christian religious experience specifically: 
Schleiermacher distinguishes religion sharply from metaphysics and 
morals, as well as from theological doctrine; he argues that religion is 
based autonomously in the immediate intuition of the historical 
manifestation of the infinite in the unique particularities of the world 
and, more specifically, in the personal self-consciousness of the ‘feeling 
of dependence’ on the infinite.  Religion’s essence is neither thinking 
nor acting, but intuition and feeling.39 
 
While it will be shown shortly that Heidegger would not agree with Schleiermacher as to 
the precise nature of the early Christian religious experience as including a 
thoroughgoing feeling of absolute dependence on the infinite, he nevertheless commends 
  
 118
Schleiermacher’s proto-phenomenological attitude which in turn enabled a crude 
phenomenological “reduction” away from metaphysics, morals and theological doctrines, 
and back to the more genuine and original religious experience of early Christianity. 
Trying to determine with exactness the extent to which the proto-phenomenology 
of Schleiermacher’s use of reduction accords with the formal doctrine of 
phenomenological/transcendental reduction pioneered by Husserl in 190740 would move 
this study well beyond its parameters, mostly because this would entail a lengthy analysis 
of the different kinds of reductions and their varied applications in phenomenological 
theory.41 However it is still important to realize that Heidegger regards Schleiermacher’s 
assertions as a prescient form of phenomenological reduction, since an operative 
“bracketing” can be observed whereby all of the established ways used to articulate 
religious experience through metaphysics, morality, and doctrine are “suspended” in 
order to be led back to Christian religious experience in its own original domain and 
peculiar character. 
 Reduction, with the Latin root re-ducere, is indeed a leading back, a withholding 
or a withdrawal.42 When introducing and developing the concept of reduction, Husserl 
himself often refers to a first procedure of bracketing or epoché.43 According to Kisiel, 
Heidegger sees Schleiermacher’s efforts “as a form of epoché which serves to ‘switch 
off’ and so sort out the various ‘teleologies’ [external trappings] normally operative in 
and with religion.”44 Schleiermacher, the proto-phenomenologist, deploys a crude form 
of the epoché and successfully switches off and sorts out the external trappings of 
religion based on prejudicial ways of thinking metaphysically and doctrinally or acting 
morally in order to arrive at the true essence of religion based on immediate intuition or 
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feeling of the infinite. This, as a result, engenders an awareness of dependence (“absolute 
dependence”) and a yearning (“a sense and taste for the infinite”). 
 The other early source, aside from this 1917 invitation only talk, for discovering 
Heidegger’s positive evaluation of Schleiermacher’s theology as proto-phenomenological 
is in the second course he taught during the early Freiburg days in the summer semester 
of 1919.  Here, Heidegger does not further explain why Schleiermacher should be seen as 
a forerunner of the phenomenological movement, but instead presumes this in order to 
note a resulting worthy contribution made by Schleiermacher.  Because Schleiermacher 
used a rough form of the phenomenological reduction so as to be led back to religion’s 
utmost primal religious experience – intuition and feeling – it is fitting to declare that, “he 
discovered primal Christianity” (“er entdeckte das Urchristentum”).45 After making this 
broad declaration, Heidegger goes on to elaborate that such a discovery was a far 
reaching contribution because of the decisive way it influenced Hegel’s youthful works 
on the history of religion and indirectly influenced Hegel’s entire philosophical system, 
which in turn shaped the ideas of the German intellectual movement in general.46 
 It should be clear from the foregoing that while Heidegger will be seen 
conducting an interesting analysis of the primal Christian experience in the “IPR” course, 
he lays no claim to original thinking on many levels.  At one level, Heidegger credits 
Schleiermacher for having “discovered” the importance of the primal Christian religious 
experience, and having done so with the aid of a methodology that would not have its 
formal debut until a century later with Husserl and the phenomenological movement.  
Incidentally, it is a curious irony that the determination of the proper relationship between 
matters religious and phenomenology per se was actually a task being reserved for 
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Heidegger. Moran has observed that, “Husserl’s initial allotted role for Heidegger in the 
great domain of phenomenology was as someone who would develop a phenomenology 
of religion…”47 
 But even at another level, when it comes to trying to decipher the more specific 
content of the primal Christian experience, there is an additional disclaimer issued by 
Heidegger that he is merely borrowing the insights of his intellectual predecessors.  It is 
interesting to note a similarity here concerning the unusual and disjointed sense of timing 
Heidegger demonstrated when deciding to properly cite his sources.  When it comes to 
acknowledging the person responsible for discovering the importance of primal 
Christianity, Heidegger did so prior to the course in which it is thoroughly discussed.  
Likewise, he does not devote any lecture time to acknowledging the sources responsible 
for detailing the content of primal Christianity, but instead postpones such recognition 
until decades later in 1970 when he writes a Foreword to the published edition of his 
1927/28 lecture “Phenomenology and Theology.”  As Heidegger was seen crediting 
Schleiermacher, a theologian, for discovering primal Christianity, he once again credits 
another theologian, Franz Overbeck (1837-1905), for more specifically identifying the 
content of this experience. 
 A friend and contemporary of Friedrich Nietzsche, Overbeck’s work was clearly 
influenced by the master hermeneut of suspicion.48 Overbeck was interested in finding 
the content of primal Christianity, and like Nietzsche he was suspicious of movements 
claiming to represent the original Christian ideal.  However unlike Nietzsche, Overbeck 
never denounced belief per se, but instead elevated a particular belief of the early 
Christians as paramount for discerning the very kernel of the primal Christian experience.  
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According to Overbeck, it was the fervent belief of the nearness of the eschaton which 
truly vivified the religious experience of the first Christians. Nearly fifty years after 
devoting almost undivided attention to this reality in his first religion course Heidegger 
lauds Overbeck for such an important insight: “the ‘little book’ On the Christianness of 
Today’s Theology of Franz Overbeck…established the world-denying expectation of the 
end as the basic characteristic of what is primordially Christian” (von Franz Overbeck, 
der die weltverneinende Enderwartung als den Grundzug des Urchristlichen feststellt).49 
 Because Overbeck admired the essential aspect of the original Christian belief as 
the world-denying expectation of the end of the present mode of the world and of the 
imminent coming of Christ, he felt that the eventual erosion of a heightened belief in the 
Parousia set the ground for rigid dogmatization and the decline of the spirit.50 The 
wearing away and neutralizing of this particular belief was hastened by the 
accommodating tendencies of formal theology, beginning with early Patristic times, to be 
relevant to its surrounding culture.  Specifically, Overbeck felt that the chronic attempts 
by theology to convert faith to knowledge, according to prevalent philosophical or 
cultural standards, was fatal to the genuine meaning of the Christian religion, and 
especially to the original Christian experience and its intensely eschatological focus.51 
 With a firm realization that Heidegger was not the first person to call attention to 
the reality of the primal Christian religious experience, nor the first to specify the content 
of this experience, it still remains to be shown that he nonetheless made a unique 
contribution toward the refinement of this reality in the “IPR” course.  What did 
Heidegger have to offer about the primal Christian experience and how did this early 
theological preoccupation influence the development of his thinking?  Attempting to 
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address these two questions and related concerns will be the main objective in the 
following pages. 
  
The Human Experience of Factical Life: 
Part One – “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” 
 
 Earlier a schematic outline of Heidegger’s “IPR” course was presented in 
Appendix-1 as a preliminary way to introduce and call attention to the important role that 
the topic of primal Christianity would assume during the winter semester of 1920-21.  To 
attempt a complete analysis of the entire course with its two main divisions would be an 
unmanageable and ineffective pursuit for the interests of the present chapter.  As a result, 
a very purposeful selectivity will be exercised in order to hone in on the portions of the 
course that will maximize an understanding of how Heidegger’s specific early theological 
interests gave rise to some later aspects of his thinking and continued to guide it often 
times in subtle and unexpected ways.52 The pertinent portion of the course that goes to 
the heart of these matters is contained in Part Two, where Paul’s letters to the Galatians 
and Thessalonians serve as the textual bases for illuminating the main concept of primal 
Christianity in conjunction with the two ancillary concepts of factical life-experience and 
primordial temporality.  To delineate even further this exercise of meaningful selectivity, 
the following will focus only upon the manner in which 1 Thessalonians 4-5 acted as the 
ultimate point of convergence whereby primal Christian experience is best understood 
when integrated with its corollaries of facticity and temporality. 
 Having established that Heidegger embraces the basic content of primal 
Christianity originally advanced by Overbeck as the first Christian communities’ 
heightened expectations for a Parousia close at hand, it becomes clear that any real 
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potential for novelty will come from appreciating Heidegger’s perception that the early 
Christian preoccupation with Jesus’ Second Coming exerted a tremendous influence on 
their understanding of human existence as factically lived with a unique awareness of and 
sensibility to time. 
 While factical life as a concept signifying concrete, historical existence is a term 
Heidegger co-opts from the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey,53 it was seen in the first 
chapter that Heidegger had a penchant for accusing Western philosophy of “forgetting” 
the richness behind many of its established concepts and then issuing a necessary call to 
recover that which has been forgotten or neglected.  Thus in Part One of the “IPR” 
course, Heidegger sets out to explicate the phenomenon of factical life-experience with 
typical Heideggerian rhetoric that if philosophy makes a conscious effort to inquire about 
the problematic nature of any of its concepts, then strides will be made in retrieving their 
deeper yet lost meaning.  But it is not just a matter of indiscriminately raising a concept 
like facticity to the level of problem and then automatically arriving at new or renewed 
points of clarity; instead, there must also be recourse to a source or sources which always 
possessed an uncompromised and pristine appreciation of the concept.  
It was the first Christian communities who possessed such a genuine grasp of 
facticity, and so by turning to Paul’s Galatians and Thessalonians, as Heidegger so 
guided his students, philosophy’s understanding of factical life-experience would be 
moved forward.  Thomas Sheehan, one of the few scholars who initially had access to the 
unpublished manuscripts of the “IPR” course lectures, weighs in with the following 
observation:  
Part One of the course introduces a phenomenology dedicated to 
recovering what was forgotten by the entire Western tradition 
(including Husserl), but which, even if unthematically, was understood 
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by early Christianity: life in its here-and-now facticity, factical life-
experience (das faktische Leben, die faktische Lebensfahrung).54 
 
 This focusing of attention on Part One of the course may seem contradictory, 
since it was emphatically stated earlier that certain constraints would mean that only a 
very confined section of Part Two could receive a thorough treatment.  However, it is 
impossible to make a quick and direct move into Part Two without jeopardizing the 
overall intellectual flow and integrity of the course.  Therefore a few essential points that 
Heidegger raises in Part One must be addressed as prefatory remarks, which will only 
enhance the eventual treatment of the more relevant topics in Part Two. 
 Because several of the Freiburg courses immediately preceding the “IPR” course 
were topically oriented to the matter and method of phenomenology,55 it would be a fair 
assessment that Part One would continue in a similar vein but with a new and specialized 
focus.  However what actually emerges in Part One of the course is an attempt to discern 
how the phenomenon of factical life-experience prescribes the need for a modified 
phenomenological method.56 So for some reason facticity vis-à-vis religion gives rise to a 
moment of pause in what would otherwise be a continuation of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological tours de force. 
 The need to halt and revise the phenomenological method to better suit the 
explication of factical life-experience (and even more specifically religious factical life-
experience) in Part One of the “IPR” course has been even seen as a sign of Heidegger’s 
conflictedness toward the phenomenological movement.  On one hand, as mentioned 
above, this early Freiburg period represents a high mark in the relationship between 
Heidegger and Husserl, and so can readily be dubbed the “golden age” of Heidegger’s 
unabashed promotion of and loyalty to phenomenology.  To that end, Heidegger sets out 
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on his task to render a phenomenological analysis of factical life-experience with a sense 
of respect for his mentor’s largesse.  According to Caputo, “Instead of Nietzsche’s flight 
from university philosophy, Heidegger puts his hope for renewal in a university that 
philosophizes and in particular in Freiburg, where Husserl’s phenomenology 
gives…access to the structure of factical life.”57 
 On the other hand, Heidegger also begins to show signs of a maturing thinker – 
teetering towards a rebelling thinker – who realizes that a few modifications to the 
orthodox phenomenological method may be in order if it is to effectively investigate 
factical life-experience and its more specific expression in early Christianity.  The 
problem in all phenomenology is always the question of access to the phenomenon – 
How does the philosopher get the phenomenon properly in view?58 For Heidegger, to 
properly get the phenomenon of factical life-experience in view, there will have to be an 
augmentation made to Husserl’s methodology.  Therefore, Heidegger feels the need to 
expand the phenomenological method in ways beyond which Husserl at that point in time 
would allow in order to reach factical life-experience in its fullness.  As Sheehan’s 
observation just pointed out, it was not Western philosophy in some generic sense which 
“forgot” factical life-experience in its authenticity, but rather Husserl himself can be 
singled out for having had an essential complicity. 
 Heidegger’s rationale for why Husserl is worthy of such a notorious implication 
has its basis in the way that Heidegger adds on to Dilthey’s definition of factical life, 
which in turn calls for a methodology divergent from Husserl’s: 
Because factic life experience is more than a cognitive experience, 
more than even the simple initial experience of taking cognizance, 
philosophy [phenomenology] in the face of it must undergo a total 
transformation.  What is had, lived, experienced in factic life is more 
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than a mere object for a subject and its theory-forming activity, it is a 
world in which one can live.59 
 
By stating that factical life experience is “more than” a cognitive experience, it is 
not as if Heidegger is implying that Husserl’s method is inadequate because it is relegated 
to the analysis of enclosed internal mental states.  On the contrary, Heidegger would have 
been thoroughly conversant with one of phenomenology’s core tenets – the intentionality 
of consciousness – which according to Sokolowski is “the teaching that every act of 
consciousness we perform, every [factical] experience we have, is intentional: it is 
essentially ‘conscious of’ or an ‘experience of’ something or other.”60 Husserl was 
leading an all out campaign against the dominating philosophy launched by René 
Descartes which established and enshrined the subject-object dichotomy with such 
assertions that when humans are conscious, they are primarily aware of themselves or 
their own ideas, again Sokolowski: “Consciousness is taken to be like a bubble or an 
enclosed cabinet; the mind comes in a box.  Impressions and concepts occur in this 
enclosed space, in this circle of ideas and experiences, and our awareness is directed 
toward them, not directly toward the things  ‘outside.’”61 Therefore, one of Husserlian 
phenomenology’s important contributions was its doctrine of the intentionality of 
consciousness, which formidably challenged the entrenched egocentric predicament 
espoused by the Cartesian doctrine – How can we transcend ourselves and make contact 
with the external world?62 
So it would be utterly absurd to conjecture that Heidegger was faulting Husserl’s 
method on the very grounds against which Husserl was so assiduously fighting. Rather, 
when Heidegger posits a definition of factical life-experience that includes much more 
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than cognition, he is finding fault with Husserl’s phenomenology at a more sophisticated 
level. 
In his earlier writings from 1907 to 1913, Husserl gradually developed his theory 
about the nature of the intentionality of consciousness.  In order to leave a conceptual 
mark of distinction against the regnant Cartesian tradition, he introduced a new 
terminology drawing on the ancient Greek terms for “what is thought,” noema, and the 
“act of thinking,” noesis.63 While a thorough explanation of these terms is beyond the 
scope of this exposition, it is still helpful at present for the terms to be introduced and 
briefly explained. 
Noema refers to any object of intentionality, to whatever is intended when human 
consciousness is focused on things, situations, facts, and any other kinds of objects.64 By 
contrast, noesis pertains to the intentional acts by which human consciousness intends 
things through perceptions, judgings, rememberings, etc.65 The main point to bear in 
mind is that for Husserl the noema and noesis are related components in the structure of 
the mental process.66 And this becomes the ground for Heidegger’s uneasiness as to 
whether or not the Husserlian method can provide the best access to factical life-
experience.  Not that the noematic-noetic interplay as an entrapped mental process would 
somehow thwart the abilities of the intentionality of consciousness to effectively reach an 
object like factical life-experience, but rather for Heidegger such an approach to factical 
life with its heavy reliance on the workings of the mental processes tends to shield and 
even “sanitize” the approach to factical life-experience and its full range of existential 
concerns. 
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Caputo has well identified some of Heidegger’s misgivings toward pure 
phenomenology’s ability to truly confront factical life in all it profundities.  Husserl 
would contend that factic life-experience would be, as any other object of experience, a 
suitable target for philosophical reflection, since with ease the intentionality of 
consciousness would put the philosopher in touch with this pure intuition of simple and 
unencumbered givenness.  But Caputo sees Heidegger raising doubt here about the status 
of factic life-experience – Is it just a “vorhanden,” a simply given, immutable object 
which is immediately evident?67  Heidegger would answer with a resounding “no,” and 
thus be fully consistent with his descriptions of factical life indicated earlier as being 
“more than a cognitive experience” which finds its fullest expression “in what I do and 
suffer…in…my states of depression and elevation.”  Therefore, if the experience of 
factical life is best understood as an ongoing attempt to actively integrate new challenges 
and joys, then a phenomenological method is required that can effectively operate within 
this atmosphere that Heidegger likened to a “struggle” or “battle” (der Kampf). 
In contrast, Husserl felt that the philosopher could carry out her mission in a much 
more tranquil climate with reflective disengagement from and neutralization of factical 
life.68 Because factical life-experience is a pure intuition and an unencumbered 
givenness, it would be readily accessed by the intentionality of consciousness and its 
noematic-noetic dynamic, thus neutralizing any trace of disturbance or agitation.  
However as Caputo suggests, “In the place of Husserlian peace, of calm correlation of 
noesis and noema, of intuition and presence, Heidegger puts the stormy battle between 
questioning and self-recessive life.  The scene of intentionality is a Kampf.”69 
Phenomenology is therefore put to the test on the score of factical life-experience.  
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Because life cannot be seen as merely an immediate cognitive intuition which only lends 
itself to a cool, clinical and clean cerebral study, then a modified phenomenological 
method is required that will be more adept at truly engaging the defining elements of 
strife and struggle present in the human condition. 
It is hoped that the above objective to show how Heidegger boldly flexed his 
muscle of difference against Husserl and Armistice era phenomenology has been 
successfully met.  However before proceeding to discuss the particular struggle that 
Heidegger’s feels beset the experience of factical life in early Christianity, it would be 
prudent to stave off any possible misunderstandings that may have arisen concerning 
1920s Husserlian phenomenology.  By restricting the discussion to such a small phase of 
Husserl’s career, it is understandable that any realistic hope of arriving at a 
comprehensive grasp of his philosophy is dashed.  This is especially true with regard to 
Husserl’s approach to the experience of factical life with which Heidegger took particular 
issue as being too relegated to the coziness of cogitation. 
However a closer look at Husserl’s development shows that his career can be 
tracked by three main stages, the latest of which being most relevant as intimated by its 
very designation as the “Lebenswelt” period.  Since the most conspicuous and seminal 
motif preoccupying the senior Husserl was the basic lifeworld (Lebenswelt), it is only 
fitting that the issue of factical life-experience would assume a more prominent role in 
furthering the understanding of this world as experienced by a living subject in her 
particular perspective, no matter how distorted.70 Interestingly enough, Moran goes so far 
as to conjecture that Husserl’s contact with Heidegger may have been instrumental in 
determining the form and focus of his final work on the Lebenswelt: 
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After his retirement in 1928, partly in response to what he regarded as 
the mistaken direction of Heidegger’s phenomenology of concrete, 
historical existence in Being and Time, Husserl began to offer his own 
version of the themes of historicity and the finitude of human 
understanding and began to emphasize the manner in which the human 
consciousness is always caught within the context of the “lifeworld” 
(Lebenswelt).71 
 
 Determining the accuracy of Moran’s speculation that the student (Heidegger) 
may have eventually influenced the master (Husserl) with regard to the issue of factical 
life-experience long after an estrangement between them had set in is not as important as 
coming to terms with the fact that much earlier the student was willing to courageously 
challenge the master on the issue of factical life-experience.  What was it about the 
experience of factical life, so distinctively expressed within the earliest Christian 
communities, that made Heidegger take notice and take a stand to the point of 
endangering a relationship that was then at its peak? 
 
The Early Christian Experience of Factical Life as “Temporalized Struggle” 
Part Two – “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” 
 
 Trying to arrive at an answer to the preceding question moves the study along 
directional lines that basically correspond with the thematic flow of Heidegger’s “IPR” 
course, (cf. Appendix-1).  Part One intended to define broadly the experience of factical 
life and then assess its compatibility with state of the art phenomenology. The level of 
compatibility was soon discovered to be discordant, since the experience of factical life 
included the very real and dynamic quality of human struggle which would not fit neatly 
into the purview of the pure phenomenological method, confined as it was in a major way 
to the parameters of cognitional activity.  Therefore in Part Two of the “IPR” course, 
Heidegger sets out to present a revised phenomenology that will adequately and 
thoroughly expose the existential depths of struggle as it is lived out in the fledgling 
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Pauline Christian communities of Galatia and Thessalonica.  Even though Heidegger 
devotes labor toward interpreting both of Paul’s correspondences to the Galatians and the 
Thessalonians, it will be beneficial for the present endeavor to restrict its focus to his 
analysis of 1 Thessalonians.  Heidegger himself only briefly treats the letter to the 
Galatians and in part endorses the course of action chosen here to dwell mainly on the 
Thessalonian correspondence, since it provides a privileged access to the vagaries of 
Christian factical life-experience in comparison to the letter to the Galatians: “Burdened 
with less dogmatic content than the letter to the Galatians, the two letters to the 
Thessalonians will be the focus of our attempts to explicate and understand the Pauline 
proclamation in the actual situation out of which it emerges.”72 
 Earnestly attempting to capture the “actual situation” has definite 
phenomenological resonances. But as a phenomenological phenomenon, “situation” is 
only accessible through, and can only be elaborated out of a performed or enacted 
understanding (vollzugsmässiges Verstehen).73 Heidegger’s emphasis concerning the 
importance of the performative or enactment sense as being determinative for truly 
grasping the context of early Christian experience was first indicated by Pöggeler after 
one of his exclusive pre-publication explorations into the manuscripts of the “IPR” 
course: “According to Heidegger, the primordial Christian experience is a factical and 
historical one, an experience of life in its actuality, because it sees life’s dominant 
structures in the significance of performance rather than in the significance of 
contents.”74  
This observation is extremely helpful for the structural integrity of this chapter 
because of its keen ability to simultaneously convey continuity and specificity.  
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Continuity is evident with Heidegger’s earlier general treatment of factical life-
experience in Part One of the “IPR” course, when it was his conviction that such 
experience is realized in what one “does” and “suffers.”  Now, as the Christian 
experience of factical life is being specifically broached, it is once again detectable that 
doing, performing, accomplishing – all forms of enactment – are integral to a genuine 
appreciation of the specific religious situation which provides the venue for Paul’s 
missives to the Thessalonians.  Finally, continuity and specificity will coalesce later in 
the chapter when Heidegger characterizes the anticipatory experience accompanying the 
future Parousia as a proactive and engaged waiting. 
 However, in acknowledging the essential position that doing, performing, and 
accomplishing (Leisten) occupy in both factical life-experience in general as well as the 
more particular articulation found in early Christian existence, it is important not to 
overlook yet another key aspect of similarity – struggle (der Kampf).75 In fact, it can be 
recalled that Heidegger’s desire to incorporate the element of struggle into any genuine 
study of the experience of factical life in general signaled a necessary break with official 
phenomenology.  Likewise in the realm of a Christian expression of factical life-
experience, there is an utmost need to qualify all doing, performing, and accomplishing 
with the certain presence of real human struggle in all its many manifestations.  As a 
result, Heidegger is seen in the second part of the “IPR” course dedicating a great deal of 
effort toward identifying and developing the precise struggle that confronted the 
Thessalonians and thus strongly influenced the form of expression that their factical life-
experience took. 
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 To do this Heidegger not only modifies the dictates of established 
phenomenology, but also fine tunes its scope to create a phenomenology of religion with 
the goal of achieving a phenomenological understanding of original Christian lived 
experience from out of itself.76 The fact that struggle is the prominent experiential base 
out of which early Thessalonian Christianity is lived is indicated by the position that the 
following assertion has toward the end of the course, which permits it to act as part of the 
concluding remarks: “The life of the Christian is enormously difficult, always actualized 
in need and affliction.”77 
 Actualizing the Christian factical life-experience in the throes of need and 
affliction is not for Heidegger realized in some generic or unspecified manner, but rather 
is always a temporalized realization.  In other words, as van Buren has so succinctly 
remarked, the experience of factical life lived by Paul’s Thessalonians was a daily doing 
and suffering – a “timed” enacted struggle: “The original Christians live in a constant, 
essential, and necessary insecurity…a context of enacting one’s life in uncertainty before 
the unseen God, ‘in daily doing and suffering.’”78 Heidegger himself says at one point in 
his discussion of 1 Thessalonians that “Christian religiosity lives temporality as such” 
(“die christliche Religiosität lebt die Zeitlichkeit”).79 Therefore, the factical sense of life 
for the struggling Thessalonians is shot through, from beginning to end, with time and 
temporality.80 
 Heidegger’s strong conviction that the challenges of early Christian factical life-
experience are ultimately realized in and affected by a temporal dimension should come 
as no surprise. It should rather be seen as a logical instance in the trajectory of his 
philosophical development, since the concepts of time and temporality maintain a 
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sustained place of prominence beginning with his phenomenological roots, surfacing with 
unmistakable force in Being and Time, and even extending into his later works. 
 From its inception, phenomenology has striven to develop a highly sophisticated 
theory of time and temporal experience.  Of particular interest has been the discernment 
of the important role that temporality plays in the establishment of personal identity.81 As 
a matter of fact Husserl maintained that “Time is the universal form of all egological 
genesis,” an important point brought to light by Moran.82 
 Heidegger clearly assumes the mantle of his phenomenological heritage on the 
score of temporality and personal identity in Being and Time.  At key junctures here, 
Heidegger reminds his readers that the ultimate quest is the meaning of Being in 
general,83 even though both Divisions clearly display an extensive phenomenological 
analysis of Dasein – the being of humans or the entity (person) who has this being.84 
With no intent to oversimplify the complicated analysis of Dasein in Being and Time, it is 
nonetheless important at this point to draw once again upon the acumen of Heidegger 
interpreter John Macquarrie. He claims that the entire picture painted by Heidegger in 
Being and Time brings into sharp relief the essentially temporal character of Dasein.85 
For example at the end of the first Division of the work, Heidegger sums up the being of 
Dasein with the inclusive concept of care (die Sorge).  The threefold structure of care 
developed in the previous sections, however, shows the marked importance of 
temporality in its various dimensions as Macquarrie’s summation shows: 
[Care] comprises understanding, by which Dasein projects itself into 
the future; it comprises also those moods or affective states which 
disclose to Dasein the situation into which it finds itself already thrown 
as a result of past conditions; and finally it comprises fallenness, 
understood as Dasein’s present lostness in the inauthenticity of the 
“they” and of routine existence.86 
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 Many are no doubt familiar with the temporal implications behind the Sorge 
principle in Being and Time, but lesser known is the fact that the roots of this emblematic 
principle stem from Heidegger’s early Freiburg period and his attendant engrossment 
with phenomenology, theology and factical life-experience.  Caputo offers a credible 
reminder of this point with his belief that it was this phase of Heidegger’s career that first 
led him to the notion of Sorge, since everything in the early Freiburg lectures turns on the 
notion of factical life, which is a life of unending Sorge (care, trouble, worry, concern).87 
Caputo bases this assertion, in part, on a loaded statement that Heidegger makes in a 
course from the winter semester of 1921-22, which immediately followed the course 
being studied.  The very title of this course establishes its philosophical province 
(“Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological 
Research”); nevertheless, the condensed definition of life that he renders in a section 
devoted to the topic of care/Sorge has a clear New Testament echo: “In its broadest 
relational sense, to live is to care about one’s ‘daily bread.’”88 
 Even though it must be conceded that this allusion to “daily bread” is more 
properly associated with the Synoptic as opposed to the Pauline New Testament tradition, 
and moreover that Heidegger’s recourse to this reference is a means to further his 
dialogue with Aristotle’s concept of privatio (the motivational principle behind the 
movement of all beings),89 it still clearly shows the pervasive and consistent influence of 
Heidegger’s early convictions regarding the experience of factical life as temporalized 
struggle, so poignantly and uniquely expressed in the lives of the first Christians.  But 
something in particular captivated Heidegger about this expression that he saw as having 
the incisive capacity to integrate the dynamic of struggle so pressurized in the crucible of 
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temporality.  It will not be some elusive mystery to discover the particular object of 
Heidegger’s fascination, since attention has already been directed to it, though in a 
different context. There it surfaced when discussing Heidegger’s indebtedness to 
Schleiermacher and Overbeck for their foundational work in acknowledging the 
importance of the primal Christian experience and detailing its core content.  It can be 
recalled that according to Heidegger, it was “Franz Overbeck who established the world-
denying expectations of the end as the basic characteristic of what is primordially 
Christian.”90 
 In the second half of the “IPR” course, Heidegger is seen expanding upon 
Overbeck’s insight that the central aspect of original Christian experience is the 
expectation of Christ’s Second Coming or the Parousia: “The eschatological problem, in 
its deep nondogmatic sense is the very center of Christian life.”91 However Heidegger 
does not passingly concur with Overbeck in order to affirm his thesis concerning the 
importance of the Parousia and so pay him polite homage. Rather Heidegger seizes the 
wisdom from a trustworthy theological source in order to move his position to a new 
level that the early Christian experience of factical life is best understood and appreciated 
as temporalized struggle.  Once this position is brought to its new height, Heidegger will 
ensure it remains there with firm footing by anchoring it to the event of the Parousia.  It 
is, therefore, this event which becomes the focal and reference point by which the early 
Christian experience of factical life as temporalized struggle finds its definitive 
actualization and realization.  And while the New Testament is filled with passages which 
warn that the return of the Lord will happen at the right time and without any warning,92 
Heidegger believes, according to Sheehan, that Paul’s Thessalonian correspondence 
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offers the best interpretation of the event: “Christian eschatology revolutionized the 
concept of time, and…within Christianity itself St. Paul’s meaning of Parousia is 
unique…”93 
 What was it that Heidegger perceived in Paul’s outreach to the Thessalonians 
about the matter of the Parousia that gave it such a radically unique character?  In other 
words, why does Heidegger see Paul, and most specifically the pastoral Paul, making 
efforts to shore up the community he founded at Thessalonica, as best suited to depict the 
Second Coming as the event that encapsulates and vivifies the temporalized struggle of 
original Christian factical experience?  Careful attention to the way that Heidegger views 
the nature of the relationship between Paul and the Thessalonians in the “IPR” course can 
be helpful as a first step in addressing these questions. 
 
The Pauline-Thessalonian Relationship: A Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity 
 
 To give a certain indication of the status of this relationship, Kisiel employs the 
word “bond” when rendering his paraphrased translation of the course in light of 
Heidegger’s recourse to such passages as 1 Thes. 2:8: “So well disposed were we to you, 
in fact, that we wanted to share with you not only God’s tidings but our very lives, so 
dear had you become to us.”94 Thus, it is justifiable for Kisiel to call the relationship that 
Paul had with the Thessalonians a special bond when Heidegger states that Paul “himself 
became, and continues to be irrevocably linked to their lives [in a] bond which went 
beyond his ‘official’ relation to them as an apostle of Christ.”95 
 From Heidegger’s perspective, then, it is crucial to appreciate the deep affinity 
that Paul has for the Thessalonians.  Even more important, however, is the need to realize 
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that this affinity is predicated upon the mutual challenge that daily confronts both Paul 
and the Thessalonian church to live in anticipation of an imminent Parousia.  Because 
Paul and the Thessalonians must strive to give witness to the Christian message under the 
constant expectation of a fast approaching Parousia, very pressing existential issues arise 
which forge a symbiotic relationship between the missionary and the missionized: “The 
bond is such that everything he [Paul] attributes to the community also says something 
about himself.”96 
 Sheehan, one of the two oft-mentioned pioneers who made unprecedented 
excursions into the unpublished manuscripts of the “IPR” course, provides an important 
clue to what enables this relationship of vicarious concern for the Parousia.  Because 
Heidegger’s interpretation of 1 Thessalonians is oriented in its broadest sense by 
linguistic concerns rather than philology or exegesis, the repetition of certain words takes 
on special hermeneutic significance.97 In this regard, Sheehan draws attention to 
Heidegger’s zeroing in on the various verb forms of genesthai (to have been/to have 
become) that are repeated time and again in 1 Thessalonians.  This becomes important in 
trying to understand the basis for Paul’s intimate identification with the community at 
Thessalonica, since according to Sheehan, “genesthai in all its forms points to the basic 
state of being of St. Paul and of the Thessalonians, namely, their ‘already having become’ 
or ‘already having been’ (Gewordensein).”98  Heidegger expresses it in this way: 
Paul experiences the Thessalonians in two ways: 1) he experiences 
their “having become” [followers of Christ]; 2) he experiences that they 
have a “knowledge” of their having-become.  Moreover, their having-
become is at once Paul’s, he is included in and affected by their having-
become and its accompanying know-how (D.h. ihr Gewordensein ist 
auch ein Gewordensein des Paulus.  Und von ihrem Gewordensein 
wird Paulus mit betroffen).99 
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 But if, as Sheehan maintains, genesthai in all its frequently occurring verbal forms 
points to the basic state of the relationship between Paul and the Thessalonians, it does so 
based on something more profound and dynamic about the expressions “having become” 
and “having been” than just their sheer recurrence in the biblical text.  While Sheehan is 
correct in his assessment that Heidegger’s interpretation of 1 Thessalonians is more 
properly a linguistic rather than a philological or exegetical analysis, he nevertheless 
restricts the hermeneutical richness of this linguistic study to the repetition of words and 
phrases. 
 For Heidegger, however, the power of language is not strictly determined by the 
utter multiplication of words.  Instead, language and words derive their real force from 
the close connection they have with Being!  A standard later Heideggerian aphorism 
states this well in declaring that, “language is the house of Being, which is propriated by 
Being and pervaded by Being.  And so it is proper to think the essence of language from 
its correspondence to Being.”100 So the ultimate source for genesthai’s disclosive 
potential concerning the relationship of Paul and the Thessalonian church comes not 
merely from quantitative reiteration but rather from a qualitative connection to Being 
itself: “words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the 
commerce of those who write and speak.  It is in words and language that things first 
come into being and are.”101 
 While making this deeper connection to what gives an expression like genesthai 
its ultimate revelatory power may not have been suited to Sheehan’s project, it certainly 
has merit for the purposes of the current to continually show, at critical junctures, the 
continuity evident among the earlier and later phases of Heidegger’s career.  Thus it is 
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observable that already in the 1920-21 religion course, Heidegger exhibits a preliminary 
fascination for the power of words to convey something telling about the basic state of 
being between Paul and the Thessalonians, which will appear in his later writings as a full 
blown preoccupation for the disclosive potential in language overall because of its very 
emanation from Being itself. 
 The “having-become/having-been” of the Thessalonians by which Paul 
experiences them, indeed has a disclosive force and dynamic quality since for Heidegger 
it “is not just a past and bygone event, but something that is constantly co-experienced by 
the Thessalonians, so that their having become is their present being.”102 Heidegger 
believes that the very essence of this becoming or genesis (“genesthai”) is reflected in 1 
Thes. 1:6, “You, in turn, became imitators of us and of the Lord, receiving the word 
despite great trials, with the joy that comes from the Holy Spirit.”  What is peculiar to the 
becoming of the Thessalonians is a receptivity to the good news being announced, which 
is accepted in great distress and tribulation.103 
However Heidegger makes a particular effort to underscore the pneumatic 
dimension in the assertion of 1 Thes. 1:6, which serves to greatly qualify the nature of 
this receptivity.  Because this receptivity to the good news is not self-made or motivated 
out of the Thessalonians’ own experience but rather comes from the Holy Spirit, a joy is 
also awakened, as Heidegger explains: “The acceptance dechesthai consists in entering 
oneself into the anguish of life. A joy is bound up therewith, one which comes from the 
Holy Spirit and is incomprehensible to life.”104 Therefore, the ongoing receptivity that 
characterizes the becoming of the Thessalonians entails the full sweep of emotional 
expression from dread to joy. 
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 Initially it might appear strange that the becoming of the Thessalonians – the 
ongoing progress they make in “having-become/having-been” followers of Christ 
through a receptivity to the gospel animated by the Holy Spirit – is one marked by such a 
wide range of emotions.  After all when Paul uses the word gospel or good news in his 
letters to the churches, it is a very technical term meaning the message of salvation 
available in and through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus.105  This would more 
typically evoke an affirmative emotional response like joy.  However besides joy, the 
affective state of the Thessalonian is also characterized by a sense of dread and 
trepidation because of the environment of “affliction” under which they labor as they 
evolve in their Christian discipleship by continual receptivity to the gospel. 
 And it is the presence of these more negative emotions, indicative of some state of 
affliction, that points to the decisive way by which Paul’s intimate bond to the 
Thessalonians is established and sealed.  Paul’s participation in the becoming and having 
been of the Thessalonians is based on the Parousia, since the “affliction” plaguing this 
early church is another technical term for the trials it experiences in the final stage of 
God’s plan – the eschatological period.106 Therefore, the degree to which the 
Thessalonians are able to be receptive to and so appropriate the reality of the Parousia 
into their Christian becoming will have a direct bearing on the authenticity of Paul’s own 
Christian becoming.  “Paul’s life depends on their steadfastness in faith (Das Leben des 
Paulus hängt ab vom Feststehen der Thessalonicher im Glauben), which puts them even 
now before our Lord Jesus Christ in his coming.  For you are our glory and joy.” (cf. 1 
Thes. 2:19ff)107 
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 Thus, the nature of the relationship between the Thessalonians and Paul is not one 
of detached professionalism, whereby Paul, the “ambassador of Christ,” fulfilled his 
duties by founding a church in Thessalonica only to then move on to do the same in 
another region without ever making any personal investment.  Any such thoughts of 
disinterested neutrality are quickly dashed in the first Thessalonian correspondence, 
where Paul not only expresses his fondness and affection by addressing the community as 
“brothers and sisters” fourteen times,108 but moreover admits of a dependency on his part 
to the extent that his very being and becoming a follower of Christ is contingent on the 
way that their discipleship is realized in light of the Parousia: “For now we live, if you 
stand fast in the Lord.” (1 Thes. 3:8) 
While standing firm in the Lord could be exhibited in many behavioral and 
attitudinal patterns of the Thessalonians, it is specifically in their manner of enduring and 
holding out for the Parousia that for Heidegger most clearly establishes a direct link to 
the state of Paul’s own well-being.  To endure and hold out for the Parousia is more a 
hopeful anticipation than a calculated waiting for it, and to the extent that the 
Thessalonians can endure and hold out in a spirit of hope, so too will Paul be able to live 
in hope.  “It is in relation to the Parousia that the Thessalonians are Paul’s hope, glory, 
and joy.”109 Close attention to the tone of the original German, upon which Kisiel bases 
his paraphrase, reveals the depth of Paul’s dependency in which he is portrayed as 
“completely surrendering” himself to the destiny of the Thessalonians.110 
 In concluding this discussion about the nature of the relationship between 
Paul and the Thessalonians, advanced as a first step in understanding Heidegger’s 
position that the treatment of the Parousia in 1 Thessalonians offers the best vantage point 
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for grasping the factical life-experience of primitive Christianity as temporalized 
struggle, it is important to see the connection that has been made between “having 
become/having been” and the future.  Heidegger maintains that the thematic presence of 
genesthai throughout 1 Thessalonians is expressive of how Paul experiences the 
Thessalonians – their having become followers of Christ directly impinges upon his own 
having become a follower of Christ.  However as the above has shown, Heidegger does 
not leave such a potentially abstract description of this contact unspecified, but rather 
contends that the mutually reciprocal Christian becoming of Paul and the Thessalonians 
is ultimately realized in the way that the Parousia is confronted.  Van Buren offers an 
articulate synthesis of the development of Paul’s relationship to the Thessalonians when 
he says that “this present perfect ‘having-been’ is taken up into and shapes precisely the 
hopeful waiting toward the Zukunft, the future that comes toward one, which means here 
the Second Coming, the ‘thy kingdom come.’”111 
Before proceeding directly to the second step in the ongoing effort to address the 
question concerning Heidegger’s conviction that Paul’s treatment of the Parousia in the 
Thessalonian correspondence best articulates the vicissitudes of the early Christian 
experience of factical life as temporalized struggle, it will be beneficial to dwell on a 
further aspect of step one.  It was just borne out in this step how the relationship Paul had 
with the young Thessalonian church was most telling for the place of the Parousia in their 
factical life-experience, since the manner in which they daily integrated this challenging 
future event not only defined their Christian faith, but moreover redounded to Paul’s own 
steadfastness in faith.  What becomes intriguing at this point, then, is trying to determine 
what it was about Heidegger’s philosophical leanings at the time of the “IPR” course that 
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would encourage him to interpret the very relationship of Paul and the Thessalonians as 
an important means of access to the experience of factical life in primal Christianity.  It is 
not just a matter acknowledging the reality of a relationship; but rather it is a relationship 
of important interdependence, whereby the way in which the Thessalonians become 
Christians in the face of the Parousia mutually conditions the way in which Paul becomes 
a Christian. 
What was it that would lead Heidegger to believe that relationality could be 
vested with such power?  Far from being a moot question, the attempt to find an answer 
fits well into the contours of the current project, since it is this chapter’s aim to show that 
certain key issues, which will prove to have a lasting place in Heidegger’s thought, 
surface during his early Freiburg period due to the strong influences of theology and 
phenomenology.  The preceding discussion of Paul’s relationship to the Thessalonians, 
and the related discovery of the determinative effect that this relationship had upon Paul’s 
own discipleship, is a perfect instance where the dual influences of theology and 
phenomenology converge.  The role of theology is more apparent, since all the preceding 
analysis which led to the conclusion regarding the importance of the relationship between 
Paul and the Thessalonians was occasioned by Heidegger’s “IPR” course steeped in 
theological concerns – the Parousia as the ultimate point of reference for the early 
Christian experience of factical life as timed struggle.  More subtle, perhaps, but no less 
influential is the role of phenomenology for investing relationality with the very 
foundational force it was seen wielding in the interaction between Paul and the 
Thessalonians. 
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Granting phenomenology such a foundational role may initially appear to be 
misplaced, since a nodding acquaintance with the vocabulary and argumentation of 
phenomenology seems to give the impression that this is a form of philosophy that veers 
towards “solipsism,” whereby nothing exists outside of one’s own mind.  In regards to 
phenomenology’s vocabulary, Sokolowski points out this possible prejudice: “With its 
talk about the transcendental ego, the temporal stream of consciousness, and the 
reduction, phenomenology may seem to neglect the existence and the presence of other 
persons and communities.”112 Moreover in regard to its line of argumentation, a 
complaint could be leveled that phenomenology “reduces” other persons to mere 
phenomena and thus makes the solitary ego the only reality.  But, connected with all this 
focus on the ego are the related problems of the experience of other egos (alter egos) and 
the experience of the “foreign,” the “strange,” or the “other” (Fremderfahrung). 
As Moran suggests, even if Husserl strongly concluded that all phenomenology 
really coincided with the phenomenology of the self-constitution of the ego, he can also 
be seen throughout his career as consistently “worried about the constitution of our 
intersubjective life.”113 Husserl claimed to have overcome the problems of solipsism as 
early as his Göttingen lectures of 1910-11 and can be seen later on making a bold claim 
about intersubjectivity in his 1931 Cartesian Meditations: “I even experience the reduced 
world of experiences as an intersubjective world.”114 Therefore, sweeping generalities 
charging that phenomenology overlooks the existence and presence of other persons and 
communities are unfounded.  Spurred on by the very interests and vexations of its 
founder, phenomenology has had much to say about human community and has provided 
extensive descriptions of the experiences between and among minds and bodies. 
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Husserl’s initial treatment of intersubjectivity utilized the concept of “empathy” 
(die Einfühlung) with others as that which enables “[me] to read into another’s actions as 
an expression of inner states analogous to my own.”115 Though Husserl adopted the term 
empathy from psychologist Theodor Lipps and the Munich school of phenomenology 
only to give it his own emphasis, there was a certain uncomfortableness with the concept, 
since he was always concerned that it might convey the wrong connotations. 
 As a result, a full development of empathy along phenomenological lines would 
come from Edith Stein (St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross), Husserl’s first Freiburg 
assistant.  Stein not only wrote her dissertation on the problem of empathy, but also had a 
heavy hand in representing Husserl’s own thinking on empathy when she transcribed and 
edited the manuscripts that eventually became his Ideas II, where empathy is closely 
discussed.116  She can therefore be seen as providing a reliable guide to Husserl’s 
thinking on empathy, which according to her is “the source of our experiences of the 
other or ‘foreign’ (das Fremde).”117 The manner by which the other is reached 
empathically is through the self feeling itself into the other, with the self as the original 
reference point, Stein explains: “When I empathize I feel into the other, but I do not 
become one with the other.”118 Empathy is not just an emotive quality but also has a 
cognitive status, which for Stein is a “blind” or “empty” mode of knowledge that reaches 
the experience of the other without possessing it.  Thus, there is no complete 
identification of the self with the other.119 
 While this is by no means a complete presentation of the phenomenological 
teaching on empathy developed by Husserl and his student Stein, and though they admit 
that empathy is a founded or non-originary experience, it should nonetheless be clear that 
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this theory shows signs of inadequacy for Heidegger, who believes that the relationship 
between Paul and the Thessalonians is one of complete identification allowing for each 
one’s level of eschatological witness to reciprocally affect the other’s.  And so if 
Heidegger’s interest in the potency of relationality were mutually spawned by his 
phenomenological heritage and its related interests in intersubjectivity, there was also a 
certain point at which he felt the need to transcend the theory of empathy in order to 
guarantee that intersubjective relationality had unquestionable disclosive force because of 
the very constitution of human existence. 
 Although Heidegger is once again parting company with the phenomenological 
establishment of his day, he does so here in regard to empathy with a degree of finesse 
and diplomacy.  Heidegger is certainly forthright in several places after the “IPR” course 
about his difficulties with the effectiveness of the widely accepted theory of empathy.  
Already in the 1925 History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, a work that many feel 
can be read as a first draft of the master work Being and Time, Heidegger is seen 
blatantly rejecting the problem of empathy as an “absurd pseudo-problem.” 
 At the same time however, he is respectful of those who have preceded him and 
embraced the concept by clarifying that his rejection of empathy is not an out-and-out 
dismissal of the larger issue that it was attempting to address: “The rejection of this 
pseudo-problem of empathy…by no means implies that being-with-one-another (das 
Miteinandersein) and its comprehensibility does not stand in need of phenomenal 
clarification.”120 Instead, for Heidegger empathy is simply not the best means to achieve 
this comprehension and clarification; and because of the very manner in which it 
proceeds, it only leads to more misguided conceptions that throw the entire grasp of 
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relationality into misinformed confusion.  Thus in a work following Being and Time, 
Heidegger speaks even more forcefully: 
 The term ‘empathy’ has provided a guiding thread for a whole range of 
fundamentally mistaken theories concerning man’s [sic] relationship to 
other human beings and to other beings in general, theories that we are 
only gradually beginning to overcome today (die wir heute nur 
langsam überwinden).121 
 
 
 In saying that there is a small scale “overcoming” taking place with regard to 
empathy and the subsequent wrongheaded theories it generated, there is an unmistakable 
echo here with an important part of the previous chapter, where it was developed that one 
of Heidegger’s distinct contributions to Western philosophy was his insistence that it 
must strive to “overcome” metaphysics on a grand scale in order to genuinely reapproach 
the question of the meaning of Being.  Heidegger did not just sit back and issue such a 
grandiose edict, but as it can be recalled, he was actively engaged in the furtherance of 
this program by offering an in-depth novel analysis of what led to the enthronement of an 
anemic metaphysics and by indicating the promise waiting behind the “end of 
philosophy.” 
 Likewise, in respect to the more modest issue of “overcoming” empathy and its 
defective corollaries in order to better comprehend and clarify intersubjective 
relationality, Heidegger can once again lay claim to having had an integral role in 
bringing this about.  Most notable on this score are Heidegger’s efforts in chapter four of 
Division One in Being and Time, where he continues his analysis of Dasein with the 
thematic hope that the more one understands Dasein, the more one begins to comprehend 
and think about Being itself.  To that end Heidegger outlines his intentions for this when 
he says, “we shall be led to certain structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with 
Being-in-the-world: Being-with and Dasein-with (Mitsein und Mitdasein).122 The 
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development of Being-with and Dasein-with that accordingly ensues in the chapter 
establishes them as the very conceptual basis for empathy’s undoing. 
 This analysis of Being-with and Dasein-with that will take place is a natural step 
in the ongoing existential analytic of Dasein.  In the previous chapters of Being and Time 
leading up to chapter four’s delineation of Being-with and Dasein-with, Heidegger 
identifies and describes an essential quality or ontological structure of Dasein with the 
fundamental concept “Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-Sein): “‘Being-in’ is thus the 
formal expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential 
state.”123 Therefore, Dasein is always in a world, and Heidegger talks of “Being-in-the-
world” as the constitutive state of Dasein. 
 But in order to fully understand this determinative quality of Dasein’s being, any 
simplistic theories must be avoided which purport that for Dasein to be “in” the world 
means merely the ability for it to be fixed in a definite position by x-y coordinates.  For 
as Macquarrie counsels, “Being-in-the-world is a ‘dwelling’ in the world, and ‘dwelling’ 
is a rich and complex relationship, far more than simply the spatial relationship of being 
located somewhere.”124 Dwelling will be treated extensively in chapter three. 
 Expressive of the richness and complexity of Dasein’s dwelling in the world is 
the fact that the world is a common world (Mitwelt, “with-world”), in other words it is a 
world always shared with others: “the world is always the one that I share with Others.  
The world of Dasein is a with-world (Mitwelt).  Being-in is Being-with Others.”125 With 
this conclusion Heidegger’s stated goals at the start of chapter four have been 
successfully met.  He set out to show that the other is as much of a fundamentally 
ontological structure of Dasein (“equiprimordial”) as the World was shown to be in 
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previous sections of Being and Time.  A synonym for a fundamentally ontological 
structure of Dasein is an “existential.”126 “To-be-in-the-world,” as one existential of 
Dasein, showed that there is no subject without the world.  Similarly, the “other” can now 
be deemed an existential, whereby there is no isolated “I” without the “other.”  George 
Kovacs deftly integrates these two important interrelated principles of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology of Dasein when he states, “The ‘other’ is ontologically given with the 
‘World’…”127 
 Certainly these are principles of Heidegger’s brand of phenomenology that can 
distinguish him specifically from other phenomenologies espoused by Husserl and Stein 
on the subject of empathy.  When it is recalled that Stein’s understanding of empathy was 
“projective” and more detached (“When I empathize I feel into the other, but I do not 
become one with the other.”), then it is easy to perceive Heidegger’s basis for divergence 
based on all that has just been advanced regarding the very ontological constitution of 
human existence – Dasein’s basic structure as Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others.  
According to Lawrence Hatab, Heidegger “finds the term Einfühlung regrettable and 
critiques the theory as phenomenologically inadequate because of its sense of empathy as 
a ‘bridge’ between a solitary subject that feels itself into the Other who is initially closed 
off.”128 
 Hatab is able to formulate this observation based upon Heidegger’s very brief 
treatment of empathy in the closing sections of his development of Being-with and 
Dasein-with in chapter four of Being and Time.  It is as if Heidegger feels the need to 
bring up empathy in this context not so much as to offer a close comparison and contrast 
analysis between it and Being-with, but rather to firmly establish the priority between 
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these two concepts that should be almost self-evident after his painstaking presentation of 
Being-with’s constitutive prominence in the structural make-up of Dasein. “‘Empathy’ 
does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does ‘empathy’ 
become possible.”129 
 With this poignant declaration of priority, a foundation is laid for Heidegger to 
offer his alternative concept of empathy in a work subsequent to Being and Time.  This 
elaboration from 1929/30 will clearly show its inspirational roots from the second half of 
the “IPR” course, where the firm conviction has been established that the relationship 
between Paul and the Thessalonian church was so forcibly effective that the manner in 
which the Thessalonians confronted the imminence of the Parousia mutually conditioned 
and impacted upon the manner in which Paul was able to live out this primary feature of 
early Christian factical life-experience as timed struggle. 
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, 
Heidegger expands upon the passing negative evaluation he made about empathy in 
Being and Time.  While not downplaying the certainty with which Heidegger rejects the 
theoretical construction of empathy because of its tendency of polarization, as evidenced 
by Heidegger clearly putting it in its proper place vis-à-vis Being-with, it is Hatab’s 
suggestion, based on his own application of Heidegger to the field of ethics, that 
Heidegger is prompting a “richer phenomenology of empathy.”130 As a result, Heidegger 
offers the concept of Mitgang (“going-along-with”) as an enrichment to empathy and as a 
specific manifestation for the otherwise broad based structure of Dasein as Being-with.  
Not only is Dasein’s structural make-up indicated by an immediate and general Being-
with others, it is also a withness able to be specified by the deep ability to go-along-with 
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others, to somehow “transpose” oneself into others.  For Heidegger then, there is a 
phenomenon in which people can intimately share one and the same comportment with 
one another – a Mitgang, a going-along-with: 
Such going-along-with means directly learning how it is with this 
being, discovering what it is like to be this being with which we are 
going along in this way.  Perhaps in doing so we may even see right 
into the nature of the other being more essentially and more incisively 
than that being could possibly do by itself.131 
 
 At first it may be off-putting when Heidegger uses a nondescript term like 
“being” (Seiendes) to explain the dynamic meaning of going-along-with, since being 
conjures up images of “entities” or any actual being.  However, once Heidegger’s overall 
intentions for this section of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics are realized, then 
it is clear that the conceptual force of going-along-with for intersubjective reciprocity is 
not lessened by its alignment with “beings,” but in this context actually demonstrates its 
far-reaching potential.  The general question being pursued by Heidegger here is whether 
or not the human person can “transpose” herself into another being that she herself is not.  
After applying this question first to animals, then to inanimate objects, he finally explores 
its relevance for other persons: “Can we as human beings transpose ourselves into 
another human being?”  (“Können wir – als Menschen – uns in einem anderen Menschen 
versetzen?”)132 
 So, far from seeing going-along-with as being compromised in its abilities to 
further specify what it broadly means that a basic state of Dasein is Being-with others, it 
actually retains its role as a compelling expression of the degree to which Dasein can be 
with other Daseins.  Seen in this context, it is only fitting that prior to probing going-
along-with’s significance for the relationality between and among humans that Heidegger 
would also find it potentially useful to elaborate on other general claims about the basic 
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ontological structure of Dasein, viz. the Being-in of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.  
Therefore, if in Being and Time Heidegger broadly claims that the world that Dasein is 
“in” is a network of relations with a sundry of inanimate beings or “equipment” (das 
Zeug) and that Dasein is the unity of this interconnection of relations, then the explicit 
nature of this encounter brought forth in The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics as a 
“transpositional” going-along-with can be seen as a welcome extrapolation. 
 But the extrapolation is most welcome as it pertains to nuancing the claim 
Heidegger makes in regard to the basic structure of Dasein as Being-with.  To further 
specify Being-with as going-along-with shows Heidegger’s mature refinement of 
concepts that were initially cultivated by two primary influential forces from the earliest 
part of his career: theology and phenomenology.  That he built upon his theological roots 
to eventually arrive at a concept like going-along-with is plain from all that was said 
above concerning the intimate relationship that obtained between Paul and the 
Thessalonian community.  In striving to uncover the essence of the early Christian 
experience of factical life in the “IPR” course, Heidegger focuses on the Thessalonian 
correspondence where the imminence of the Parousia becomes emblematic of an 
existence overwhelmingly characterized as temporalized struggle.  And while Paul writes 
to the Thessalonians from Corinth to reiterate the importance of continually incorporating 
this challenge into their Christianity, he does so not in a detached sense that his medium 
of correspondence might seem to convey.  Rather as Heidegger notes, there is a special 
“bond” that exists between Paul and the Thessalonians, whereby each one’s ability to 
confront and integrate the Parousia mutually influences the other’s experience of 
Christian discipleship. 
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 Because empathy is an important tenet of phenomenology, a discipline that had 
such a formative influence upon Heidegger, it would seem that he would wholeheartedly 
embrace it as the apt conceptual means to articulate the reciprocal force underlying the 
Pauline-Thessalonian relationship. However, as it was seen, Heidegger short circuits 
empathy’s ability (at least in its main line interpretations) to found relationality and so 
advances another concept. This not only supersedes empathy but also complements his 
broad based ontological assertion that the existence of Dasein is implacably structured as 
a Being-with others.  Therefore, Heidegger’s introduction of going-along-with (Mitgang) 
to describe the capacity of intersubjective relationality is at once indicative of a 
continuation as well as a surpassing of his theological and phenomenological 
background.  Going-along-with becomes the effective conceptual means to first articulate 
what Heidegger intimated about the relationship between Paul and the Thessalonians, and 
in the second place it is the corrective to empathy’s shortcomings. 
 A deeper appreciation is now possible for the early references to Heidegger’s use 
of 1 Thes. 3:8 to indicate the intersubjective reciprocity that exists between Paul and the 
church at Thessalonica in light of the Parousia close at hand: “we shall flourish only if 
you stand firm in the Lord!”  This is clearly an example of what Heidegger would later 
express as going-along-with (Mitgang), the phenomenon in which people can “share one 
and the same comportment with one another.”133 That human beings can have such a 
“transpositional” relation with others means for Hatab that “there can be moments of 
spontaneous, direct, affective response wherein we are immersed in/there/with the other 
person.”134 It is evident that an affective response is most palpable between Paul and the 
Thessalonians in the face of the Parousia when Heidegger refers to 1 Thes. 2:19: “Who, 
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after all, if not you, will be our hope or joy, or the crown we exult in, before our Lord 
Jesus Christ at his coming?” 
 Heidegger later indicates that the affective response that is able to be exchanged 
when people are in a transpositional relationship of going-along-with will actually be 
heightened by the awareness that there is the possibility of a deep sense of mutual 
involvement: “And do we not experience a new sense of elation in our Dasein each time 
we accomplish such going-along-with in some essential relationship with other human 
beings?”135 To read this back into the factical life-experience of Paul and the 
Thessalonians, it is apparent that the joy that can be shared between them relative to the 
Parousia can be positively influenced or increased when there is a conscious recognition 
that their strong relationship is the very conduit for the affective experience.  Conversely, 
Heidegger also discusses the fact that feelings at the other end of the spectrum, such as 
anxiety and dread, will also be intensified when there is only minimal, or worse yet, no 
relational accord: “And yet how often we feel burdened by our inability to go along with 
the other.”136 To retrofit this into the mutual challenge of the Parousia vexing both Paul 
and the Thessalonians means that the anxiety and dread associated with the meaning of 
the Parousia would only be exacerbated by any evidence of alienation in the relationship. 
 In sum, Heidegger would expand the old bromide that “misery loves company” 
in two ways.  First, misery as well as glee love company; and second they require 
company for their full affective response to not only be mutually felt but also for it to be 
mutually conditioning.  Or according to Hatab, Heidegger’s richer non-projective and 
less detached phenomenology of empathy as expressed in going-along-with “can exhibit 
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intersubjective reciprocity, that is, not just a one-to-one ‘withness’ but a productive co-
presencing, where both sides alter each other.”137 
 Again, questions arise concerning the nature of the impending Parousia and its 
effect on the factical life-experience of Paul and the Thessalonians.  There must have 
been something extraordinary about this event that allowed it to arouse such extreme 
affective responses ranging from joy to dread.  Moreover, there must have been 
something distinctive about the experience of anticipating the Parousia with this 
admixture of feelings that enabled it to serve as the nexus for Paul and the Thessalonians 
to be not merely politely sympathetic to one another’s common plight, but instead to be 
“transpositionally” involved with each other to the extent that one’s varied anticipatory 
reactions could impinge upon and so transform the other’s.  The word “again” is 
appropriately used when discussing the questions surrounding the experience of the 
Parousia, because these questions can be seen as corollaries to the questions which 
spawned the extensive treatment above about the special relationship that existed 
between Paul and the young church at Thessalonica.  It was suggested earlier that 
studying this relationship was an important first step for better understanding why 
Heidegger saw the Thessalonian correspondence concerning the Parousia as the best 
interpretation of the early Christian experience of factical life as timed struggle.  Now a 
second step will be advanced with the intent of focusing on the experiential depths of 
anticipating the Parousia that mutually confronted the Christianity of both Paul and the 
Thessalonians. 
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“Living Time” in Light of the Parousia: 
The Thessalonian Experience of Anticipatory Alertness and the Phenomenology of 
Temporality 
 
 After discussing the unique relationship between Paul and these first Christians, 
Heidegger then moves the “IPR” course toward an examination of what he believes is the 
climax of Paul’s proclamation in 1 Thessalonians – “a clarification of the Parousia in 
response to the ‘dogmatic’ questions usually asked about it: 1) What is the fate of those 
who have already died, and so will not experience the Parousia? (4:13-18); 2) When will 
the Parousia take place, when will the Lord return (5:1-12)?”138 While Paul entertains 
both questions, Heidegger is more interested in Paul’s handling of the second question 
about the “when” of the Parousia. 
 Heidegger’s heightened level of interest for the latter question stands to reason, 
because even in those casual instances where a questioner invokes the interrogative 
“when,” she does so well within the experiential base of anticipation.  In addition, the 
respondent must formulate an answer to the when from the realm of temporality.  
Therefore to ask the question when, even if the specific content is unknown, 
automatically creates the necessity to negotiate the human experience of anticipation and 
the constraints of time.  Bearing this in mind, it is then even clearer why Heidegger is so 
intrigued by Paul’s specific application of when to the event of the Parousia.  He has 
maintained throughout the “IPR” course that the Parousia is the event around and through 
which the factical experience of life for the first Christians as timed struggle is best 
realized.  Further, it is Paul’s writings in 1 Thessalonians that offer the clearest 
expression of this reality because of the special relationship that obtained between him 
and the Thessalonian church, as seen above, and because Paul is now seen as 
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unabashedly broaching the topic of the Second Coming with the direct question of when. 
The combination of “when” and “Parousia” into the form of a question, though simple in 
structure, has immense conceptual potential for Heidegger. This is because as Paul seeks 
an answer he will be forced to identify the specific nature of the early Christian 
experience of waiting and anticipating, which will in turn give fuller clarity to the timed 
struggle that so characterizes the factical life-experience of early Christianity. 
 Heidegger is emphatic, however, that Paul’s efforts to devise an answer to the 
when of the Parousia have labored under the pressures of external criticism from those 
eager for a clear-cut answer and internal challenges offered by the very nature of the 
question itself: 
Paul does not answer especially the second question [about the “when” 
of the Parousia] literally and directly, so that the exegetical tradition 
has accused him of avoiding the question and not knowing the 
answer…But for Paul, the question of the when is not an “examination 
question” with a neatly packaged content.139 
 
The presence of these difficulties, while real and formidable, does not prevent Paul from 
offering an answer about the when of the Parousia.  Instead, it is Heidegger’s view that 
because this particular when cannot be answered in a direct and literal fashion with a 
specific content, then an opportunity arises for Paul to develop and present a unique 
answer that reaches to the very heart of the early Christian experience of factical life as 
timed struggle. 
 The first indication that Heidegger believes Paul gives signaling that there are 
really no one-word answers in discerning when the Second Coming will take place comes 
through in his insistence that the experience of expecting and awaiting this future event 
cannot be focused upon some specific historical date and time: “the experiential structure 
of Christian hope, which (as we have seen) is in fact the relational sense associated with 
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the Parousia, runs counter to any expectation which might be defined in terms of 
objective time.” (“Die Struktur der christlichen Hoffung, die in Warheit der Bezugssinn 
zur Parusie ist, ist radikal anders als alle Erwartung.”)140 
 Because confronting the Parousia in 1 Thessalonians means transgressing the 
boundaries of time in its ordinary sense, several interpreters of Heidegger’s “IPR” course 
have creatively stated that Paul’s attempt to answer “when” actually gets transformed into 
a question about the “how.”  For instance Caputo asserts that, 
Heidegger argues, that for Paul the relation to the “when” of the 
Parousia is not a matter of an objectivistic calculation, of making one’s 
best estimate about the length of time until then.  It is not a matter of an 
objective “when” in an objective time, but of a “how,” of how to live 
until then, how to hold out and hang tough.141 
 
A strong basis for such an interpretation rests on the fact that immediately after 
Heidegger admonishes that the when of the Parousia is not quickly resolved by simple 
recourse to calendar or clock time, he then refers to Paul’s opening line in 1 Thes. 5, “As 
regards specific times and moments, brothers and sisters, we do not need to write to 
you…” Though different literary and rhetorical devices could be cited to explain Paul’s 
style here, it is Heidegger’s contention that Paul is purposefully and consciously steering 
the energies of the Thessalonians away from any attempts to estimate the when of the 
Parousia: “He [Paul] immediately deflects the question of the when away from the 
questions of ‘times and seasons’ (chronoi kai kairoi)…”142 
 But the deflection away is also a deflection to, and for Heidegger where Paul 
directs the Thessalonian concern for the Parousia comes through in the next verse, “You 
know very well that the day of the Lord is coming like a thief in the night (1 Thes. 5:2).” 
That the Lord will return “like a thief in the night” means that the early Christian 
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experience is greatly colored by a vigilance and preparedness, otherwise the full 
significance of living life in the wake of an imminent Parousia could be unrealized. 
 Therefore it is observable once again that for Paul, according to Heidegger, it is 
not so much the ability to precisely answer the question “when” in regards to the Parousia 
that has the greatest influence on living out the factical life-experience of early 
Christianity as timed struggle.  Rather, it is the answer to the question of “how” to live in 
anticipation of the Lord’s coming that becomes truly determinative of the degree to 
which the early Christian experience of factical life is authentically lived. 
 Accenting Caputo’s interpretation that the key to understanding Heidegger’s read 
on Paul as more of a response to “how” than to “when” in the face of the Parousia is 
Sheehan, who underscores the necessity of vigilance and preparedness as indispensable in 
the anticipatory experience of these first Christians. “To relate authentically to the 
Parousia means to be ‘awake,’ not primarily to look forward to a future event.  The 
question of the ‘when’ of the Parousia reduces back to the question of the ‘how’ of life – 
and that is ‘wachsam sein,’ to be awake.”143 
 That alertness is the basic trait of the how of the Parousia is made explicit for 
Heidegger when Paul in verses 3 and 6 of 1 Thes. 5 “juxtaposes two ways of living, two 
Hows of comporting oneself to the Parousia.”144 On the one hand, there are those who 
urge “peace and security” (Friede und Sicherheit), “just when people are saying, ‘peace 
and security,’ ruin will fall on them…” (vs. 3). Heidegger maintains that these people are 
totally absorbed in the world and the rest and security it can offer.  As a result, they 
ignore the travails of factical life and so remain in the dark.  It is not just a matter of 
disregarding the challenges that confront life in general that keep these people benighted, 
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but rather it is a more serious oversight that undermines their achieving a full grasp of 
Christian factical life-experience, since becoming and being a Christian is a constant 
struggle that must be heeded at every turn.  Paul warns, to Heidegger’s liking, that to 
ignore this dimension of struggle and to be lulled into a false sense of security will 
eventuate in being caught off guard by the Parousia: “ruin will fall on them with 
suddenness of pains overtaking a woman in labor and there will be no escape (vs. 4).”  
 On the other hand is the comportment of the how of the Parousia represented by 
Paul and his beloved Thessalonians.  By contrast, they are the enlightened and will not be 
caught unawares by the Second Coming, since they live by the credo, “Let us be watchful 
and sober (laßt uns wachsam sein…):”  
You are not in the dark, beloved, that the day should catch you off 
guard, like a thief.  No, all of you are children of light and of the day.  
We belong neither to darkness nor to night; therefore, let us not be 
asleep like the rest, but awake and sober (vss. 4-6a)! 
 
Therefore the eyes of the Thessalonians are open, according to Caputo, since “they are in 
the light, and they understand the incessant vigilance that Christian life requires, to stay 
always awake, always sober, always ready.”145 
 For Heidegger this posture of wakefulness is the better of the two hows for 
comporting oneself to the Parousia, since the experience of anticipatory alertness points 
to the very essence of the Thessalonian expression of Christian factical life-experience as 
timed struggle.  It will be remembered that the whole aim of the second part of the “IPR” 
course was to discover the original features of Christian religious lived experience, and so 
the introduction of the importance of anticipatory alertness in the face of the Parousia 
becomes the poignant and privileged means of access toward fully appreciating both 
dimensions of the early Christian experience of factical life as a temporalized struggle. 
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 The depths of the temporal dimension are exposed by this stance of attentive 
anticipation, but not only because it is expressive of a “how” toward the Parousia instead 
of determining an objective and datable “when.”  If this were the case, then the other 
comportment of how expressed by the declaration to live with a sense of peace and 
security would also have an equal claim toward representing the temporal aspect of early 
Christian factical life.  However, it is the how of incessant vigilance that most effectively 
avoids a quick temporal answer about the when of the Parousia while simultaneously 
leading to the temporal complexities of the timed struggle associated with early 
Christianity. 
 This is another indication of the influence of phenomenology upon Heidegger’s 
thinking in the early Freiburg period.  Since its inception phenomenology has set out to 
develop and promote a highly articulated theory of time and temporal experience.  
Heidegger sees the Thessalonian eschatological experience of anticipatory alertness as a 
nuanced extension of the phenomenology of time.  Being alert has the ability to 
synthesize and integrate in one stroke the unique way that these first Christians lived 
time.  Heidegger contends that “alertness” gives way to an intensified temporal 
awareness, which then enables the Thessalonians to fully realize their Christianity in light 
of the Second Coming: 
Actualization involves a peculiar “kairotic” moment of illumination 
that comes from full alertness to my situation. The when of the 
Parousia (being “before God”) is now determined by the how of my 
self-comportment…and this in turn by the actualization of my factic 
life-experience in and through every moment.  How the Parousia stands 
in my life refers back to the full temporal actualization of my life, and 
not to a passing when.146 
 
 This statement, placed as it is toward the close of Heidegger’s treatment of 1 
Thessalonians in the “IPR” lecture, brings to a head the unique temporal reckoning that 
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the imminent Parousia spells for the early Christian experience – it is not merely a matter 
of predicting and knowing a detached when and then living accordingly in a passive way; 
but rather it is a matter of how to live actively in a state of constant readiness that draws 
together past, present, and future in a special kairotic moment of personal choice and 
decision. 
 The ability for anticipatory alertness to sensitize the Thessalonians to this unique 
and dynamic way to live time shows undeniable similarities to Heidegger’s 
phenomenological element in the 1920s.  James Hart, a contemporary phenomenologist 
who specializes in applying Husserlian phenomenology to theology and religious studies, 
makes the insightful connection between the experience of anticipatory alertness and 
phenomenological time on a general level.  “What founds this horizon of world-
wakefulness is the origin of time-consciousness: we have the horizon world in an 
encompassing ‘now’ because we retain retentions and protend future presencings.”147  
Though Hart’s statement is loaded with the standard sophisticated phenomenological 
vocabulary related to the study of temporality, i.e., “retention” and “protention,” the main 
point upon which Heidegger bases his specific interpretation of the Thessalonian 
temporal experience is evident.  To live alert and sober in anticipation of the Lord’s 
coming is predicated on living with a distinctive time consciousness that synthesizes and 
integrates past and future into a kairotic now that becomes the arena for engaged 
decision-making that will either enhance or diminish Christian witness. 
 Heidegger would have been well aware of the foundational quality of time 
consciousness because of his close association with Husserl and his theory of internal 
time consciousness.  Consciousness of time would remain a very important focal point of 
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Husserl’s phenomenological analysis between 1900 and 1917.  The result of these 
investigations was made ready for publication in 1928 by Heidegger who acted as the 
editor for Husserl’s The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.148 In this text 
that Heidegger produced by making extensive use of Edith Stein’s earlier 1917 editorial 
efforts, Husserl warns against evaluating his work on time and the consciousness of time 
as the last and definitive word on the topic.  “I do not at all intend to offer this analysis as 
a final one; it cannot be our task here to solve the most difficult of all phenomenological 
problems, the problem of the analysis of time.”149 
 The present study will heed Husserl’s advice concerning the complexity of this 
issue and so make no claim to present a thorough understanding of the Husserlian 
investigation of time that influenced Heidegger.  Instead, what will be conveyed is a 
general appreciation for the fact that for Husserl reflections on time and the 
consciousness of time, as complex and evolving as they may be, are essential in 
phenomenological theory because, as Rudolf Bernet, et al. have asserted, “consciousness 
of time is the most fundamental form of consciousness and is presupposed in all other 
structures and forms of consciousness.”150 In other words, the consciousness of time has a 
founding role in regard to all other experiences, and Hart has just offered a specific 
instance of this with regard to the experience of anticipatory alertness (“wakefulness”) 
being founded upon time consciousness. 
 Once the foundational character of phenomenological time consciousness is 
acknowledged, other aspects of it can be seen as impacting upon Heidegger’s work in 
(and beyond) the “IPR” course.  For instance, it has been argued that Paul’s 
correspondence to the Thessalonians is a decisive source for coming to terms with the 
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early Christian experience of factical life as timed struggle. This is because of its 
instruction that how one lives life in the expectancy of the Parousia matters more to 
Christian existence than deciphering an objective when of the Parousia. 
That Husserl left a distinctive mark on Heidegger here is evident, since as David 
Carr maintains: “The first thing that must be noted about Husserl’s theory [of time 
consciousness] is that it is not an account of time itself but of how we experience 
time.”151  Thus time is approached by Husserl in the manner that any other theme in 
phenomenology would be approached, as “for us” not “in itself.”  As Carr further 
suggests, the focus is not simply time but the intersection of time and human experience, 
where time is human and human experience is temporal: “the question is not how we 
think about or conceptualize time, but how we directly encounter and experience it.”152  
This line of thinking has an unmistakable parallel with Heidegger’s praise for Paul’s 
ability to identify the crux of early Christian factical life by his insistence that the 
Thessalonians live the how and not the when of the Parousia.  Otto Pöggeler, 
commenting on the important connections Heidegger makes between temporality and the 
facticity of life of the first Christians, bolsters the Husserlian influence when he says: “It 
[the factical life-experience of the Thessalonians] lives not only ‘in’ time – it ‘lives’ time 
itself.”153 
But Husserl’s influence cannot be restricted to Heidegger’s crediting Paul with 
capturing the deeper sense that temporality plays in the lives of the Thessalonians eager 
for the Lord’s return.  It is just not a matter of Husserl having introduced the distinction 
between chronos (“when”) and kairos (“how”) into Heidegger’s religion course.  Rather, 
it is with this distinction in place that an even more profound and far-reaching influence 
  
 166
of Husserl can be detected.  It can be recalled that Heidegger saw the experience of 
anticipatory alertness as the necessary extension of the how by which the Thessalonians 
should live in the advent of the Parousia.  Furthermore, this posture of alertness serves to 
enunciate a heightened temporal awareness so that they live out or actualize their 
Christianity in a kairotic moment where past, present, and future converge.  Living 
wakefully in light of the Second Coming means that every moment calls for a decision 
that may either enhance or diminish Christian witness, and this moment is a unique 
temporal amalgam implicating the past, present, and future. 
Heidegger is echoing Husserl here because of a stance intimated earlier when 
discussing Husserl’s insistence that time’s significance is measured more by the human 
encounter and experience of it (“how”) than by its positivistic conceptualizations 
(“when”).  Carr believes that Husserl is led to this conviction because of the assumption 
that “any ability we have to conceptualize time will ultimately be based on [an] original, 
preconceptual encounter.”154 This original or preconceptual encounter with time is to be 
especially prized for its ability to allow human experience to inhabit a kairotic moment 
where past, present, and future come together so that existence can be fully actualized.  
Husserl calls this synthetic, integrative capacity of temporality at the preconceptual level 
the “living present” (lebendige Gegenwart), within which the past and future are 
assimilated and kept.155 
This concept is a fine example of how Husserl’s thought on time was constantly 
evolving, since according to Sokolowski it is in “Husserl’s later philosophy [that] this 
segment, the part of one’s conscious life that is alive and actual, comes to be called 
lebendige Gegenwart, the living present.”156 Without question the living present is a 
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technical term that Husserl introduced to phenomenology to describe the immediate or 
pre-conceptual experience of time whose fullness is best understood as “a stretched now” 
that gathers present, past, and future into a privileged moment (kairos). Elsewhere 
Sokolowski describes the merit of Husserl’s living present for ensuring that the two 
important aspects of temporality do not get overlooked – its pre-conceptual sense and the 
related ability to be simultaneously gathered and differentiated by tense: 
The term the living present signifies the full immediate experience of 
temporality that we have at any instant.  The living present is the 
temporal whole at any instant.  This living present, as the whole, is 
composed of three moments: primal impression, retention, and 
protention.  These three abstract parts, these three moments, are 
inseparable.157 
 
 Without getting into the phenomenological fine points of “primal impression,” 
“retention,” and “protention,” which is well beyond the boundaries of this chapter’s aims, 
it is nonetheless important to recognize that a crucial aspect of Husserl’s theory of the 
living present is that in the original, pre-conceptual experience of time the three 
dimensions – past, present, future – are not simply “ranged alongside one another, as if 
one could be lacking,” according to Carr.158 Therefore, the future is not something human 
experience merely gazes into from time to time, nor is the past something that gets 
dredged up occasionally with the implication that normal life is lived only in the present.  
Rather as Carr so deftly conveys the richness of Husserl’s living present: 
To be conscious at all is to be in past, present, and future “at once.”  
Not that the three dimensions interpenetrate to the point that they lose 
their difference…On the contrary, temporality consists precisely in the 
fact that they are differentiated.  To be in all three “at once” is not to be 
in all of them in the same way.  Rather, their differentiation is what 
constitutes a field which makes it possible for us to experience 
something temporal, something that is in time or takes time – that is 
something that happens.159 
 
 Though Heidegger does not explicitly acknowledge in the “IPR” lectures the 
impact that Husserl’s reflections on time and time consciousness had upon the unique 
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temporality that the Thessalonian church lived in light of the Parousia, Husserl’s presence 
is palpable. On one score, Heidegger is seen singling out the Parousia as the temporally 
charged event around which the essence of early Christian factical life is determined.  
Paul’s communication to the community of Thessalonica about actively appropriating 
this event into their lives means an engaged temporal experience of vigilance that will in 
turn reflect an enhanced or diminished Christian witness on a personal level.  This “how” 
to live in light of the Parousia is in contrast to a more passive appropriation surrounding 
the “when.” Once there has been an objective calculation as to “when” the Parousia is to 
take place, it is then merely a matter of waiting and allowing time to pass without any 
true temporal engagement requiring personal investment. 
But Heidegger is very clear that “Christian religiosity lives temporality as 
such…” (“die christliche Religiosität lebt die Zeitlichkeit…”), which is the constant 
opportunity for personally realizing Christian discipleship because of the need to be 
awake to the specific concerns of a particular situation.  “Actualization involves a 
peculiar ‘kairotic’ moment of illumination that comes with full alertness to my 
situation.”160 So it is a living of time that is proactive and intrinsic, since the Parousia is 
to be waited for with alertness to how “my” Christianity can better reflect the presence of 
the Lord prior to his coming again in fullness.  The alternative way to live time is not 
really a living of time prior to the Parousia but a “killing” of time, since a fixation on a 
positivistic conceptualized objective when in anticipation of the Lord’s return calls for a 
whiling very similar to that of waiting for a bus to arrive according to some established 
schedule. 
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Aside from this pre-conceptual and more original way of how to encounter and 
experience time where time is human and human experience is temporal, there is another 
score upon which Husserl’s temporal analyses exerts an influence in the “IPR” course 
despite Heidegger’s lack of attribution.  Building on the pre-conceptual “how” of the 
Thessalonian self-comportment toward the coming Parousia, Heidegger believes that 
each attempt to actualize and realize Christian discipleship as presented in the 
opportunities and challenges of specific situational moments goes beyond the present and 
redounds to the past and future: 
The when of the Parousia…is now determined by the how of my self-
comportment…and this in turn by the actualization of my factic life-
experience in and through every moment.  How the Parousia stands in 
my life refers back to the full temporal actualization of my life, and not 
to a passing when.161 
 
 While the application of Husserl’s living present has been discussed as the 
temporal whole composed of past, present, and future in which a full experience of 
temporality can be had at any instant in the Christianity of the Thessalonians, Heidegger 
can actually be seen as providing a corrective to the living present.  As valuable as this 
concept is in establishing that temporality is not a series of punctuated nows where past, 
present, and future are simply ranged along side one another but in fact differentiate and 
interpenetrate each other, Husserl nevertheless gives a priority to the present.  As Carr 
argues: 
Though past and future belong inseparably to the field of what is 
directly given, they still have only the status of background for the 
present which is the central or zero-point.  From the earliest to the latest 
of Husserl’s meditations on time, the now – nunc stans, lebendige 
Gegenwart – remains the primal source, the fountain from which the 
river of experienced time gushes forth.162 
 
 Even if Heidegger avoids some of the basic terms of Husserlian phenomenology, 
he would agree fully with Husserl that such a three-dimensional temporality is to be 
  
 170
recognized instead of a two-dimensional understanding of time conceived as a succession 
of now-points.  This comes through clearly with specific regard to the full temporal 
experience that Heidegger believes envelopes the Thessalonians’ striving to live out their 
Christian existence in light of the Parousia.  “How the Parousia stands in my life refers 
back to the full temporal actualization of my life, and not to a passing when.”163 And 
while it has been discussed that the “how” of the Thessalonian self-comportment toward 
the Parousia includes an active and personal effort to make Christ’s presence felt in the 
here and now, as opposed to merely biding passively for the “when” of his full and 
complete presence, there is nonetheless an undeniable futural dimension fully operative 
here. 
 In other words, Paul’s exhortation to be “awake and sober” (1 Thes. 5:6) does 
indeed convey a need for the Thessalonians to be alert to their particular situation in the 
present as opportune moments for choices and decision that will positively show forth 
their Christianity.  At the same time though, this alertness includes an important aspect of 
anticipatory experience that must not be overlooked.  In the very passage where 
Heidegger mines so much wealth about Paul’s insights into the Parousia, there is mention 
of the enlightened and awake Thessalonians as a people who embody all three theological 
virtues – faith, hope, and love – with hope being a primary indicator of the important role 
of the future: “We who live by day must be alert, putting on faith and love and the hope 
of salvation as a helmut.” (1 Thes. 5:8) 
 In one place, Heidegger mentions that this hope (elpis) acquires a “special sense” 
for Paul and the impending Parousia: “hope, glory, and joy acquire a special sense (einen 
besonderen Sinn) in Paul’s life-context.  The hopeful anticipation of the Parousia is more 
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a matter of enduring the Parousia, holding out, than a calculated waiting for it.”164 While 
this affirms all that has been previously stated concerning the need for the Thessalonian 
vigilance to seize every moment as an opportunity to give witness to Christ’s partial 
presence instead of waiting for the eventual return to do so in a full sense, there is 
nevertheless a futuristic consideration indicated by the experience of anticipatory 
alertness lived virtuously in hope. 
 The interesting point of speculation then becomes the degree to which this 
theological concern may have been instrumental in causing Heidegger to break ranks 
with Husserl over the matter of which temporal dimension should receive priority in a 
phenomenological understanding of time.  Husserl’s living present made plain his bias 
for the present as the zero-point around which past, present, and future reciprocally 
interpenetrate and differentiate each other in a holistic way.  When Heidegger broaches 
the temporally significant factical life of the first Christians, lived as it is in light of the 
Second Coming, he is fully aware and accepting of Husserl’s integrative and synthetic 
understanding of time and its promise when applied to early Christian existence.  
However, it is widely accepted in Heidegger scholarship that the more mature Heidegger 
in Being and Time and beyond gives priority to the future as the zero-point where past, 
present, and future are manifested in and with human experience. 
 Ecstases becomes Heidegger’s concept of the relation among the three 
dimensions of time developed in Being and Time: “We therefore call the phenomena of 
the future, the character of the having been, and the Present, the ‘ecstases’ of 
temporality.”165 And though at first blush this bears a close resemblance to Husserl 
because of Heidegger’s suggestion that the three ecstases of past, present, and future are 
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inseparable aspects of a whole that mutually effect one another, it becomes clear that the 
similarity ends as the exposition ensues in the pages of Being and Time and the future is 
accorded a privileged status.166 This stands to reason once it is remembered that 
Heidegger’s main preoccupation in Being and Time was the existential analytic of 
Dasein, an analytic where the future is given a priority because of the projective character 
of Dasein. 
 By projecting itself Heidegger means that Dasein grasps itself in terms of its 
possibilities, and so in this sense Dasein is always ahead of itself: “Being-free for one’s 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and 
inauthenticity…means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself…always 
‘beyond itself.’”167 Possibility is consistently esteemed over actuality in Being and Time.  
Most famously, death is considered to be Dasein’s ultimate or “capital” possibility, as 
Macquarrie designates it, since it is “the one in front of which all other possibilities lie 
and in relation to which they must be evaluated.”168 As a possibility death belongs to the 
future, and if the tack is actually taken whereby all possibilities are evaluated in 
deference to the uttermost possibility of death, then the experience of death is being 
“resolutely anticipated” with an honest acceptance of human finitude. All this can lead to  
authentic existence as Heidegger explains: 
Dasein’s primordial Being towards its potentiality-for-Being is Being-
towards-death…Anticipation discloses this possibility as possibility.  
Thus only as anticipating does resoluteness become a primordial Being 
towards Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being…When one has an 
understanding Being-towards-death – towards death as one’s ownmost 
possibility – one’s potentiality-for-Being becomes authentic and wholly 
transparent.169 
 
 Carr interprets this important passage with an acumen unblurred by the sensory 
overload possible with such vintage heady Heideggerian phraseology:  “Anticipatory 
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resoluteness is authentic existence…My existence is truly my own – and thus authentic – 
when I acknowledge my finiteness. I do this by living it in the light of a future which 
finds its closure in death.”170 
 Therefore, Dasein’s self-projection into and being ahead-of-itself in its many 
possibilities is by necessity yoked to the future, as Heidegger reaffirms:  “The ‘ahead-of-
itself’ is grounded in the future.”171  This explains the privileged position that the future 
holds in Heidegger’s temporal schema, since present and past are grasped together and 
interpreted by way of the future.  He writes: “Self-projection…is grounded in the 
future…and is an essential characteristic of existentiality.172 The primary meaning of 
existentiality is the future.173 
 
To a God “Unseen” – The Struggle of Uncertainty in Hope and Faith 
 
Despite the many ways that Husserl’s phenomenology influenced Heidegger in 
the specific area of temporality, by the time of Being and Time Heidegger makes a radical 
break with Husserl by the primacy of place he grants to the future as opposed to the 
present.  It is the position of the current study that the seeds for this parting of ways over 
the issue of temporality and the lead role of the future were sown in the “IPR” course in a 
curious way.  Curious, because at this point Heidegger is no doubt a full fledged member 
of the “Husserl circle” at Freiburg, and so there would be a natural respect maintained by 
Heidegger for his senior colleague and mentor, which in this instance would take the 
shape of promoting the virtues of a concept like the living present.  As the Thessalonians 
live in constant awareness that the Lord will soon return, they are pressed by Paul to seize 
every present moment as a kairotic opportunity to express their Christianity in decisions 
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that will manifest glimpses of the Lord’s presence prior to his return in fullness.  So it is 
“how” they live actively engaged in the now, as opposed to knowing the precise “when” 
of the Parousia and merely passively tarrying until the eventual future in-breaking of 
God’s presence. 
 As challenging as it is for the Thessalonians to live their temporality in the present 
by daily attempting to express their Christian discipleship, it cannot be denied that this 
lived temporality is one that includes an important aspect of the future.  No matter how 
much Paul stresses their comportment now, it is done so in anticipation of an unknown 
futural coming.  And Heidegger was also cognizant of the special challenges that living 
this future meant for the church at Thessalonica.  It has already been established that the 
virtue of hope for Paul and the Thessalonians awaiting the Parousia had a “special sense,” 
but Heidegger elaborates on this when he states that there is a decisiveness in the waiting 
that transcends the usual human experience of hopefully waiting for something: “The 
waiting for the Parousia is decisive. Not in the human sense that the Thessalonians are 
hopeful for the Lord, but instead in the sense of the experience of the Parousia itself.”174 
 What is most decisive about their experience of hopeful anticipation is that it is 
pronouncedly characterized by a high level of difficulty, tribulation, and struggle that 
absolutely consumes the Thessalonians as they live “ahead-of-themselves” toward the 
future of the Lord’s return at the end of time. Heidegger explains: “The experience is an 
absolute struggle (thlipsis)…This struggle is a fundamental characteristic, it is an 
absolute worry in the horizon of the Parousia, in the horizon of the eschatological 
return.”175 
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 These statements concerning the unique experience of Thessalonian waiting bring 
the current chapter to a fitting climax and closure.  With all that has been said in regard to 
Heidegger’s diligent efforts in the “IPR” course to arrive via the Thessalonian 
correspondence at the kernel of “primal Christianity” (the early Christian experience of 
factical life as timed struggle), temporality has played a seminal role, chiefly because of 
the imminent Parousia.  It was first discussed how the Thessalonians were exhorted by 
Paul to live each present moment (kairos) as a ripe opportunity to reflect their Christian 
discipleship and so image Christ’s presence prior to his definitive return.  While 
undoubtedly this endeavor presents an ongoing challenge in the daily lives of the 
Thessalonians, it is not until the temporal dimension of the future and its effects on 
anticipatory experience are discussed that Heidegger most emphatically assigns a place 
and name to this struggle. 
 The nature of this struggle associated with the futural coming is foremost one of 
living with uncertainty.  Van Buren points out that Heidegger’s use of the Greek thlipsis 
in identifying this struggle is a hearkening to 1 Thes. 1:6, where mention is made, “not 
only [of] the ‘joy’ of hope, but also [of] thlipsis, affliction or anxiety in the face of the 
uncertainty of the time and shape of the Parousia.”176 But it is important to realize that 
there is something upon which this uncertainty is predicated.  It is not merely an 
uncertainty that could be easily alleviated if the exact time and shape of the Parousia 
were to be disclosed to the Thessalonians.  This would amount to nothing short of 
undermining the entire program of phenomenological time that Heidegger has 
consistently promoted, as well as misidentifying the depth of the struggle that plagues the 
Thessalonians. 
  
 176
 It is a temporalized struggle with the full force of temporality impinging upon the 
way in which this struggle is experienced.  Having become followers of Christ (past), the 
Thessalonians are called to live each moment as an opportunity to advance their 
discipleship (present) in anticipation of the Lord’s return (future).  The uncertainty of this 
futural return helps to enunciate the very depths of the struggle that in actuality permeates 
all temporal phases of Thessalonian existence – living before the unseen God.  Sheehan, 
having been one of the first scholars to pour over the “IPR” course manuscripts, identifies 
the specialized Heideggerian vocabulary used in naming this struggle: “what Heidegger 
calls a Vollzugszusammenhang mit Gott, a context of enacting one’s life in uncertainty 
before the unseen God.”177 
 As daunting as the Thessalonian call is to live their Christianity under the 
constraint of uncertainty before an unseen God, it is also true that this constraint is 
lessened, not only because they are imbued with hope which enables their projection 
toward the future possibility of the Parousia, but also because they possess yet another 
important theological virtue – faith.  Therefore, their “special sense” of hope is 
complemented by faith, which in actuality was the indispensable virtue for establishing 
their relationship with an unseen God the moment they became followers of Christ.  
From the very beginning then, faith has prevented any of the uncertainty associated with 
an unseen God from becoming debilitating.  In general, faith combined with hope is 
recognized as an accepted means for allowing Christians to project “ahead-of-
themselves” toward unknown future possibilities in relationship with an unseen God, as 
reminded by the author of the Letter to the Hebrews: “Faith is confident assurance 
concerning what we hope for, and conviction about the things we do not see.”178 
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 While Heidegger does not explicitly acknowledge this important alliance of faith 
and hope in Thessalonian Christian existence, it can be remembered that he does 
nonetheless observe that the level of faith of the Thessalonians had a tremendous impact 
on Paul: “Paul’s life depends on their steadfastness in faith. He hands himself over 
entirely to the fate of the Thessalonians.”179  This passage from the “IPR” course was 
referenced earlier when discussing the special relationship that existed between Paul and 
the Thessalonian church and the resultant intersubjective ramifications.  And while in that 
context Heidegger perceived the value of the virtue of faith to help forge the symbiotic 
relationship between Paul and the Thessalonians, he overlooked its value in the current 
context discussing the relationship between the Thessalonians and God!  This oversight 
meant that when Heidegger identified the struggle associated with the futural Second 
Coming as an anxious uncertainty before an unseen God, he overestimated the degree of 
difficulty this presented to the Thessalonians.  As formidable of a challenge as it may be, 
it is not insurmountable for them to face the imminent Parousia in uncertainty before an 
unseen God because of their possession of faith and its very purpose. 
However without faith, the formidability of the struggle is better understood, 
because then the matter is changed from living in uncertainty before an unseen God to 
doing likewise before an absent God.  The Thessalonians do not operate under such an 
extreme condition, since their faith disallows any equation of the unseen and the absent.  
Perhaps Heidegger could more easily equate an unseen God and an absent God, and for 
this reason sees the plight of the Thessalonians moving toward the Parousia as a struggle 
of unmanageable proportion.  Though this is all speculation at this early point in 
Heidegger’s career, the entire issue of God’s absence in Nietzsche’s writings and the 
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flight of the gods in Hölderlin’s poetry becomes important for the later Heidegger.  In 
fact, it is in the initial phases of his later career that he devotes energy to clarifying the 
necessity for theology to be centered on faith and for philosophy to maintain a faithless 
“atheism.” The next chapter will examine the multivalent issues of seeing (vision), God’s 
absence, atheism, and faith ever mindful that the formative influence of phenomenology 
and theology in the early Freiburg days continues. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Authentic Rooted Dwelling and 
Measured Poetic Openness to the Godhead 
 
 
Recapitulation 
 
 The previous chapter fostered an appreciation for the way in which 
phenomenology and theology influenced the scholarly activity of the young Heidegger as 
his academic career began in earnest during the 1920s at the University of Freiburg im 
Breisgau.  The specific project where these two influences came together with poignancy 
was in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion course (IPR). While Heidegger 
could have selected several means by which to show his students the rich potential of an 
encounter between phenomenology and religion, it was his decision that a careful 
analysis of the writings of Paul would offer the best pedagogical strategy. Most 
specifically, it was Paul’s correspondence with the Thessalonian community and the 
ensuing preoccupation over the parousia that enabled an ideal platform for the 
convergence of phenomenological and theological concerns. That the parousia has the 
ability to unite these two otherwise expansive disciplines in a manageable way is clear by 
the issues accompanying its primary focus – the lived-experience of waiting for the 
second coming of Jesus. 
 It is well within the competencies of phenomenology to address the ontological 
and existential implications related to the parousia as summed up in the phrase 
“temporalized struggle.” These first Christians were called to maintain an alert vigilance 
before an elusive “when” of Jesus’ return under the empathetic guidance of Paul’s 
missives. Heidegger calls all that this challenge entails the essence of “primal 
Christianity” (Urchristentum). While Heidegger’s lectures lopsidedly devoted fuller 
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attention to explicating the aspects of factical life-experience and temporality (in 
Thessalonica), which fall more in the province of phenomenological analysis, the lectures 
were also an effective invitation for rich theological speculation. The course was 
therefore able to successfully fuse phenomenology and religion, even though the more 
theological fine-points of the eschatological encounter between believer and God go 
explicitly untreated. 
 This lack of treatment is especially noticeable on the “God” side of the encounter. 
Even when it appears as though Heidegger is veering toward an opportunity for further 
elaboration on the nature of the returning Lord by discussing the suddenness of the great 
in-breaking (“like a thief in the night,” “glance of the eye” – Augenblick), it is to no avail 
since he quickly resumes course back to the Thessalonians and their existential plight to 
authentically live the temporality of the parousia’s unknown when. Heidegger’s 
fascination with the significance of suddenness for temporality and perceptual seeing is 
more fully explicated by William McNeil, who performs a thorough study of Augenblick 
at various stages in Heidegger’s thought without forgetting to acknowledge the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion course as formative in the way the 
concept develops.1 
 
 
Poetizing in a “Needy Time” and the God of Theology 
 
 As this chapter now shifts its attention away from Heidegger’s very early career 
and lands squarely in the domain of the later writings, a similar pattern will be noticed. 
Exciting opportunities for theological speculation will abound but rarely so along strict 
confessional lines. Nonetheless, in the move from the novice professor, striving to satisfy 
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philosophy course descriptions under chairman Husserl, to the established and unyoked 
academic, there is a more pronounced openness (be it ever so tentative and implicit) 
toward the ultimate theological concern – God. Nowhere is this more palpable than in the 
instances where Heidegger develops his concept of “poetizing” (das Dichtende). While a 
more complete development of poetizing will take place as this chapter unfolds, for now 
it is important to appreciate Heidegger’s “poetics” as a very selective blending of poetry 
and thinking which results in a languaged, meditative event with exceptional disclosive 
potential. But it is not just to any disclosure or revelatory possibility that poetizing aims, 
rather it is specifically the nature and the plight of the Deity in the present era that is its 
primary concern. In these contexts Heidegger does not adhere to traditional formulae and 
discuss the event of poetizing and one God, instead a panoply of seemingly synonymous 
terms are used – “the holy,” “the divine,” “gods,” “God,” “Godhead.” While this may be 
unsettling, it nevertheless shows that the later Heidegger is much more at ease in 
discussing matters that bear directly upon theology. It is Robert Gall’s contention that “by 
coming to Heidegger’s talk of gods and the holy we have come upon the most obviously 
‘religious’ dimension in his thinking…”2 
 Gall’s prudent use of quotation marks to qualify Heidegger’s most religious 
dimension resonates with the preceding observation about the unsettling condition that 
may arise here. As a result, there is a need to proceed cautiously in the ensuing study by 
performing a thorough analysis of the context in which these various terms referencing 
the Deity surface. Otherwise there could be a hasty dismissal of Heidegger’s work on 
poetics as errant and so valueless for or even unworthy of theological discourse. David 
White has addressed this issue in a balanced way. On the one hand, he admits that 
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numerous theological objections could be leveled, especially in Judeo-Christian circles 
where monotheism is a revered creedal tenet. He writes: 
One obvious difficulty is Heidegger’s apparently random reference to 
“God” (or, perhaps more accurately “god”) and “the gods.” A theology 
based on the one deity will be very different from a theology based on 
more than one deity, regardless of the exact number of “the gods.”3 
 
On the other hand White recommends patience and flexibility with Heidegger’s 
theological imprecisions, since premature negative evaluations would rob theology 
proper of the salutary effects that can result from a frank dialogue with the later 
Heideggerian corpus. White counsels: 
When Heidegger uses the word the gods, we should not interpret the 
plural as necessarily ruling out the resurgence of one deity, but rather as 
an openness indicative of the historical sweep of theological 
possibilities from the Greek epoch to the present.4 
 
Therefore Heidegger’s seeming carelessness in bandying about many terms, when 
theology would prefer he use “God” with strict consistency, need not be perceived as a 
threat. If instead a spirit of openness can be maintained, then the larger issues that surface 
in Heidegger’s discussion of poetizing can be seen as parallel to theology’s ongoing 
challenge to study God with terminological precision. 
 Beyond the mere ability to welcome parallels and note points of intersection with 
an attitude of openness lies the real possibility that a deeper enrichment will redound to 
the theological enterprise. The Heidegger at his “most religious” discusses 
poetics/poetizing as potentially helpful in the current “needy time” of the Deity’s/gods’ 
unprecedented elusiveness. It is good to keep in mind as the argument continues 
throughout the chapter that this needy time is a between time, since the gods have fled 
and the gods have yet to arrive. Since theology, regardless of agenda or affiliation, is 
called to present God anew in light of the unique challenges of the era in which it finds 
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itself, then it could greatly benefit by listening to a voice in another discipline which 
hears a similar call to situate the pressing challenges of a particular epoch within a wider 
setting that acknowledges mystery. So it is not the mere detection of a tangential point 
where Heidegger (in his own loose fashion) and theology (with its established rigor) 
happen to discuss God, rather there is an urgency that gives rise to Heidegger’s more 
blatant interests in the Deity that promises to forge a more substantive bond with 
theology. 
 A telling passage from a 1966 interview that Heidegger granted to the 
newsmagazine Der Spiegel5 exemplifies the urgency for addressing concerns that are 
typically more within the bounds of theology per se. At the same time an attentive ear 
will also hear an echo from Heidegger’s very early dabblings in theological matters. 
However, here, Heidegger is more direct in broaching issues surrounding the Deity and 
the special role accorded to poetizing in such undertakings is unmistakable. At one point 
Heidegger responds to a question about the role of Western philosophy in the late 20th 
century: 
Only a god can save us. The sole possibility that is left for us is to 
prepare a sort of readiness through thinking and poetizing, for the 
appearance of the god or for the absence of the god in the time of 
foundering (Untergang), for in the face of the god who is absent, we 
founder.6 
 
 Immediately noticeable are the themes of preparation and readiness which are 
clearly reminiscent of the issues that consumed so much of Heidegger’s energies some 45 
years prior in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion course. Preparedness 
through an alert and sober vigilance was the posture the first century Thessalonians were 
exhorted to assume in the face of the parousia, with very little elaboration upon the role 
and nature of the Deity so anticipated. Now, the role and nature of the Deity is expressly 
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mentioned – “only a god can save us” whose appearance is an enigmatic event of 
presence and absence. Moreover, the call to be ready in the current era of God’s 
elusiveness is directed to a much wider audience with the challenge, as well as the 
resources at its disposal, placed on a more transcendental level.  Whereas the small 
church at Thessalonica, confined to the Theramaic Gulf of the Aegean Sea, was called to 
authentically live the temporal stretch of now and the Lord’s futural return by a full 
engagement with daily, factical human concerns, the call now is aimed at all of Western 
humanity laboring to positively integrate the pervasiveness of technology with its identity 
and vision. But instead of situating the focus for achieving this at the more existential 
level and so recommending that contemporary Western culture should wait for a 
resolution by confronting its day-to-day challenges, it is now at a different level where 
energies will be channeled with hopeful resolve. It is by recourse to God (a god, the gods) 
whose vexing elusiveness is nonetheless the ultimate source for enabling a successful 
confrontation with the current entanglement of technology and the fiber of Western 
humanity.7 Access to this “god” however is not automatic, nor does it result from 
quietistic passivity. Similar to the plight of the early Christians, but again at a different 
level, there is an active preparation that must be executed on the human side. This time it 
is not just a matter of making ready by a full engagement with life’s daily and nitty-gritty 
concerns in the interim, but rather it is through an active engagement with poetic 
thinking. This will usher in a heightened sensitivity receptive to a mysterious yet much 
welcomed god. Heidegger’s reflections on the “essential law” of poetic activity make it 
clear that poetic thinking involves a dynamic, alert sensitization beyond the demands of 
immediate, mundane concerns: 
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When the poet calls out for a fragrant cup, he is asking to be confirmed 
in the essential law of his poetic activity, which is to think with one 
accord of what has been and what is coming, instead of sleeping 
through the time which now is.8 
 
 The poet at the close of the 20th century (as well as at the beginning of the 21st 
century), therefore, assumes her role at a different level and with a different emphasis 
than the first century Thessalonian Christian. Indeed both must be alert and prepared as 
they dwell in their respective “between” times of the now and the appearance of the 
gods/God or the return of Jesus. However as the earliest Christian lived the between by a 
serious reckoning with life’s daily struggles, the poet resides in the between more 
circumspectively in Janus head fashion with one eye glancing backward for the god(s) 
who have fled, and the other eye looking forward for the god(s) who are yet to come 
(“der entflohen Götter und des kommenden Gottes”). The poet is therefore seen 
inhabiting the between in relationship to a mysterious Deity as opposed to being 
exclusively preoccupied with the existential challenges at hand. This is not meant to 
disparage the way in which the first Christians were called to live the temporality of their 
between, but more a matter of appreciating the different focus or emphasis. Both 
confrontations with the between can be authentic and meaningful, but the poet’s 
immersion in the between is tied up with and determined by the complexities of an 
elusive Deity. 
 
The Pained Between of the Ontological Difference 
and the Wandering Stranger-Poet 
 
 Several commentators have drawn attention to the fact that Heidegger’s belief that 
poets are the distinctive denizens of the between is no mere fleeting thought but actually 
thematic at different places and with varying emphases in the later writings. Before 
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specific instances are cited to establish that the between is the rightful residence for the 
poet, it is important not to lose sight of the more foundational implications that the 
between in its own right purports in Heideggerian thought. In other words, the between, 
and the unique way the poet may occupy this spatio-temporal dimension, is not just an 
isolated nicety bestowed upon poetic thinking but has consequences for the overall thrust 
of Heidegger’s mission. 
 The crux of this mission was clearly stated in chapter one as Heidegger’s 
distinctive place in Western philosophy was presented. Heidegger was through and 
through the philosopher of Being, and so at the basis of any specific topic during any 
particular phase of his career was the attempt to address the question of the meaning of 
Being. It can be recalled that one interesting strategy Heidegger recommended for 
reawakening and deepening the question of the meaning of Being was through a novel 
approach to the long-standing philosophical concept known as the ontological difference. 
The ontological difference is the difference between Being as such and the being of 
entities; and it was Heidegger’s suggestion that by taking a venturesome “step back” 
(Schritt zurück) into the differing of this difference, philosophy would gain an 
unprecedented access to the meaning and functioning of Being itself. In attempting to 
expose the promise of Heidegger’s new approach to the ontological difference for 
Western metaphysics in general, the intricacies of the between were overlooked, even 
though its understated dynamism gave palpable force to his argument. For instance, mere 
mention was made of Heidegger’s firm conviction that various terms for the between 
must be used for the ontological difference – die Differenz, der Austrag – in order to 
capture the true depth of this realm as revelatory for the meaning and truth of Being. 
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 Beyond the limits of this earlier treatment, a fuller exposition is possible by 
carefully studying one of Heidegger’s later writings. In October 1950 the concept of the 
ontological difference surfaced in the lecture “Language” as a means to elaborate the 
relationship between Being and language. Joseph Kockelmans remarks that this point in 
time marks a watershed moment in the development of Heidegger’s later thought, since 
“it was not until 1950 that Heidegger would finally be ready to unfold his conception of 
the relationship between Being and language in a systematic fashion.”9 
What must be borne in mind for the interests of the present chapter is an 
appreciation for the firm foothold that the between maintains throughout Heidegger’s 
evolving thought, so that in the march toward discussing the specific implications that it 
has for the poet and poetic thinking the between will be seen as a well grounded and 
versatile point of continuity in the overall Heideggerian trajectory. Heidegger’s concern 
for the ontological difference and language in “Language” can be seen as an intermediary 
step in the unfolding discussion of the between. It builds upon the initial level, where the 
between was implicated in a general way with the ontological difference in the project to 
renew the question of the meaning of Being. The final step will then be a well-grounded 
exposure of the pivotal role played by the between for the full disclosive functioning of 
poetized thinking with regard to an elusive God. Therefore, in varying degrees the 
concept of the between accompanies Heidegger as he traverses his way through Being, 
language and poetics. 
 In pausing to look more closely at the intermediary phase of the between, it is 
quickly noticed how Heidegger’s choice of alluring imagery in the lecture greatly 
enhances the understanding of the between and enlivens its role in the ontological 
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difference. Heidegger describes the differing relationship that obtains in the between of 
beings and Being as “pain” (der Schmerz). Metaphorizing the between of the ontological 
difference as pain arises in the lecture as Heidegger digresses to perform a 
phenomenological linguistic analysis of a poem by Georg Trakl (1887-1914) entitled “A 
Winter Evening.”10 Though, as indicated, the main purpose of the lecture was to elucidate 
the relationship between Being and language, Heidegger is productively detoured in this 
analysis by Trakl’s poem and especially taken aback by one particular verse that recasts 
the understanding of the ontological difference into a much more evocative light – “Pain 
has turned the threshold to stone” (Schmerz versteinerte die Schwelle).11 
 Heidegger admits that this verse is not only “startling” (Überasche), but that it is 
also thematic for the overall meaning of the poem: “the second verse of the third stanza is 
startling…This verse speaks all by itself in what is spoken in the whole poem.”12 The 
reason it holds the hermeneutical key to the entire poem is because it leads to a definition 
or “naming” of pain: “It names pain. Pain is the dif-ference itself” (Der Schmerz ist der 
Unter-scheid selber).13 In other words pain is the ontological difference.14 While it may 
be initially unclear why this terse, esoteric verse about pain is so telling for the between 
of the ontological difference, it is the advice of Parvis Emad to exercise a certain degree 
of patience, since “when it comes to the question of pain Heidegger expresses himself 
quite concisely and most cryptically.”15 Therefore, there is a need here to simultaneously 
bask in the conciseness and wade perseveringly through the cryptic in order to better 
grasp the deepening of the between that takes place in Trakl’s refrain – “Pain has turned 
the threshold to stone.” The fear of coming to a watery end while wading through the 
more cryptic aspect of the verse dissipates once the direct association that pain has with 
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“threshold” (die Schwelle) is recognized. As Heidegger elaborates, the significance that 
pain has for expressing the nature and function of the between vis-à-vis threshold 
gradually becomes clearer: 
The threshold is the ground-beam that bears the doorway as a whole. It 
sustains the middle in which the two, the outside and the inside, 
penetrate each other (einander durchgehen). The threshold bears the 
between (Die Schwelle trägt das Zwischen).16 
 
 Even though Trakl’s passage does not explicitly say what pain is, for Heidegger it 
is most telling because of its identification with the realm of threshold. According to 
Caputo, on Heidegger’s account everything in “A Winter Evening” is organized around 
pain.17 So the possible innocent alignment that Trakl makes between pain and threshold 
provides a ripe opportunity for Heidegger to further the understanding of the between of 
the ontological difference. Because threshold is so connotatively rich in conveying the 
dynamic of juncture that takes place in a doorway or any passage, Heidegger believes 
that pain is part and parcel in the vivification of this middle ground of the between, where 
outside and inside are not strictly separated but actually coinhere and mutually influence 
each other in a penetrating and pervading manner (“einander durchgehen,” “einander 
durchmessen”): “The threshold, as the settlement of the between, is hard because pain has 
petrified it…The pain presences unflaggingly in the threshold as pain.”18 
 Because pain plays such an important role in accurately portraying the between, 
the threshold, as a dynamic “differential spacing,” it then becomes the mot juste to 
rehabilitate the workings of the ontological difference as it applies to the differing 
difference between beings and Being. For Heidegger, pain speaks with full expressive 
eloquence from the threshold joining the rift between beings and Being while preserving 
their difference.19 
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But what is pain? Pain rends. It is the rift. But it does not tear apart in 
dispersive fragments. Pain indeed tears asunder, it separates, yet so at 
the same time it draws everything to itself, gathers it to itself. Its 
rending, as a separating that gathers…draws and joins together what is 
held apart in separation. Pain is the joining agent in the rending that 
divides and gathers…Pain joins the rift of the difference. Pain is the 
[ontological] dif-ference itself…in whose intimacy the bearing of 
things [beings] and the granting of the world [Being] pervade one 
another (in deren Innigkeit die Gebärde der Dinge und die Gunst der 
Welt einander durchmessen).20 
 
 Kockelmans’ insights at this point are helpful. With his own terminology he 
reaffirms Heidegger’s metaphor of pain as able to capture the between of the ontological 
difference, and he also keeps matters on track by drawing attention to the unique role 
played by language. It should be remembered that the original purpose that leads to 
Heidegger’s fascination with pain in Trakl’s “A Winter Evening” was to present a 
systematic examination of the relationship between Being and language. Kockelmans 
enhances the imagery of the “painful” relationship between beings and Being with the 
introduction of the expression scission: “The ontological difference is a scission (Scheid) 
between (unter) Being and beings that relates them to each other by the very fact that it 
cleaves them apart.”21 As compelling as Heidegger’s concept of pain may be in restoring 
the dynamic depths of the ontological difference, Kockelmans points out that it is 
ultimately the role of language that must be appreciated as foundational: 
in his later works, Heidegger often suggests that man’s thought and his 
speaking are a response to the saying of language as logos. Originally it 
is language (logos) which summons beings and Being, things and 
world. Language summons things [being] to give a bearing to the world 
[Being], and the world is summoned to “yield” things in their being 
things. By summoning things and world in this way, language sets 
world and things, Being and beings, apart without separating them; in 
this way it brings about the ontological difference…The ontological 
difference that comes-to-pass in language must be understood as a 
process, a dif-ferre, a bearing each other out, as if both Being and 
beings shared a common center that remains interior to both, a common 
measure that serves as the single dimension of both, a primal unity by 
reason of which each adheres to the other and out of which both “issue 
forth.”22 
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While Kockelmans’ assessment opens up many new doors for further reflection, 
especially with regard to the Heideggerian implications of the “saying of language as 
logos,” it is most important now to recognize the significance that the active realm of the 
painful between of the ontological difference holds in reawakening the question of Being. 
Doing so will firmly establish the between’s position at the very heart of the 
Heideggerian project. Eventually the poet will be seen addressing the issue of the 
mysterious Deity through poetized thinking that is exercised well within this spatio-
temporal zone. At that point, the between will be appreciated as an essential and 
consistent coordinate along the path of the Being question and not merely a happenstance 
excursion. Keith Hoeller, who recently translated Heidegger’s anthology Elucidations of 
Hölderlin’s Poetry, highlights the centrality of the Being question in any of Heidegger’s 
explorations of the poetic. For instance, Hoeller cites Heidegger’s unequivocal 
declaration of the one and only purpose of his dialogue with Hölderlin: “The poetic turn 
toward his [Hölderlin’s] poetry is possible only as a thoughtful confrontation with the 
revelation of Being which is successfully accomplished in poetry.”23  
 The revelation of Being was obviously accomplished in other poetry and with 
other poets, as was just seen in the discussion of “A Winter Evening.” There, Trakl’s 
mention of pain became for Heidegger a manifestation of Being via the between of the 
ontological difference. Most specifically it is Being, as alive and at work in language, 
which addresses the human being as Dasein and so allows the power of the between in 
the ontological difference to be seen as making it possible for Being itself (world) and 
being (thing) to be properly disclosed.24 Even in this instance where a furthering in the 
understanding of Being is the ultimate goal, Heidegger does not remain in the land of 
  
 198
heady abstraction. Instead, the revelation of Being that takes place in its close 
relationship with language is quickly enfleshed when Heidegger alludes to Trakl’s poem 
and its intriguing imagery of pain. 
It is not just to any generic Dasein that Being in language issues its summons in 
order to unravel the disclosive potential of the pained differing between Being and 
beings. It is rather a specific call directed to the wandering stranger. Heidegger relates the 
import behind the specification of this calling when he says elsewhere: “All that Georg 
Trakl’s poetry says remains gathered and focused on the wandering stranger (auf den 
wandernden Fremdling).”25 With the recipient of the call clearly designated there is 
likewise a specificity given to the content of the call, as Heidegger’s interpretation of “A 
Winter Evening” shows: 
the third stanza begins with an emphatic calling:/Wanderer quietly 
steps within./ Where to? The verse does not say. Instead, it calls the 
entering wanderer into the stillness. This stillness ministers over the 
doorway (das Tor). Suddenly and strangely the call sounds:/ Pain has 
turned the threshold to stone./26 
 
Thus, Being at work in language beckons the wanderer to a new disclosure about 
its meaning and truth. Being is not only understood in a lopsided dichotomized way 
through the prism of beings. This is the traditional approach of Western metaphysics and 
its manner of using the ontological difference. Instead, the admonition to heed the 
pained/painful active process as characteristic of the relationship between Being and 
beings resonates with Heidegger’s call for the “overcoming of metaphysics” discussed in 
chapter one. For Heidegger, metaphysics neutralizes this dynamic differing relationship 
by setting up an unbalanced and bifurcated conceptualization of the difference between 
Being and beings. George Kovacs comments on Heidegger’s sense of the plight that the 
ontological difference suffers at the hands of Western metaphysics: “the difference is 
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being wrapped up in darkness, because the primacy of beings over Being characterizes 
metaphysics.”27 
Heidegger is not hopeful that this biased, opaque pall of metaphysics, which 
inhibits the understanding of Being, can ever be removed. Thus in one of his latest works 
(perceived by some because of its lateness as a “landmark” statement28), he urges a 
radical measure to ensure that the Being question is pursued properly and without the 
encumbrance of metaphysics’ bias toward beings. In this rather extreme tactic Heidegger 
is willing to sacrifice the rich potential that the Being question could derive from 
engaging the ontological difference at its most active sense expressing the pained rifting 
and joining between Being and beings, and instead counsels a more direct approach to 
Being itself. Heidegger’s student André Schuwer points out the severity of this 
methodological shift when he writes: 
we observe that in his preface to “Time and Being” Heidegger writes 
that he wants to say something about his endeavors to think Being 
without [beings] das Seiende (Sein ohne das Seiende zu denken); that he 
wants to think Being without regard to a Be-gründung, a foundation of 
Being in and through beings.29 
 
 As Heidegger’s analysis in “Time and Being” ensues Schuwer’s remarks ring 
true. Being is directly confronted and discussed with some of the more fascinating and 
complex conceptual gems that become thematic throughout the later Heideggerian 
oeuvre. For instance, he exploits the literal significance behind the ordinary German 
expression “Es gibt,” usually rendered “There is,” in order to discuss the mysterious 
giving nature of Being and time. As the essay continues, Heidegger eventually presents 
his ultimate concept for understanding Being – das Ereignis, the event of appropriation. 
 Even though Heidegger uses novel concepts to discuss the nature of Being in a 
straight forward manner, several commentators contend that this should not be interpreted 
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as an all out dismissal of the importance of the ontological difference and its dynamic 
functioning. Kockelmans sees Heidegger’s tack as an attempt to fit the workings of the 
ontological difference within the newer conceptualizations of Being’s functioning so as 
to prevent any recidivism to the stilted ways of metaphysics. He writes: 
“to think Being without beings” does not mean that the relationship of 
Being to beings is not essential and that one can leave this relationship 
one day out of consideration. It says, rather, that Being must not be 
conceived of in the way which it has been in metaphysics. Thus, what 
Heidegger later rejects is not the ontological difference as such but 
rather “the metaphysical characterization of the ontological 
difference…”30 
 
Kovacs voices a similar concern. Because the ontological difference is a core issue in 
Heidegger’s thought, it cannot be easily passed over in the seeming rush of the later 
Heidegger to reach Being itself: 
The sense of wonder about [B]eing does not abolish but rather deepens 
the primordial ontological difference…Heidegger’s way of thinking 
(even in its later and latest development), then, should not be 
interpreted as a quick passage from beings to [B]eing, as the light-
hearted celebration of the death of metaphysics…31 
 
Despite any of the new and promising concepts that Heidegger may introduce in his more 
direct approach to Being, the attempt to hastily by-pass the experience of the between of 
the ontological difference would only serve to retard any real advance in the entire 
question of Being. Therefore, Kovacs is a strong proponent of not losing sight of beings 
when attempting to arrive at a true grasp of Being. He also advocates paying close 
attention to the dynamic of the active between of the ontological difference in order to 
achieve an appreciation of Being’s profundity. 
The true comprehension of the meaning (of the very concept) of 
[B]eing, then, comes out of the experience of the nature as well as of 
the tension of the ontological difference…the detour from the 
experience and exploration of “the” difference in the ontological 
difference would also obstruct, at the same time, the new language of 
the fullness of Being, of the “mystery” of Being…32 
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 The challenge set before the thinker, therefore, is to fully embrace the experience 
of the nature and tension of the between in the differing relationship of Being and beings. 
This familiar challenge arose in chapter one in conjunction with the “step back” (der 
Schritt zurück). There the emphasis was on overcoming traditional metaphysics. 
Heidegger prompted the philosopher to step back into the differing difference of the 
ontological difference, and exclusive attention was devoted to the nature of the step back 
as effective for restoring philosophy to its proper task to think Being. Now, the same 
invitation to enter into the ontological difference has a different emphasis. The current 
effort seeks to better understand the “where” (the between) that the thinker is urged to 
enter into, as well as to gain clarity about the desired result of inhabiting this unique 
spatio-temporal realm – to obtain a more primordial comprehension of the meaning of 
Being itself. Kovacs makes the specifics of this invitation clear: 
The main task of entering into the primordiality of the ontological 
difference is quite ambitious…not an abandoning but, rather, a 
deepening (an entering into the essential nature) of “the” difference as 
such between beings and [B]eing…in such a way that neither side 
(term) of the relation abolishes the other, that the balance (the 
difference between them) is safe-guarded and more deeply rooted.33 
 
 This ambitious project to enter into the ontological difference in order to 
experience and uphold the nature and tension of the between that obtains in the 
relationship between Being and beings will eventuate in a deeper meditation on the 
mystery of Being itself only if the “right” thinker responds to such a challenge. The 
thinker must be of the more receptive and passive type and not inclined toward 
manipulation or control of the final outcome of this undertaking. Heidegger reiterates in 
different places that the ontological difference (and its spatio-temporal between) is not 
something made or produced by the thinker; it is rather something found, discovered, 
entered into by the thinker who is open. Thus the right thinker, who possesses the optimal 
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disposition for exploration and discovery, is the wandering stranger. She is eager to 
embrace and inhabit the pained rifting and gathering that so poignantly captures the 
activity of the between of the ontological difference. 
Heidegger calls for such a receptive, passive and adventurous spirit when 
encountering the ontological difference in the greatest portion of his lecture course Basic 
Concepts. According to Kovacs, sections 2-19 of this 25 section lecture let the 
ontological difference speak in an inviting and enrolling way so that it leads the thinker to 
experience and enter into the difference.34 Moreover, it is Heidegger’s contention that 
such an invitation to explore coupled with a response marked by an attitude of openness 
and docility will result in a true appreciation of the between, since rediscovered will be 
“the unthought sojourn (der Auftenhalt) of the human being in the differentiation between 
Being and beings.”35 
When the wandering stranger in Trakl’s poetry was initially introduced above, the 
finer points of this character were omitted in order to focus on the powerful imagery of 
pain that Heidegger fastens upon in the poem as the best expression to capture the 
between in its fullness. While acknowledging that Heidegger interprets the poetry of 
Trakl as revolving around this wandering stranger, it naturally follows that when the key 
metaphor of pain arises in the poem, it is none other than the wandering stranger who will 
become closely associated with, affected by and witness to the painful rifting and 
gathering that takes place in the between of the ontological difference. In other words, 
this seminal figure in Heidegger’s interpretation of Trakl in some way embodies or 
represents the pained relationship between Being and beings. Presently the aim is not to 
revisit the importance of the pain metaphor, but rather to pay closer attention to the 
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wandering stranger and the distinctive qualities that enable her to be such an effective 
agent for disclosing not only in a narrow sense the meaning of Trakl’s poetry, but also in 
an even broader way the meaning of Being itself. After all, the sole purpose of any 
Heideggerian dialogue with a poet is ultimately for the benefit of Being’s understanding. 
Recall that the search is on for someone who will willingly enter into the 
ontological difference as a sojourner in order to explore and discover the ramifications of 
its differentiating between. The wandering stranger of Trakl’s poetry is the best candidate 
for such an endeavor because she possesses the requisite trait of openness for an 
adventurous journey without any rigid itinerary. Paying careful attention to the way 
Heidegger artfully expands upon this enigmatic figure gives evidence that the wandering 
stranger has the wherewithal to strike out on a road less traveled. When he makes the 
familiar bold assertion that everything about Trakl’s poetry centers on the wandering 
stranger, Heidegger immediately follows with a very specific descriptive definition of 
who this person is: “He is, and is called, ‘he who is apart’ or ‘he who has parted’” (Er ist 
und er heißt “der Abgeschiedene”).36 Exploiting the productive ambiguity built into the 
term der Abgeschiedene as either someone who is “apart” or someone who has “parted” 
is the best means to promote the candidacy of the wandering stranger for entering into the 
between and embodying its significance. An initial grappling with the connotation of 
“apartness” draws attention to the odd or unusual demeanor of this wandering stranger. 
Someone is indeed apart when s/he in some way differs or stands out from what is 
accepted as the normal course of affairs, or as Karsten Harries writes in his study of 
Heidegger’s use of Trakl’s poetry: “Heidegger understands the Abgeschiendene as one 
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who has taken leave from the community. He is no longer with us but stands alone and 
apart, a stranger.”37 
But merely indicating that the wandering stranger is quirky because she is apart 
from others does not really build the case that her qualifications best suit her for an 
exploratory excursion into the between in order to expose its significance for the meaning 
of Being. Attention must therefore shift from the weird aspect of the wandering stranger 
to the fact that she is also a wanderer. In other words, the notion of being apart must be 
held in tension with the notion of the one who has parted (departed), and thus more fully 
appreciating the productive ambiguity present in der Abgeschiedene. Heidegger makes 
such a shift in connotative emphasis possible when he goes so far as to call him a 
“madman” (der Wahnsinnige).38 This designation should not be taken in the pejorative 
sense, which would only serve to revert the character analysis of the wandering stranger 
to the odd or apartness aspect. However when it is understood in a deeper sense, it 
becomes integral in the cause to promote the wandering stranger as that adventurous 
spirit eager to enter into and explore the between of the ontological difference for the 
treasures it may bear for the meaning of Being. The wandering stranger as mad more 
positively indicates one who is indeed strange and apart from others because she is a 
willing wanderer who has departed. Heidegger clarifies and specifies this important 
nuance as he writes: 
Does the word [madman] mean someone who is mentally ill? Madness 
here does not mean a mind filled with senseless delusions. The 
madman’s mind senses – senses in fact as no one else does. Even so, he 
does not have the sense of the others. He is of another mind (Sinn).  
“Sinnan” means originally: to travel, to strive for…, to take a certain 
direction. The departed one is a man apart, a madman, because he has 
taken his way in another direction.39 
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 The wandering stranger is therefore not just some meandering eccentric whose 
estrangement is to be either mocked or pitied. Rather, his alienation is the result of a 
deliberate choice to exercise the unique gift of a special sense or way of thinking that 
allows him to eagerly embark on journeys not typically taken by others. The thinker who 
can assume the mantle of the wandering stranger is thus best suited to enter into the 
between of the ontological difference, undaunted by the uncharted and lonely course but 
nevertheless hopeful of what lies ahead for discovery. 
 Heidegger’s interpretation of Trakl’s “A Winter Evening” hints at how the 
wandering stranger exhibits a spirit of wanderlust with very purposeful aims. By keeping 
the imagery of pain on the periphery and paying closer attention to Heidegger’s general 
synopsis of the structural flow of the poem, the figure of the wandering stranger begins to 
emerge in her own right as an eager traveler whose special sense of direction leads her to 
follow less trodden paths. 
 To facilitate the examination of Heidegger’s synopsis a copy of the poem in 
German and English appears in Appendix 2. The poem’s description of a winter evening 
begins in the first stanza by drawing attention to two noteworthy occurrences taking place 
outdoors – snowfall and the ringing of the vesper bell. For Heidegger, what is happening 
outside has bearing on what is occurring indoors: 
The things outside touch the things inside the human homestead. The 
snow falls on the window. The ringing of the bell enters into every 
house. Within, everything is well provided and the table set.40 
 
The second stanza takes on an added significance for the current study. By virtue of the 
broad contrast it introduces between the characters who are inside and those who are 
outside, the wandering stranger is able to make a fitting debut. Heidegger writes: “While 
many are at home within the house and at the table, not a few wander homeless on 
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darksome paths.”41 However it is in the third stanza where the full force of the wandering 
stranger comes to the fore. According to Heidegger, it is this stanza that “bids the 
wanderer enter from the dark outdoors into the brightness within. The houses of the many 
and the tables of their daily meals have become house of God and altar.”42 
 Despite Heidegger’s disputable interpretive style, he nonetheless allows the 
poetry of Trakl to speak with a poignancy and precision that extols the virtues of the 
wandering stranger for the purposes at hand. First, the figure of the wandering stranger is 
depicted as an unusual traveler on otherwise “darksome paths,” who nonetheless is 
willing to enter into the illuminated and warm house which will entail the obvious 
necessity of crossing over a threshold. While indeed stepping over a threshold can be 
easily overlooked as an uneventful gesture in the normal course of locomotion, it must 
not be forgotten how the threshold in the poem is intimately associated with the all-
important metaphor of pain. (“Pain has turned the threshold to stone.”) And it was 
discussed earlier how the imagery of pain for Heidegger best expresses the spatio-
temporal dimension of the between. This being the case not just for any between, but for 
the very lofty tension of rifting and gathering that obtains in the relationship between 
Being and beings – the ontological difference. Caputo effectively captures the 
comprehensive Heideggerian interpretation so that nothing is lost in regard to the 
character of the wandering stranger: 
On the thinker’s account, everything in the poem is organized around 
the pain. For it is pain which “institutes” this scene by dividing outside 
from inside, darkness from light, cold from warmth, hunger from 
nourishment, wandering from rest. Pain drives the traveler within and 
motivates the whole movement of the poem, setting the wanderer on 
his path, setting up the distinction between inside and outside. Pain is 
the differential spacing. That is very powerful.43 
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 Although Caputo showcases the important link between the wandering, “mad” 
stranger and pain, and even further specifically commends the evocativeness of pain as a 
powerful concept, the ultimate purpose of his analysis is to take issue with the way 
Heidegger restricts the imagery of pain to an abstract description of the rifting/gathering 
tension between Being and beings. Caputo is disappointed that Heidegger does not allow 
pain, in all its connotative fullness, to burst forth and speak in the way that it usually does 
– pain in terms of sensitivity as it applies to the more physical realm of human existence. 
Hence Caputo admonishes: 
But do not be misled. For this pain, the thinker’s [Heidegger’s], has 
nothing to do with feeling or actually (“factically”) being cold, hungry, 
weary, desperate. That would be a thoughtless sentimentalizing of the 
poem in terms of feeling and sensation. We have to break this habit of 
thinking that this is a pain in anyone’s hide…44 
 
For Caputo, then, Heidegger’s concept of pain as found in the poetry of Trakl has 
unfortunately been relegated to the cozy conceptual realm where the differing and tense 
relationship between Being and beings is comfortably entertained: 
A great poet might poetize aboriginal polemos, the conflict between 
Being and beings which in tending apart are led back towards one 
another [the differing between of the ontological difference]. But no 
great poet would ever be caught dead poetizing war, not a real, actual, 
factical war, with “broken mouths” and “spilt blood,…”45 
 
 The veracity of Caputo’s charge cannot be summarily dismissed or ignored, for 
Heidegger does (by his own admission) take the physical suffering out of pain in its more 
poetic use and functioning. In another place where Heidegger again discusses Trakl’s 
poetry and the nature of pain, he clearly indicates that: “Its nature remains impenetrable 
to any mind that understands pain in terms of sensitivity.”46 However, there is more room 
for refuting the corollary that Caputo develops from the charge that Heidegger defangs 
the meaning of pain when he states that Heidegger has thus spiritualized the notion of 
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pain to the degree that it is a vaporized nothingness applicable to no one and no real 
situation:  
[This] Pain is the rift between Being and beings, world and thing…not 
the suffering but the Unter-Scheid [differing difference] is what comes 
to pass in pain. Heidegger has taken the suffering out of pain and 
distilled it into its essential spirit: nobody is wehleidig, miserable, or 
cut to the quick.47 
 
 This critique by Caputo is certainly justifiable and cogent – pain in its nitty-gritty 
physicality is sanguinely conceptualized to capture the more ethereal tensive relationship 
between Being and beings. However, if the figure of the wandering, mad stranger is kept 
in purview, then an acknowledgment of pain’s reorientation need not mean its tragic 
impoverishment. To remove the physical suffering from pain and so “distill” it into a 
more spiritual plight does not necessarily entail its complete anesthetization and 
inapplicableness to real people and events. No, the wandering stranger is the flesh and 
blood person, the somebody who by his close association with the pain of the threshold 
can be seen as undertaking and so embodying a spiritual anguish. It is more a matter of 
emphasis rather than a complete denial. While pain for Heidegger is not specifically 
expressed in a bodily or physical way, it is nevertheless able to be expressed in its more 
spiritual aspects through the itinerary of the wandering stranger. 
 The validity of Caputo’s observations would be grossly misrepresented if they 
were taken to mean that Heidegger ignores or downplays the significance of life’s real 
challenges. Such a claim can be easily countered in several ways. First, and most close at 
hand, recourse can be made to the previous chapter. There it was vehemently argued how 
important the real “factical” life experiences of the first Christians were for coming to an 
understanding of the active waiting for the return of Jesus. To arrive at the Urchristentum 
(the original or “primal” Christian experience) Heidegger employed phenomenology to 
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expose the depths of the historically enacted real life experience of St. Paul’s 
Thessalonians, thus warding off any understanding of early Christian experience as a 
generalized state of passive indifference in anticipation of some abstract and nebulous 
eschaton. 
 
 
The Equilibrium of Human Existence and the Phenomenology of the Body  
 
 Moving beyond the boundaries of this work, there is a second means available to 
safeguard Caputo’s critique from hardening into an inaccurate depiction of Heidegger as 
one-sidedly concerned with the speculative and ethereal. Once again Heidegger’s 
relationship to phenomenology will prove most beneficial on this front. Heidegger 
embraced the phenomenological method in his first Freiburg period study of the primal 
Christian experience to ensure that the entire range of the factical life concerns of the 
Thessalonian community would be completely exposed and fully appreciated. Now, at a 
different level, Heidegger’s affiliation with the phenomenological movement is crucial in 
rescuing him from any ad hominem charge of solely addressing matters abstract. Such a 
charge would actually place Heidegger in the same camp as René Descartes, who was 
notorious for advancing numerous dualisms which left an impressionable mark on the 
complexion of Western philosophy. In fact, it is in the wake of this tide of influence 
created by Descartes that phenomenology had its genesis. 
 While it would be impossible here to discuss all the specific ways in which the 
philosophy of Descartes (and subsequent Cartesianisms) gave shape to the 
phenomenological movement launched by Husserl, it is nonetheless important to 
appreciate its general influence as precipitory and enduring. For instance, in discussing 
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phenomenology’s efforts to overcome one of Descartes’ more celebrated dualisms, that 
between subjectivity and objectivity, Dermot Moran observes: 
[in] one way or another, phenomenology is always in a tension with 
Descartes and hence with the subjective turn of modern philosophy – 
either radicalizing it or seeking to overcome it.48 
 
For Husserl’s part the tension with Descartes would be resolved more along the lines of 
attempting to radicalize it rather than by overcoming or dismissing it. 
 As noted in the previous chapter Husserl developed one of his core tenets, the 
intentionality of consciousness, as a strident means to break down the impenetrable 
barrier that Descartes erected between subject and object. This demonstrated that there is 
a mutual belonging and reciprocal influence that obtains immediately between 
subjectivity and objectivity. According to Moran, the overcoming of the subject-object 
divide in Husserl is really a retrieval of the essential radicality of the Cartesian project.49 
In other words, Husserl reconciles the chasm between subject and object, occasioned by 
Descartes’ valorization of the isolated thinking subject (cogito ergo sum), by finding a 
deeper meaning of subjectivity itself. Elisabeth Ströker maintains that Husserl was able to 
achieve a delicate balance as a philosophical reformer, since he respected the foundations 
set forth by his predecessors as the basis for any innovation. She makes the following 
general observation in light of the problem of knowledge: 
When Husserl regarded the epistemological tradition which had, at 
least since Descartes, arrived at absolute foundations of knowledge by 
referring back to subjectivity, and when he realized that in the past 
those foundations had never been reached, he drew the conclusion that 
a completely new philosophical discipline was needed with quite new 
methods, if it was to get to the foundations. He therefore set his 
phenomenology off against all tradition.50 
 
Thus in referring back to subjectivity as foundational in order to discover 
something new that could rehabilitate the estranged relationship between subject and 
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object, Husserl was living the spirit and trusting the potential behind the very anthem of 
phenomenology – “to the matter itself.” When Husserl ventures back to subjectivity – the 
matter itself – he does not discount Descartes’ work on the thinking subject but rather 
plumbs its depths. Instead of resting content with Descartes’ notion of the individual 
subject as res cogitans – a thinking substance entirely independent from objective reality 
(matter) – Husserl describes the subject as ego-cogitatio-cogitatum. This implies a self 
with an intentional structure whose acts of consciousness are in immediate and reciprocal 
contact with objective correlates. Moran is therefore justified when he states: “We have 
overcome the subject-object divide only by finding a deeper meaning within subjectivity 
itself.”51 
 Any advance credited to Husserl for having used Descartes’ vaunted subject only 
to radicalize it and so put it in proper rapport with the objective world is a hollow victory 
if prized for its theoretical prowess alone. It is not just a case of one philosopher besting 
another philosopher at his own game by some clever maneuvering. Instead, the impact of 
Husserl’s radical rethinking of the Cartesian project itself redounds to the very 
understanding of who humankind is and the kind of anthropological image that is 
ultimately conveyed. One of the true contributions of phenomenology in its assiduous 
efforts to overcome the strict dichotomy of subject and object is a balanced description of 
human existence. 
William A. Luijpen admits that phenomenology’s penetration into the history of 
Western thought by touting such a balanced description is most praiseworthy, since past 
philosophical systems were more or less skewed exaggerations vying for either a 
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spiritualistic or a materialistic understanding of the human person. Phenomenology, 
however, achieves a rare instance of “equilibrium” in the history of philosophy: 
Such a moment of equilibrium is present in the [contemporary] 
philosophy known as existential phenomenology. This philosophy 
knows how to retain the values perceived by materialists and 
exaggerated spiritualists, without falling into the one-sidedness of 
either system.52 
 
Luijpen dubs materialism in its extreme variety “materialistic monism” and relates its 
depiction of human existence as one whereby the person as an entity is inserted into 
reality just as all other things are: “man is a thing in the midst of other things of the 
world, a fragment of nature, a moment in the limitless evolution of the cosmos.”53 At the 
other extreme is “spiritualistic monism.” Here the subject pole is absolutized to the extent 
that things and the world have no meaning without human subjectivity. In the more 
graceful words of Luijpen, leaning heavily on the insights of French phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty: “spiritualistic monism lets the density of the material things 
evaporate into the thin air of ‘contents of consciousness.’”54 
Existential phenomenology is able to reach a condition of equilibrium between 
these two systemic extremes by at once rejecting their respective excesses and embracing 
the reality which these systems have respectively slighted – existence. In other words, 
when striving to answer the question, “What is humanity?,” the phenomenologist fastens 
upon the concept of existence. To be human is fundamentally and essentially to “exist” 
which means to go out from any given state in which one finds oneself. Luijpen clarifies 
how the concept of existence is instrumental in creating a state of equilibrium between 
the spiritualistic and materialistic accounts of humanity: “man is a subject, undoubtedly, 
but he is an existing subject, a subject which places itself outside itself, in the world.”55 
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 Much of this should have a familiar ring, since it receives an alternative classic 
expression by Heidegger in the well known existential analytic of Being and Time. When 
Heidegger uses the all-important term “existence” there, he does so in a very restricted 
and specified way. He writes in a cautionary and illuminating tone: 
To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the Interpretive 
expression “presence-at-hand” for the term “existentia”, while the term 
“existence”, [Existenz] as a designation of Being, will be allotted solely 
to Dasein. The “essence” of Dasein lies in its existence.56 
 
It was mentioned in chapter two that when Heidegger talks about the distinctive being of 
the human person in his earlier period he generally uses the expression Dasein. What is 
important here is to take notice of the fact that the being of the human being or Dasein 
and existence proper are inextricably linked. While a complete exposition of the 
ramifications of Dasein as existence and existence as Dasein is impossible here, it is 
possible to appreciate how Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of Dasein in its own 
right contributes to the condition of equilibrium between any excessive spiritualistic or 
materialistic conceptions of humanity. 
Heidegger further specifies the attribute of existence applicable to Dasein as 
being a priori in the world. Dasein is always in a world, and the far reaching implications 
of this specification are realized in pertinent sections of Being and Time’s Division I. 
There it is clear that Being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-Sein) as the constitutive state of 
Dasein will influence the course that Heidegger’s ensuing ontological exposition of 
human existence will take. Regardless of the manifold ways or modes by which Dasein 
may be examined, it is imperative not to lose sight of that which is ultimately vivifying 
and foundational: 
In each case Dasein exists [and]…Dasein’s Being takes on a definite 
character, and they must be seen and understood a priori as grounded 
upon that state of Being which we have called “Being-in-the-world.” 
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An interpretation of this constitutive state is needed if we are to set up 
our analytic of Dasein correctly.57 
 
Recognition of being-in-the-world as the essential state of the existence of Dasein allows 
Luijpen to advance the following synthetic conclusion: “As Heidegger expresses it, to be 
man is to-be-in-the-world, or, what amounts to the same, Dasein.”58 
 The phrase being-in-the-world thus has become common currency used among 
existentialists and phenomenologists to describe the basic condition of human existence. 
The immediate implication of this expression that allows it to be a force of equilibrium 
between the philosophical extremes of spiritualism and materialism is the assertion that 
there can be no self without a world, with which the self is in immediate and a priori 
interaction, as John Macquarrie observes: “We do not begin with a self to which a world 
gets added on, so to speak; we begin with a unity of being-in-the-world, and out of this 
prior unity self and world emerge in a reciprocal relation.”59 While this reminder from 
Macquarrie may appear redundant and self-evident in light of all the preceding, it is 
within the context of these remarks that this astute translator of Being and Time offers an 
important refinement for the concept of being-in-the-world: 
To say that there can be no self without a world is also to assert that 
there can be no self without a body, for it is in virtue of the body that 
we are in the world. Only as embodied selves can we act on the world 
or be acted upon by the world. The body is not an appendage to the 
self, still less an encumbrance to the self, but an essential part of 
personal being.60 
 
 With this meaningful expansion upon the significance of being-in-the-world, the 
equilibrium touted by phenomenology which avoids the theoretical extremes of both 
materialism and spiritualism now assumes a more specific articulation with practical 
implications. No longer is the discussion focused exclusively on the generic human 
subject who is immediately involved in an objective world; instead, the subject is now an 
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embodied self whose interaction with the world signals very down-to-earth consequences 
for cultivating a balanced grasp of human existence. 
 The value of equilibrium is furthered and better appreciated, since lopsided 
spiritualistic or idealistic views of the self emphasize, in the words of Macquarrie, “the 
spiritual and intellectual side of man’s being, to the disparagement of the bodily and 
worldly side.”61 Therefore, the soul and its inner life are what really matter – the soul is 
the real self and the body merely its habitation. And conversely without the expression of 
this more practical equilibrium, the one-sided understanding of human existence as 
materialistic may lead to an attitude of “sensualism,” as Macquarrie puts it, which makes 
“the satisfaction of bodily needs the highest good for man.”62 
 Heidegger’s Dasein therefore becomes the effective conceptual means that allows 
him to join ranks with the phenomenological flank to revisit and radicalize Descartes’ 
coveted subject in order to stave off any resultant rigid dualisms. To this point, two such 
dualisms have been exposed and tempered: the more generalized severe split between 
subject and object and the related strict dichotomy between mind and body. For Dasein to 
exist, it must do so as a being-in-the-world, which is further specified as a concrete, 
embodied existence in contrast with a bare thinking subject. 
The concept of Dasein is not something that Heidegger devised in a vacuum. As a 
formidable means to specifically soften the body-soul division, it is best seen in the wider 
context of phenomenology’s crusade to radicalize yet another extreme of Cartesian cogito 
philosophy. Recall the insight of Moran cited earlier that in one way or another 
phenomenology is always in a tension with Descartes. The mind-body problem which 
finds an articulate resolution in Heidegger’s Dasein was greatly influenced by the work 
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of Husserl. In fact, David Woodruff Smith, in his analysis of the mind-body issue in 
Husserl, claims that an essential force behind Heidegger’s formulation and institution of 
his trademark Dasein concept was Husserl’s correlative labors to salvage the mind-body 
problem from remaining mired down in the ossified dichotomy established by Descartes. 
Smith writes: 
Husserl fashioned an intricate ontology of mind and body, coordinated 
with a rich phenomenology of our awareness of body and mind, as well 
as an epistemology of the kinds of evidence we have about body and 
mind.63 
 
Husserl offers the most in-depth discussion of the mind-body experience in the Second 
Book of Ideas (1912), and Smith is convinced that this was familiar to Heidegger and 
most formative upon his views of Dasein: 
Husserl’s groundbreaking work in Ideas II, separating crucial aspects 
of mind and body as we experience them, was known to Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty. The influence of Ideas II is at work in the well-known 
views of Heidegger on the practical, social activities of the self…64 
 
The embodied self becomes Dasein for Heidegger, which is best appreciated as one of his 
signature conceptual pieces that nonetheless owes a great deal to the Husserlian 
confrontation with the Cartesian denigrations of mind and body unity. As Smith 
observes: “Heidegger explicitly re-christens the traditional notion of the self or subject, 
the human being as ‘Dasein,’ with the aim of shedding inter alia suggestions of Cartesian 
dualisms.”65 
 The particular challenge of these dualisms stems from Descartes’ solipsistic 
method concerning the functioning of human consciousness, which accords no serious 
role to the body. Luijpen corroborates the problematic nature of this method when he 
suggests: “Descartes’ method locked consciousness up in itself: consciousness, for him, 
was consciousness of consciousness. Consciousness was isolated, walled in, and existed 
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without the body.”66 Abjuring any caricaturizations of Descartes’ method, it must be 
borne in mind that while he did isolate consciousness or soul and the body from each 
other and so placed them along side each other as complete substances, he nevertheless 
believed that there are relations between consciousness and the body. But because his 
steadfast view of the body as a complete substance meant that it was “extension” only 
(res extensa) – and so fully subjected to the laws of extension – the sad and irrevocable 
result from Smith’s perspective is that “Descartes reduced the body to a mechanical body 
whose essence is exhausted by the mathematics of classical mechanics.”67 This particular 
dualism posed a most formidable challenge to phenomenology and would require serious 
energy if a concept like Heidegger’s Dasein were ever to see the light of day. Not only 
had Descartes introduced yet another separation between consciousness and the body, but 
now the body was seen merely as a machine. Only from this very specified Cartesian 
viewpoint does the dualism acquire its real bite, since now it is possible to speak of the 
body alone. Luijpen discusses how such a solitary view of the body excludes the 
important corrective of phenomenology, which takes into consideration that the body is a 
human body and is given to human beings in a very unique mode: “my body is given to 
me – namely, as ‘mine’…The body is properly human only in the indivisible unity which 
man is…The body is my body in its participation in the conscious self.”68 
 The crucial point of divergence that is being advanced between the Cartesian 
mechanized body of extension and the phenomenological humanized body of integration 
is that the former stance views the body as “a” body which is in and amongst other 
extended bodies. On the other hand, the latter position particularizes the body and 
appreciates the profound contribution that it offers toward the realization of fuller human 
  
 218
personhood. Condensing the pertinent insights of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Luijpen 
traces the lineaments of the contrast in the following manner: 
According to Descartes’ description the body is always only “a” body, 
i.e., a body pertaining to the immense group of bodies…The body 
which occurs in anatomy, biology, and physiology is merely “a” body. 
These sciences describe the body as a thing in the world. Their 
descriptions are based upon the observations of [people] of science, but 
they do not explicate my perception of my body as mine.69 
 
So the promising foil offered by existential phenomenology that prevents the body from 
becoming yet another calculable and measurable reality of the natural sciences is its 
unflinching assertion that the human body, viewed in its immediate and reciprocal 
relationship to the conscious self, becomes the indispensable condition by which a person 
assumes a unique identity and realizes her distinctive possibilities. The anatomical and 
physiological questions do not focus on the body as such a condition for the realization of 
personal being and authenticity, but rather address concerns about how the body works. 
In order to study how the body works a certain detached objectivity is undoubtedly 
required, but along with this are the negative tendencies to ignore the unique conscious 
self that is deeply and intimately interwoven with this body as specimen, and moreover to 
overlook how such an in tact unity becomes the very nexus for revealing and manifesting 
distinctive personal meaning. As Luijpen indicates: 
My body, however, is mine through its mysterious reference to me, to 
the conscious self with which it has fused. My body has even grown so 
much into one with me that in some cases I do not hesitate to speak of 
“me” when I mean my body.70 
 
 Well aware on a professional level of the abuses that may result when the body is 
specimenized and thus divorced from the conscious self is the renowned Dutch 
phenomenological psychiatrist Jan H. van den Berg. According to van den Berg, the 
Cartesian conviction that the body as res extensa belongs to the world of other material 
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objects is “extraordinarily fertile to medical science. For an object one has can be 
dissected, and in this way one can try to understand it [how it works], whereas that which 
is cannot be dissected.”71 And certainly the body as indivisibly part and parcel of a 
unique conscious self (an “I,” a “you,” a “she”) is not a separate possession that one 
“has” but rather an integral dimension of who one “is” and may become. The 
indispensable connection between the personal conscious self and her very body is 
expressed by van den Berg as follows: 
A person needs only to look at his hand to know that he is there 
himself, in his hand. Legion are the instances that make it clear that we 
are our bodies… 
Talking about one’s body means talking about oneself. A person 
washes himself, not his body. He shaves himself, not his face. And if he 
is shaving his chin, he is not shaving the chin of the face he has, but of 
the face he is. He who is cutting his nails; not for a moment does he 
estrange himself from his hand, unless there is something wrong with 
it. A disturbance, a disease, has to enter the body one is to make the 
body one has come into existence. Or one has to reflect upon the body 
one is for the body one has to come into existence.72 
 
 Aside from acknowledging that the body is integrally mine and constitutive of my 
personal being, and so no mere appendage one possesses for clinical biomedical study, it 
is also important to acknowledge the personal meaning that can be revealed from such an 
appreciation of the body. Luijpen captures well the rich manifestation of meaning that 
results from the fusion of my body and conscious self: 
My hand reveals itself as mine when I try to grasp an object; my feet 
manifest themselves as mine when I carefully place them on the steps 
of a steep staircase; my eyes disclose themselves as mine when I let my 
gaze travel over the world. My hands with which I grasp do not belong 
to the system of seizable things, such as my pen, my shoes, and my 
pack of cigarettes. My feet do not belong to the world that can be 
walked upon, and my eyes do not pertain to the visible world. They 
reveal themselves as meanings which lie on the side of the subject 
which I am. These meanings cannot be found in a text book of anatomy 
or physiology, because “I” do not occur in such books.73 
 
But the “I” as the embodied conscious self who is always meaningfully in the world 
occurs resoundingly throughout the literature of phenomenology. While the emphasis of 
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different authors may vary and thus give rise to different modes of expression, the 
positive outcome remains the same as Cartesian dualisms are confronted and any 
particular attempts to devalue the body’s role are halted. 
For his part, Husserl expresses the matter from a more epistemological angle. He 
focuses on the functioning of consciousness in its broad intentional sense in order to 
describe how the embodied conscious self is meaningfully in the world. Luijpen 
identifies Welterfahrendes Leben as the specific Husserlian term of choice to articulate 
this truth: “Being-[human] is being-conscious-in-the-world, it is ‘Welterfahrendes 
Leben.’”74 Heidegger on the other hand, especially in his earlier phases, assumes a more 
ontological perspective and so readily discusses the being of the human person by use of 
the well known Dasein to capture the fusion of conscious self and body who finds herself 
meaningfully in the world. 
 Regardless of the different vocabulary that may be used, the phenomenological 
truism remains preserved: the distinctive human person as an “I,” “you,” or “s/he” finds 
identity and meaning as an embodied conscious self. It has been noted that Husserl’s 
wranglings with the mind-body dilemma had a significant impact on the way in which 
Heidegger eventually resolved the dilemma through the conceptual means of Dasein. 
What was it about Husserl’s approach to the mind-body issue that enabled him to so 
cogently address it in his own right and at the same time allowed it to be so influential 
upon the work of his successors? In other words, what is the basis for the 
phenomenological principle concerning the meaningful soul/body union that transcends 
the varied semantics by which it is expressed? The answer lies in one of the three formal 
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structures of phenomenology – the structure of parts and wholes. Sokolowski attests to 
the prominence and pervasiveness of these structural forms in phenomenological method: 
Three formal structures are present “everywhere” and appear 
“constantly” in Husserl’s philosophy: (a) the relationship between parts 
and wholes, (b) the contrast between empty and filled intentions, or 
between presence and absence and (c) the structure of identity in a 
manifold.75 
 
Sokolowski’s opinion is that an awareness of these forms will contribute greatly toward 
understanding how a particular theme is developed and explicated from a 
phenomenological standpoint. While it would be ideal to have more than a nodding 
acquaintance with each of these formal structures, the current discussion surrounding the 
unity of soul (mind) and body will be best furthered by paying exclusive attention to the 
relationship between parts and wholes. 
 How does the formal structure of parts and wholes lend foundational support to 
the being of the human person – whether expressed as Welterfahrendes Leben or Dasein 
– who is seen as a necessary and welcome unity of body and conscious self? The 
relationship between parts and wholes is developed by Husserl in his influential early 
work Logical Investigations (1900-01). While described as a “huge and unmanageable” 
book in two volumes, an awareness of its overall intent and structural flow makes it more 
approachable. Moran provides an overview when he discusses the nature and purpose of 
the six specific investigations comprising the book: 
The six Investigations are concerned with [analyzing] the most basic 
elements which are required for any form of knowledge 
whatsoever…[more specifically they] are in-depth meditations on 
certain key concepts which Husserl thinks are required in any formal 
science for example…the relation of individual to universal, part to 
whole…76 
 
 Husserl probes the logic of parts and wholes in the third of the six Investigations, 
and again Moran proves helpful by offering a contextual synopsis of what to expect: “The 
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third Investigation generalizes from the relation between instance and universal to 
produce a general formal theory of the necessary a priori relations specifiable between 
parts and wholes in general.”77 Barred by constraints of space and time, it is impossible to 
follow in close detail the case Husserl develops for parts and wholes; nonetheless, it will 
be beneficial and germane to the issue of the unity between body and conscious self to 
realize that the gist of his argument centers on the difference between pieces and 
moments. Because these various terms – parts, wholes, pieces, moments – retain a 
technical meaning as defined by Husserl, a brief overview will help to promote a better 
understanding of how this theory advances the body/conscious-self unity. 
 Husserl’s begins by claiming that wholes can be analyzed into two different kinds 
of parts: pieces and moments. Pieces are parts that can subsist and be presented even 
apart from the whole. Because pieces can be detached from their wholes, they can also be 
called independent parts.78 To clarify Husserl’s rather abstract theorizing, Sokolowski 
provides the example of a tree. A tree is a whole, while its trunk, roots, branches, leaves 
and bark are pieces. All of these pieces can be separated from their tree and still present 
themselves as independent entities. There are important phenomenological implications 
because a branch as a piece “presents itself.” Separated from the tree and no longer 
functioning as a living branch means that it is only a piece of wood. However, the branch 
as a piece can still exist and be perceived as an independent thing. As Sokolowski 
summarizes: “Pieces, then, are parts that can become wholes.”79 
 The analysis then proceeds to distinguish pieces from moments. Unlike pieces, 
moments are parts that cannot subsist or “present themselves” apart from the whole to 
which they belong. In other words, moments are non-independent parts that cannot be 
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detached from their whole. 80 Once again, Sokolowski’s examples concretize the 
explanation. Whereas the branch of a tree was cited above as exemplary of a piece, 
musical pitch and vision are put forth as instances of moments. Musical pitch cannot exist 
except as blended with a sound, nor can vision occur except as dependent on the eye. 
Therefore, unlike pieces as parts that can become wholes, moments are the kind of parts 
that cannot become a whole. “A branch can be cut off from a tree, but the pitch cannot be 
isolated from a sound and vision cannot float away from the eye.”81 Moments, therefore, 
are the kind of parts that cannot become whole and so separately presented to perception. 
 While on initial glance these distinctions may appear pedantic, from a 
phenomenological perspective they actually prove to be an effective prophylactic against 
a grave philosophical error. Sokolowski dubs this mistake a “cardinal one” and goes on to 
explain why: 
The cardinal philosophical mistake, phenomenologically speaking, is to 
force an abstractum into being a pseudo-phenomenon, and so to base 
philosophy on the abstract meaning of words and not on things as they 
actually appear.82 
 
For certain, parts such as moments are abstracta, and should remain as such, whereas 
wholes and parts as pieces are concreta. In other words, a whole and a piece as an 
independent part can exist, present themselves and be experienced as concrete 
individuals.83 The branch as an independent part or piece, though separated from the tree, 
still exists and can be perceived as an independent thing. Moments as non-independent 
parts, however, cannot become concreta. Whenever they exist and are experienced they 
drag along their other moments with them, and so they exist only as blended with their 
complementary parts. For example, pitch cannot be by itself apart from sound, nor can 
vision exist without the eye.84 
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 All this becomes very blurred and the near occasion to commit the cardinal 
mistake of philosophy presents itself because of the imprecise nature of human speech 
and language. Even though Heidegger develops and promotes a high regard for the 
disclosive potential of language, at this point its ability to be a stumbling block must be 
heeded. No matter how emphatically it may be stated that moments as non-independent 
parts cannot be detached from their whole to which they belong, they nonetheless can be 
spoken about by themselves, as Sokolowski avers: “Although we can think or speak 
abstractly about certain moments, and simply not consider their necessary supplements 
and founding parts, we cannot think about such moments as capable of independent 
existence or presentation.”85 While it is advantageous that speech allows for abstracting 
and a moment can be referred to by itself, there is also a danger that speech will convey a 
separation when there is actually only a distinction.: 
we can speak about pitch without mentioning sound…we can talk 
about vision without mentioning the eye…because we can refer to a 
moment by itself, without mentioning its associated moments, we may 
begin to think that this moment can exist by itself, that it can become a 
concretum… 
There is always a danger that we will separate the inseparable, that we 
will make the abstractum into a concretum, because in our speech we 
can talk about one moment without mentioning what it is founded 
upon.86 
 
 Husserl’s treatment of the mind/body question avoids the pitfalls brought on when 
the comfort and security of speech unwittingly erects unbridgeable separations instead of 
introducing nuanced distinctions between and among moments. Advancing the 
phenomenological motto – “to the things themselves” – is most palpable in this regard as 
Husserl admonishes: “we can absolutely not rest content with ‘mere words,’ i.e. with a 
merely symbolic understanding of words…we must go back to the ‘things 
themselves.’”87 To penetrate to the heart of the mind/body dilemma, Husserl would not 
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recommend purely a linguistic analysis, but rather a phenomenological approach focusing 
on the combination of moments associated with mind and body. Sokolowski states 
Husserl’s ambition well:  
In his phenomenology he does not wish to analyze the meaning of 
words used when we intend something signitively and abstractly, but to 
describe how what is meant appears concretely in its actual presence, 
when all its moments must be taken into account.88 
 
Indeed, Husserl follows his own advice as he specifically confronts the mind/body issue 
in his later writings. He does not allow the ability to speak abstractly about the mind and 
the body to compromise the underlying truth that these are distinct moments of a single 
individual. Taking account of the many operative moments associated with the 
mind/body dynamic, and so not being deluded by speech into analytical lethargy, allows 
Husserl another opportunity to confront Descartes and his dualistic tendencies. Woodruff 
Smith relates how Husserl’s concept of moments not only serves to bring clarity to the 
mind/body discussion, but also underscores in a different context the well established 
theme that phenomenology is always in a tension with Descartes: 
whereas Descartes also distinguished the I or the res cogitans from the 
body or the res extensa, Husserl insisted that the “I” and the “body” are 
distinctive aspects (moments) of a single individual…Descartes held 
that no substance can have attributes of both thought and extension, so 
that no substance could be both a body and a mind. Husserl held to the 
contrary, that the same individual can be both spatial and thinking, that 
“body” and “mind” are not two kinds of individual[s] but two aspects 
or moments in one individual.89 
 
 True to the form of his more epistemological concerns, Husserl’s desire to nuance 
the mind/body unity as a distinction of moments rather than a separation of pieces comes 
across in an abstract and detached tone. However, this does not prevent the extrapolation 
of his thought for application in a foundational way to more anthropological and down-
to-earth concerns. For instance, while to this point there has been a laxity in 
distinguishing among concepts like mind, conscious-self and soul when discussing their 
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relationship to the body, the human soul specifically and its rich connotations can be 
clarified by an appeal to phenomenology’s formal structure of parts and wholes. The first 
step in clarifying the nature of the soul is to show that it is not a separable thing that can 
be understood apart from its involvement with the body. While the manner in which the 
soul is a moment to the living body differs from the way mind is a moment to the body, 
Sokolowski is clear that “The soul is a moment; it bears an essential relation to the body 
and is founded on the body that it enlivens and determines and in which it is expressed. 
Human beings are animated bodies, not enmattered spirits.”90 As long as the general 
principles of parts and wholes are respected and their more specific delineations applied 
in regard to the mind/body unity, then the more anthropological prospects will be 
realized. Moreover, any misleading caricturizations will be staved off that turn the soul 
into a piece (an independent part) and depict it as merely a vital force or thing that could 
exist, be presented and so understood apart from its organic base. 
 Sokolowski openly and proudly applies the theory of parts (pieces/moments) and 
wholes to the dynamics of the soul and body, thus greatly vivifying the typical Husserlian 
application to the mind/body quandary. Heidegger, on the other hand, extrapolates the 
theory in a very different manner. For instance, the fallout of Heidegger’s awareness of 
and respect for Husserl’s work vis-à-vis the mind/body problem was already noted as 
most influential upon the early project to “rechristen” the existence of the human being as 
Dasein. The qualitative unity of distinction, rather than a hard and fast Cartesian 
separation, means that Dasein is indeed a unitary phenomenon – a being-in-the-world – 
whereby there is no self without a world nor (by extension) is there ever a self without a 
body. Einar Øverenget is firmly convinced that despite Heidegger’s reticence to 
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adequately acknowledge his sources, the ability to analyze the structural make-up of 
Dasein in Being and Time is heavily indebted to Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes and 
its corollary of pieces and moments: 
My claim is that by taking over these fundamental discoveries from 
Husserl he [Heidegger] helps himself to more of Husserl than one 
might take notice of through a first reading of his texts…However, 
Heidegger himself displays a total silence when it comes to this 
influence. Indeed, there is only one explicit reference to the very 
distinction [between parts and wholes and pieces and moments] in 
Being and Time and that takes place in a footnote in which nothing is 
said about its importance for his own thinking.91 
 
But the importance is unmistakable, especially with regard to the way in which 
Heidegger preserves and nuances the hybrid unitary phenomenon of Dasein. In other 
terms, in the ongoing polemic to fend off any sedimented separatist Cartesian 
inclinations, the unity that Heidegger ascribes to Dasein is by no means a facile unity in 
which Dasein is a slipshod cobbling together of various compounds: 
Dasein is neither a combination (eine Verkoppelung) of behaviors nor a 
composite (ein Zusammengesetztes) out of body, soul, and spirit, 
whereby it would be futile to seek the meaning of the unity (dieser 
Einheit) of this composite;…92 
 
 The counsel of seasoned Heidegger and Husserl translator Richard Rojcewicz 
made it clear that “Verkoppelung” and “Zusammengesetztes” are the operative 
expressions in this passage for better understanding Heidegger’s overall intent. These two 
words are connotative land mines which meaningfully reveal Heidegger’s adoption of 
Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes in order to precisely articulate the unique nature of 
Dasein as a unitary phenomenon. By stating that it is not “a ‘combination’ (eine 
Verkoppelung) of behaviors nor a ‘composite’ (eine Zusammengesetztes) out of body, 
soul, and spirit,” Heidegger is hoping to avoid the negative tendencies of traditional 
philosophical and theological anthropologies. These often advanced a meaning of unity 
that emphasized inventorying the quantitative dimensions to the neglect of the more 
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qualitative aspects, thus compromising a true and comprehensive grasp of human 
existence: 
How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to be ascertained 
ontologically in a positive way?…It must face the Being of the whole 
man (ganzen Menschen), who is customarily taken as a unity (die 
Einheit) of body, soul, and spirit…When, however, we come to the 
question of man’s Being, this is not something we can simply compute 
by adding together those kinds of Being which body, soul, and spirit 
respectively possess…93 
 
Terms such as Verkoppelung and Zusammengesetztes, however, are very complicitous in 
formulating uneven theories about the meaning of Dasein’s unity. Such theories are more 
quantitative and expediently superficial since Verkoppelung and Zusammengesetztes 
convey the more pejorative senses of unity and composite. In other words, Verkoppelung 
and Zusammengesetztes communicate a forced extrinsic unity that is valued because its 
various elements can be easily counted or measured. The imagery of Verkoppelung is 
especially redolent since it is often used to describe the process of tying together a group 
of animals, such as a team of oxen, whose resultant unity is one that is imposed and 
quantifiable. 
 In order to avoid repeating any excesses of philosophical or theological 
anthropologies that rest content with impoverished conceptions of the meaning of the 
unity of the human person, Heidegger will not use the more customary terms of body, 
soul, and spirit to advance a more accurate notion of this unity, even though he admits of 
their possible merit when distanced from the ploys of traditional usage: “In their turn 
‘body,’ ‘soul,’ and ‘spirit’ may designate phenomenal domains which can be detached as 
themes for definite investigations…”94 To examine and properly appreciate the meaning 
of Dasein’s unity Heidegger opts to focus on the phenomena that he feels are structurally 
fundamental. While the exact nature of these various phenomena and the specific reasons 
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for Heidegger’s embracing them need not detain the current argument,95 it is nevertheless 
important to appreciate Heidegger’s adaptation of Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes as 
the necessary means to ground the very unity of Dasein and to give the unique meaning 
of this unity its proper articulation. 
 This Husserlian influence is most apparent as Heidegger defends his strategy to 
discuss the distinctive unity of Dasein by appealing to the various phenomena he believes 
comprise that unity. Otherwise, it could appear that he dismisses the more traditional 
anthropological expressions related to the elements of this unity only to then cosmetically 
reinstate them with a new garb of sophisticated jargon. Surely Dasein is a unitary 
phenomenon, but this does not prevent an analysis of its structural components so long as 
the proper and well-established terminology is applied to these components. Here is 
where Husserl’s theory becomes invaluable to Heidegger’s objective. 
In the interpretation of Dasein, the structure is something “a priori;” it 
is not pieced together (keine zusammengestückte), but is primordially 
and constantly a whole (ganze Struktur). It affords us, however, various 
ways of looking at the items which are constitutive for it 
(konstitutierenden Momente). 
 
The compound expression “Being-in-the-world” indicates in the very 
way we coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary 
datum must be seen as a whole (Ganzen). But while Being-in-the-world 
cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together 
(zusammenstückbare Bestände), this does not prevent it from having 
several constitutive items (konstitutiver Strukturmomente) in its 
structure.96 
 
 At first sight it may appear that Heidegger is merely reiterating the unitary 
phenomenon of Dasein, while giving permission that this unity may be further analyzed 
by its various structural elements. But careful attention to the precise terminology in the 
original German divulges that Heidegger is more profoundly specifying the nature of this 
unique unity by the good offices of Husserl’s theory of parts/wholes and the sub-theory 
of pieces/moments. The unity of Dasein is not merely a quantitative “piecing” together 
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(Verkoppelung) or forced extrinsic compositing (zusammengesetztes) of various 
constitutive elements. Instead, it is a qualitative “momenting” that simultaneously allows 
the constitutive elements to be acknowledged and analyzed in their own right but also 
appreciated as contributing to the natural unique unitary phenomenon of Dasein: 
Emphasis upon any one of these constitutive items 
(Verfassungsmomente) signifies that the others are emphasized along 
with it; this means that in any such case the whole phenomenon 
(ganzen Phänomens) gets seen.97 
 
 The Husserlian influence can be easily overlooked, especially if the examination 
of the above pertinent passages from Being and Time is restricted to only an English 
reading. The likely oversight results from the translation decisions made by John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. While they use “stücke” and its various cognates to 
convey the notion of “piece” and “piecing” – (zusmmengestückte, 
zusammengestücktbare) – they render the German “Moment” (Momente, 
Strukturmomente, Verfassungsmomente) and its cognates into the English term “item.”98 
Thus the presence and power of the Husserlian contrast that could have been more readily 
detected if “piece” were seen in tandem with “moment” is easily lost. Øverenget bemoans 
this possibility and respectfully takes Macquarrie and Robinson to task for their unwitting 
role in advancing the commonly held opinion that Heidegger started out as a 
phenomenologist but ended up with a project that was entirely different from that of 
Husserl’s. To translate the German word Moment as “item” is a striking choice for 
Øverenget, since “according to The Oxford Duden German Dictionary, the term ‘item’ is 
not listed as a possible translation of the German ‘Moment.’”99 The selection of “item” 
for Moment could have been redeemed to some extent, in Øverenget’s estimation, if there 
would have at least been some acknowledgment of the weighty significance of Moment: 
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even if they [Macquarrie and Robinson] were to use the term “item” as 
a translation of “Moment” they should have stated that this is a 
translation of a term that is an important technical term in Husserl.100 
 
 That technical meaning conveyed by moment in relationship to piece, as 
previously outlined, states that moments are parts that cannot subsist or be presented 
apart from the whole to which they belong, while pieces are parts that can subsist and be 
presented even apart from the whole. Therefore, as Heidegger strives to promote the 
unique unitary phenomenon of Dasein in Being and Time, he obviously makes use of 
Husserl’s theory of parts/wholes and pieces/moments. Not only does he use Husserl’s 
very terminology, which may get smoke screened by translation choices, but he also uses 
the theory in accordance with Husserl’s conventions, as Øverenget explains: “‘moments’ 
or ‘constitutive moments’ are what they are by belonging to a whole and by doing so in a 
non-pieced together manner.”101 
 
 
The Wandering Stranger-Poet: From Being-in-the-World as Dasein to 
Dwelling on Earth as a Mortal 
 
 The foregoing makes clear, once again, how extensive and crucial Husserl’s 
influence was upon Heidegger. As the early Heidegger approaches the question of the 
meaning of Being via a painstaking analysis of Dasein in the pages of Being and Time, 
the degree of Husserl’s impact is unmistakable. Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as a 
unique unitary phenomenon owes its ultimate foundation and meaningful depth to 
Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes and his concerns over the mind/body problem. 
These influences carry over into Heidegger’s later interests, where despite a noticeable 
shift in emphases and different terminology, an overall continuity abides as Heidegger 
moves forward along the committed path to probe ever more deeply the question of the 
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meaning of Being. Such a variation in perspective that nonetheless keeps this ultimate 
goal in focus was developed earlier when discussing how inhabiting the spatio-temporal 
realm of the between of the ontological difference affords a great opportunity to advance 
the meaning of Being. Most specifically, it was the poet, along with her poetic thinking, 
who most authentically inhabits and experiences the vicissitudes of this between as pain. 
For Heidegger, this finds precise expression in the poetry of Trakl, where the poet-
wandering stranger receives the call from Being to enter into and assume the pain 
associated with the differing difference of the between, thus allowing her to approach 
more closely Being’s mysterious depths. 
 But not only does poetic activity lend itself to grappling with the mysteries of 
Being, it also was seen to have exciting potential in disclosing the mysterious depths of 
the Deity in light of the peculiar challenges confronting the contemporary era as a “needy 
time.” Since this sounds promising for the overall interest of this current study, it can be 
asked why this chapter was sidetracked by such an extensive treatment of Heidegger’s 
enchantment with the between. Out of respect for the priorities established by Heidegger 
himself, it was certainly an acceptable and productive detour, since it is only by first 
understanding the dynamics involved in the pained between of the ontological difference 
as it applies to the disclosure of Being that any possible similar applications could be 
seriously attempted in regard to the disclosure of the Deity during this needy between 
time when the gods have fled and the gods have yet to arrive.102 As the exposition of the 
ontological difference ensued the discussion centered on the experience of pain, so 
expressed and experienced by the poet who willingly embraces the differing difference 
between beings and Being (the ontological difference proper). To avoid any misguided 
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estimations of the poet’s pain it was important to fully grasp human existence as 
conceived by Heidegger. This resulted in appreciating the concept of Dasein – being-in-
the-world – as a unique unitary phenomenon of an embodied self that is ever co-
constituted by the world in which it is immersed. With this specific structural composite 
firmly established by a phenomenological method, Cartesian dualisms are eliminated, and 
the pain of the poet is richly appreciated as an experience suffusing her body and soul as 
well as interpenetrating her engagement with the world.  
 Therefore any hasty jump to the role of the poet and the power of poetry in order 
to discover how these later Heideggerian themes contribute to the theology of God is 
indeed reckless in both its launch and landing. The launch is more sure footed as long as 
Dasein, replete with all its phenomenological underpinnings, is seen as vivifying the poet 
and all her poetic activity. In different ways many have warned against making any 
precarious leaps that could compromise or even denigrate the staying-force that Dasein 
maintains throughout the entire Heideggerian corpus. 
For instance, Robert E. Wood highlights the lynch pin effect that Dasein exercises 
for maintaining continuity as one traverses the various phases of Heidegger’s long career. 
Wood refers to six figures present throughout Heidegger’s works who exhibit six very 
different ways of life. He identifies these varying figures as the peasant, the artist-poet, 
the philosopher, the scientist, the man-on-the-street and the thinker. Whatever variety 
these characters add to the expression of Heidegger’s thought about Being, it is Wood’s 
belief that “Underlying them all is the notion of human existence as Da-Sein, as the Da, 
the ‘There’ of Being, the locus of concern for the whole of what-is and thus also for the 
whole of its own existence.”103 While these six figures may allow Heidegger some 
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literary license as he nuances his philosophizing, they nonetheless maintain a constancy 
since they are all at base expressions of Dasein. Therefore, even though the casting call 
may increase and become more diverse as Heidegger’s approach to the question of the 
meaning of Being continues to unfold, this should not spawn the interpretation that 
Dasein and its structural analysis have been eclipsed. If anything, it is a further testament 
to Dasein’s ability to allow the fruits of its analysis in Being and Time to adapt and so 
productively accompany Heidegger’s ongoing task. 
 Philp Buckley issues a more stern warning. He contends that any reading of 
Heidegger is an “amputation” approach which attempts to make him more credible in the 
eyes of postmodernity by scuttling the existential-phenomenological analysis of Dasein. 
For those coming at Heidegger from a skeptical postmodern perspective, the work of the 
early Heidegger on Dasein is severely restricted, if not completely irrelevant, because of 
its modernist bias to give primacy of place to the self, the subject. Buckley observes: “A 
frequently expressed view of Heidegger is that while Sein und Zeit [Being and Time] 
offers a profound critique of the Cartesian subject, the existential analysis of Dasein still 
remains within the bounds of a traditional or ‘modern’ view of the subject.”104 The rash 
solution, therefore, calls for a cutting off of the early gangrenous Heidegger to save the 
later Heidegger. In this way the modernist errors infesting Heidegger’s theory of Dasein 
cannot contaminate the poet and the poetic activity, which are more agreeable with the 
postmodernist mindset. However, Buckley conveys the real result of this aggressive 
procedure: “In its surgical brutality, however, this reading does away with all the 
phenomenological richness of Heidegger’s description of the life of the subject in Sein 
und Zeit.”105 
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As a less invasive tactic for moving into the later Heidegger and latching on to its 
more novel and promising features, Buckley recommends not an out-and-out rejection of 
the philosophy of subjectivity in Heidegger’s early works but rather an appreciation for 
the deepening of Dasein as subject that ensues. Beyond the purposes of this chapter, but 
pertinent to Buckley’s answering the charges of the postmoderns, are the notions of 
fluidity and self-displacement. That the subject is determined by displacing itself and 
fluctuating between the first-person singular and plural is not a novel insight that first 
arises in Heidegger’s later lectures concerning the poet of Hölderlin’s river poetry. 
Instead, this is a deepening and an expansion of the investigation of Dasein that 
originally took place in Being and Time. There the subject is determined as it displaces 
itself into an ongoing fluid dynamic between the “I” and the “we.”106 Heidegger has 
therefore never posited a theory of human existence whereby the subject is granted the 
status of an enshrined, impervious monolith, so odious to the postmodern sentiment. 
 Cutting through this sophisticated argumentation and its possible merits in 
responding to the concerns of another audience, Buckley’s overall wisdom shines through 
for the current endeavor. It may be tempting to bypass the existential-phenomenological 
analysis of Dasein in the early Heidegger and move directly to his later treatment of 
human existence as poetic, a place more conformable with and exciting for agendas 
ranging from postmodernity to religion. There is, however, still an important continuity 
that must be acknowledged – the poet and the humanity to whom she poetically speaks 
are in essence deepened expressions of Dasein. 
 With all due respect given to the important and persistent influence of Dasein 
throughout all phases of Heidegger’s work, it is also widely accepted that a definite and 
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marked shift in emphases and style takes place when crossing over into his later period. 
One aspect of this shift demonstrates well the continuity that obtains as Heidegger’s 
preoccupation with the analysis of Dasein wanes and other figures such as the poet come 
to the fore to realize their many roles, including those that have greatest interest for 
theology. While initially the ability of this shifting to trace the course which moves from 
Dasein to poet to God is not readily obvious, it is hoped that the following argument will 
illuminate the course in a careful and cautious way. 
 The point of access, which allows for an eventual entry into what poetic discourse 
offers to the issue of God, is gained by first heeding the important place that the concept 
of “dwelling” (wohnen) assumes for the later Heidegger vis-à-vis human existence. 
Whereas Dasein, as the being which humans possess, was depicted in its utmost as being-
in-the-world, Heidegger opts in his later writings to express this same deep existential 
immersion and involvement as dwelling. Kockelmans explains the ascendancy of 
dwelling in Heidegger’s thought as a natural progression instead of an inexplicable 
metastasis: 
After Heidegger had described man as that being whose essence is to 
be in the world, and that man therefore is to be characterized as that 
being who stands out into the openness of Being which is the world, he 
finally came to conceive of dwelling as the specifically human way of 
being.107 
 
 It must be stated that the later Heidegger embraces the concept of dwelling in 
order to achieve many purposes. Julian Young provides a glimpse of Heidegger’s 
extensive and diverse use of dwelling: 
Together with its [dwelling’s] cognates – homeland (Heimat), 
being/becoming homely (Heimischwerden/Heimischsein) – and 
contraries – homelessness, estrangement, alienation… – dwelling can 
plausibly be said to constitute the central topic of the thinking of the 
later Heidegger. 108  
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To point out and explain each of these various uses would be an impossible undertaking 
at this point; however, it is possible and beneficial to at least advance some appreciation 
for dwelling as it pertains to Heidegger’s well-known “Fourfold” (das Geviert). In fact 
for many scholars, an assiduous pursuit of the significance of Heidegger’s Fourfold unto 
itself has proved to be a suitable and productive means for breaking into the general 
meaning of the later writings, and most especially how these texts impact upon matters 
religious. This is understandable because of the way Heidegger presents the Fourfold. As 
his later conceptualization of the world, he insists that whatever world one encounters, 
and however that world in each case may be structured, it can always be understood in 
terms of four basic ontological regions: heaven, earth, gods and mortals. Robert Orr dubs 
these regions “four fundamental interpenetrating meaning-domains109 of world 
openness”; and Joseph Kockelmans corroborates this understanding with the following 
explanation: 
The term fourfold, as well as the four terms heaven, earth, gods, and 
mortals, must be understood as being ontological in character; thus all 
semblance notwithstanding, they do not refer to ontic things, nor do 
they divide the totality of all ontic things into four basic sets of things. 
They express the fact that whatever has meaning ultimately means 
whatever it means, with respect to these four basic dimensions of 
Being, which…in a concrete form always manifests itself as world.110 
 
 The analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world, which nearly monopolized 
Heidegger’s early thinking, is now expanded with a new terminology that sounds 
potentially promising for theological endeavors, even when superficially heard by more 
skeptical ears. Dasein has given way to the mortal(s): “The mortals are human beings,”111 
who are in the world, now expressed as the Fourfold. And while all this new 
nomenclature has a fresh and fanciful ring, it in no way usurps the conceptual depths 
already established by Heidegger’s Dasein as being-in-the-world. However, what is 
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undeniably tantalizing in the rhetoric of the Fourfold for any agenda seeking to forge a 
dialogue between the later Heidegger and more theological concerns is its explicit 
acknowledgment that the gods or the divinities (die Göttlichen) now have an important 
role to play in the dynamic interplay between mortals (humanity) and the world. 
 At one time Heidegger was satisfied to describe Dasein’s existence as being-in-
the-world, never conceiving the “inness” as a mere spatial location, but as an immediate 
and co-constituting relationship of reciprocity between Dasein and the world. The 
introduction of the Fourfold allows Heidegger to embellish this relationship between 
Dasein and world. Mortals are said to be in the Fourfold only when they “dwell” in 
accordance with the unique relational demands required by the three other regions – gods, 
earth, sky (heaven). As Vincent Vycinas explains: “earth and sky together with gods and 
mortals are the phenomena whose play bestirs a world, or rather whose play is world.”112 
 When Heidegger explains the nature of this relationship, the theological prospects 
become even more promising, since there is a mark of necessity that encompasses the 
nature of the unity and interaction that obtains among the regions of the Fourfold. The 
earth, the heavens, the gods and the mortals are not united in a casual, happenstance 
gathering. Instead, the Fourfold is able to constitute the world only because the unity of 
its four regions mutually belong to each other in such a way that their playful interaction 
becomes a structural world where things can become what they are, and where human 
beings can live their lives. With eloquence worth quoting at length, Heidegger captures 
“the worlding of the world” (das Welten der Welt) that ensues as a result of the unique 
relational dynamic in and among the regions of the Fourfold. 
When we say mortals, we are then thinking of the other three along 
with them…earth and sky, divinities and mortals – being at one with 
one another of their own accord – belong together by way of the 
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simpleness of the united fourfold. Each of the four mirrors (spiegelt) in 
its own way the presence of the others…This mirroring does not 
portray a likeness. The mirroring, lightening each of the four, 
appropriates (ereignet) their own presencing into simple belonging to 
one another…The appropriative mirroring sets each of the four free 
into its own, but it binds these free ones into the simplicity of their 
essential being toward one another. 
 The mirroring that binds into freedom is the play that betroths 
each of the four to each through the enfolding clasp of their mutual 
appropriation. None of the four insists on its own separate particularity. 
Rather, each is expropriated, within their mutual appropriation, into its 
own being. This expropriative appropriating is the mirror-play (das 
Spiegel-Spiel) of the fourfold. Out of the fourfold, the simple onefold of 
the four is ventured. 
This appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth, 
sky, divinities and mortals we call the world.113 
 
 Reaching a consensus on the merit of Heidegger’s explanation of the event of the 
Fourfold from a perspective of logic or literary aesthetics could prove impossible, but it is 
easier to achieve widespread agreement that an unmistakable place is now granted to the 
gods/divinities in the establishment of the world and in the description of how all things 
are one in Being. The unanimity reached on this score has indeed been attractive to the 
more theological minded. For even if the utmost caution is exercised so that no sloppy or 
brash assertions are made reducing or equating Heidegger’s gods to the all-encompassing 
Supreme Being called God, there is still something compatible here with theism. 
Macquarrie is at once sympathetic to such compatibility and keenly sensitive to its 
fragility. As a result, he uses some carefully crafted phraseology to discuss the gods of 
Heidegger’s Fourfold and the specific expansion that this signals from the earlier Dasein 
as being-in-the-world: 
What, for instance, does Heidegger mean by “the gods”?…It would be 
wrong to read into the expression “God” in a theistic sense, but the 
word “gods” does stand for what might be called a “divine factor” in all 
reality, something holy in which everything participates…in the 
philosophy that he develops in his middle years, he finds room within 
time and history for the divine and for the human spirit…114 
 
  
 240
 That Heidegger makes room in his later thought, in a most unspecified way, for a 
divine factor and something holy vis-à-vis the Fourfold could be license enough to rest 
content with the description of the gods that takes place there as the definitive point of 
contact for theology. Heidegger demonstrates a degree of consistency and reliability 
when discussing the gods in light of the Fourfold in two separate works of the early 
1950s; and this does much to cultivate a dialogue with theology. He writes in “The 
Thing” (1951) and in “Building Dwelling Thinking” (1954): 
The divinities (die Göttlichen) are the beckoning messengers of the 
godhead (die Gottheit). Out of the hidden sway of the divinities the god 
emerges as what he is, which removes from him any comparison with 
beings that are present.115 
 
The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the 
holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws 
into his concealment.116 
 
Moreover, as Heidegger develops his thought in the context of the latter quote, the 
conversation between theology and him seems unstoppable. There, he elaborates on the 
relationship between the gods and humankind, which is one of the necessary 
interrelations of appropriation-expropriation in the Fourfold stressed above as a mirror-
play (das Spiegel-Spiel): 
Mortals dwell (Die Sterblichen wohnen) in so far as they await the 
divinities as divinities. In hope they hold up to the divinities what is 
unhoped for. They wait for intimations of their coming and do not 
mistake the signs of their absence. They do not make their gods for 
themselves and do not worship idols. In the very depth of misfortune 
they wait for the weal that has been withdrawn.117 
 
But despite the many points that this and the preceding provide for establishing and 
maintaining a lively discourse between theology and Heidegger’s later concerns, their 
quick referencing of the gods actually short-circuits the more profound and sustained 
conversation that can take place when recourse is made to another dimension of the 
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mirror-play that occurs in the Fourfold – mortals and their dwelling poetically upon the 
earth. 
 
 
The Phenomenon of Earth 
 
 The suggestion that the optimal and most grounded exchange between the later 
Heidegger and theology will ensue by shifting attention to the earth-mortal dynamic of 
the Fourfold could appear at first to be misguided, if not absurd. It would seem more than 
adequate that once Heidegger establishes in a general way that “Mortals are in the 
Fourfold by dwelling,”118 and then goes on to specify the peculiarity of the dwelling 
between mortals and the gods, that a rather straightforward access has been gained to a 
rich Heideggerian vein of theological treasure. While there is much that could be 
extracted from the assertion that mortals dwell in the Fourfold by waiting for the elusive 
gods,119 the potential for theology will realize more long-term positive effects if respect is 
paid to the integrity of Heidegger’s work overall. This will be accomplished by 
acknowledging that the more foundational interaction which takes place in the Fourfold is 
the dwelling of the mortals on the earth. Not only will this be the best means to preserve 
the continuity in Heidegger’s work, it will also act as a pivotal means to establish a 
continuity in this chapter, where an earlier emphasis was placed upon the realm of the 
pained between as the place where the distinctive work of the poet with regard to the 
Deity occurs. The poet effectively confronts the “needy” between time when the gods 
have fled and the gods have yet to arrive. First and foremost, however, it is necessary to 
show that Heidegger gives primacy to the interplay between mortals and the earth when 
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addressing the various interplays (mirror-plays) of the Fourfold throughout the later 
writings. 
 The previously referenced essay “Building Dwelling Thinking” offers important 
evidence of the privileged status given to the dwelling relationship between mortals and 
the earth. First given as a lecture in 1951, this essay arises at a time when a severe 
housing shortage still plagues a post-war, defeated Germany. But the kind of building 
that Heidegger discusses offers no immediate solutions to the lack of housing through 
novel architectural ideas or techniques of construction. The building that he has in mind 
is meant to stir deeper questions about human dwelling, as Michael Zimmerman 
observes: 
The housing shortage was, for Heidegger, a concrete expression of a far 
more fundamental and serious problem – the homelessness of modern 
humanity. World War II, the proximate cause of the destruction of so 
much German housing, was itself a symptom of modern humanity’s 
disease of homelessness. We are not at home because we no longer 
understand who we are. One can live peacefully or dwell appropriately 
only if one knows, at some profound level, who one really is.120 
 
Heidegger proceeds in the essay to state who humanity really is: “To be a human being 
means to be on earth as a mortal. It means to dwell.”121 And in subsequent passages 
Heidegger reiterates the intricacies of human existence and dwelling, which in turn 
elevates the earth-mortal dynamic to a place of unrivaled prominence among the other 
members of the Fourfold and their various interactions. For instance, at one point in his 
efforts to urge a deeper notion of building, Heidegger exhorts that a careful listening to 
what the word “building” (bauen) says will reveal several aspects of meaning, such as, 
“Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth” (auf der Erde sind).122 
Furthermore, as he discusses the fundamental character of dwelling in another place, he 
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asserts that “human being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the 
stay of mortals on earth.”123 
 While it is clear that the later Heidegger holds the mortal-earth dynamic in special 
regard, it is not so clear at this point why this interaction is to be prized for theological 
discourse over the other interactions of the Fourfold that seem valuable because of the 
alluring terminology they invoke, i.e., the dwelling of mortals as they await the divinities 
(gods). With the hope of avoiding any theological proof-texting of Heidegger, but at the 
same time wanting to make some claim for theological relevance, every effort must be 
taken first to plod patiently through his later writings to allow that which is consistently 
thematic to be firmly established. This ensures that a dialogue with theology takes place 
in a more grounded way from a Heideggerian standpoint. The first steps toward such a 
grounded exchange have been taken already by establishing the thematic consistency in 
the earth-mortal interaction in the Fourfold and foregoing the gods-mortal interaction, 
despite its theological appeal on the surface. 
To more firmly ground this exchange, the background of the earth-mortal 
dynamic must also be shown. This will prevent proof-texting (or perhaps piece-mealing) 
of another stripe, whereby interesting points are teased out of certain texts of the later 
Heidegger as if they had no precedent in his earlier writings. This misreading of 
Heidegger has been sternly avoided throughout this work by painstakingly digging 
deeply into Heidegger’s earliest works to show that the basis for many of his subsequent 
interests stem from his phenomenological formation. While such a far reach back is not 
necessary in the current effort to establish the whence and wherefore behind the 
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hegemony of the earth-mortal dynamic in the Fourfold, it is still possible to discover its 
stirrings and foundational presence in the earlier phases of Heidegger’s later period. 
Why does Heidegger attach more importance to the dwelling of mortals upon the 
earth than to the other dwellings that mortals must also achieve in the Fourfold? 
(“Mortals dwell in that they save the earth…receive the sky…await the gods…”124) The 
answer resides in Heidegger’s long-standing fascination with the concept of the earth (die 
Erde). Somehow the dwelling that the earth provides for mortals strikes at the very heart 
of true dwelling and thus addresses ultimately the deeper homelessness of late 20th and 
early 21st century humankind. In other terms, to arrive at the true essence of dwelling one 
must first fully appreciate what it means for humans to dwell on earth. Then, the further 
ways that Heidegger modifies this dwelling are able to be better grasped and widened for 
different purposes. For instance, in the section of this chapter titled “Openness to the 
Mystery as Openness to God” Heidegger’s nuance that “…poetically men dwell upon the 
earth…” will prove invaluable in forging a deep and lasting dialogue with theological 
issues relating specifically to God. This will be enhanced by re-visiting the role of the 
wandering stranger/poet who best experiences the pain of the between. 
In attempting to better understand Heidegger’s curiosity for the earth, which 
provides the opportune place for mortals to dwell and thus offers the best way to 
appreciate dwelling in its fullness, it should be realized that even though earth’s precise 
meaning is hard to pin down, its appearance in the later writings gives Heidegger yet 
another mark of distinction as a philosopher. That the earth is a difficult concept best 
associated with the later texts is captured by Alberto Canán: 
The term “earth” plays no imminent role in Martin Heidegger’s Being 
and Time at all; in fact Heidegger begins to use it only in the 1930s, it 
then becoming a proper concept. The concept thus belongs in the time 
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after the so-called “turning” (Kehre), and then it plays an obscure 
role.125 
 
Despite its ambiguity, Heidegger’s very willingness to embrace the concept of the earth 
and appreciate its metaphorical value for addressing philosophical concerns in a novel 
way is noteworthy and praiseworthy. Eager to offer Heidegger such due plaudits is Hans-
Georg Gadamer, who stressed that Heidegger’s making the earth a theme of 
philosophical reflection was a genuine breakthrough in his own thought, as well as in 
philosophy as a whole. Kockelmans, who is responsible for pinpointing this Gadamerian 
insight, adds his own chorus to the ode of praise: 
in the entire philosophical tradition since the days of Plato, the earth 
has never constituted an essential element of the great philosophies 
developed in the West. In this tradition, the earth has always been taken 
for granted as something which contains nothing worthy of being 
thought about. In Heidegger’s thinking, that is no longer the case.126 
 
 
The Earthly Character of Artwork to Conceal and the Sheltering of 
Genuine Dwelling 
 
 Heidegger breaks the long-standing philosophical prejudice against the earth, 
especially with regards to the illuminative worth that thinking about the earth sheds upon 
dwelling. Reflections in this vein appear in Heidegger’s thought for the first time in his 
1935/36 lecture “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Here the overall aim is to mine the 
depths of the work of art in order to discover the essence of art within it. Because 
Heidegger chooses to gain access to the meaning of art by giving priority to the work of 
art instead of to the artist or the spectator, it becomes necessary to appreciate the basic 
thrust of what it means for a work of art to be a work or to possess a “workly” (das 
Werkhafte) character. This in turn will prove not to be an unnecessary sidetracking into 
Heidegger’s theory of art, but an important and expedient means for understanding the 
concept of earth and the genuine dwelling that takes place thereupon. Essential to this 
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understanding is a recognition that the contrasting roles played by world and earth are 
important for the work character of artwork. 
 To guide his discussion about what happens in the work-being of art, Heidegger 
avails himself of Vincent van Gogh’s painting of a pair of peasant shoes and asks, “What 
happens here? What is at work in the work?”127 For Heidegger, what happens when one 
is confronted with van Gogh’s painting is that it speaks the truth by disclosing what the 
shoes are: 
This painting spoke. In the nearness of the work we were suddenly 
somewhere else than we usually tend to be. The artwork lets us know 
what the shoes are in truth…Van Gogh’s painting is the disclosure of 
what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth. This being 
emerges into the unconcealment of its Being.128 
 
And it is at this point in the work of art – by being a work – that the role of the world 
becomes paramount. According to Heidegger, if the peasant shoes (as a particular being) 
through the “workly” nature of the painting are allowed to stand in the light of their 
Being, then artwork opens up in its own revelatory way the Being of beings and does so 
in a world which provides the ultimate context for an unobstructed and clear 
manifestation: 
A work, by being a work, makes space for that spaciousness. “To make 
space for” means here especially to liberate the free space of the open 
region and to establish it in its structure…The work as a work sets up a 
world. The work holds open the open region of the world.129 
 
 
 Art, therefore, by virtue of being a work, lets things appear as they really are and 
openly displays this moment of truth in a world. However, it will be recalled that for 
Heidegger truth is aletheia. This means that while disclosure, transparency and 
unconcealment are apt expressions of what takes place in any event of truth, they only 
partially grasp the totality of the event. Aletheia also acknowledges that hiding, opacity 
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and concealment are equally valid occurrences in moments of truth. Art as a specific 
conveyer of and participant in truth must incorporate both senses of aletheia. The sense 
of unconcealment was clearly put forth in the preceding discussion, where art, in its 
workly character, was said to allow things to emerge as they really are in an 
unencumbered spacious staging area known as a world. World, then, becomes the 
representative concept for the disclosure and illumination that takes place in an artwork. 
So much for one sense of aletheia, but how does Heidegger incorporate the other sense? 
Heidegger searches for and finds in the concept of “earth” the antithetical representative 
concept that best conveys the concealment and darkness that also happens in a work of 
art. By counterposing world and earth Heidegger is able to consistently express his 
“alethic” notion of truth as it occurs in works of art. A necessary “strife” (der Streit) 
takes place between the worldly work character of art and its earthly work character. But 
as Heidegger states, this tempestuous relationship is welcome and necessary to preserve 
the integrity of truth conveyed in art as a work: 
The setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth are two essential 
features in the work-being of the work… 
The opposition of world and earth is strife. But we would surely all too 
easily falsify its essence if we were to confound strife with discord and 
dispute, and thus see it only as disorder and destruction. In essential 
strife, rather, the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of 
their essential natures.130 
 
 The essential nature of the work-being of art was appreciated above for its ability 
to set up a world where van Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes could be clearly beheld in 
spacious openness. But now the essential nature of the “setting forth of earth” that is also 
part of the workly character of art must be given its due. According to Heidegger, the 
imagery of earth is able to capture and convey the more closed and hidden aspects that 
abide in any artwork: “The earth is essentially self-secluding (Sichverschließende). To set 
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forth the earth means to bring it into the open region as the self-secluding.”131 Thus, 
artwork opens up a world and simultaneously allows the earth to display itself as earth – 
as something concealed: 
Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it…The earth appears 
openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that 
which is essentially undisclosable, that which shrinks from every 
disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up.132 
 
 The implication of earth’s dogged impenetrability is an invitation from Heidegger 
to be at home with the hidden (the immeasurable, the ungraspable) that is nonetheless 
“there” but in a different or less obvious sense. It is not as if art as a work in its earthly 
aspects slams a door in the face of the beholder, but rather it allows room for mystery. 
The reason that this could rub those of a more modern temperament as a rude exclusion is 
that the earthly power in art to suggest mystery is not as comfortable as the worldly 
power in art to display something as it is in the wide open. Heidegger sees this 
uncomfortableness as another instance of the encroachment of the scientistic and 
technological attitude upon the realm of art, which should otherwise be a natural haven 
exempt from such scrutiny. An attitude dominated by a narrow scientistic-technological 
bias would be more comfortable if the truth conveyed by art remained in the illuminated 
worldly openness, where the work appears as it plainly is and so can be readily 
controlled, evaluated, quantified and dismissed – “used up” (verbraucht) according to 
Heidegger. However, the introduction of the complementary earthly closedness of art 
disallows any such immediate and exhaustive encounter: 
Earth shatters every attempt to penetrate it. It causes every merely 
calculating importunity upon it to turn into destruction. This destruction 
may herald itself under the appearance of mastery and of progress in 
the form of the technical-scientific objectivation of nature, but this 
mastery nevertheless remains an impotence of the will.133 
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 The encounter with art that its earthly character strives to foster is one that sees its 
impenetrable aspects as an exciting opportunity rather than a frustrating obstacle. The 
excitement stems from the immeasurable depth and moreness exuded by any work of art 
as earthly. Returning to Heidegger’s reflections on van Gogh’s painting of the peasant 
shoes gives a clear indication of the exciting truth potential of art in its more earthly 
dimensions: 
As long as we only imagine a pair of shoes in general, or simply look at 
the empty, unused shoes as they merely stand there in the picture, we 
shall never discover what the equipmental being of the equipment in 
truth is…A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet— 
 From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the 
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness 
of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge 
through the far-spreading and ever uniform furrows of the field swept 
by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. 
Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening 
falls…This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the 
certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood 
want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the 
surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth…134 
 
Art will not realize the opportunity to speak in this way if the wrongheaded notions of 
earthly as strictly delimiting and restrictive go unchallenged. Thus Heidegger offers the 
following challenge: 
The self-seclusion of earth, however, is not a uniform, inflexible 
staying under cover, but unfolds itself in an inexhaustible (eine 
unerschöpfliche) variety of simple modes and shapes. To be sure, the 
sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way. But he 
[the sculptor] does not use it up…To be sure, the painter also uses 
pigment, but in such a way that color is not used up (nicht verbraucht) 
but rather only now comes to shine forth.135 
 
 The functioning of the concept of earth as expressed in a work of art is therefore 
not under the direction of some miserly evil genius who derives a certain level of 
satisfaction by stingily and arbitrarily barring access to what otherwise would be a full 
and complete artistic encounter. Instead, the earthly aspect, in a more positive and 
constructive manner, acknowledges that something very real abides and is being 
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conserved in any experience with a work of art, though it remains hidden and unavailable 
to perception. 
 Heidegger’s choice of words to describe this more purposeful earthly concealing 
as “preserving,” “sparing,” and “sheltering” has the greatest bearing on furthering the 
understanding of dwelling, which was the original intention for delving into his study of 
art. Kockelmans’ reflections capture the important nuance that erupts when sheltering is 
seen as complementary to the concealing that takes place in the earthly character of 
artwork: 
Earth does not mean here a certain mass of mater or a planet. Earth is 
that toward which the emerging brings back and shelters everything 
that emerges. In everything that emerges, the earth co-emerges as that 
which abides and gives shelter.136 
 
Earthly concealing, in order to spare and conserve the less apparent depths of the artwork, 
is thus a show of respect for limitless interpretive possibilities. The stone or the paint 
which the artist plies to create a final rendering never fully exhausts or uses up (nicht 
verbraucht) the fullness of meaning available to subsequent beholders. When van Gogh 
rendered the pair of peasant shoes he used paint and canvas to capture the visual image of 
a pair of well-worn work shoes. This is immediately apparent when looking at the 
painting. However, because of the ever operative earthly aspect in any work of art, the 
paint and the canvas are not able to use up or deplete all the profundity that can be 
possibly conveyed through these shoes. Instead, these media converge to shelter the 
unseen woman who wears these shoes so that her “slow trudge through the far-spreading 
and ever uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind,” her “uncomplaining worry 
as to the certainty of bread,” her “wordless joy of having once withstood want,” her 
“trembling before the impending childbed” and her “shivering at the surrounding menace 
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of death” can gradually and slowly emerge with an awe inspiring force that surpasses the 
immediate perceptual contours offered by the painting. 
 It is Heidegger’s hope that such prospects for a gradual unveiling of the powerful 
mysterious depths residing in the earthly character of any artwork will tantalize not only 
the art enthusiast, but will also be enticing in more general terms to all humanity which 
he sees as homeless and in search of authentic dwelling. Almost two decades after his 
reflections on art, Heidegger specifies the essence of this authentic dwelling as a 
“sparing,” a “preserving,” a “sheltering” – Schonen: “The fundamental character of 
dwelling is this sparing and preserving” (Der Grundzug des Wohnins ist dieses 
Schonen).137 However, the magnitude of this later assertion, repeated twice in refrain-like 
manner, and the specific contextual ramifications it has for furthering the understanding 
of the mortal-earth relationship in the Fourfold, are firmly established by the familiar 
claim of the earlier essay on art: the earthly character in any work of art must be 
appreciated for its tenacious ability to spare, to preserve, to shelter (Schonen) the more 
profound meaning emerging slowly and guardedly for the patient beholder, who values 
and welcomes the work as pregnant with endless depth and mystery. Heidegger is 
optimistic that those who resonate with this earthly sheltering of art will in turn freely 
accept it as the guiding principle in their own efforts to seek genuine shelter and so dwell 
authentically: “Earth is that which comes forth and shelters (Sie ist das Hervorkommend-
Bergende). Earth, irreducibly spontaneous, is effortless and untiring. Upon the earth and 
in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in the world.”138 
 Regardless of how Heidegger may later expand the notion of authentic dwelling, 
his earlier ruminations upon art establish the important and far reaching connection 
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between shelter, as it pertains to protecting, preserving and respecting mystery, and 
shelter as it applies to being at home with mystery. The special status which Heidegger 
accords to the mortal-earth dynamic of the Fourfold, discussed earlier, now reaches a 
defining moment. If dwelling is the manner in which (the comportment by which) 
mortals are on the earth, and the fundamental character of dwelling is Schonen – a 
sparing, preserving, sheltering of the mystery – then mortals do not so much as dwell 
authentically at a particular spatio-temporal region called the earth, but rather willingly 
embrace the unknown with a sense of awefilled expectation. To underscore the 
placelessness of this earthly dwelling, Michael Haar consistently designates earth as 
“Earth.” This signals to his readers that Heidegger’s sense of earth surpasses physical 
location to provide a level of comfort and at-homeness for true dwelling: 
we have had recourse to a capital letter to emphasize the nonfactual, 
non-geographic, non-planetary character of the Earth as the place of 
rootedness capable of proffering, given an epoch and world, a 
nonhistorical possibility. Written with a lowercase letter, “earth” 
simply designates the earth as a planet.139 
 
 Despite the fact that Heidegger wants to encourage a conceptualization of earth or 
earthiness which goes beyond a certain mass of matter or planet with precise spatial 
coordinates, his very choice of the word “earth” (die Erde) to convey that which shelters 
mystery is immediately suggestive of dwelling in its more obvious sense – the at-
homeness or rootedness that humanity only experiences with the earth. There is a range 
to the human experience of being-rooted upon the earth, and a phenomenological 
description is an excellent way to present this range in its fullness. Anna-Teresa 
Tymieniecka, translator of Karol Wojtyla’s (Pope John Paul II) The Acting Person and 
founder of The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, 
articulates an aspect of this range by first describing the more familiar and obvious 
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experience of rootedness. Here the earth provides a dependable base of operations for 
human projects: 
Our seemingly most direct “contact” and experience of the earth comes 
from our experience of living “upon” the earth. We walk, we build, we 
establish our dwelling, whether in a cavern or in a building and 
surround it with a garden; we plant crops, trees, and flowers; we 
cultivate the surface of the soil; we dig up precious minerals and stones. 
In one word, “upon” the earth entails a primordial sensing, feeling, 
conviction of the solidity, the indisputable solidity of the earth upon 
which we stand, upon which we may rely in all our ventures.140 
 
 Beyond the experiential solace that comes from the rootedness that only the earth 
can provide as terra firma which gives a reliable grounding and spacious platform for 
human endeavors, there is also a more subtle rootedness consistently provided by the 
earth that is likely to go unnoticed and so unappreciated. Nevertheless, it is this 
experience of rootedness upon the earth that pervasively sustains human existence in a 
more fundamental way. Though this experience of the earth is less palpable and so cannot 
boast of a tangible solidity to demonstrate its degree of rootedness, it is still determinative 
of life on earth in a powerfully hidden way. Tymieniecka dubs this vital and invisible 
rootedness a unique “genetrix” which transcends rootedness as earthly solidity. The 
latter, as seen above, gives an actual ground for human projects, while the former 
provides all that is necessary for the ultimate grounding of the human project: 
The expression “life on earth” tells it all: our body, flesh, physiology, 
and sensing, our ways of securing our unfolding in life and our 
subsistence, our generation, corruption, and extinction. All these in all 
their particular features we have in virtue of earthly powers, energies, 
seminal virtualities, potentialities, and dynamics. 
 And all these perdure in specific artistically measured and 
coordinated articulations that form a unique network within which we 
originate, unfold, subsist, and vanish from the scene. It is no wonder 
that we call earth our genetrix. 
 This is a unique genetrix. It holds dominion over the span of 
our existence. Although the articulations by which it maintains and 
controls our route remain invisible, hidden, mute… 
 Earth in its otherwise mute interplay with our faculties and 
their employment brings our entire existence to the scene of life…we 
deploy from this interplay our special passions, the vital passions of our 
existence within the earthly conditions, confines, rules. 
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 Our vital passions of the earth are, on our experiential side, 
most deeply rooted within our interplay with the earthly existential 
conditions. They constitute the existential gist of our being.141 
 
 Tymieniecka allows her phenomenological colors to show after reading these two 
descriptions of the experience of being-rooted. Whether describing the rootedness upon 
the earth that culminates in the more obvious sense of solidity or in the less apparent 
sense of genetrix, the full range of this experience, from one end of the spectrum to the 
other, is teased out by respectfully allowing the expression “upon the earth” to realize its 
descriptive force. As Tymieniecka set out to describe the representative extremes of 
experiential rootedness, she merely pitched her lead expressions – “living upon the earth” 
and “life on earth” – and allowed their evocative power to resonate fully and freely with 
the possibilities of human experience. 
 Most specifically, the expressions “living upon the earth” and “life on earth” 
evoked the important sense of being rooted and exposed the various degrees and depths 
of this experience in relationship to the earth. This could only take place with a 
phenomenological description, since an ordinary description merely litanies the special 
features that a particular phenomenon possesses. A great value to an ordinary description 
is that the enumerated features used to describe a phenomenon like “life on earth” will 
strike a chord of agreeable recognition with anyone living on the earth. At the same time, 
however, this undercuts the power of the earth unto itself to manifest the experiential 
dynamics of rootedness. This reassigns and restricts any potential for disclosure to the 
province of the individual subject, who after engaging in a more or less private cognitive 
venture to arrive at a list of essential characteristics to explain “life on earth” can then 
share these features with others who will concur, since these same obvious traits will 
appear to anyone living on earth. By contrast, a phenomenological description respects 
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the manifestational power of the phenomenon itself. Therefore, the phenomena of earth 
and life on that earth unto themselves convey and foster a sense of rootedness, as well as 
a sundry of other possible experiences, without seeking approval from human estimation 
as the final arbiter of what life on earth really means. Sokolowski fine-tunes the contrast 
between ordinary description and phenomenological description: 
A theory of phenomenological description must set this issue 
straight…it must allow us to recognize our place in the world and the 
world’s power of manifestation…When I carry out a transcendental, 
phenomenological description, I describe an object [phenomenon] not 
in terms of special features that it has, but in terms of the ways in which 
it can be experienced. I describe the modes of experience and the 
modes of presentation, not the contents of what is presented.142 
 
 When there is a willingness to embrace the rigors of a phenomenological 
description, there is a simultaneous acknowledgment of humility. No longer is what can 
be determined only from the human perspective seen as the definitive and final appraisal 
of the encountered phenomenon, i.e., living upon the earth. Instead life on earth is 
allowed to present itself from the vantage point of the earth, and as it does so it will attain 
heights of manifestation that will surpass the formulations of life on earth derived 
exclusively from the confines of human reasoning. This exercise in humility occasioned 
by the phenomenological description does not lead to an impoverished humiliation 
because the locus of manifestation shifts from the thinking subject to the phenomenon 
itself. Rather, this recentering is a nudge away from a narrow solipsistic view and an 
invitation to greater affinity with the phenomenon itself so that unprecedented discovery 
will ensue. Sokolowski claims: 
when we carry on a phenomenological description we are with the 
objects [phenomena] and not merely with our own sensibilities or our 
own ideas…when we enter this descriptive stance; we become aware of 
more of the world.143 
 
  
 256
 Another contemporary phenomenologist, Amedeo Giorgi, specifies the precise 
nature of this “moreness” that awaits discovery when a phenomenological description is 
pursued. Giorgi’s life’s work is dedicated to advancing psychology as a human science 
rather than a natural science. The need to pay careful attention to the value of the 
phenomena directly impacting upon the human person led him to champion 
phenomenological description for qualitative empirical psychological research. It is not 
merely a generic moreness that is encountered as the various phenomena that enfold 
human existence are described. Instead, the description specifically leads to an 
acquaintance with moreness as something hidden and mysterious: 
by adopting a strictly descriptive approach, we can let the phenomena 
speak for themselves, and when we do, we discover that whatever 
appears suggests in its very appearance something more which does not 
appear, which is concealed.144 
 
 
The Affinity between Humanity and Mystery 
 
 Now in returning to Heidegger, no explicit attribution is given to 
phenomenological description as the enabling force behind his thoughts on earth. 
Nonetheless there are clear indications that the phenomenon of the earth occupies a 
privileged position to the degree that it acts as the point of continuity and source of 
cohesion for everything that he advances with respect to dwelling and being-rooted. This 
was seen in “Building Dwelling Thinking” (1954) where Dasein (being-in-the-world) 
gave way to mortals who dwell upon the earth, and the nature of that dwelling was 
defined as sparing and preserving (Schonen). The full implication of this was appreciated 
when recourse was made to an earlier essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935/36). 
There earth was said to be that aspect of any artwork which preserves its more elusive or 
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hidden dimensions so that meaning is revealed slowly and carefully but never to the point 
of depletion. 
 If the phenomenon of earth is allowed to speak unencumberedly as that which 
provides the dwelling for a humanity of preservers and shelterers, and at the same time 
provides art with the capacity to preserve and shelter its treasured depths, then it becomes 
quite apparent that an abiding affinity exists between humankind and that which is 
concealed or hidden – mystery. This connection is established only if the earth, as it 
appears throughout the Heideggerian corpus, is respected as a phenomenon with immense 
manifestation potential. The best way to realize the important aspects of this 
manifestation is by submitting the experience of earth to a phenomenological description. 
This will unleash its moreness in a twofold way: first, as the true dwelling place of 
mortals who dwell essentially insofar as they shelter and protect; and secondly as the 
prerogative of any work of art to shelter and protect in a reverential regulatory fashion the 
manner and degree by which its endless subtleties of meaning are disclosed. 
 Heidegger articulates the continuity and cohesive force of earth by means of a 
verse that enchants him in the poetry of Hölderlin: “Full of merit, yet poetically, man / 
Dwells on this earth.”145 Heidegger calls this verse as well as four others “key” in any 
effort to arrive at a sense of the essence of poetry and the identity of the poet. To that end, 
in the 1936 lecture “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” Heidegger assembles these five 
key passages from their various occurrences throughout Hölderlin’s writings and submits 
each one to an interesting commentary. 
As Heidegger begins critiquing the verse concerned with poetic dwelling, he 
proffers the following definition: “ ‘to dwell poetically’ means to stand in the presence of 
  
 258
gods and to be struck by the essential nearness of things.”146 While its mention of the 
presence of gods is most attractive and seemingly pertinent to the overall purpose of the 
current project, it is more important at this point to forego the definition’s initial appeal 
and focus instead on the verse itself. Later, there will be a closer study of the theological 
possibilities contained in this verse. For now, the verse is to be appreciated at face value 
because of its keen synthetic ability to gather everything that has been said about 
dwelling, rootedness, sheltering and hiddenness, and re-center it on earth with a very 
meaningful refinement – “poetically man dwells on earth.” Indeed, earth is where mortals 
dwell as shelterers and preservers; and earth is also constitutive of any work of art to 
ensure that something remains hidden and ineffable in any sculpture or painting. But as 
Heidegger embraces the Hölderlinian distinction that humans dwell poetically upon the 
earth, the centripetal force of earth receives new momentum. Earth now becomes the 
focal point for dwelling, sheltering and concealing as something poetic. 
Less obvious, yet of even greater significance, is the ability of this poetic 
modification to deepen the suggested affinity that exists between humanity and mystery. 
Once again, this is fully appreciated only if there is a willingness to resist the many 
temptations held out for theological speculation by Heidegger’s quick definition of poetic 
dwelling – “ ‘to dwell poetically’ means to stand in the presence of the gods and to be 
struck by the essential nearness of things” – and move instead to what he does in another 
context. A different poet is invoked who directly addresses the human connection to 
mystery that is most pronounced when humans dwell on earth with such a heightened 
sense of rootedness that they cannot help but act as stewards (shepherds) who shelter and 
preserve. In October 1955 Heidegger was invited to speak in his hometown of Messkirch 
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(Baden-Württemberg) at a commemoration to mark the 175th birthday of another native 
son, composer Conradin Kreutzer. For this occasion Heidegger felt that the words of 
Johann Peter Hebel (1760-1826), an Allemanic short-story writer and dialect poet, were 
most apropos: 
We are plants which – whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not – 
must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether 
and to bear fruit.147 
 
He uses this quote near the beginning of his speech and again in closing. It is therefore 
thematic of the message he hoped to convey originally to the townsfolk who played a role 
in his formative years. 
This keynote speech would come to be known as the “Memorial Address” and 
gave Heidegger another opportunity to revisit the theme of dwelling previously touched 
upon in his 1951 lecture “Building Dwelling Thinking.” As specifically mentioned 
above, one concern of this earlier lecture was the deeper homelessness of modern 
humanity and the resultant need for redress in order to achieve authentic dwelling. The 
message to his kith and kin a few years later strikes a similar chord, but does so in a way 
that more clearly implicates the role of the earth in fostering the relationship between 
humanity and mystery. Not only is humankind homeless, but it has also lost its very 
foundation and roots because of the hubris and arrogance that characterizes much of the 
dominant technological attitude in the late 20th century. In accepting the invitation to 
speak at a proud and festive moment in the life of his hometown, Heidegger returned to 
his literal roots and saw an auspicious occasion to exhort others on the necessity to 
recapture their roots in the more profound and pervasive sense of again being-rooted and 
so better enabled to dwell authentically. 
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 In order to make such a proposition appealing, Heidegger points to the 
composer being fêted and suggests that Kreutzer’s artistic achievement was attributable, 
in great part, to his being-rooted: 
What does this celebration suggest to us, in case we are ready 
to meditate? Then we notice that a work of art has flowered in the 
ground [soil] of our homeland (aus dem Boden der Heimat)… 
We grow thoughtful and ask: does not the flourishing of any 
genuine work depend upon its roots in a native soil (die Verwurzelung 
im Boden einer Heimat)?148 
 
Before quickly dismissing this as just another instance of Heideggerian provincialism, it 
must be seen in the light of the Hebel verse Heidegger deemed thematic, which is the 
immediate context in which he intended this invitation to be read. Hebel wrote: 
We are plants which – whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not – 
must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether 
and to bear fruit. 
 
Jeffner Allen, who has devoted careful study to Heidegger’s often overlooked enthusiasm 
for Hebel, maintains that the best way to really get a hold of Heidegger’s predilection for 
this particular passage is by paying close attention to Hebel’s use of the concept of earth. 
She arrives at this conclusion after examining Heidegger’s use of the quote throughout 
the “Memorial Address,” as well as in the closing lines of the 1957 opusculum, Hebel—
Der Hausfreund. Referring to the quote Allen remarks: 
If we take Hebel’s statement as our guide, we may turn first to the 
image of the earth. In so doing, we may view our own becoming as 
intertwined with that of the earth in which we are rooted and from 
which we arise, for the earth houses us. The earth bestows on us that 
space in which our historical being is founded and unfolds – in which 
we may come to be “at home.”149  
 Allen’s comments about Hebel’s earth and its capacity to ground and house 
humanity bear a close resemblance to A-T. Tymieniecka’s insights cited earlier. Her 
phenomenological description of the experience of earth gave way to the optimal sense of 
dwelling for humanity, in both obvious and less obvious ways. But now the concern is 
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with not being rooted as opposed to homelessness, and so Heidegger’s concern for the 
plight of humankind vis-à-vis earth can be observed to follow a progression of severity. 
At one point, he is alarmed at the condition of homelessness which blights humanity as a 
result of inauthentic dwelling upon the earth. Later the condition worsens, since the very 
ability for humans to be rooted on the earth is threatened. Before there can be hope for 
dwelling that will lead to a sense of being at home there must first be the opportunity for 
a more fundamental rootedness in the earth. 
 Attaining such a fundamental sense of being-rooted will be a formidable 
challenge, due once again to the entrenchment of technological prowess which has 
already delivered and will continue to deliver devastating blows to human rootedness. 
Thus, Heidegger finds Hebel’s admonition telling and poignant because his use of 
metaphor, in which human beings are plants, helps to underscore vulnerability and the 
serious implications that rootedness has for survival as well as flourishing – “We are 
plants which…must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and 
to bear fruit.” The context of the “Memorial Address” where Heidegger repeats this 
phrase is disturbing to some and becomes the basis for their charges that Heidegger is 
parochial and merely advancing the cause of German superiority. After all, Heidegger is 
delivering a speech in his hometown to honor a successful composer who also hailed 
from that town; and he is greatly aided in his presentation by the poetry of Hebel – yet 
another artist of Black Forest heritage. Even though a marked provincialism abounds as 
Heidegger refers to the wisdom of Hebel and credits Kreutzer’s compositional 
achievements to his abiding sense of rootedness upon the earth, it must be borne in mind 
that Heidegger is capitalizing on the mood of the audience present at the ceremony. As a 
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result, he specifies the place of rootedness upon the earth that enabled Kreutzer’s artistic 
accomplishments as that of his native soil – his literal homeland in Germany’s Black 
Forest. Despite this rhetorical adjustment by a sensitive orator, the importance of earth 
unto itself as consistently used by the later Heidegger must not be lost. In other terms, it 
was much more appealing to the first listeners present at Heidegger’s key note address, as 
well as it would be for those who would subsequently read it, if the merits of heeding the 
rather abstract invitation to be rooted on the earth were first appreciated in a more 
tangible experience, such as the unique sense of being rooted in a specific spot of the 
earth – one’s native soil or homeland (der Boden, die Heimat). 
 As Heidegger’s reflections ensue in the “Memorial Address” it becomes clear that 
he transcends the limits of any narrow parochialism or nationalism. Immediately after 
citing the Hebel verse he asks in very general terms: “Is there still a life-giving homeland 
in whose ground [soil] man may stand rooted, that is be autochthonic?”150 The 
provisional attempts at an answer to this general question also come through in very 
broad terms: “the rootedness, the autochthony (Bodenständigdkeit), of man is threatened 
today at its core!… The loss of autochthony springs from the spirit of the age into which 
all of us were born.”151 Therefore it is not just the fear that a sense of a transient 
rootlessness will afflict the younger townspeople of Heidegger’s Messkirch if they 
choose to live somewhere else besides Germany’s Black Forest. It is rather the specter 
that a more profound rootlessness from the earth, already plaguing humankind in the 
commercialized, industrialized, urbanized West, will only worsen to the degree that 
technology continues to permeate and influence every aspect of human existence. Haar 
affirms this stance when he writes: 
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“The native” encompasses a greater meaning than the Earth where we 
are in fact born. The native soil is not a Boden, a ground of biological, 
purely vital rootedness. Heidegger formally rejects this meaning…and 
he thereby rejects the [Nazi] racist ideologies of “Blut und Boden”… 
 
Heideggerian dwelling is not founded on a mysticism or a magic of the 
factually native place. The native is neither patriotic nor political, nor 
purely geographic nor linked to the singular charm of a place: it is the 
“home” [Heimat] which, though being completely spontaneously given, 
keeps asking to be chosen, adopted.152 
 
However the ability for humankind to freely seek and obtain a deeper sense of 
rootedness, and so be truly at home upon the earth, is thwarted by “the spirit of the age” 
which imposes its own comprehensive agenda: “The power concealed in modern 
technology determines the relation of man to that which exists. It rules the whole 
earth.”153 Despite the rather ominous tone cultivated by Heidegger’s estimation of 
technological dominance to severely inhibit humanity’s potential to ever achieve 
authentic rootedness, he is still a person of hope. While the threat of technology to 
continue to uproot and disenfranchise humanity is very real, it is Heidegger’s advice not 
to villainize technology to the extent that it is something that people of the late 20th (and 
21st) centuries must completely avoid or abandon – that would be nothing more than an 
unrealistic and pious hope. The following remarks are clear that his message of hope is 
realistically balanced and attainable. Humanity can still be authentically rooted and also 
be part of a technological culture: 
For all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology 
are, to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to 
attack technology blindly. It would be short-sighted to condemn it as 
the work of the devil…We can use technical devices as they ought to 
be used, and also let them alone as something which does not affect our 
inner core. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, 
and, also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, 
and lay waste our nature.154 
 
 The challenge thus becomes to believe that a rootedness can be established and 
maintained which will allow human beings to cohabitate with technology without letting 
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its ethos penetrate to the depths of their being and so determine the shape of their hearts. 
Heidegger is hopeful because he believes in the possibility of a new rootedness for 
humanity which will affect a compatibility with technology while at the same time 
offering a meaningful counterpoint. In a spirit of hope he asks: 
even if the old rootedness (die alte Bodenständigkeit) is being lost in 
this age, may not a new ground and foundation (ein neuer Grund und 
Boden) be granted again, a foundation and ground out of which man’s 
nature and all his works can flourish in a new way even in the atomic 
age?155 
 
As Heidegger ponders the possibility of humanity’s re-rootedness to a level that 
will allow it to flourish in a time when the formidability of technology has necessitated 
new rootedness, it is clear why the imagery of Hebel’s poetry guides and frames his 
thoughts – “We are plants which…must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to 
bloom in the ether and to bear fruit.” Hebel’s delicate plant, which is vulnerable to a 
variety of forces, can only hope for survival and flourishment if it is first deeply rooted in 
the soil of the earth [Boden]. Likewise, the innermost core of humanity is fragile. Its heart 
as a tendril is prone to being washed away or choked off by an imposing technological 
enterprise. However, Heidegger asserts that humankind will be empowered to withstand 
technology’s forces and protect its heart because there will be a restored sense of 
rootedness. This will be achieved by meditative thinking: “What could the ground and 
foundation be for the new autochthony [rootedness]? …This way is the way of meditative 
thinking (Nachdenkens).”156 
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Meditative Thinking: Openness to the Mystery and 
      Restored Rooted Dwelling 
 
 The topic of meditative/essential thinking arose in chapter one by way of contrast 
with calculative thinking. This contrast illuminated Heidegger’s well-known concept of 
the “step-back” (Schritt zurück), which he saw as crucial for philosophy’s new beginning. 
While the contrast between meditative and calculative thinking resumes in earnest 
throughout the “Memorial Address,” it need not be revisited. Such an excursion would 
only divert attention from the more pressing matter at hand to secure the rootedness that 
will ensure humankind’s thriving in a technological world. A more direct move is called 
for, one that will lead squarely to an understanding of what meditative thinking entails. 
Orientation to this direct route is greatly facilitated by John M. Anderson, who co-
translated the “Memorial Address” with E. Hans Freund. After struggling to render an 
English version of the text, Anderson’s privileged insights are most helpful. They lead 
unswervingly to the specifics of meditative thinking and also ward off any false 
accusations that Heidegger’s recommendation was a facile solution open to an elitist (if 
not gnostic) few: 
It is evident that he [Heidegger] finds meditative thinking to be a 
difficult and cryptic enterprise, even if it is also one of which every 
man is capable. Indeed, he exhorts us to have the courage and 
persistence which are necessary to think in this way. To think in this 
way, he states that we will require two uncommon attributes, two 
stands which man can take; …157 
 
 What, then, are the requirements of this meditative thinking that will ultimately 
lead humanity to a restored and relevant sense of rootedness? According to Heidegger, 
the requisite comportment is a releasement toward things and an openness to the mystery: 
Releasement toward things (Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen) and 
openness to the mystery (die Offenheit für das Geheimnis) belong 
together. They grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a 
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totally different way. They promise us a new ground and foundation 
(einen neuen Grund und Boden) upon which we can stand and endure 
in the world of technology without being imperiled by it. 
 Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery give 
us a vision of a new rootedness (eine neue Bodenständigkeit) which 
someday even might be fit to recapture the old and now rapidly 
disappearing rootedness in a changed form.158 
 
Before engaging in a more detailed consideration of the dynamics of meditative thinking, 
it is wise to maintain a sense of bearing. This comes with the realization that no matter 
how esoteric Heidegger’s assertions may initially sound, they nonetheless speak directly 
to an alleviation of the rootlessness that blights the existence of the contemporary person. 
Again, the thought of Anderson is heeded in order to maintain this bearing: “Heidegger 
somewhat relieves the cryptic character of these attributes [of meditative thinking] by 
showing their relevance to human life, by showing that…rootedness depends upon such 
thinking.”159 
 Turning now to a closer examination of the attributes of meditative thinking – 
releasement toward things and openness to the mystery – it will be noticed that an 
exercise of discretion is afoot, since in the pages that follow a more extensive treatment 
will be given to the latter attribute. This is by no means an arbitrary selection, but one 
that is purposeful and expedient. There is also no attempt by this selectiveness to demean 
the conceptual import of releasement toward things, since the concept of releasement 
(Gelassenheit) unto itself is readily recognized as a favorite Heidegger mainstay in 
several places of the later writings. A testament to its weightiness and potential for 
greater study is reflected in the remarks of Michael Zimmerman: “As John D. Caputo and 
Reiner Schürmann have demonstrated, Heidegger’s concept of releasement 
(Gelassenheit) resembles the Christian mystic Meister Eckhart’s concept of releasement 
(Gelâzenheit).”160 
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The very mention of Meister Eckhart and the possibility of yet another conceptual 
link between him and Heidegger is indeed an exciting prospect that would readily 
complement a connection discussed in chapter one between the mystic and the 
philosopher concerning the “heart’s core” (der Herzensgrund). However, space does not 
allow for a fully developed presentation that would do justice to Heidegger’s releasement 
and its Eckhartian lineage. Thus only the second attribute of meditative thinking – 
openness to the mystery – will be given a thorough development. 
Openness to the mystery will prove to be a multifaceted conceptual gem able to 
refract light effectively in many directions. In one direction, it will illuminate the more 
immediate concerns surrounding Heidegger’s concept of earth, his distress over dwelling 
and rootedness, and the noted affinity between humanity and mystery. In another 
direction, light will expose openness to the mystery in its broader relief as yet another 
expression contributing to the overall Heideggerian agenda – the pursuit of the meaning 
of Being. All of this illuminative potential will permit the current chapter to draw to a 
close in proper fashion. But before openness to the mystery as a posture to be assumed by 
meditatively thinking humans can be justly prized on any account, it is first prudent to 
entertain what Heidegger means by mystery in the context where such openness to it is 
being exhorted. 
It comes as no surprise that Heidegger’s discussion of mystery in the “Memorial 
Address” revolves around the issue of technology. He is certain that there is a meaning to 
technology, but it is a meaning that eludes any easy or quick apprehension: “The meaning 
pervading technology hides itself.”161 This is not to say that the meaning of technology is 
impenetrable and so beyond human comprehension. Aspects of the meaning can be 
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grasped, for as much as the true essence of technology remains aloof, it also attempts to 
forge a relationship with humanity. And it is through this elusive contact that a better 
understanding of and appreciation for technology can eventually take place. In 
Heidegger’s words: 
If we explicitly and continuously heed the fact that such hidden 
meaning touches us everywhere in the world of technology, we stand at 
once within the realm of that which hides itself from us, and hides itself 
just in approaching us.162 
 
 This verbiage should have a very familiar ring, since it reverberates with 
Heidegger’s assessment of the nature of Being itself. It was in chapter one where 
Heidegger’s respect for the acuity of Heraclitus’ insight that “Being loves to hide itself” 
became an important refrain in the ongoing efforts of philosophy to realize another 
beginning and a radical possibility away from metaphysics. Only the philosopher who 
willingly “steps back” and meditatively ponders the defaulting and concealing nature of 
Being will be truly attuned to the call of Being, and thus be on the vanguard of Western 
philosophy’s dire need of reorientation and rejuvenation. Being reveals itself but only 
while simultaneously concealing itself, and so “Being remains mysterious.”163 Heidegger 
is convinced that an unprecedented encounter with Being and a privileged access to its 
truth and meaning await any philosopher who accepts, rather than spurns, this mysterious 
quality of Being: 
Correctly thought, oblivion, the concealing of the as yet unrevealed 
essence (in the verbal sense of essential unfolding) of Being, shelters 
untapped treasures and is the promise of a find that awaits only the 
appropriate seeking.164 
 
Addressing in this way, while withholding itself in default, Being is the 
promise of itself. To think to encounter Being itself in its default means 
to become aware of the promise, as which promise Being itself “is.” It 
is, however, in staying away; that is to say, insofar, as there is nothing 
to it.165 
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 Heidegger now urges a similar disposition when confronting technology. For as 
much as it is part of contemporary existence, and so not as seemingly abstract as Being, 
technology nonetheless exhibits the same dynamic trait with any efforts to apprehend its 
truth and meaning – it simultaneously reveals and conceals itself. The invitation is no 
longer confined to a limited audience of professional philosophers seeking to gain 
understanding about the etherealities of Being, but is now extended to all people of good 
will who must meaningfully integrate the ubiquitous presence of technology with their 
lives. Not only is Heidegger’s appeal more down-to-earth by the very composition of the 
intended audience and their matter of concern; he is also more direct in his description 
that it is none other than mystery (das Geheimnis) that humanity is called to encounter 
and relate with whenever the truth and meaning of technology is at once being revealed 
and concealed: 
That which shows itself and at the same time withdraws itself (sich 
zeigt und zugleich sich entzieht) is the essential trait of what we call the 
mystery (das Geheimnis). I call the comportment which enables us to 
keep open to the meaning hidden in technology, openness to the 
mystery.166 
 
 But just as Heidegger is lavished with praise for being more down-to-earth and 
forthright, a first glance at his assertion concerning the comportment of openness to the 
mystery seems to indicate a return to the abstract. The comportment is now said to 
provide access to the meaning hidden in technology. Heidegger, however, readily 
redeems himself in the ensuing paragraphs as he spells out the extent of the 
comportment’s inclusiveness. To adopt the comportment of openness to the mystery is 
not to embark on some narrow venture that will eventually lead to cracking the deep 
secrets of technology. This would be too melodramatic and restrictive. Instead, those who 
are willing to adopt a comportment of openness to mystery will be enabled to live in right 
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relationship with technology, because this comportment allows for the possibility of 
regaining a sense of deep rootedness and a concomitant genuine dwelling. Heidegger’s 
familiar words cited earlier to introduce the requirements of meditative thinking now 
express their full meaning, since the requirement of openness to the mystery is better 
appreciated as the ultimate basis of rootedness and dwelling: 
 Releasement toward things and openness to the 
mystery…grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally 
different way. They promise us a new ground and foundation upon 
which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without 
being imperiled by it. 
 [They] give us a vision of a new rootedness which someday 
even might be fit to recapture the old and now rapidly disappearing 
rootedness in a changed form.167 
 
 If being open to the mystery is the best comportment for recapturing rootedness 
and dwelling upon the earth, then the deep and abiding affinity that exits between 
humanity and mystery becomes clearer. Mystery is closer to the human project than 
realized! To the degree that one is open to the mystery – hospitable to the dynamic of 
revealing and concealing – not just in technology but in all meaningful encounters, then 
one will dwell on earth with a deep and extensive rootedness (autochthony). Mortals who 
dwell rootedly on the earth do so only as friends of mystery. 
 
 
Openness to the Mystery as Openness to God 
 
 This connection that Heidegger advances between human dwelling rootedly on 
earth and openness to the mystery invites cautious speculation along religious lines. In 
strict Heideggerian terms, mystery pertains to the back-and-forth flow of revealing and 
concealing that is experienced when striving to apprehend the meaning and truth of any 
encounter, ranging in magnitude from something as ultimate as Being to something as 
specific as technology. But with such an expansive range of possible encounters, what is 
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to prevent applying the workings of Heideggerian mystery to the notion of God? It goes 
without saying that without much difficulty the standard theological categories used to 
discuss God’s mysterious capacity to simultaneously draw near and withdraw would 
nicely dovetail with Heidegger’s convictions that truth and meaning are always sought 
after by the inner workings of a tandem between revelation and concealment. Most 
specifically, the ideas of God’s immanence and transcendence come to mind, where 
immanence is associated with the nearness of God to humankind and transcendence 
conveys God’s remoteness with regard to human concerns. Instead of trying to draw such 
explicit parallels, it would be more respectful to both the discipline of theology and 
Heideggerian philosophy to be a bit circumspect. In other words, instead of quickly 
making a connection between Heidegger’s revealing/concealing dynamic accompanying 
the varied searches for meaning and truth with theology’s assertions about God’s activity, 
it is more manageable and less contentious to see in Heidegger’s comportment of 
openness to the mystery a broad based appeal to make room for, or at least be open to the 
possibility of, the presence of the Holy, the Sacred, the Divine – God. In this way the 
bounds of propriety are maintained, since that which is more properly the province of 
theology is not transgressed and the integrity and continuity of Heidegger’s intentions are 
preserved. 
It is now clear that one of Heidegger’s consistent concerns in the later works is to 
address and offer redress for the loss of genuine human dwelling, which in fact has 
denigrated into a condition of utter rootlessness. Humanity is no longer able to dwell 
rootedly upon the earth, but a glimmer of hope that there can be some reversal to this 
unfortunate state of affairs lies in the ability to foster and embrace a comportment, a 
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manner of being, which is receptive to mystery. For humans to dwell authentically once 
again and to re-attain true rootedness means that they must also welcome mystery. 
Without making any careless claims that Heidegger is engaged in some narrow agenda of 
unconscious evangelizing, he is nevertheless acknowledging the role played by 
something godlike when he advances an openness to the mystery and couples this with 
the promise of a restored dwelling and rootedness.  
 However, access to matters religious is never direct in Heidegger, and the current 
context is no exception. As Heidegger anguishes over humanity’s loss of dwelling and its 
no longer being rooted firmly on the earth as a result of the rise of technology’s 
influence, it is his hope that the perils offered by this ever growing influence can be 
confronted, and dwelling and rootedness reestablished, so long as people willingly opt for 
an existential comportment that allows room for mystery. Whether or not such openness 
to the mystery means openness to God in a specific theistic sense is not certain. However, 
what is undeniable is Heidegger’s conviction that the paramount need to recapture 
authentic dwelling and rootedness is enabled by a spirit receptivity to that which is 
ineffable. 
 The following observation by Frank Schalow not only highlights the 
Heideggerian correlation between the revival of rooted earthly dwelling and openness to 
the mystery, but also ventures a bold assertion about the specific outcome of this 
correlation. This proves the wisdom of being tentative with regard to the theological 
ramifications of openness to the mystery: 
To appeal to the earth, to humanity’s autochthony (Bodenständigkeit) 
[rootedness], is to help draw the boundaries in which mortals can dwell 
in proximity to the gods. Indeed, humanity’s cultivation of this place 
(Ort) of dwelling accompanies the possibility of any experience of the 
Sacred.168 
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It is not merely the posture of openness to mystery that neatly terminates in cause-effect 
like fashion with a new sense of dwelling rootedly at home upon the earth. Instead, being 
open to the mystery is the prompting that initiates the process of cultivating the eventual 
establishment of rooted dwelling. Heidegger himself uses provisional words like 
“possibility,” “promise” and “vision” to stress the embryonic capabilities of openness to 
the mystery: “[it] grant[s] us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different 
way… [it] promise[s] us a new ground…[it] give[s] us a vision of a new rootedness…”169 
Once the inaugural impetus of openness to mystery is heeded and the course is laid out 
for the ever greater realization of rooted earthly dwelling, then, according to Schalow’s 
bold assertion, comes the added prospect of an experience of the Sacred. 
 While Schalow is to be credited for enunciating Heidegger’s connection of 
openness to the mystery and humanity’s rootedness, as well as the deeper implications 
latent in the connection, it is actually a tried and true tenet of the later Heidegger that 
genuine dwelling (at its utmost) is somehow always associated with the Divine. To fully 
appreciate this, however, it was necessary to proceed in the manner traced out above. It is 
only by grasping the urgent need for a technologically sophisticated humanity to regain a 
rooted dwelling upon the earth as properly inspired by an attitudinal openness to the 
mystery that places in proper and firm perspective any direct Heideggerian discussion of 
the Divine. So as tempting as it was, there was a concerted effort to avoid glomming on 
to openness to the mystery and trying to extract from it a facile link between the later 
Heidegger and theology. Openness to the mystery was a theological intimation at best, 
and only so because it was bound up with the more consistent Heideggerian concern for 
humankind’s dwelling rootedly upon the earth. Only when this priority is recognized, and 
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Heidegger is seen to be somewhat satisfied that the agenda of genuine dwelling has been 
addressed, is it then possible to appreciate how more theological issues appropriately 
arise, including the question of God. 
 The locus classicus where this priority is established is in those instances where 
Heidegger is found mulling over the implications of Hölderlin’s expression “Full of 
merit, yet poetically, man / Dwells on this earth.” Mention was already made of 
Heidegger’s discussion of this passage in the 1936 essay “Hölderlin and the Essence of 
Poetry.” There the suggestion was made to bypass the potential theological points that 
unfold as Heidegger specifies the meaning of poetic dwelling, and to concentrate instead 
on the verse’s ability to convey the central role played by the phenomenon of earth to 
promote authentic dwelling and restored rootedness. At this point, however, it is fitting to 
return to Heidegger’s definition of poetic dwelling and entertain the most blatant 
theological issue that it engenders: “ ‘To dwell poetically’ means to stand in the presence 
of the gods and to be struck by the essential nearness of things.”170 
Again, as was the advice offered very early in the chapter (section 1), when it 
comes to Heidegger’s discussions surrounding the poetic there is no need to rashly 
dismiss him as irrelevant or inconsequential for theology simply because he loosely uses 
a litany of terms to discuss the Deity – gods, the Holy, God, the Sacred, the Divine. In the 
instance at hand Heidegger remains true to form. Immediately after upholding 
Hölderlin’s declaration that humankind dwells poetically on earth, Heidegger is quick in 
the essay to explain that such dwelling automatically involves a relationship with “the 
gods.” Despite the just criticisms that could be leveled from more mainstream theological 
quarters, as long as Heidegger’s choice of words to invoke the Deity in this particular 
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context is allowed to stand, then there is still ample opportunity for theological 
speculation. For instance, it becomes a point of great curiosity why Heidegger, in an 
almost reflexive way, connects some of his more overarching later concerns – the poetic 
and human dwelling – with an experience of the Deity. Heidegger, however, offers no 
further explanation throughout the essay that might otherwise slake any curiosity 
surrounding the connection. 
In fact, there would be no relief in the offing until 15 years later in the early 1950s 
when Heidegger presents another lecture on Hölderlin. The curiosity that arises after 
reading the 1936 work where Heidegger first touches upon the notion of the poetic 
human dwelling is justified, since Heidegger himself is motivated by his own fascination 
with the topic to give it the further reflection it is due. Eugene Kaelin comments: “So 
convinced was Heidegger of the force of this poetic statement [Full of merit, yet 
poetically, man / Dwells on this earth] that he dedicated an entire lecture to its 
message.”171 On October 6, 1951 Heidegger delivered a lecture at Bühlerhöhe entitled 
“…Poetically Man Dwells…” in which he dialogues with Hölderlin about the 
significance of this phrase from his later poem “In Lovely Blueness.” Space does not 
permit this study to travel down the many exciting avenues opened up by Heidegger’s 
decision to capitalize on the Hölderlinian belief that humankind dwells “poetically.” Nor 
is it necessary to reiterate all that was said at the outset of the chapter about the nature of 
poetizing and the special role of the poet in this “needy time.” Instead, an exclusive focus 
on the aspect of the poetic will best serve the current interests to continue to build upon 
the Heideggerian penchant for a humanity renewed by a sense of regained authentic 
dwelling/restored rootedness, and also to attend to any related theological concerns. 
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Véronique Fóti, who has written extensively on Heidegger and the poetic, provides just 
the right focus with the following observation: “The power of the poetic word, for 
Heidegger, is above all its capacity to bring about a healing of human homelessness.”172 
 As Heidegger begins (and concludes) this essay devoted to the meaning of human 
poetic dwelling, he is certain of the capacity and promise of the poetic word to ameliorate 
the current dismal state of unrooted inauthentic dwelling. He writes: 
the phrase “poetically man dwells” says: poetry first causes dwelling to 
be dwelling. Poetry is what really lets us dwell (Dichten ist das 
eigentliche Wohnenlassen). 
 
When the poetic appropriately comes to light, then man dwells 
humanly on this earth.173 
 
The question then becomes, what is it about poetry and the efforts of the poet that allow 
dwelling to realize its utmost potential? Or to pose it differently, when and how does the 
poetic reach the necessary level of effectiveness to bring about the condition of true 
human dwelling rooted firmly upon the earth? In short, the specific capacities of poetry 
are being sought. 
 
 
The Poetic Measure of the Human-Divine Encounter 
 
 Heidegger responds to these questions and substantiates his claim that the poetic 
is the basic capacity for human dwelling174 by his conviction that poetry has the ability to 
take measure: “The taking of measure is what is poetic in dwelling. Poetry is a measuring 
(Dichten is ein Messen).”175 To best understand how the poetic measure-taking capability 
of poetry effectively recaptures and restores authentic rooted dwelling, it is first 
necessary to respect what Heidegger envisions as true measuring. And Heidegger himself 
is fully aware that arriving at his sense of measure-taking will prove challenging, since 
the kind of measure that is taken in poetry by the poet varies drastically from the more 
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standard quantitative understanding of measuring. This latter understanding is 
emboldened by the very technocratic complex that has severely threatened the 
contemporary person’s ability to ever again achieve authentic rooted dwelling upon the 
earth. Thus it is an interesting irony that in order to address this threat by recourse to the 
power of the poetic, there must be a concomitant effort to reappropriate the way in which 
the very tools and concepts best associated with technology are used. 
 Heidegger indicates in the essay currently under consideration that the measure-
taking of poetry varies from the usual understanding of measurement as a calculable 
entity, since it is more than “measuring rods and their number.” He delineates the contrast 
with much more compelling and comprehensive force in the Zollikon Seminars. 
Intermittently from 1959 to 1969 Heidegger conducted a series of seminars with students 
of medicine and psychiatry. A more challenging demographic could not be provided for 
him to contrast his phenomenological notion of measuring with the reigning natural 
scientific model: 
If scientific research and its theme – nature – is characterized by 
measurability, then we have an insufficient concept of this 
measurability if we believe that it is merely a matter of acquiring some 
definite numerical statement.176 
 
The insufficiencies which mark this sort of measuring can be overcome, according to 
Heidegger, if there is first a willingness to recognize on a very general level that all 
measuring is not necessarily quantitative. Once this is granted then the more specific 
implications for human existence can be appreciated, since the relationship of the human 
being to measuring is also not exclusively comprehended as something calculable.177 To 
illustrate this Heidegger subjects the German messen to various verbal reworkings, which 
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in turn conveys a deeper meaning beyond the mere numbers gauging the dimensions of 
space: 
Whenever I take notice of something as something, then I myself have 
“measured up to” (an-messen) what a thing is. This “measuring-up” 
(Sich-anmessen) to what is, is the fundamental structure of human 
comportment toward things.178 
 
For the human person who therefore engages in this more profound experience of 
measuring, the result is a meaningful encounter to the extent that a right relationship is 
forged with whatever is or may be encountered. But for Heidegger, the spectrum of these 
encounters ranges from the more mundane, which take place during daily interactions 
with physical entities (“things” as cited above), to the more sublime that occurs with the 
awareness of participating in the vastness of a surrounding and sustaining reality or 
presence: “The relationship of the human being to what gives a measure is a fundamental 
relationship to what is. It belongs to the understanding of Being itself 
(Seinverständnis).”179 
 With this understanding of measure-taking in mind, it is possible to return to the 
1951 essay and better grasp Heidegger’s belief that poetry measures. He expresses this 
belief emphatically, which in turn exposes the far reaching effects of this activity: “In 
poetry the taking of measure occurs. To write poetry is measure-taking understood in the 
strict sense of the word, by which man first receives the measure of the breadth of his 
being.”180 Commenting on the definitive nature of the poetic measure-taking and its 
profound consequences, J. Glenn Gray states: 
Poetry is “in a strict sense a measure or a standard by which man 
receives the measure for the width of his being.” Poets alone can teach 
us our limits…their words are not simply arbitrary; they are neither 
subjective nor objective but a true standard of man’s situation in time 
and in the midst of nonhuman realities. Such utterance is the voice of 
Being itself…They teach us to dwell rightly on earth, to make a home 
instead of merely inhabiting a series of houses…181 
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Human beings are allowed to dwell rootedly on the earth because the poet takes an 
efficacious and comprehensive measure of this encounter which establishes the right 
relationship and the most fitting comportment possible. 
What is it about the poet and her poetizing labors that enables her to tap into the 
powerful forces of true measure-taking and achieve for humankind the ultimate 
comportment which rehabilitates genuine dwelling and rootedness? An answer comes by 
paying careful attention to the immediate context of Hölderlin’s poem in which the 
thematic phrase “Full of merit, yet poetically, man / Dwells on this earth” appears: 
24 May, if life is sheer toil, a man 
Lift his eyes and say: so 
I too wish to be? Yes. As long as Kindness, 
The Pure, still stays with his heart, man 
28 Not unhappily measures himself 
Against the godhead. Is God unknown? 
Is he manifest like the sky? I’d sooner 
Believe the latter. It’s the measure of man. 
32 Full of merit, yet poetically, man 
Dwells on this earth. But no purer 
Is the shade of the starry night, 
If I might put it so, than 
36 Man, who’s called an image of the godhead. 
Is there a measure on earth? There is 
None. 
 
The immediately preceding verses, 27-31, are the most telling, since they disclose 
Hölderlin’s broad belief concerning the measure-taking performed by humankind in 
general: “man / Not unhappily measures himself / Against the godhead.” Commenting on 
these lines Heidegger writes: 
It is enough, then, if we attend to the poet’s own words. For in the next 
lines Hölderlin inquires, before anything else and in fact exclusively, as 
to man’s measure. That measure is the godhead against which man 
measures himself.182 
 
Heidegger is thus intrigued by Hölderlin’s insistence that humankind has always 
measured itself with and against something greater – “something heavenly.” But what is 
most significant for Heidegger is that this lofty measure-taking impacts upon the state of 
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humanity’s dwelling. The comportment of genuine rooted dwelling that is currently 
sorely lacking can be realized anew, only if there is first some deep engagement with the 
relational encounter between humanity and the godhead: 
The godhead is the “measure” with which man measures out his 
dwelling, his stay on the earth beneath the sky. Only insofar as man 
takes the measure of his dwelling in this way is he able to be 
commensurately with his nature. Man’s dwelling depends on an 
upward-looking measure-taking…183 
 
 However, the attainment of authentic dwelling further depends on the poet who 
most naturally assumes the upward-looking posture needed to take the measure that puts 
the human-divine relationship in proper order. It must be borne in mind that the genuine 
rooted dwelling that Heidegger hopes humankind will recapture is a poetic one – 
“poetically man dwells on earth” – and for this to be realized the poet must be allowed to 
exercise her special charism to measure humanity’s relationship to the godhead, which in 
turn determines the best disposition for the human-divine encounter. All of this occurs 
metaphorically by the poet’s upward glance to “the sky,” which for Heidegger is 
synonymous with gazing upon God who can be “known” or experienced in this 
encounter, but only in a mysterious way. Thus, Heidegger places a lot of stock in 
Hölderlin’s insight concerning the nature of God by whom humanity measures itself: 
Is God unknown? 
Is he manifest like the sky? I’d sooner 
Believe the latter. It’s the measure of man.  (In Lovely Blueness, vss. 29b-31) 
 
 Hölderlin’s predilection for the imagery of the sky as the primary focus for the 
measure-taking endeavors of the poet allows Heidegger to apply once again his well-
known dynamic of revealing and concealing, which occurs in any quest for truth 
(aletheia) and instills such pursuits with an element of mystery: 
the sky is not sheer light. The radiance of its height is itself the 
darkness of its all-sheltering breadth. The blue of the sky’s lovely 
blueness is the color of depth. The radiance of the sky is the dawn and 
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dusk of the twilight, which shelters everything that can be 
proclaimed.184 
 
Because the sky is an expressive realm where the revealing promise of dawn’s light and 
the looming concealment of dusk’s dimness ebb and flow in harmonious accord, it 
becomes an apt metaphor for the activity of God which is also marked by episodes of 
revealing and concealing. Heidegger describes the correlation between the sky and God’s 
activity which serves to define measure-taking and specify its scope: 
The measure consists in the way in which the god who remains 
unknown, is revealed as such by the sky. God’s appearance through the 
sky consists in a disclosing that lets us see what conceals itself, but lets 
us see it not by seeking to wrest what is concealed out of its 
concealedness, but only by guarding the concealed in its self-
concealment. Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown by way 
of the sky’s manifestness. This appearance is the measure against 
which man measures himself.185 
 
 It is therefore not a literal looking toward the sky that determines the measure-
taking performed by the poet in order to ensure an authentic rooted dwelling for 
humanity. Instead, it is a willingness to appreciate the sky as the cosmological staging 
area for both daytime’s revelatory brightness and the night’s concealing darkness, and to 
perceive how this is symbolic of a God who is mysteriously encountered as illuminating 
presence as well as obscuring absence. The tentative nature of the previous discussion on 
“openness to the mystery” is now appreciated for its preparatory value. The earlier 
general admonition to be attitudinally open to mystery in an unspecified sense offered the 
promise for a new dwelling and rootedness. Partial meaning and truth about the mystery 
would also result, since any disclosure occurs along with concealment. Now the 
discussion focuses on poetic measure-taking. Here, the poet artfully measures the human-
divine relationship with full acceptance that the experience of God in these encounters 
will include disclosure as well as concealment. Heidegger, therefore, laid the necessary 
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foundation with the initial broad appeal that authentic dwelling and rootedness will come 
to those who willingly embrace mystery as an occurrence of simultaneous disclosure and 
concealment. With that set forth, greater specificity is given to the human quest for 
genuine rooted dwelling. Such a dwelling is now deemed poetic – “poetically man dwells 
on the earth” – for it is the poet who is able to create this dwelling by being open to the 
mystery that results from her unique aptitude to take the measure of the nature of the 
human-divine encounter. This is ultimately a coming to terms with and being acceptant of 
a God who relates to humanity by showing herself – “letting us see” – but never in an 
absolute manner. As the encounter unfolds God is not completely revealed or fully 
grasped by the human gaze. 
 The degree to which humanity is willing to be comfortable with this mysterious 
measure taken by the poet will determine the extent to which it will achieve rooted 
dwelling. In other words, there must be an engagement with the divine – “a measuring 
with and against the Godhead” – that fully and willingly embraces the mystery of these 
experiential encounters. Expressed as appearances, these encounters are respected as 
being guarded from complete exposure and able to withstand any attempts, no matter 
how valiant, to wrest what remains concealed out of its concealedness. Such a haughty 
pursuit of manipulation and domination is not a poetic measure of the human-divine 
experience, but is actually characteristic of the very technocratic spirit of hubris that led 
to the dissolution of human dwelling and rootedness.  
 Despite the salutary outcome promised by poetic measure-taking, when 
humankind will again dwell rootedly on the earth with full acceptance that such dwelling 
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means being compatible with an elusive Godhead, Heidegger admits that the poet’s 
measuring efforts will be disconcerting for many because of their “strangeness:” 
 A strange measure (ein seltsames Maß), perplexing it would 
seem to the common notion of mortals, inconvenient to the cheap 
omniscience of everyday opinion, which likes to claim that it is the 
standard of all thinking and reflection. 
 A strange measure for ordinary and in particular also for all 
merely scientific ideas…186 
 
Some would find corroborating evidence to substantiate the claim that this measure-
taking is in fact strange or odd since it was originally inspired by Hölderlin, whose 
mental and emotional decline is well documented. His poem “In Lovely Blueness,” 
which has been under close scrutiny, was written between 1822-24. This is several years 
after his condition had reached a decisive low point in 1806, when he was transported by 
force to Autenrieth Psychiatric Clinic in Tübingen and released after nearly ten months of 
unsuccessful treatment.187 Awareness that some of Hölderlin’s most intriguing work was 
created during the advanced stages of his schizophrenia was never a problem for 
Heidegger. He talks quite openly and candidly about Hölderlin’s “madness,” as evident in 
the following remark: “Hölderlin spoke long after he had been taken away into the 
protection of the night of madness.”188 Instead of being unsettled by Hölderlin’s serious 
mental illness and avoiding his strange teaching, Heidegger was enamored with Hölderlin 
and willingly accepted his specific thoughts on dwelling and measure-taking. In a way 
that neatly summarizes what has been discussed above with regard to dwelling and 
measuring, and at the same time shows Heidegger’s unflinching devotion to Hölderlin, 
Karsten Harries writes: 
Following Hölderlin, Heidegger calls human dwelling poetic and links 
such dwelling to a measuring… 
 But where does the poet find or take this measure? Following 
Hölderlin, Heidegger gives us what appears to be the traditional 
answer: the most fundamental measure of human being is the Godhead. 
  
 284
If so, human beings must affirm the Godhead as their measure if they 
are to dwell authentically.189 
 
 Heidegger’s allegiance to Hölderlin is not based sheerly on the shock effect that 
might result from his endorsement of the unique wisdom that can be acquired from 
someone adjudged to be mentally unsound. Nor is his eagerness to follow Hölderlin a 
sign of malcontention. There is something much deeper that motivates Heidegger and 
leads him to seriously believe that the strange measure-taking advanced by the poetic is 
the worthy remedy to cure humanity’s lost sense of dwelling rootedly on the earth. For 
Heidegger the “madman” is not merely a debilitated person to be patronized or shunned, 
but rather someone who should be followed because he has a unique intuitive awareness 
that can point out new directions which otherwise will go unnoticed. Heidegger makes 
this point with a cogency that went unexamined when this same passage from his 1953 
essay on Trakl’s poetry was cited earlier to discuss the wandering stranger: 
the madman (der Wahnsinnige). Does the word mean someone who is 
mentally ill? Madness here does not mean a mind filled with senseless 
delusions. The madman’s mind – senses in fact as no one else does. 
Even so, he does not have the sense of others. He is of another mind. 
The departed one is a man apart, a madman, because he has taken his 
way in another direction.190 
 
To heed Hölderlin’s exhortation to welcome a measure-taking that acknowledges the 
presence of a Deity who is unable to be controlled and resists any efforts of complete 
disclosure will indeed be a strange standard by which to gauge human dwelling on earth. 
The reigning technological and natural scientific attitude would promote an entirely 
different measure by which humans would feel comfortably at home and rooted in the 
world – one that would put them firmly in control and so reduce or eliminate as much 
ambiguity as possible. Some mysterious God or Transcendent Other who defies human 
efforts to manipulate, control and dominate might be suitable in some instances governed 
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by those of faithfilled temperaments. But the dwelling of status quo, promised in a stream 
lined world of technological precision, has no serious place for some Other of 
inexhaustible depth. For Heidegger such status quo dwelling is unpoetic. It is based on an 
unpoetic measure that will have wide appeal for its being in the mainstream and so less 
strange: 
Thus it might be that our unpoetic dwelling, its incapacity to take the 
measure, derives from a curious excess of frantic measuring and 
calculating (eines rasen den Messens und Rechnens Käme).191 
 
 A reorientation is possible that will quell the frenetic desire to control and dwell 
unpoetically without serious recognition of the place of mystery. This will occur if there 
is a willingness to embrace the poet and her mad sense of measure-taking: “Whether, and 
when, we may come to a turning point in our unpoetic dwelling is something we may 
expect to happen only if we remain heedful of the poetic.”192 Heeding the poetic means 
accepting the strange measure taking which establishes rooted dwelling by means of 
moving in another direction, one that is away from the usual frenzied course seeking 
absolute control and total mastery. The way of the poet, attuned to the alternative way 
because of her madness, takes a measure where humans find authentic rooted dwelling in 
complete acceptance of an elusive and transcendent God. This is not mere status quo 
dwelling that results from the unpoetic measure taken by technology and scientism, 
where a feeling of peacefulness comes only when all variables are controlled so that there 
are no surprises and no mysteries. Instead, genuine rooted dwelling is achieved by the 
poetic measure that welcomes the God who guards and preserves her concealment. This 
is poetic dwelling; it is characterized by a true sense of being serenely at home and results 
from the strange measure taken by the poet whose madness points to another direction: 
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From that other direction, his madness may be called “gentle,” for his 
mind pursues a greater stillness (Von dorther durf sein Wahnsinn ein 
“sanfer” heißen; denn er sinnt Stillerem nach).193 
 
 The desire to follow the madperson for unique sagacious insight does not end 
once rooted dwelling is restored. As the next chapter will point out, not only will 
Heidegger continue to follow Hölderlin, but he will also be shown following Nietzsche, 
another thinker gravely inflicted by psychotic illness. Most specifically, Heidegger is 
captivated by the famed madman who lands upon the town square in The Gay Science 
announcing God’s death. According to Pöggeler, Heidegger willingly followed the 
“other” directions offered by Hölderlin and Nietzsche in full acceptance of their mental 
suffering. Their infirmity was not an impediment to thinking but rather a potential source 
for enrichment and advancement, most remarkably along religious lines. Theirs was a 
“free theologizing of one[s] marked out by insanity, which burst all established 
boundaries.”194 
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Chapter Four: Theological Possibility in the Godlessness of Nietzsche 
and Hölderlin 
 
 
What is God? Why this question? 
Can God be said to be a thing? 
Since He is dead, do we not at 
Least owe Him respect for the  
person He was? 
— Jean-Luc Nancy 
 
 
Therefore, from the time that I have known you,  
You have always been present in my memory. 
It is there that I find you when I remember you 
and delight in you. 
— St. Augustine 
 
 
Introduction: Assuming the Nietzschean and Hölderlinian Perspectives 
This chapter will conclude this study by carefully examining two texts from 
Heidegger’s late writings – “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead’” (1943) and 
“Remembrance” (1943). While the connection of these lectures is not immediately 
apparent, it will be shown how each is able to thematically synthesize the major concerns 
related to Heidegger’s later works and the theology of God. Heidegger’s interest in the 
death of God vis-à-vis Nietzsche may at first blush appear contradictory and even 
counter-productive for any positive discussion of God. But as will be seen, if there is a 
willingness to embrace Nietzsche in the way that Heidegger did in his later writings, then 
much can be discovered that meaningfully addresses the topic of God in early 21st 
century postmodernity. Heidegger invites the theologically minded, easily repulsed by 
Nietzsche’s well-known invectives against Christianity, to assume a Nietzschean 
perspective.    
The effort to keep an open mind and to assume the vantage point of Nietzsche can 
lead to a fruitful exchange for theology.  Trying to see as Nietzsche sees means at least 
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allowing his message to receive a fair and impartial hearing without ever having to fully 
embrace his doctrine, which at face value is incompatible with most theological pursuits.  
William A. Luijpen endorses such an approach for the skeptical philosopher as well when 
he writes, 
Today’s philosopher is willing to examine Nietzsche’s work when, 
reading what this philosopher and prophet has said, he tries to be 
sensitive to what Nietzsche has “seen.”  For one thing is certain: If 
Nietzsche belongs to the classics, we cannot say that he has “not seen 
anything.” He did see something. The modern philosopher, then, is not 
asked to accept Nietzsche’s theses, but it is expected of him that, in his 
attempt to express the meaning of reality in his own way, he personally 
assigns due value to what Nietzsche has seen.1 
 
Likewise, the theologian who reads Heidegger’s examination of Nietzsche’s declaration 
of God’s death will stay on course and find enrichment so long as she continually asks, 
what did Nietzsche have in mind when he made that statement? — what did Nietzsche 
actually see? 
 Such an open spirit toward Nietzsche was earlier evidenced in chapter one when 
attempting to locate Heidegger’s distinctive place in Western philosophy. There openness 
came rather easy, since Heidegger’s use of Nietzsche was an exercise of safe, academic 
contrast seeking how best to overcome metaphysics — Nietzsche’s will to power versus 
Heidegger’s meditative step back. However, the current focus to join Heidegger as he 
examines Nietzsche’s more incendiary claims — “We have killed Him - you and I! We 
are all His murderers! … God is dead! God remains dead!” — requires a more conscious 
effort of openness. 
 Aside from the theological points of interest that will be exposed in this chapter 
by the requisite attitude of openness to Nietzsche, it is also important to notice the already 
mentioned synthetic quality or capacity in Heidegger’s later interest in Nietzsche’s 
assertion that God is dead. It is synthetic both for the limited intentions of this project as 
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well as for a more general grasp of Heidegger’s work overall. Many times throughout this 
study the question of the meaning of Being has been presented as the abiding theme for 
Heidegger’s life’s work. Most appropriately this became the center piece around which 
chapter one was developed, since one credible way to appreciate Heidegger’s unique 
contribution to Western philosophy is by exposing the novel ways he attempted to enroll 
other thinkers to revisit and reexamine the question of the meaning of Being. 
 The novelty will be quite palpable below, when Heidegger’s curiosity over 
Nietzsche’s insistence that God is dead will be seen as ultimately related to the question 
of the meaning of Being and its plight at the hands of metaphysics. But beyond the ability 
of Nietzsche’s report of God’s death to demonstrate continuity with Heidegger’s overall 
thematic concern, there is also the ability for Heidegger’s interest in Nietzsche’s report to 
forge a synthesis between the thematic interests of this work — God and Heidegger’s 
later writings. Heidegger is quick to point out something very important that could be 
easily overlooked in Nietzsche’s textual style when recounting the passage in The Gay 
Science where the madman enters the marketplace to announce obstreperously the death 
of God. Please refer to Appendix Four, where section 125 of The Gay Science has been 
provided in its entirety to facilitate analysis here and throughout the chapter. Two key 
phrases are italicized by Nietzsche, and this emphasis for Heidegger holds the 
interpretive key for understanding the nature of God’s death. The two phrases read “We 
have killed him” and “and yet they have done it themselves,” and for Heidegger these are 
significant as clear expressions of Nietzsche’s desire to implicate humanity in this surreal 
event. He writes: 
The two italicized sentences give the interpretation for the word “God 
is dead” … The pronouncement means something worse: God has been 
killed … For the word “God is dead” would be much more readily 
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grasped if it declared: God himself, of his own accord distanced 
himself from his living presence. But that God should be killed by 
others and indeed by men is unthinkable.2 
 
 Such a weighty charge should produce reactions of varied kind and intensity, 
Heidegger notes that even: “Nietzsche himself was astounded at this thought.”3 But 
whatever the initial reaction, it need not eventuate in some sort of debilitation as long as 
the context of Heidegger’s later writings is kept in mind.  Responding to the grandiose 
indictment for God’s murder becomes bearable when reminded of one of Heidegger’s 
main later concerns — the forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit). Though the 
particulars of this phenomenon were closely discussed above in chapter one, it is 
important now to recall Heidegger’s basic belief that Western metaphysics since Plato 
has suffered from this vexing amnesia. The immediate result of this affliction has been to 
compromise genuine access to the meaning of Being. Symptomatic of this condition of 
forgetfulness is misdirected, if not defective, thinking and Heidegger renders a 
differential diagnosis when he makes the following connections: 
This ultimate blow in the killing of God is perpetuated by metaphysics, 
which, as the metaphysics of the will to power, accomplishes thinking 
in the sense of value-thinking … Nowhere are we confronted by a 
thinking that thinks the truth of Being itself and therewith thinks truth 
itself as Being … Nothing is befalling Being. Being is not coming into 
the light of its own essence. In the appearing of whatever as such, 
Being itself remains wanting. The truth of Being falls from memory. It 
remains forgotten.4 
 
 With a clearer understanding of where Heidegger assigns the blame for God’s 
death when reading Nietzsche, a natural question arises, what if anything can be done? In 
other words, once all the parties associated with Western metaphysical thinking, 
including theology, have been convicted of contributing in some way to God’s death, is 
there some meaningful form of restitution, is there some opportunity for redress? An 
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affirmative response to these questions is possible, but true to any Heideggerian path that 
will lead to restitution and redress, the charted course will not be direct or easy. While 
this may be mildly frustrating for the philosopher, it can become downright discouraging 
for the theologian. Fully aware that the potential for frustration was great and wanting to 
stave off any quick fix solutions to ease the pain, as early as chapter one this study 
sounded a cautionary note to avoid what John Macquarrie called a “false move” in the 
interaction between Heidegger and theology. Reckless and desperate maneuvers can be 
avoided in theology’s efforts to exculpate itself from God’s death if the following 
familiar Heideggerian priority is heeded: 
Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. 
Only from the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the 
light of the essence of the divinity can it be thought or said what the 
word “God” is to signify.5 
 
Without revisiting the complexities treated in chapter three surrounding Heidegger’s 
tendency to toss about seemingly synonymous terms — holy, divinity, God — it is 
important here to appreciate in Heidegger’s sequential chain the place of primacy given 
to Being. Only after the meaning and truth of Being has been adequately addressed is it 
possible to broach the question of God. As disconcerting as this may be for theologians 
interested in an express route to God, it nonetheless presents a window for dialogue 
between their work and Heidegger. 
 The matter of God’s death is no exception. God’s murder was a conspiracy aided 
and abetted by generations of thinkers across disciplinary lines who embraced the 
reigning mode of thought known as metaphysics. Of its many deficiencies, one was its 
ability to cultivate and advance a forgetfulness of Being to the point that “The truth of 
Being falls from memory” and so “remains forgotten.” The challenge then becomes to 
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arrest and reverse this state of forgetfulness in order to achieve some progress in the 
discovery of Being’s genuine truth and meaning. Essential to meeting this challenge is 
the obvious need to neutralize those aspects of metaphysical thinking that foster 
forgetfulness and memory loss and to find instead a thinking that not only enhances the 
activity of remembering but more importantly infuses the activity with a deeper quality of 
meditative commemoration. Such a tack resonates with the grand scheme to overcome 
metaphysics outlined in chapter one.  There a meditative step-back into the ontological 
difference was shown to be the most effective strategy for philosophy to re-approach the 
Being question with all due respect for its mysterious depth. Meditative thinking was best 
suited for this task when qualified as a recollective thinking (andenken). 
 While obviously related to the wide-ranging goals to overcome metaphysics and 
give philosophy a new beginning, this chapter’s interests in memory and remembering 
have a very specific purpose. No longer is genuine recollection important as a devotional 
sub-category and qualification of meditative thinking; instead, as will be seen later 
andenken can be upheld in its own right as the most efficacious way for philosophers and 
theologians to exonerate themselves from participating in a particular event in the 2,500 
year period of metaphysics — the death of God. To effectuate this project recourse will 
be made to Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s late poem “Remembrance.” Please 
refer to Appendix Three where the poem has been provided in its entirety to facilitate this 
analysis. In Heidegger’s line by line commentary the special power of remembering will 
be exposed.  While no patent mention of God’s death is found in Heidegger’s thorough 
analysis of Hölderlin’s poem, the connection will become evident as these reflections are 
placed in the wider context of Heidegger’s special reverence for Hölderlin’s perspicacity.  
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Specifically, it can be recalled in chapters one and three how Heidegger was inspired by 
Hölderlin to describe the present age as a “needy time” (dürftige Zeit). Because Hölderlin 
has the distinction of having established the essence of poetry, it is also Heidegger’s 
related contribution that Hölderlin identified and inaugurated a new era. Heidegger writes 
that this “new” time, 
is the time of the gods who have fled and of the god who is coming. It 
is the time of need because it stands in a double lack and a double not: 
in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and in the not-yet of the god 
who is coming.6 
 
The special role that poets and poetizing play in overcoming dilemmas of various sort has 
been well chronicled in this study. Yet Heidegger invokes the poetic charisms once more 
with hope that they will offer the best means to confront an unprecedented challenge of 
great magnitude. For Hölderlin’s new needy time the gods have fled and for Nietzsche 
“There has never been a greater deed”7 than God’s murder. Hölderlin’s estimation of the 
current situation appears to be the more hopeful at first glance, since he blatantly 
juxtaposes the condition of godlessness with the possibility of the gods’ return. The 
closer treatment of Nietzsche that will take place below, however, will depict 
Heidegger’s more positive evaluation of Nietzsche’s assertions for theology. For now it is 
important not to hastily pit Hölderlin against Nietzsche, but to see theological possibility 
lurking in both. Commentators recommend varied approaches to salvage Nietzsche’s 
voice from being quickly silenced and dismissed as harbinger of a new era of atheistic 
nihilism. Dirk de Schutter sees Nietzsche’s more hopeful side residing in his ambiguity: 
“Nietzsche remains ambiguous: he proclaims the death of God and confesses his belief 
that a new type of god is possible.”8 In a similar vein Luca D’Isanto views Nietzsche’s 
inconclusiveness as pointing to a deeper theological opportunity: “This death, however, 
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does not settle the question concerning the divine being. Indeed, Nietzsche himself left 
open the possibility that new gods might be created; in other words, he did not close off 
the possibility of a renewal of religious experience.”9 Finally, the insights of Erich Heller 
and Anthony Thorlby are valuable for maintaining a balanced view of the theological 
prospects occasioned by Hölderlin’s fled gods and Nietzsche’s dead God. They observe, 
“Both Hölderlin and Nietzsche are possessed by a more intense and genuine feeling for 
man’s spiritual need than is shown by much orthodox belief.”10 
 
 
The Existential Anxiety of Godless Nothingness 
 
 Just how magnanimous either Hölderlin or Nietzsche are or whether or not they 
would want to be depicted as spiritual guides in troubling times remains subject to 
debate.  Nonetheless, for Heidegger these poets have, by their varied proclamations of 
divine withdrawal, necessarily ushered in a disturbing time, whether one of “needy 
destitution” (Hölderlin) or one that is a “monstrous logic of terror” (Nietzsche). And even 
if an attitudinal openness prevents outright panic and waits in hope for something deeper 
to be revealed about God, it remains nevertheless a distressing transitional time replete 
with the typical anxiety operative during such phases. Even though Heidegger oftentimes 
shrugged off the labels of existentialist, he remains true to his phenomenological 
approach to feeling/mood and so urges an embrace of the anxiety accompanying this 
unprecedented time of godlessness. For the early Heidegger in Being and Time, die Angst 
is the basic way in which one finds oneself — the Grundbefindlichkeit.11  
 Where, better yet, how does one find herself in the wake of the dead God/departed 
gods? It is clear from the foregoing that the where is readily comprehended as an interim 
  
 301
state. Yet discerning the condition of how is less easily grasped, clouded as the 
discernment is by the haze of existential anxiety. Without question, to search for an 
answer to the question of how one finds oneself in light of the realization that there is no 
God would be an incontestable instance of anxiety as developed in the existential 
tradition. There anxiety is a more comprehensive mood than the ordinary fear associated 
with being afraid of certain things. For the existentialists, anxiety is provoked by an 
overwhelming sense of nothingness within our own being. William Barrett eloquently 
delineates the concept of anxiety and its place in existential philosophy: 
Anxiety is not fear, being afraid of this or that definite object, but the 
uncanny feeling of being afraid of nothing at all. It is precisely 
Nothingness that makes itself present and felt as the object of our 
dread. The first time this fundamental human experience was described 
was by Kierkegaard … Heidegger has greatly expanded and deepened 
Kierkegaard’s insight.12 
 
An entire section in chapter one, “Being and the Embarrassment of Nothing,” attests to 
one mode of Heidegger’s expansion noted by Barrett. There, Heidegger was seen once 
again recommending that philosophy embrace the anxiety attendant with the discovery 
that Being is intimately related to non-Being or nothing. What made this proposition 
sunnier than the current invitation to welcome the anxiety linked to the fled gods/dead 
God was that a connection was made with the mystical theology of Meister Eckhart. A 
careful similarity was drawn between the non-Being aspect of Being and the mysterious 
nothingness of the Godhead. This profound nothingness of God could however be 
positively encountered as long as the spiritual sojourner was willing to embrace the 
mysterious abysmal nothingness of her own soul. 
 The effort to integrate the anxiety and be clear about how one finds oneself 
becomes a much more arduous task. Now the gods have left and God has been murdered, 
there is no possibility of latching on to some deeper aspect of their being, since their 
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elusiveness has become an absence. Because the intensity level of anxiety produced by 
this stark encounter with nothingness cannot be quickly defused, there is the great 
potential for escapism. Nietzsche’s speaking through the madman who has just 
announced God’s demise by human hands captures well the resulting degree of anxiety. 
He writes: 
How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What 
was holiest and mightiest of all the world yet owned has bled to death 
under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there 
for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred 
games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too 
great for us?13 
 
If the anxiety produced is too great to bear when confronted by this godless nothingness, 
escape becomes an option to relieve the overwhelming stress. This likely reaction is 
based on Heidegger’s estimation of what happens when the nothingness that the human 
existent confronts within his own being leads to a sobering sense of radical insecurity, 
which can only be coped with by flight. The discussion of anxiety in this light is 
developed in Being and Time by Heidegger’s analysis of “Falling” (Verfallen).14 
Macquarrie as co-translator of this work provides the following helpful gloss on Falling 
occasioned by the intense dread of inner nothingness: 
In Heidegger’s view, what happens in falling is that the existent flees 
from himself. He may lose himself in the inauthentic being-with-others 
which is called the “they” or again in the busy-ness of his concerns 
with the world of things.15 
 
 However because anxiety is the Grundbefindlichkeit, the mood which offers a 
total disclosure of human existence, it must do more than incite self-evasion in the face of 
nothingness which in turn seeks refuge from the dread by the stop gap tranquilizing effect 
of absorption in people and things. Aside from dread, anxiety in the face of nothingness 
also produces a sense of fascination. In other words, while an initial anxiety ridden 
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reaction may result in a short term desire to escape from the threat of nothingness into a 
frenzied preoccupation with the everyday routine involving tasks and others, there is also 
the possibility of a secondary reaction. A more sustained and consequential modality of 
anxiety before nothingness is fascination over the realization that freedom and possibility 
are the true outcomes of entertaining the nothingness of oneself. At some point, then, 
anxiety is able to shift the experiential reaction to nothingness from avoidance to 
approach. Anxiety continues to rumble beneath the seeming calm rendered by egress 
(Fallenness) into mundane concerns, but eventually it jerks the existent (Dasein) out of 
these pseudo-securities and throws the human person back to a realization of his unique 
freedom and possibility. Heidegger explains: 
Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding 
itself, as it falls, in terms of the “world” and the way things have been 
publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is 
anxious about — its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world … 
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being — that is, its Being-free for the freedom of 
choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to 
face with its Being-free for (propensio in…) the authenticity of its 
Being … as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in 
the “world.”16 
 
 Heidegger’s early work on the being of human existence holds out hope in the 
current challenge to stare down the nothingness created by the departure of the divinities 
and the execution of the divine. Anxiety is always present in the being of the human 
person to attain authentic self-understanding in light of a pervasive sense of nothingness. 
Though the initial anxiety is dreadful, and causes a reaction of flight, there is a gradual 
awakening in anxiety that becomes fascinated by the nothingness and this inspires the 
self to make the free decisions necessary to work toward an authentic existence. Can a 
similar pattern be followed now with a genuine hope for a meaningful ending? In other 
words, can the initial anxiety of dread experienced in the encounter of gods who have 
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withdrawn and a God who has been killed engender an exclusive reaction of escape? (“Is 
not the greatness of the deed too great for us?”) Or, can this initial panic provoking 
anxiety be directed and converted to a sense of wonder and fascination that godless 
nothingness is really an opportunity for theology to realize an authentic possibility? 
 This last question can be resoundingly answered in the affirmative so long as 
there is an appropriate program in place to receive and guide the initial anxiety to its 
more promising ends. Finding such a program is easier and closer at hand than might first 
be realized, since it is none other than poetics that will offer the best resource to 
positively integrate the initial anxiety aroused by godlessness. In the previous chapter, 
passing mention was made of the special vocation of the poet during this needy time. 
There the primary emphasis for developing the potentials of poetized thinking was to 
expose the poet as a wandering stranger. Her willingness to journey into and inhabit the 
between of Heidegger’s ontological difference became emblematic of poetic dwelling, 
which necessarily entails some relationship with the Godhead evaluated by poetic 
measurement. In those discussions, the presence of the gods and God was presumed, and 
two of Heidegger’s favorite poets — Trakl and Hölderlin — were enlisted and shown to 
be exemplary practitioners of poetic thinking able to address the issues at hand. Once 
again, recourse is made to poetics and exclusively to the writings of Hölderlin in order to 
achieve a theologically meaningful outcome from encountering the reality of godless 
nothingness. According to Heidegger the poet is up to the challenge, “The time is needy 
and the poet is extremely rich … But he holds his ground in the Nothing of this night.”17 
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The Venturesome Poet and the Traces of the Divine 
 
 What is it about the mien of the poet that enables her to stand firm in the face of 
this daunting nothingness? Heidegger maintains that poets are more venturesome and 
open to taking risks (die Wagenderen) The mention made in the last chapter concerning 
the thinker/poet embodied in the figure of Trakl’s wandering stranger, who possessed a 
trait of openness for an adventuresome journey into the between of the ontological 
difference, is similar but not exact. The venturesome risk taking is now assigned 
exclusively to the poet who plays a specific role in the needy time of absent deities. 
 Before coming to appreciate the effectiveness that comes with the poet’s 
possession of a venturesome spirit when comforting the angst of godlessness, it will be 
necessary to be aware of another distinction made by Heidegger. In his 1943 postscript to 
“What is Metaphysics?”, Heidegger concludes his considerations of the relation between 
philosophy and poetry by stating, “The thinker says being. The poet names the holy.”18 
Space does not allow for a complete analysis of Heidegger’s understanding of the holy 
(das Heilige), but suffice it to say that the gods and God are not synonymous with the 
holy. Keeping this basic refinement in mind will prevent any misconstruals of the poetic 
activity beyond its Heideggerian parameters as Robert Bernasconi is wont to remind: “the 
naming of the gods is not the same as the naming of the holy that Heidegger writes of 
when characterizing the difference between poet and thinker.”19  For Heidegger it is 
necessary to create a crucial intermediary region called the holy that has direct bearings 
on the poet’s venturesome nature in her encounters with the gods’/God’s elusiveness. 
Several commentators believe that the holy becomes the equivalent to Being in many 
instances of Heidegger’s writings on Hölderlin. Convinced of the genesis of Being’s 
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linkage to the holy in Heidegger’s evolving thought, Joseph Kockelmans writes: “In his 
reflections on Hölderlin’s poems, Heidegger finds the proper words to describe Being as 
the holy.”20 Bishop Bernhard Welte, who delivered the homily at Heidegger’s funeral, 
offers insight that broadens the understanding of the Being-holy connection so that the 
role of the risk seeking, venturesome poet meeting the challenge of godless nothingness 
becomes clearer. He contends, “The poet who ‘dwells in the region of the openness of 
Being’ and is aware of its possible grace is allowed to call it holy.”21 But to arrive at an 
even clearer grasp of the poet’s role it must be asked, what does this dimension, whose 
overarching breadth is coequal with Being, have to do with the gods and their vexing 
evasiveness? A first step toward answering this question is the realization that for 
Heidegger the holy is the god’s/God’s dwelling place, “The High One … inhabits the 
Serene of the holy.”22 However, consonant with the understanding of Being presented 
many times throughout this study, the realm of the holy does not provide the type of carte 
blanche conditions where its most famous resident can come and go at will or entertain 
visitors without restriction. In other terms, the holy in keeping with the 
unconcealment/concealment operation of Being, regulates the nature and extent of the 
gods’/God’s availability and accessibility. Heidegger explains, “The Holy does indeed 
appear. But the god remains far off.”23  The word “trace” (die Spur) becomes the most 
forceful way for Heidegger to convey the regulatory influence that the holy exercises as 
lord of the manor over the gods’/God’s interactions. Kockelmans offers this analysis: 
“Holding Himself back in the vastness of the holy (i.e. Being as what is whole), God 
waits there and sends holiness out before Him as his trace.”24 Even with the valid charges 
that the holy imposes a rather inhibitive force upon the gods’/God’s availability and 
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access, it is nonetheless for Heidegger the medium through which their presence appears. 
Michael Haar recommends the need for an acceptant and tolerant attitude when trying to 
come to terms with Heidegger’s innovative yet complex reflection on the holy’s 
functioning in relation to the gods/God: 
the Holy is … the original and inaugural light, the native soul that 
makes possible the advent of a God or the gods. For [Heidegger] 
without a preludial Holy — conceived as the Wholesome [Being] … or 
that which has the power to save — no god can appear.25 
 
But even if one can learn to be comfortable with the activity of the holy, it still remains 
extremely troublesome to deal with these ungenerous traces or glimpses it offers of God. 
The difficulty level increases when it is remembered that God’s death/the gods’ fleeing 
further encumbers any access to an ephemeral trace. David White lends support to the 
mounting complexity with his claim that, “Although Heidegger does not expressly state 
this, one can assume that traces of a flown deity are more difficult to locate than traces of 
anything else.”26  
 Without question, the daring poetic demeanor becomes requisite to boldly 
confront this anxiety ridden situation, where godless nothingness has been complicated in 
a twofold way. As intimidating as it may be to first learn of the gods’ departure and 
God’s death, an added layer of intimidation results with the realization that the means to 
any possible recovery and restoration is through the strictures of the holy. Heidegger 
highlights with eloquence the unflappable spirit of the poet who is able to sing amidst the 
gloom of this manifold nothingness: 
To be a poet in a destitute [needy] time means: to attend singing, to the 
trace of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet in the time of the 
world’s night utters the holy. This is why … the world’s night is a holy 
night.27  
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Undaunted by the bleakness of divine absence and the encumbrances offered by the holy 
to thwart any unobscured reappearance, the poet moves forward. With a song in her heart 
she offers hope to those interested by indicating that traces of the gods’/God’s presence 
are discernible even when — especially when — strong forces do all that they can to 
militate against it. This implacable force is the holy for Heidegger, and despite its ability 
to add insult to injury by hiding an already hidden deity the venturesome poet fully 
embraces the functioning of the holy/unholy and accepts its obfuscations as preparatory  
to and concomitant with the resurgent brightness of the gods’/God’s traces. He writes: 
Poets who are of the more venturesome kind (Wagenderen) are 
underway on the track of the holy because they experience the unholy 
as such … the more venturesome [sort] experience unshieldedness in 
the unholy. They bring to mortals the trace of the fugitive gods, the 
track into the dark of the world’s night.28 
 
 
Essential Poetic Activity 
 
 While the primary motivation behind Heidegger’s praise for the venturesome poet 
centers on the spirit of bravery and hope to encounter head-on the dark night of the holy 
in order to glimpse traces of  the gods’/God’s presence, it is also important to appreciate 
that this venturesome nature operates simultaneously in another dimension — 
temporality. Realizing that poetic venturesomeness transcends a boldness for the 
darkness, a quality of space, and also includes a willingness to hold out promise for the 
nighttime hours recasts the search for the gods’/God’s traces within a unique relationship 
to the temporal. It can be recalled how Heidegger firmly stamps the essence of poetic 
activity with the imprint of temporal significance. The essence of poetry determines a 
new time, the crucible in which the venturesome poet is put to the test as it is a 
needy/destitute time of double lack and double not — the no-more of the gods who have 
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fled or the God who has been murdered and the not yet of the god/God who is returning. 
Undoubtedly, this is a between time, and the suggestion that the poet will be naturally 
suited for it is a variation on another familiar theme. Chapters one and three devoted a 
great deal of attention to the multiple purposes that the between realm serves for 
Heidegger as well as for the role of the thinker and poet as its best qualified inhabitants. 
Moreover, chapter two addressed the temporal evidence of the early Thessalonian church 
from a phenomenological perspective in order to examine the between time of Jesus’ 
ascension and his futural return at the Parousia. 
 While the current focus on the between as a temporal modality is related to these 
previous efforts, it will be shown that poetic engagement with this modality possesses a 
certain distinctiveness in the later Heideggerian corpus which in turn has the greatest 
bearing for any current theological discussion of God. As Heidegger reflects on 
Hölderlin’s poem “Remembrance” he casts the work of the poet in broad temporal relief 
— the between of the past and future. At one point in the poem, the poet asks for a sip 
from a fragrant cup, “But someone pass me/Full of dark light/The fragrant cup …”29 This 
request, according to Heidegger, is no light occasion for cheer but rather a definitive 
gesture for the poet’s very vocation. 
When he calls for the cup, does he not rather call for the fragrance 
which anesthetizes one into forgetfulness and for the inebriating drink 
which makes one lose consciousness? …When the poet calls out for the 
fragrant cup, he is asking to be confirmed in the essential law of his 
poetic activity, which is to think with one accord of what has been and 
of what is coming, instead of sleeping through the time which now is.30  
 
The ability to comfortably exist and move between the two temporal realms of past and 
future could appear as a burdensome task. The poet could find herself overcome by the 
challenges of bilocation, ultimately resulting in the schizophrenic bifurcation of 
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personhood. On the other hand, she could merely resolve the seeming conflict and divert 
all attention and energy to one realm, resulting in a nostalgia for the past or a fantasy-like 
optimism for the future. There is, however, a thinking at the disposal of the poet which in 
fact is an integral part of the poetic character. It avoids these pitfalls and permits the poet 
to meaningfully think “with one accord” the what has been of the past and the what is 
coming of the future. Heidegger calls this thinking andenken – remembrance. This was 
discussed above in chapter one because of the meditative quality it brings to 
philosophical thinking. With such an enhancement, the way was cleared there to consider 
the means for philosophy to better confront Being’s desire to conceal itself through 
recollective thought. The stress now is to demonstrate how remembrance is the 
distinctive thinking of poetic activity which allows the poet to comfortably and 
effectively relate to the past and future. 
 A fuller treatment of why remembering offers such rich opportunity for the poet 
will take place later in the chapter. There the experiential depths of remembering and 
memory will be examined from an existential-phenomenological perspective. Presently, 
it is adequate to appreciate Heidegger’s establishment of remembrance as the exclusive 
provenance of poetry and secondly to acknowledge its ability to achieve a unique 
temporal feat — the creation of integrative accord between past and future. Heidegger 
conveys the first point with an uncharacteristic directness and succinctness as he 
concludes his lengthy essay on Hölderlin’s poem “Remembrance”, “Poetry is 
Remembrance.”31 His belief in remembering’s capacity to perform temporal marvels 
comes through in an earlier part of the essay. In more typical style Heidegger writes: 
one of the mysteries of re-thinking-of (An-denken) is that it thinks 
toward what-has-been, in such a way though, that what-has-been comes 
back to the one who thinks of it, coming from the opposite direction. Of 
  
 311
course this does not mean that what-has-been remains standing now 
like a kind of object present in the present moment of a mere 
representation. If remembrance of what-has-been lets this be in its own 
essence, and does not disturb it by a hasty misreckoning, trying to bring 
it into the present, then we experience what-has-been, returning in the 
remembrance, swinging out beyond our present, and coming to us as 
something futural. All at once this remembrance must think of what-
has-been, as something which is not yet unfolded.32  
 
A hint of remembering’s important capacity to ensure that the poet faithfully lives out her 
poetic vocation was evident when reference was made to Heidegger’s highlighting of 
Hölderlin’s estimation of the result of the poet’s imbibing of the fragrant cup. There it 
may have been easily overlooked, but swallowing the draught of the heady wine is not 
intended to induce the poet into a drunken stupor of forgetfulness, but instead is meant to 
be a moment of unprecedented clear-headedness and alertness when the poet’s vocation 
is confirmed as a thinking that thinks “with one accord” what has been and what is 
coming “instead of sleeping through the time which now is.” Such sensitized acuity for 
the vicissitudes of temporality is cultivated only by remembering, the very antithesis of 
forgetting. 
 Adrian Del Caro lends support to Heidegger’s interpretation of the far reaching 
implications surrounding the poet’s consumption of the fragrant cup. In his more recent 
analysis of Hölderlin’s poem “Remembrance” he offers this point: “If we take this 
fragrant cup to be filled with wine, which is dark light because the holy quality of wine 
equalizes or reconciles day and night, then the poet is on the verge of entering a new 
phase of remembrance.”33 In keeping with the overall purpose of his study of Hölderlin, 
the final outcome of the poet’s state of heightened temporal sensitivity induced by the 
dark light wine of remembrance is an encounter with Being: “the poet reaches the highest 
level of remembering as an event manifesting Being.”34  
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Earlier an important correspondence was established between Being and the holy in 
Heidegger’s general appropriation of Hölderlin’s poetry. With this in mind, it is safe to 
raise an important question: Does the remembering of the poet to bring about an 
innovative encounter with the past and future modes of temporality, which culminates in 
an encounter with Being, have the related potential to also engage the holy? If so, the 
venturesome spirit of the poet to face down the nothingness of godlessness would be seen 
as complementary to the essence of the poetic calling to foster a temporal flow where 
past and future are united by remembering. In this case the poet is without doubt the key 
figure to confront this needy time of a double lack, a double not — the No-more past of 
the gods who have fled and the Not-yet future of the god who is coming. The intricacies 
of the poet’s interaction with the holy will be fully developed in the final section of the 
chapter. Most specifically, the dynamic surrounding the remembering poet’s being 
“greeted” by the holy will be seen as offering an exciting opportunity for theological 
speculation. In this way, all the necessary steps will be presented to demonstrate 
how/why the remembering poet is the key figure able to make sense out of this needy 
time. Such a presentation will safeguard the integrity of Heidegger’s thinking and also 
allow for a cautious theological expansion. Closer at hand, it must be borne in mind that 
the extraordinary significance of poetic remembrance cannot be captured entirely in its 
ability to foster a holistic relationship between the temporal modes of past and future. As 
laudatory as this may be, it remains, more or less, an important claim that Heidegger 
directs to philosophy. However this does become the conceptual foundation upon which 
theology can cautiously build. With respect paid to the temporal achievements that 
Heidegger bestows on poetic remembrance, it becomes an easy theological extrapolation 
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to apply this meditative gift of the poet to the workings of the temporal theological 
movement par excellence identified by Heidegger as the needy time — a past of the fled 
gods/dead God and a future of the gods/God yet to arrive. 
The Dark Holy Night of Reverential Shelter for Past and Future Gods 
 The venturesome spirit of the poet now takes on a greater depth. Above, the 
poet’s daring was extolled by Heidegger for its ability to productively transform the 
anxiety/fear of godless nothingness and channel it to hopeful signs of divine presence: 
“poets who are of the more venturesome kind … bring to mortals the trace of the fugitive 
gods.”35 And while all of this daring was acknowledged to have taken place with a certain 
level of temporal consciousness — “To be a poet in a destitute [needy] time means: to 
attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods”36 — this awareness is given its greatest 
due when the needy time in which the poet speaks is set in the broader temporal relief of 
day and night: “They [the venturesome poets] bring to mortals the trace of the fugitive 
gods, the track into the dark of the world’s night.”37 Heidegger insists that this dark night 
of the world can be ironically appreciated as a luminous or “holy” night when placed 
against the backdrop of Hölderlin’s poetry. As he submits Hölderlin’s “Remembrance” to 
a rigorous exegesis, Heidegger is struck at one point by the following line as an important 
Hölderlinian corrective to the typical bias against the night as an exclusive time of 
impenetrable darkness and gloom: “In the month of March,/When night and day are 
equal.” By fastening on to the equilibrium potential of the vernal equinox when day and 
night are nearly the same length, as well as highlighting Hölderlin’s placing night before 
day, Heidegger points out Hölderlin’s efforts to challenge any diminished perceptions of 
the night: 
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Usually we use the word sequence day and night. We first call out the 
day as being “positive.” We let follow it the night, which is its 
disappearance. Night is the absence of day. But for Hölderlin the night 
which precedes the day is the sheltering profusion of the day, even 
though still indeterminate. Night is the mother of day.38 
 
The venturesome grit of the poet meets yet another test in her ability to welcome the 
night and cultivate a level of comfort for its attendant darkness. For if night is the mother 
of day — not the mere lack of day — then the only effective way to live with and 
welcome the night is to wait for its hidden potential to burst forth. This has some 
resonance with the measure-taking endeavors of the poet discussed in the previous 
chapter. There the ability of the poet to restore an authentic rooted dwelling for humanity 
was determined by a measurement that puts the human-divine relation in proper order. To 
take this measurement the poet looks to the sky as the cosmological staging area for both 
daytime’s revelatory brightness and the night’s concealing darkness as symbolic of a god 
or God who encounters humanity in both illuminating presence and obscuring absence. 
Now, however, the poet’s venturesome mettle is undergoing a strain that surpasses a 
measure-taking calibrated by neatly defined categories where rooted human dwelling is 
achieved by receiving the day light as metaphorical of God’s presence and merely 
tolerating the night as metaphorical of Her absence. The night is to be valued for its own 
sake as “the mother of day” — a creative nurturing force — instead of a privation of day 
— a defective property. 
 
 
Poetic and Nautical Night Watch 
 
 To underscore that only the most venturesome poet is up to the task to stay with 
the night and willingly embrace it for its own potential, Heidegger likens the poet to a 
sailor or mariner. He is able to do this in his interpretation of Hölderlin with little 
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difficulty since the poem “Remembrance” has been dubbed by Del Caro as “Hölderlin’s 
greatest completed hymn featuring the theme of sea travel.”39 The vocation of the poet is 
therefore readily juxtaposed with that of the sailor to suit Heidegger’s interpretive 
purpose without doing violence to Hölderlin’s original intentions. Del Caro also supports 
this claim when he writes, “When we follow the chronology of Hölderlin’s 
correspondence we learn that the theme of the sea and images of seafaring play a vital 
role in his perception of the poet.”40 In keeping with the spirit of Hölderlin, why does 
Heidegger at various points of his analysis of “Remembrance” make the explicit 
assertions that, “the poets must first be mariners,” and “These poets are mariners”?41 To 
set sail on the open seas for any length of time means to navigate during the day as well 
as the night, and it is this working with and through the night that makes the sailor worthy 
of comparison to and even emulation by the poet. Heidegger alludes to the fourth stanza 
of “Remembrance” and allows Hölderlin’s eloquence to express the sailor’s vocation to 
be at home with the night.  
To dwell alone, for years, beneath  
The leafless mast, where through the night gleam neither 
The holidays of the town, 
Nor lyre-music and native dancing. 
 
 These lines indicate the type of difficulties which besets the lifestyle of the sailor. 
He is certainly a venturesome sort in his own right and this serves as a genuine role 
model for the venturesome poet. Forced to be at sea for lengthy periods means that all the 
usual humanizing features of being at home on dry land are suspended. For Heidegger, 
this level of alienation reaches its most acute form when the sailor must forgo spending 
holidays with family and friends. He writes: 
the mariners dwell in something unhomelike far from the shady forests 
of the homeland …  
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 The mariners are without holidays. So it seems as if they are 
without relation to the festival, thrust into a festival-less time (eine 
festlose Zeit).42 
 
Del Caro lends credence to Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin on the severity of the 
sailor’s isolationistic lifestyle: “Hölderlin’s seafarers make the great sacrifice of distance, 
solitude, darkness, and barrenness.”43 But for Heidegger what sums up all the many 
challenges faced by the sailor alone at sea is his night work. Heidegger pauses after 
reflecting on Hölderlin’s depiction of the alienation of the sailor to note that the life of 
solitude, homesickness and the lack of familial holiday merriment can all be withstood 
because first and foremost the sailor is able to endure the night. That is why Heidegger 
puzzles over Hölderlin’s interjecting the word “night” as he litanies the many obstacles of 
loneliness overcome by the sailor: 
To dwell alone, for years, beneath  
The leafless mast, 
Where through the night gleam neither 
The holiday of the town 
Nor lyre-music and native dancing. (emphasis added) 
 
For Heidegger, it is no accident that the night is associated with the trying life of the 
sailor, since the duties of night watch occasion the defining attitude for the sailor’s 
calling and existence. He ponders: 
But why does Hölderlin expressly name the night? Because the 
mariners keep watch throughout their journey. Insofar as their 
wakefulness determines the whole manner in which they persist in the 
season of wandering, this season appears as the time of night.44 
 
Vigilance throughout the night characterizes the sailor’s life and explains his model 
venturesome spirit. The night time is not seen as exclusively a time of meaningless 
darkness or opaque obscurity. Instead, the sailor remains true to his calling and remains 
vigilant for the promise of the night as well as its threats. Heidegger continues: 
The period of this night does not plunge into mere blackness, which lets 
nothing appear. This night has its own clarity (einege Klarheit) … The 
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night of the mariner’s voyage … still remains the mother of the day … 
The mariner’s voyage is the nightwatch for destiny.45 
 
The affinity between the vocation of the sailor and that of the poet is now clear. The 
venturesome hearty temperament of the sailor is best expressed as he assumes the duties 
of night watch marked by an attitude of vigilance for the promise that the darkness may 
bring. The poet, too, is called in this needy time to accept a night watch as she points out 
traces of the fled gods/dead God and those yet to come in the darkness of the world’s 
night. Heidegger makes an important qualification about this world’s night that confirms 
the parallel between the poet and sailor and their respective charges to watch through the 
night with venturesome spirits. Familiar is Heidegger’s job description of the 
venturesome poet in this needy time. She points out for humanity the traces of the gods 
who have fled or the God who has been killed as well as traces of the gods/God yet to 
arrive. Tracking these evasive deities takes place in the dark of the world’s night, but for 
Heidegger this night is granted a special distinction by Hölderlin: “In Hölderlin’s 
language, the world’s night is the sacred/holy night.”46 It will be recalled how in 
Heidegger’s reflections on Hölderlin’s poetry, the holy provides the larger ontological 
framework from which the gods/God appear — from the slightest trace to an eventual full 
blown return. As the sailor dutifully maintains a vigilant watch through the night, so too 
does the poet. The night is not sheer nothingness for the sailor but rather, as has been 
noted, “has its own clarity” for the overall journey. Likewise, the night of the poet under 
the auspices of the holy (“the holy night”) during the needy time of double not — the no 
more gods of the past and the not yet gods of the future — has its own clarity and 
purposiveness that must be venturesomely confronted. Holiness suffuses the darkness of 
the world’s night and while there may only be the slightest traces of the gods/God 
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detectable throughout the poet’s watch, there is the hope that a fuller manifestation of 
divine presence is possible with the dawning of a new day. The holy is always 
preparatory for any encounter with the gods/God in Heidegger’s schema, but the night as 
holy conveys an added dimension to its preparatory function. Heidegger’s observations 
on this score are worth quoting in full: 
Night is the mother of day. Insofar as the holy comes in the breaking of 
the day, and the advent of the gods is given, the night is the time of 
god-lessness (Gott-losigkeit). This word does not mean here the mere 
lack or even the naked absence of gods. The time of god-lessness 
contains what is indecisive about what is yet to be decided. Night is the 
time of the sheltering of the gods of the past and of the concealment of 
the gods that are coming. Because the night, in such sheltering-
concealing darkness, is not nothing, it also has its own vast clarity (eine 
weite Klarheit) and the peacefulness of the silent preparation for 
something which is coming.47 
 
 While there is much that can be unpacked in Heidegger’s observations, there are a 
few key points that should definitely not be lost in his turgid prose. For one thing, this 
passage makes very clear the close resemblance between the sailor and the poet as they 
complete their respective night watch tasks. Nautical navigation requires a vigilance with 
and through the night, but the sailor does not see this chore as a necessary evil or 
drudgery. Instead the night offers its own sort of “clarity” (Klarheit). The sailor does not 
approach the night with trepidation as if its darkness were a “mere blackness, which lets 
nothing appear.” The night is venturesomely accepted and experienced for its promise as 
the “mother of the day.”  
The poet likewise is called to steer humankind through a needy time that includes a holy 
night. It is a two tiered time of god-lessness. On the one hand the gods have fled or the 
God has been killed, and on the other hand they are yet to come back. But this dark night 
time of two-layered god-lessness is not mere blackness. It, too, has its own clarity, 
whereby it affords a unique opportunity to encounter the divine and so is no “mere lack” 
  
 319
or “naked absence of gods.” The venturesome poet does not run from this darkness but 
vigilantly embraces the seeming nothingness of godlessness for its deeper potential. The 
darkness of this two-fold godless night is more of a sheltering or protective cloak as 
opposed to a blanket of obscure impenetrability. For Heidegger it is a “sheltering-
concealing darkness” (bergend-verbergenden Nachten) whereby the dead God/fled gods 
of the past are safely sheltered and the returning God/new gods are concealed, but with a 
sense of anticipatory hopefulness. In other words, encounters with the deities are possible 
but not in any conventional way. The past God who is dead/the past gods who have fled 
are there in the safety of the darkness of the holy night. Likewise, the God who will 
return in the future or the new gods of eager expectation are concealed in the darkness of 
the holy night as a gesture of respect for their initiative and choice of how and when to 
become fully manifest. To put this in other terms, this concealment of the gods’/God’s 
future appearance is meant to foster a reverential uncertainty for any eventual arrival. In 
Heidegger’s words this nighttime of anticipatory godlessness “contains what is indecisive 
about what is yet to be decided.” The venturesome spirit of the poet is therefore tempered 
by a sense of wonder and humility. While she bravely keeps watch through the holy night 
of double godlessness with a sense of hope that absent gods from the past and future will 
be encountered, she nonetheless respects the prerogative of these deities to determine the 
onset and nature of any such encounter. 
 
 
The Dark Light Wine 
 
 This unique personality profile of the poet who confronts the holy night of 
godlessness with daring and humility gains an added clarity when closer attention is paid 
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to the type of wine that fills the poet’s fragrant cup. The significance of the poet’s 
partaking of the fragrant cup was treated earlier. There the poet’s ability to effectively 
assimilate the various modes of temporality was noted in a general way. According to 
Heidegger, by the poet’s imbibing the wine of remembrance, poetic thinking is brought to 
its defining point and empowered to attentively integrate past, present and future: 
When the poet calls out for a fragrant cup, he is asking to be confirmed 
in the essential law of his poetic activity, which is to think with one 
accord of what has been and of what is coming, instead of sleeping 
through the time which now is.48 
 
Now, these broad temporal domains of past and future have a specific content and the 
ability to integrate them takes on an unprecedented exigency. The past is associated with 
gods who have fled and the God who was murdered, while the future is enlivened by the 
God or gods set to return. In any event it is a needy time of godlessness best symbolized 
as a dark holy night that reverentially shelters the no more gods/God of the past and 
conceals the not yet of the coming future gods/God. The possibility of encountering and 
accessing the illusory deities through this holy night is conceivable because it is the 
mother of the day. Thus the poet venturesomely braves the holy night with awe and hope 
as one who is comfortable with the potential of the twilight since the night has its own 
clarity. This is predicated on the basis of the wine that originally accords the poet her 
unique capabilities to meditatively encounter temporality, so that past and future are 
meaningfully brought together, instead of the poet merely inhabiting the present with a 
sleepy sense of contentment. The fragrant wine that enables the poet to exercise the very 
essence of poetic activity is of a unique color; it is “dark light.” Heidegger asserts, “The 
wine is named the dark light (das dunkel Licht).”49 The words in the third strophe of 
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Hölderlin’s “Remembrance” that inspire Heidegger’s thoughts bear repeating: “But 
someone pass me,/Full of dark light,/The fragrant cup.” 
 Savoring the dark light vintage allows the poet to be confirmed in her poetic 
calling in a most specific way. Beyond acquiring a temporal aplomb with past, present 
and future, the dark light wine of the fragrant cup also enables the poet to appreciate the 
unique clarity of the holy night. Both the poet and the sailor have been lauded for 
granting the night its own kind of clarity (eine Klarheit) worthy of exploration. However, 
now it becomes plain, for the poet at least, that it is her choice of wine that defines this 
clarity offered by the night. 
 What is most important about the clarity gained by the poet after taking in the 
dark light wine is the way in which it modifies the now well-known and important trait of 
venturesomeness. While the unique clarity that comes to the imbibing poet emboldens 
her venturesomeness to search for the missing gods/God in this needy time, it does so by 
instilling a concomitant sense of humility and unpretentiousness. Surrounded by the 
overwhelming nothingness, the venturesome poet can indeed indicate the traces or bright 
spots of the departed gods/dead God and those of the gods/God who are expected. 
However the clarity induced by the dark light wine challenges any tendency to smugness 
or over-confidence that the poet could develop after having bravely confronted the 
godless nothingness and successfully exposed the traces of the elusive deities. To 
overestimate the brightness of these blips could lead the poet to a false sense of self-
importance. The poet must not lose sight of the fact that she acts as a mediator only. And 
while her venturesome spirit allows her to offer some privileged points of contact 
between humanity and the divinities in this needy time of their overwhelming absence, it 
  
 322
is an offering never fully accomplished on her terms or at her behest but rather at the 
initiative and discretion of the gods/God. To maintain this sense of priority and 
deference, the poet sips the fragrant cup of dark light wine to bravely welcome the night 
and respect its unique clarity. Véronique Fóti affirms Heidegger’s stance on the 
importance of the dark light wine of the poet to keep things in proper perspective: “His 
[Heidegger’s] interpretive decisions here are, first, to understand the ‘dark light’ in terms 
of the poet’s mediational role with respect to the holy…”50 
 The reaction produced by the poet’s dark light wine is at once similar to and 
dissimilar from other alcohol induced reactions. On the one hand, it produces a euphoric 
awareness with regard to the distinctive clarity of the holy night that is very much in 
alignment with the inspirational high attested to by many musicians and artists. With the 
thirst for the Muse quenched the right chords are played, the right words flow forth. On 
the other hand, this perceptual keenness never degenerates into a drunken stupor, 
whereby the elevated sense of awareness oversteps its bounds and creates a false illusion 
of clarity — a confident, brave venturesomeness turned into a deluded self-assured 
arrogance. Heidegger prefers to call the desired effect of the poet’s dark light wine 
intoxication and the state it avoids inebriation. He distinguishes accordingly: “… this 
filled cup does not produce a stupor. Its work is not to make one inebriated, but it does 
nevertheless make one intoxicated (Er soll nicht betrunken, wohl aber trunken 
machen).”51  
 Intoxication by the dark light wine becomes the best condition for the poet in 
which to venturesomely meet the holy night of godlessness and point out the traces of the 
fled gods/dead God and those traces of the anticipated gods/God. However, there are 
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stages to this condition according to Heidegger that ease the poet into this encounter and 
maintain the all-important reverential respect for the nature of the clarity provided by any 
such experience. The preliminary phases of intoxication create a general state of 
consciousness necessary for any encounter with the divine — a de-centered and 
heightened sense of receptivity. Heidegger describes the initial effects of intoxication as 
provoking 
that sublime elevation of mood wherein that single voice can be heard 
that sets a tone, and where those who are attuned to it may be led most 
resolutely beyond themselves… The intoxication confuses the senses 
so little, that it rather brings sobriety for the sublime (für das Hohe) and 
lets one think of this”.52 
 
Beyond these first effects that lay the groundwork, the intoxication produces a second 
level of reactions that take on greater specificity and become more characteristic of the 
poet. In other words, many could drink the dark light wine to the point of intoxication and 
begin to feel moved to an experience with the sublime. But only the poet specifically 
requests the fragrant cup full of dark light wine as a gesture of confirmation for her very 
vocation. Any ensuing intoxication has a complementary effect and so contributes to the 
advancement of the poetic mission. At its broadest level, treated earlier, the poet is called 
to enjoy a temporal fluency whereby her poetic, meditative thinking brings together past, 
present and future. In this current needy time this wide-ranging mandate finds a more 
explicit expression in the challenge of godlessness that implicates the generalized modes 
of past and the future — the gods who have fled/the God who has been murdered in the 
past and the gods/God yet to come in the future. The parameters of the poetic vocation 
now become clearly delineated as she venturesomely confronts the dark night of 
godlessness in order to point out traces of the elusive deities. The initial effects of the 
intoxication brought on by the dark light wine greatly enhance the poet’s ability to 
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indicate any such traces as it elevates the mood and lets her “think of” the sublime 
(Hohe). The lingering effects of the intoxication, however, are more far reaching and give 
ultimate shape to the poetic calling. Beginning to come under the influence of the dark 
light wine, the poet’s venturesome spirit is quickened so as to withstand the dark night of 
overwhelming godlessness with a confident resolve that even the slightest and most 
fleeting traces of the gods/God of the past and the gods/God of the future can be shown. 
But as the poet continues to hoist the fragrant cup and the level of intoxication increases, 
the ultimate effect of the dark light wine is realized. Her mood is not merely prepared for 
a greater receptivity to glimpses of the sublime — the elusive deities (past and future) 
tracking about in a dark holy night — but instead the intoxication cultivates an 
understanding for the kind of clarity operative in those bright traces left by the gods/God 
at night. This unique clarity neutralizes any temptations the poet might have to rest 
content in the accomplishments of her venturesome spirit. Undoubtedly this spirit — 
enhanced by the intoxicating effects of the dark light wine — enabled the poet to 
withstand the seeming black night of godlessness in order to eek out some brightness 
evidenced by divine traces. But it is the very nature of the brightness that keeps the role 
of the poet in proper perspective and thus establishes her as the best mediator between the 
divine and human in this needy time. 
 Heidegger’s reflections on Hölderlin’s familiar words in the third stanza of 
“Remembrance” give way to an important description of the inner-workings between the 
brightness and clarity that come to the poet intoxicated by the dark light wine. When 
Hölderlin recounts the poet’s request, “But someone pass me,/Full of dark light,/The 
fragrant cup,” Heidegger proposes: 
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The wine is named the dark light. Thus at the same time the poet asks 
for the light of brightness which contributes to clarity… The dark light 
does not deny clarity; rather it is the excess of brightness which, the 
greater it is, denies sight all the more decisively… Sheer brightness is a 
greater danger to the poet’s presentation, because the brightness leads 
to the illusion that in its appearance alone there can be sight. The poet 
asks for the gift of the dark light in which the brightness is tempered 
and softened.53 
 
From this comes a better appreciation of the clarity of the bright traces of divine presence 
indicated by the intoxicated poet against a vast backdrop of dark godlessness. The dark 
light wine reveals in its very name the ability it has to keep in proper tension the seeming 
oppositional forces of dark and light. Somehow as the poet quaffs this wine she is able to 
realize the value of the unique clarity that regulates the brightness level of the 
gods’/God’s traces. The clarity of the poet’s bright traces does not seek the full 
manifestation of divine presence by a complete intoxication of the overarching darkness 
of divine absence. This, for Heidegger, would be an illusion of clarity and a sign that the 
desired state of intoxication had slid into a more delusional state of inebriation. The 
brightness of these traces and the poet’s charge to point them out are both held in proper 
check by the intoxicating effects of the dark light wine. The clarity produced by the wine 
aims to soften and temper the brightness of the divine traces and also helps the poet to 
maintain an attitude of humble reverence with regard to her interaction with these traces. 
On this latter score, Heidegger calls the clarity induced by the dark light wine a “Sobriety 
without pretentiousness.”54 Pretense or any similar attitudinal disposition could lead the 
poet to misconstrue the prospects of the divine traces whose brightness is tempered and 
softened. While an initial reaction to any suggestion to dull the brightness of godly traces 
might seem counterproductive or damaging to a more direct encounter with the 
gods/God, it is Heidegger’s judgment that the full effects of the intoxicating clarity will 
be felt so that a respect for the genuine promise and potential of the darkness can be 
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realized: “This intoxication lifts one into the illuminating clarity in which the depths of 
the concealed are opened up and darkness appears as the sister of clarity.”55 
 What stands out as Heidegger continues to be inspired by Hölderlin’s rich 
imagery concerning the poet is an undeniably clear challenge to the typical remedies 
offered in reaction to the disturbing awareness of divine elusiveness and even worse 
divine absence. One usual solution would be sought by following the dictates of 
“calculative” thinking discussed in chapter one. There it was shown how Heidegger 
believes that calculative thinking represents the dominant thinking of the West, since it is 
most compatible with the outlook and aims of scientism and technology. As this thinking 
over the centuries has focused on the thought of beings which can be seen, quantified, 
manipulated and controlled, the thought of Being itself remained impoverished with its 
most special feature of self-concealment completely ignored and unappreciated. 
Nonetheless, “Being loves to hide itself,” a point Heraclitus made long ago, but for 
Heidegger was a truism never heeded and embraced because it was more comfortable for 
Western calculative thinking to concentrate on the manifesting dynamic of Being most 
palpable in beings. 
 This general challenge with regard to Being and the 2,500 year history of 
defective thinking given its greatest impetus by metaphysics now has a specific 
theological application. This can be achieved without inflicting any damage on the 
integrity of Heidegger’s philosophy, since there is no attempt to merely substitute the 
gods/the God of current interest with the Being of Heidegger’s overarching concern. 
Instead, this careful application fully respects Heidegger’s well-known chain of sequence 
outlining the path to God vis-à-vis Being: 
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Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. 
Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of the divinity to be 
thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or 
said what the word “God” is to signify.56 
 
If an important though much neglected truth concerning the meaning of Being is that it 
prefers to conceal and hide itself, then it is safe to make the well accepted theological 
assertion under Heideggerian auspices that the gods and God opt for a self-concealing at 
certain times. Representative of this well-established theological tenet is Blaise Pascal 
and his familiar dictum, “A religion which does not affirm that God is hidden is not true. 
Vere tu es Deus absconditus!”57 
 Though Heidegger would never give an outright endorsement to this and many 
other credible theological sources which lend credence to God’s penchant for hiding, he 
nonetheless does something very close through the inspired words of Hölderlin 
concerning the kind of clarity emitted by the bright traces of the fled gods/dead God and 
the gods/God of anticipation. The venturesome poet intoxicated by the dark light wine 
points out these traces against an overwhelming dark night background of godless 
nothingness. She does so with a sense of appreciation for the clarity produced by the 
brightness of these traces. In other words, the immensity of the dark night and the 
intensity of the blackness are not forces to be dispelled so that the bright traces of the 
deities can eventually realize their refulgent glory. Instead, as suggested by Heidegger, 
“The poet asks for the gift of the dark light in which the brightness is tempered and 
softened.” And while this may at first glance seem to be a capitulation to the black night 
of godlessness and a testament to the anemic brightness of the residual traces left by the 
gods/God, it is actually neither a concession nor a resigned acceptance of weakness. 
Instead of attempting to obliterate the black darkness of the godless night, the intoxicated 
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poet sees the darkness as an opportunity for her bright traces to realize their clarity in a 
respectful way. Heidegger writes: 
this softening does not weaken the light of brightness. For the darkness 
permits the appearance of that which conceals, and thus in its appearing 
preserves what is concealed within. The darkness preserves in the light 
the fullness of what it has to bestow in its shining appearance.58 
 
 Ironically, then, the real foe of poetic clarity during this time of godlessness and 
the force which would hinder the poet’s ability to indicate some genuine trace of godly 
presence is not the daunting black darkness of night, but rather its very elimination and 
replacement by a daylight of all pervasive radiance. As counter intuitive as this may be, 
Heidegger presses on with the following challenge: 
The poet of course sees an illumination which comes to appearance 
through its darkness. The dark light does not deny clarity; rather, it is 
the excess of brightness which, the greater it is, denies sight all the 
more decisively. The all-too-flaming fire does not just blind the eyes; 
rather, its excessive brightness also engulfs everything that shows itself 
and is darker than darkness itself. Sheer brightness is a greater danger 
to the poet’s presentation, because the brightness leads to the illusion 
that in its appearance alone there can be sight. The poet asks for the gift 
of the dark light…59 
 
Therefore, the poet under the influence of the dark light wine works with the darkness of 
the godless night as she points out the bright traces of divine presence. It is an ongoing 
collaboration, since her aim in pointing out these bright traces is not to have them evolve 
into an illuminating force that completely dispels all darkness, whereby constant 
immediate access to the divine is established. Instead, the poet is a mediator between the 
gods/God and humanity and stands in awe of the divine prerogative for self-concealment 
in the darkness. It is not a matter of promoting the virtue of the traces and reveling in 
their brightness as the definitive experience of the gods/God. It is more a matter of 
humbly pointing these traces out while realizing all the while that it is the source of their 
emanation — the dark night of godlessness — that ultimately determines the nature and 
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scope of any human-divine encounter. There is a need to preserve the darkness and 
accept its agenda to emit any bright traces of the gods/God that the poet is able to point 
out — “For the darkness permits the appearance of that which conceals…” 
 The poet protects the darkness and values it as the true yet mysterious source for 
encounters with the divine because in a like way the night and its darkness are protective 
of the gods/God. This was discussed in passing earlier when attempting to discern the 
true nature of the godlessness associated with the needy time of the gods’/God’s double 
absence — the past gods/God who have fled and the future gods/God who are yet to draw 
near. There the sheltering or protective nature of the dark of night was overlooked. Now 
however, this acquires a deeper meaning when seen in tandem with the extent to which 
the poet strives to protect the night for its godly potential. Heidegger’s words can be 
recalled: 
Night is the time of the sheltering (die Bergung) of the gods of the past 
and of the concealment (die Verbergung) of the gods that are coming. 
Because the night, in such sheltering-concealing (bergend-
Verbergenden) darkness, is not nothing, it also has its own vast clarity 
and the peacefulness of the silent preparation for something which is 
coming.60 
 
 With a blood level alcohol content spiked by dark light wine the poet protects, 
values, esteems the night because it in turn protects and shelters its hidden potential for 
divine revelation. However it is Heidegger’s belief that even with intoxication maintained 
at its desired and proper level, the poet’s venturesome spirit for the dark may soon be put 
to the test. Despite the divine instances of brightness that shine forth in and from the 
darkness, thus giving continual evidence of the night’s unique clarity in darkness, a 
certain stamina will be required to stay with the night, to protect the night, that may not 
be possible for even the most well disposed poet under the influence of the dark light 
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wine. According to Heidegger’s frank observations, “No doubt the length of this night 
can at times exceed human powers to the point that one wishes to sink away into sleep.”61 
 
Nietzsche’s Mad Search for the Dead God 
 
 It is as if a different or even more severe altered state of consciousness is needed 
if the poet is not going to be overcome by the challenges associated with her duty to point 
out the bright traces of the gods/God, doing so all the while with constant realization that 
it is from and through a surrounding dark night of godlessness that all her activity takes 
place. Can continuing to work from this perspective and under these conditions lead to a 
breaking point of frustration, not readily relieved by recourse to the fragrant cup of dark 
light wine? Or does the stress of having to continually point out traces of elusive deities 
drive the poet to overindulge in the dark light wine to a point where a proper intoxication 
becomes an inebriation of stupefaction? Whatever the case, enduring this night of 
godlessness can take its toll on the emotional well-being of even the most venturesome 
poet. If the pressure does not break the spirit of the poet so that she opts to sleep through 
the dark night instead of keeping a nurturative vigilance for any bright godlike glimpses, 
there is another outlet. Driven to the brink of insanity the poet’s vigilance through the 
night is transformed into a frenzied insomniac search for the elusive gods/God in the 
bright light of daybreak. This is certainly the impact that living in a godless night had 
upon another figure who greatly piqued Heidegger’s later interest — the madman of 
Nietzsche’s The Gay Science who announced God’s death: “Have you not heard of that 
madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran into the market place, and 
cried incessantly: ‘I seek God! I seek God!’”62 
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 Heidegger’s acceptance of the state of madness and the very figure of the 
madman was well established in the previous chapter. At different points there it was 
shown that those tormented by some kind of mental affliction are not to be shunned or 
relegated to the margins in accordance with standard reactions. Instead, it was 
Heidegger’s stance that madness was a complementary condition well suited to fully 
execute several aspects of poetic activity. Whether prompting the wandering stranger to 
enter into the between of the ontological difference (Trakl) or facilitating the poet’s 
measure-taking to achieve a rooted dwelling (Hölderlin), it was Heidegger’s conviction 
that some accompanying madness as personified by the madman (der Wahnsinnige) 
would clinch a successful outcome. It is his otherness and the ability to observe and 
critique from an alternative perspective that grants him the advantage of maintaining an 
atypical clarity and calmness in certain situations: “From that other direction, his 
madness (sein Wahnsinn) may be called ‘gentle,’ for his mind pursues a greater 
stillness.”63 
 With no intention to disesteem the poetic activities of entering into the between 
and measure-taking greatly advanced under the madman’s guidance discussed in chapter 
three, there is a notable shift in urgency surrounding the activities of Nietzsche’s 
madman. In other words, searching for God and announcing God’s death are very 
weighty endeavors and call for a different degree of madness. This important nuance is 
detected by examining the original German texts and through comparison discovering 
Heidegger’s varying word choice to speak of the intensities of madness attending poetic 
activity on the one hand and God seeking on the other. The English translations gloss 
over this distinction by using the same word “mad” to qualify the entering into the 
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between, taking measure and searching for God. The work of Silke-Maria Weineck is 
instructive here. After closely studying the German of Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, 
which is the basis for Heidegger’s reflections, Weineck makes it clear that the madness 
indicated there is not Wahnsinn but Irrsinn: “It is here that Nietzsche finally gives a 
definition of madness, not as Wahnsinn, however, but as Irrsinn: ‘the eruption of 
arbitrariness in feeling, seeing, and hearing, the enjoyment of the mind’s lack of 
discipline, the joy in human unreason.’”64  
 Heidegger’s earlier use of Wahnsinn has thus been eclipsed by Irrsinn. The need 
for a bit of non-threatening otherness that will enable the poet to take a slightly different 
route so that she can accomplish various poetic chores becomes a radical otherness that 
steers one completely off the map. Again the insights of Weineck regarding Irrsinn and 
its cognates are valuable: 
Irrsinn, in contrast, suggests not only error, as in Irrtum, but a 
wondering mind, one that strays from the path: irren, to drift, to stray, 
sich verirren, to get lost… Irrsinn implies a dynamic and unlimited 
deviation, like travel in an unmarked desert, a failure to walk the 
established paths of reason as well as to create new paths, a failure to 
arrive.65 
 
Searching for God after she has been pronounced dead calls for drastic measures and a 
frame of mind equally suited to the challenge. This reaches its ultimate expression in the 
marked change in vocabulary. Heidegger’s choice of Wahnsinn to describe the madness 
of the madman (Wahnsinnige) set about to pursue poetic duties with a quiet, gentle 
manner of otherness is transformed into Irrsinn, where the madman becomes der tolle 
Mensch whose search for God calls for extremes. Weineck goes on to explain this dual 
shift in terminology which more adequately depicts the new level of madness and its 
personality manifestations: “The madman who mourns the death of God is der tolle 
Mensch where toll connotes not only madness but a frantic, furious, and destructive 
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quality: a dog with rabies is toll (English uses ‘mad dog’ in much the same way, but the 
implication is much stronger in the more specific German term toll).”66 
 Coming to appreciate these fine points of Nietzschean phraseology has great 
bearing for any attempt to understand the aim of Heidegger’s reflections on Nietzsche’s 
death of God theme. Most specifically, it is invaluable to be cognizant of the frantic and 
furious character of the madman’s reaction to God’s death. Because for Heidegger it is 
only by paying attention to the tone which expresses the madman’s affect that one can 
arrive at the crux of Nietzsche’s assertion that God is dead. In other terms, an informed 
sense of what Nietzsche’s madman means when he declares God’s death is derived from 
an attentiveness to how he speaks about this matter. As only a mad man (tolle Mensch) 
can, he speaks with a tenor of frenzy and fury which should not go unnoticed or 
dismissed according to Heidegger: 
In order to pay heed to it and to learn to pay heed, it can be enough for 
us simply to ponder for once what the madman says about the death of 
God and how he says it. Perhaps we will no longer pass by so quickly 
without hearing what is said at the beginning of the passage that has 
been elucidated: that the madman “cried incessantly: I seek God! I seek 
God! (Ich suche Gott! Ich suche Gott!).”67 
 
 Heidegger’s urgings to pay attention to the tonal quality of the subtext 
surrounding the announcement of God’s death is especially important for the current 
project eager to find theological moorings. Most specifically, the realization that the 
death of God is fully comprehensible only in relation to a fast and frenzied search for 
God bodes well for any theological enterprise. This in turn is an enactment of the advice 
offered at the outset of this chapter to not dismiss Nietzsche outright, but rather to attempt 
to see what he saw. As odious as Nietzsche’s death of God doctrine may be to theological 
ears, it is softened quite extensively when placed in the full textual context depicting a 
madman quite vexed by his own declarations and desperately looking for God. 
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 But this is how Heidegger saw Nietzsche himself and evaluated his otherwise 
theologically alienating assertions. Heidegger perceived Nietzsche as someone who was 
looking for God and the madman in The Gay Science becomes merely an alter ego 
expressive of this search and yearning. Weineck supports Heidegger’s conviction that the 
God seeking madman is an extension of the true Nietzsche who rarely finds a 
sympathetic welcome in most theological quarters. She writes, “Nietzsche’s madman is a 
narrative persona, a fictional voice in which Nietzsche, the master of many voices, 
writes.”68 Indeed there are many voices of Nietzsche, and some without question instantly 
foreclose any rapprochement with theology. It is hard enough for theology to embrace 
Nietzsche’s writings when they so vehemently attack the most vaunted Christian virtues, 
i.e. love, humility, temperance, self-renunciation. But it is Nietzsche’s specific 
excoriations aimed at theologians, priests and any official representatives of Christianity 
that do the most to inhibit theological receptivity. Luijpen has made the following helpful 
observation, though his equating of priests and theologians is a bit archaic: “Nietzsche’s 
torrent of abuse is inexhaustible when he pours out his hatred toward priests, for they are 
the bearers of Christianity — ‘He who seeks a criterion for truth has merely to go to the 
theologians and turn their value judgments upside down.’”69 
 Here is where Heidegger offers great potential for theology. As a philosopher he 
is not initially stunned by Nietzsche’s rantings and put off by his ad hominems hurled at 
professional theologians. He instead lets Nietzsche’s other voices be heard and as a more 
objective mediator can present those that are of theological merit with better effectiveness 
than Nietzsche himself. In several instances of his later works, Heidegger makes it clear 
that Nietzsche should be seen as someone who is seriously looking for God. In an address 
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delivered on the occasion of his assumption of the rector’s office at the University of 
Freiburg im Breisgau in 1933, Heidegger said: 
And if, indeed, our ownmost being (Dasein) itself stands before a great 
transformation, if what that passionate seeker of God and the last 
German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, said is true: “God is dead” 
— and if we have to face up to the forsakenness of modern man in the 
midst of what is, what then is the situation of science?70 
 
In a similar vein, Nietzsche’s authenticity as an indefatigable searcher is underscored in a 
lecture on Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence: 
We dare not confuse Nietzsche with such “god-less” ones, who cannot 
really even be “god-less” because they have never struggled to find a 
god, and never can. Yet if Nietzsche is no atheist in the usual sense, we 
dare not falsify him as a “sentimental,” “romantic,” halfway-Christian 
“God seeker.”71 
 
 What Heidegger is able to do that is of theological worth is to leave the door open 
for the study of Nietzsche. As long as Heidegger couples any discussion of the death of 
God with a discussion of a search for God, then how can theology justly preclude any 
possible dialogue with Nietzsche? As was stated in the opening pages of this chapter, a 
thinker of Nietzsche’s magnitude did see something and if theology can benefit from the 
entrée provided by Heidegger to at least one vista, then theology is seeing what Nietzsche 
saw with potential enrichment as the final result. This author believes that many 
theologians will be open to dialogue with Nietzsche and will try to see what he saw as 
long as he is not seen as advocating a brazen atheism when the issue of God’s death 
arises in his writings. Again, there is no attempt to white wash Nietzsche and deny his 
many vitriolic charges against religion, specifically Christianity, but if he is not 
promoting an out-and-out atheism when discussing the death of God, then he still 
deserves a fair hearing in the court of theology. And Heidegger’s going to great length to 
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highlight the figure of Nietzsche’s madman who simultaneously declares God’s murder 
and seeks God’s presence ensures such a hearing. 
 It becomes possible to discuss God’s death in a non-threatening way for theology 
once atheism is not seen as the only eventual result. So when Heidegger broaches the 
delicate topic of the death of God in Nietzsche he is not put off by the initial shock effect 
that seems to provoke atheistic sentiment. Instead, as just discussed he places any 
consideration about God’s demise on the lips of Nietzsche’s madman in the context of a 
concurrent search for God. Moreover, Heidegger puts the madman’s declaration and 
yearning into an even wider relief in order to diffuse the fate suffered by many of 
Nietzsche’s more outlandish claims. Prior to launching into a close reading of the scene 
of the madman in the marketplace from The Gay Science, Heidegger situates Nietzsche’s 
treatment of God’s death within the entire span of Western philosophy or metaphysics: 
What is important to us now is the reflection pertaining to Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics. Nietzsche’s thinking sees itself under the heading 
“nihilism.” That is the name for a historical movement, recognized by 
Nietzsche, already ruling throughout the preceding centuries, and now 
determining this century. Nietzsche sums up his interpretation of it in 
the brief statement: “God is dead.” … The following reflections attempt 
to elucidate Nietzsche’s pronouncement in a few essential respects. 
Once again let it be emphasized: The word of Nietzsche speaks of the 
destiny of two millennia of Western history.72  
 
 Even with this suggestion to view Nietzsche’s concern for God’s death against the 
vast backdrop of Western philosophy, the details of which will be discussed below, 
Heidegger is well aware that there will still be a rush to label this as an attempt to 
promote an atheistic agenda. Heidegger explains, 
One could suppose that the pronouncement “God is dead” expresses an 
opinion of Nietzsche the atheist and is accordingly only a personal 
attitude, and therefore one-sided… But the question remains whether 
the aforesaid word of Nietzsche is merely an extravagant view of a 
thinker about whom the correct assertion is readily at hand: he finally 
went mad. 73 
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It is the extravagance of Nietzsche’s statement that God is dead, especially from a 
theological perspective, that has just the right shock value to consign anything he says 
before and after to the realm of atheistic rhetoric. But Heidegger goads all readers of 
Nietzsche, including those with theological interests, to apply hermeneutical discretion to 
this otherwise disconcerting statement that God is dead: 
Before taking any position too hastily, we must first try to think this 
pronouncement, “God is dead,” in the way in which it is intended. To 
that end, therefore, we would do well to put aside all premature 
opinions that immediately obtrude for us at this dreadful word.74 
 
Heidegger is therefore addressing one of the perennial pitfalls that stymies much of 
Nietzschean interpretation with regard to his more extravagant remarks. To heed 
Heidegger’s admonitions to think what Nietzsche really intended when he espoused 
God’s death and to put aside any prejudicial opinions proves to be difficult because of the 
statement’s very extravagance. A hermeneutical template is called for that goes beyond 
the mere interpretive goal to find the meaning of what Nietzsche said and instead to 
discern his true conviction for his own assertions. When Nietzsche pronounces the death 
of God it must be asked to what degree he really means this, instead of, what does he 
mean. This hermeneutical insight is advanced by the Nietzsche scholar Robert C. 
Solomon, who insists that Nietzsche’s style requires the reader to walk an extra 
interpretive mile in order to arrive at any meaningful destination. He writes: 
Nietzsche was a brilliant and ferocious stylist, who rarely backed away 
from even the most outrageous overstatements and accusations. He 
consequently invited all sorts of wild interpretations that went far 
beyond what he could have conceived or proposed. It is evident that 
Nietzsche intended to shock and provoke us and jar us into critical self-
examination. What is not so clear is how we should take the many 
outrageous things he seems to say… Thus the primary problem in 
reading Nietzsche is not trying to understand what he means… His 
sentences are admirably clear and concrete, and colorful besides. The 
primary problem in reading Nietzsche is trying to figure out to what 
extent he really means what he seems to be saying.75 
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 The way in which Nietzsche presents the death of God in The Gay Science 
passage certainly fits into the category of the outrageous, especially when the vignette 
about the madman’s visit to the marketplace unfolds and it is learned that God has been 
murdered. Adding to the drama are the taunts of the surly crowd in the marketplace that 
irreverently make light of the madman’s search for God and the eventual announcement 
of God’s death. True to his own hermeneutical provisos, Heidegger aims to find 
Nietzsche’s true intentions and to suspend any preconceptions in order not to be thrown 
off by all this outrageousness. For his part, Heidegger never saw in these passages 
featuring God’s death a platform to promote atheism. In other places Heidegger clearly 
expresses what he perceives to be Nietzsche’s true convictions when he writes about the 
death of God: “‘God is dead’… The proposition has nothing to do with the assertion of an 
ordinary atheism.”76 The recent scholarship of Tracy Colony provides another interesting 
reference overlooked for decades that supports Heidegger’s efforts to gauge Nietzsche’s 
true intentions. In reculling through the original manuscripts of Heidegger’s voluminous 
Nietzsche lectures, Colony discovered that three pages were omitted in the final 
published English translation of a lecture titled “Platonism and Nihilism.” A portion of 
this omission directly addresses the issue at hand: 
The common interpretation of Nietzsche’s expression “God is dead” is 
that Nietzsche states unequivocally: the only possible standpoint today 
is atheism. But exactly the opposite, and more is Nietzsche’s actual 
position.77 
 
 If something completely different from atheism lurks behind Nietzsche’s real 
intentions when proposing the death of God, then from a Heideggerian point of view 
there is an outreach to theology that is made possible, surprising as it may seem. Two 
contemporary scholars from diverse perspectives and with different purposes in mind 
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lend support to Heidegger’s position. Merold Westphal’s fresh study of atheism and 
religion bolsters Heidegger’s suggestion and does so from an explicitly theological 
viewpoint. According to Westphal, it is the Nietzschean doctrine of “resentment” that 
poses the greatest threat to any deténte with theology. It is beyond the scope of this work 
to fully develop Nietzsche’s theory of resentment, but it is instructive at this point to 
realize that the sources which actually support his atheistic tendencies do so in more 
subtle and indirect ways. In Westphal’s assessment, 
Nietzsche calls the First Part of The Genealogy of Morals, in which he 
gives his most extensive account of this distinction [master morality 
versus slave morality] and especially of the emergence of slave 
morality, his account of “the birth of Christianity out of the spirit of 
ressentiment!” In other words, it is here, rather than in Nietzsche’s 
periodic announcements of the death of God that his critique of religion 
is to be found.78 
 
The postmodern philosopher Gianni Vattimo is much more direct in his affirmation of 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche and the resulting positive theological fall out: 
“Nietzsche’s announcement that ‘God is dead’ is not an atheistic thesis like ‘God does 
not exist’”79 Writing autobiographically, Vattimo explains how he was able to 
appropriate Christianity anew, not with the well established credo “I believe in God,” but 
with the alternative “I believe that I believe in God.” He maintains that he was able to 
arrive at a restored relationship to Christianity because of Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
 A logical question thus arises. If Nietzsche’s fixation with God’s death is not an 
atheistic diatribe which would perforce exclude the possibility of any conversation with 
theology, then more positively what is it? In attempting an answer, what must be kept in 
mind initially is the broad philosophical relief into which Heidegger inserts Nietzsche’s 
announcement that God is dead. It was shown above, as one effort to build a bridge to 
theology, how Heidegger sees God’s death in Nietzsche’s program as one philosophical 
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tenet caught up in the grand scheme of Western philosophy’s 2,500 year history. From 
this standpoint Heidegger explains the meaning of Nietzsche’s death of God: 
The pronouncement “God is dead” means: The suprasensory world is 
without effective power. It bestows no life. Metaphysics, i.e., for 
Nietzsche Western philosophy understood as Platonism, is at an end. 
Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the counter-movement to 
metaphysics, and that means in opposition to Platonism.80 
 
As was seen in chapter one, the end of metaphysics was also a major concern for 
Heidegger. But it was not Nietzsche who succeeded in bringing about the renewal of 
Western philosophy, as he was according to Heidegger the last great metaphysician. 
Philosophy could meet with much more success at overcoming itself by adopting 
Heidegger’s recommendations, some of which were outlined in chapter one as points of 
Heidegger’s unique contribution to philosophy. Even if Nietzsche did not succeed in 
bringing an end to metaphysics, connecting its possibility to the death of God had a very 
far reaching effect upon Western humanity. Heidegger continues:  
If God as the suprasensory ground and goal of all reality is dead, if the 
suprasensory world of the Ideas has suffered the loss of its obligatory 
and above all its vitalizing and upbuilding power, then nothing more 
remains to which man can cling and by which he can orient himself.81 
 
With eloquence and objectivity, Vattimo is able to demystify Heidegger’s interpretation 
of Nietzsche and also to judge Heidegger’s corresponding contribution to the matter at 
hand. 
In sum, for Nietzsche “God is dead” means nothing else than the fact 
that there is no ultimate foundation. An analogous meaning… is found 
in Heidegger’s polemics against metaphysics — the whole European 
philosophical tradition from Parmenides on — which believes itself 
capable of grasping the ultimate foundation of reality in the form of an 
objective structure like an essence or a mathematical truth, which is 
given outside of time.82 
 
 In the effort to see the very broad context into which Heidegger fits Nietzsche’s 
atheism, it is important not to lose sight of the human implications that Heidegger also 
indicates. In other words, two attempts have been made thus far to fend off any quick 
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dismissal of Nietzsche’s “God is dead” proclamation as a sanction for irreligious atheism. 
First, Heidegger highlighted the fact that Nietzsche’s madman puzzles over God’s death 
while simultaneously conducting a search for God. More will be said on this below. 
Second, as was just presented, Heidegger renders Nietzsche’s “God is dead” declaration 
promising by assigning it to the watershed moment of antifoundationalism in Western 
thought. And it is this attempt that is most prone to losing touch with the human 
dimensions involved in Nietzsche’s assertions that Heidegger wants to forestall. 
 The challenge arising here is primarily the result of an attempt to make 
theological applications. On the one hand, there is the need to properly situate 
Nietzsche’s wont to talk about God’s death in order to properly detoxify it. But by 
showing its conceptual merit at a particular phase in philosophy’s history and so numbing 
its initial anti-theological sting, there is a danger of making it all too abstract. Consigning 
Nietzsche’s death of God preoccupation exclusively to the realm of philosophical 
concerns takes away the atheistic virulence but at the expense of neutralizing the human 
implications that could be of great interest to theology. However, Heidegger permits such 
theological investigations to ensue by the balanced way in which he defines Nietzsche’s 
statements concerning God’s death. This was indicated above in both instances where he 
interpreted Nietzsche’s phrase “God is dead” as symptomatic of the suprasensory world’s 
decline. No longer is there a rigorous unbending order of Objective Truth able to hold the 
center firm. But this metaphysical inability has very down-to-earth human consequences 
as Heidegger explained “The suprasensory world is without effective power. It bestows 
no life… if the suprasensory world of the Ideas has suffered the loss of its obligatory and 
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above all its vitalizing [inspiring] and upbuilding [constructive] power, then nothing more 
remains to which man can cling and by which he can orient himself.”83 
 The richness of these passages to convey the existential significance of God’s 
death could have been easily overlooked when cited above. There the primary effort was 
to connect Nietzsche’s interest in God’s demise with antifoundationalism. With a second 
look, however, Heidegger’s imagery allows for a more extensive interpretation. As 
detached and lofty as the phrase “God is dead” becomes when seen in light of the 
suprasensory world’s failure to provide a foundation for all of reality, it is Heidegger’s 
aim to immediately associate it with challenges confronting lived human experience: If 
the suprasensory world no longer has effective power, then “it does not bestow life.” 
Likewise, if the suprasensory world is bereft of its binding power, then it no longer 
possesses its “inspiring/vitalizing” and constructive force which humans can turn to for 
meaning and direction in life: “nothing more remains to which man can cling and by 
which he can orient himself.” 
 But Heidegger goes even a step further. Not only must Nietzsche’s concern for 
God’s death be seen in light of the antifoundationalism resulting from the collapse of the 
suprasensory world of absolute truths, which has a direct bearing on the human search for 
meaning. It is the mode of this very search as theologically conditioned that must also not 
go unnoticed. Heidegger, therefore, specifies the depth of disorientation that the human 
person struggles with when living in a world devoid of the foundations provided by the 
suprasensory world. The deep sense of arid meandering could be remedied by a 
faithfilled stance before a God who is more than an abstract restored suprasensory world 
which lays new foundations. Heidegger expressly names the theological virtues of faith 
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and love as able to alleviate the human distress of living in the postmodern world. As a 
minority stance, however, it will experience meager results at best. He writes: 
That which formerly conditioned and determined the essence of man in 
the manner of purpose and norm has lost its unconditional and 
immediate, above all its ubiquitously and infallibly operative power of 
effective action. That suprasensory world of purposes and norms no 
longer quickens [inspires] and supports life. That world has become 
lifeless, dead. There will be Christian faith here and there. But the love 
holding sway in that world is not the effectively working and operative 
principle of what is happening now.84 
 
 Heidegger, therefore, becomes a surprising yet welcome bridge between theology 
and philosophy with regard to Nietzsche’s considerations of God’s death. Theology is 
extended an initial invitation when the philosophical interpretation of antifoundationalism 
is advanced against ordinary claims of atheism. Then a more sustained theological 
exploration ensues once it is realized that the abstract philosophical understanding has a 
profound impact on human existence with theological reverberations. This important 
connection for theology advanced by the Nietzschean interpretation of the philosopher 
Heidegger finds an echo of support in the Nietzschean interpretation of the theologian 
Alistair Kee: “For Nietzsche, to lose religious beliefs is to lose the foundations of life 
itself: truth, moral values and aesthetic judgment.”85 
 With a better grasp of the interpretive flow that results from Heidegger’s 
appropriation of Nietzsche’s phrase “God is dead,” it becomes possible to detect a great 
irony that gives substance to the early claim concerning Nietzsche’s madman who 
simultaneously announces God’s death and seeks after Her presence nonetheless. The 
irony is apparent from the final outcome of Heidegger’s interpretive journey. A statement 
that would otherwise stop all theological discussion by its very utterance — “God is 
dead!” — comes around full circle to be a statement which stimulates unending 
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theological debate. Heidegger reacts to Nietzsche’s more philosophical appraisal of 
God’s death by showing the deeper human consequences of torpor and lack of purpose. 
 Though with a very different purpose in mind, Heidegger’s interpretive course 
can be seen here as following the logical pattern found in Jean-Paul Sartre’s well-known 
reflections on God’s death. After pondering the novelist Fydor Dostevsky’s statement “If 
God didn’t exist, everything would be possible,” Sartre concludes in a way similar to 
Heidegger’s assessment of the final outcome of the disempowerment of the suprasensory 
world. Sartre explains his reaction:  
The existentialist… thinks it very distressing that God does not exist, 
because all possibility of finding values in a heaven of ideas disappears 
along with Him; there can be no longer an a priori [prior to human 
experience] Good, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness 
to think it. Nowhere is it written that the Good exists, that we must be 
honest, that we must not lie; because the fact is we are on a plane where 
there are only men.  Dostoevsky said, “If God didn’t exist, everything 
would be possible.” That is the very starting point of existentialism. 
Indeed, everything is permissible if God does not exist, and as a result 
man is forlorn, because neither within him nor without does he find 
anything to cling to.86 
 
The similarities here with Heidegger are unmistakable. Both thinkers identify the final 
consequences of God’s death in very human terms. On the one hand, it has been shown 
how Heidegger reacts to Nietzsche’s consideration of God’s death by placing it in the 
context of philosophy as a statement signaling the end of the suprasensory world. While 
an amiable enough partial solution to stave off any blatant charges of atheism, Heidegger 
does not wish to stop here. Instead, he immediately proceeds to underscore the existential 
fall out: “nothing more remains to which man can cling and by which he can orient 
himself.” He then goes even farther to indicate that any corrective to this human plight 
will be found not in philosophy’s debate over the reestablishment of foundations but in 
theology’s convictions that meaningful encounters between humanity and God are real 
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possibilities. On the other hand, Sartre maps out a more direct route from God’s death to 
existential challenge. If God no longer exists human beings are forlorn, because, 
reminiscent of Heidegger’s imagery, there is nothing for them “to cling to”. 
 But aside from the similarity of both thinkers to show the alienating effect that 
God’s death has upon human existence, there is sharp divergence as to where this 
alienation leads and how or whether it should be resolved. Completely lacking in Sartre is 
any recourse back to God in contrast with Heidegger’s suggestion that Christian faith and 
its promulgation of love could be curative to the malaise resulting from the dismantling 
of the suprasensory world’s influence. Sartre opts to heighten the alienation by placing 
the entire burden of God’s departure on the shoulders of humanity: “we are on a plane 
where there are only men.” In a very radical way, Sartre responds to God’s death by 
replacing Her with humanity. Because that is such an awesome burden the sense of 
alienation intensifies to a feeling of despair, a point not missed by Macquarrie in his 
investigation of alienation and iconoclastic forms of atheism: “Our brief survey of the 
history of the concept of alienation has in fact suggested that atheism is no cure, but 
rather brings in its train even more severe forms of estrangement. We have seen clear 
evidence for this in the philosoph[y] of…Sartre.”87 In his study of the ethical impact of 
Sartre’s absorption in death of God thought, Charles Guignon accents Macquarrie’s 
observations. He identifies the severe form of estrangement or alienation as 
abandonment, since humanity has replaced God as the source for values which could 
legitimize its conduct. If God no longer exists to cling to in order to guide and judge 
human decisions as blameworthy or praiseworthy, then human beings are alone and 
according to Guignon’s reading of Sartre they “are thrown back onto themselves in a 
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radical way. We are ultimately self-creating, with ‘no excuses behind us, nor justification 
before us.’”88 
 Heidegger takes aim at the Sartrean position, not because of the serious existential 
implications that result from a confrontation with God’s death or absence, but rather 
because of the related tenet that a pervasive mood of forlornness permeates all reactions 
in their final stages, whether expressed as despair, alienation, or abandonment. This is the 
end result only if human beings view God’s death as a mandate for them to assume all the 
roles He once performed. To think that humans must step in and replace the dead God is 
a complete misreading of Nietzsche according to Heidegger. While it is incumbent upon 
humanity to search for and be receptive to possible replacements for God, they could 
never be found in humankind itself. As Heidegger explains his position on the absurdity 
that a human being could replace God, he not only adds to his interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s interest in God’s death and clarifies Nietzsche’s concept of the Overman (der 
Übermensch), but he also shows a marked theological sensitivity:  
“Dead are all gods: now we will that overman live!” 
 We could believe, were we thinking crassly, that this 
pronouncement says that dominion over all that is, is passing from God 
to man or, even more crassly, that Nietzsche puts man in place of God. 
Those who believe thus do not, of course, think in a very godly way 
about the divine essence (denken allerdings wenig göttlich von Gottes 
Wesen). Never can man put himself in the place of God, because the 
essence of man never reaches the essential realm belonging to God.89     
 
 Heidegger thus quickly checks any death of God musings that usher in a new age 
of human mastery and supremacy — an enactment of sorts of Protagoras’ expression that 
“man is the measure of all things.” Instead there is something that must be respected 
about God’s essence as belonging only to God, and any human attempt to enter into this 
realm and occupy it in order to see as God sees is a completely misguided effort to 
address the challenges of God’s seeming absence. Luijpen lends credibility to 
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Heidegger’s interpretation by observing that: “For Heidegger, the death of ‘God’ does not 
mean that man substitutes himself for God. That would be mere foolishness.”90 
 But if humankind is not a suitable replacement for the dead God, Heidegger is 
nonetheless convinced that a replacement is possible. The effort then becomes to discern 
his rationale for maintaining such a position and how this relates to theology. What will 
become apparent in order to entice those theological temperaments easily put off by 
suggestions of God’s replacement is that the search for the right replacement eventuates 
in a positive outcome for the theology of God. First, however, there must be an 
appreciation of Heidegger’s insistence for a replacement and what motivates his resolve. 
Heidegger’s position on replacement as the fitting reaction to Nietzsche’s deliberations 
over God’s death comes through forcefully in the following remarks: 
if God in the sense of the Christian God has disappeared from his 
authoritative position in the suprasensory world, then this authoritative 
place itself is still always preserved, even though as that which has 
become empty… What is more, the empty place demands to be 
occupied anew and to have the God now vanished from it replaced by 
(durch ersetzen) something else.91 
 
The operative phrase in Heidegger’s replacement theory is that “the empty place demands 
to be occupied anew,” and this provides a privileged insight into Heidegger’s vehemence 
for this cause. It never becomes redundant to bear in mind that Heidegger writes as a 
philosopher, and so when he sets forth an agenda to find the proper replacement for the 
God of happy memory he is hedging his venture from a philosophical vantage point. To 
put this in another way, Heidegger is trying to fend off what would be typical 
philosophical reactions to the suggestion that since God is dead a replacement must be 
found. Asserting that the empty place demands to be occupied “anew” means that any 
tired philosophical understanding of God will not do. In fact, if the only replacement for 
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God is one that merely reinstitutes the God of the philosophers, then it would be better to 
just maintain the void left by God. Heidegger explains: 
Thought metaphysically, the place that is peculiar to God is the place of 
the causative bringing about and preserving of whatever is, as 
something created. That place of God can remain empty.92 
 
 What is noticeable here is a further articulation of Heidegger’s theological 
sensitivity vis-à-vis the nature of God alluded to earlier. There Heidegger’s firm stance 
was articulated against any misguided Nietzschean interpretations of God’s death. 
Humanity does not step into the empty place left by God, “because the essence of man 
never reaches the essential realm belonging to God.” Now as Heidegger cautions against 
any facile philosophical solutions to fill the empty space left by God, the same 
theological sensitivity is palpable. The deceased God cannot be replaced by a clone of the 
God who in the past performed all the vicarious functions necessary to shore up the 
foundations provided by the suprasensory world. This is the God of metaphysics who 
remained an abiding concern for Heidegger in various places of his later writings. These 
typically fell under the rubric of onto-theology discussed in chapter one as a further 
defect in metaphysics’ ability to fully appreciate and convey the meaning of Being. In 
any event, the metaphysically motivated understanding of God is eager to depict one of 
Her more important aspects as the ground of all other beings. God is here shown to be the 
ultimate cause and thus the self-cause — causa sui. While this may be acceptable in some 
metaphysically driven philosophical quarters its theological ramifications are deplorable, 
as Heidegger makes clear: 
causa sui. This is the right name for the god of philosophy. Man can 
neither pray nor sacrifice to this God. Before the causa sui, man can 
neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before 
this God.93 
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 Searching for an apt replacement for God in the wake of Nietzsche’s report of Her 
death is shaping up to be an arduous task on at least two fronts. First, it is an absurdity to 
recommend humankind as God’s replacement, and second it is untenable to drudge up a 
defunct God of philosophy as a substitute. Nietzsche thus performs a valuable service for 
theology when coming at him from a Heideggerian interpretation. God’s death which 
immediately translates into an empty space that must be filled begs for a replacement that 
is theologically suitable. Thus, theology is made to pause and ponder how it would best 
articulate a meaningful notion of God in the early 21st century. Tracy Colony indicates 
how Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche results ultimately in a positive theological 
moment of truth and discernment: 
This common affirmation around which the strife of Heidegger’s 
conflict with Nietzsche turned can be seen to be an awareness that the 
emptiness opened in the wake of the departed God was a sense of 
nihility which held within it the possibility for re-encountering the 
divine.94 
 
To stare down the empty space left by God means that theology is forced to articulate a 
replacement that is respectful of that essential realm that can only be inhabited by “a 
godly God” — not humanity and not the God of metaphysics. And it is Heidegger’s 
strong belief that a positive re-encounter with God will come from this period as theology 
feels its way through the godless nothingness and strives to think about and express a 
fitting replacement. During the time of uncertainty, re-evaluation and soul searching, 
theology can be assured that a genuine re-encounter with God is being realized more and 
more so long as it stays the course and refuses to fall back on the tired support offered by 
metaphysics: 
The god-less thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god 
as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine [godly] God 
(göttlichen Gott). Here this means only: god-less thinking is more open 
to Him than onto-theo-logic would like to admit.95 
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The willingness to entertain the speculations resulting from God’s absence is indicative 
of progress toward genuine re-encounter, whereas choosing to fall back on well-known 
formulations to quickly and painlessly fill the void will only compromise any true 
progress. 
 Many commentators on Nietzsche’s musings over God’s death have concurred 
with Heidegger’s interpretation. Instead of Nietzsche promulgating an irreligious atheism 
in the sense that an irreversible void is left by God’s demise and absence, he signals the 
possibility for a re-evaluation of how God is to be understood and encountered. For some 
this has been expressed as a welcome opportunity for deconstruction. David Allison, for 
instance, elaborates on the nature of deconstruction called for by Nietzsche’s death of 
God fixation. It is a comprehensive program where nothing is excluded from revision and 
re-evaluation. Nonetheless in keeping with the estimation of Heidegger, any such re-
evaluative exercise that specifically touches upon religion promises to be an opportunity 
for building up rather than destruction. Allison recommends that Nietzsche should be 
viewed as summoning humanity to a task that: 
would amount to a critical deconstruction of our tradition: it would 
consist in a critique of those historically derived notions of causality, 
unity, identity, divisible time, rationality, logic, truth, soul, and God… 
We must also remember that this kind of critical “destruction,” or 
“deconstruction,” is not merely negative: its results are positive, that is, 
it rids us of two millennia of withered pieties, of sanctimonious 
shrouds.96 
 
 If Allison’s description of the positive theological potential lurking behind 
Nietzsche’s concerns for God’s death comes across a bit strong, another commentator, 
alluded to earlier, expresses the matter in such a way that the theological prospects cannot 
be missed. Instead of using highly charged phrases to characterize the deconstruction 
project that “rids us of… withered pieties… sanctimonious shrouds,” Colony upholds the 
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Heideggerian read of Nietzsche in a more theologically sensitive manner: “Beyond the 
atheistic interpretation of Nietzsche’s experience of the death of God, the thought of a 
deeper sense of the divine constitutes the proper context in which to interpret the 
proximity that Heidegger uncovered in Nietzsche’s accounts…”97 This helps to balance 
out theology’s re-evaluative experience. In the wake of God’s death, theology is faced 
with a crisis presented by the void of Her absence. To put forth a replacement first 
requires some very serious consideration of how God has been presented and how She 
should be better presented today. While this deconstruction may yield an awareness that 
some past articulations of God should be modified or even abandoned, its more important 
outcome is that a deeper grasp of who God is today issues forth from this re-evaluative 
encounter. Writing from a theological perspective, Grace Jantzen is able to articulate an 
evaluation of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche that integrates the best of Allison’s 
and Colony’s philosophical observations. God’s death and absence offer theology an 
opportunity of challenge and hope — a deconstructive moment where both a 
hermeneutics of suspicion and a hermeneutics of generosity work in tandem. 
Commenting on the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s reflections on Heidegger’s 
concern for God’s/the gods’ absence, Jantzen writes: 
But which god is absent? Is it the “good old God” who could change 
the weather, intervene on the side of his favorites in battle, and watch 
while those who called themselves his (Christian) children slaughtered 
Jews, Muslims, and one another? Is it the “god called God,” the god-
father in whose name continents were appropriated, people enslaved, 
women oppressed, lesbians and gay men harassed, while incense and 
candles and boy-choirs chanting psalms deflected attention from the 
atrocities? If so, then we should hope that this god will stay away for a 
long time; and we should do all we can to prevent his return. That 
includes rethinking religion, which has a way of turning up in 
unexpected disguises… Therefore when Irigaray, pondering Heidegger, 
sees this time of the absence of god… her comments should not be read 
as nostalgia and not retreat to nostalgia for old time religion. Rather, 
her summons is to re-think religion, reconceive divinity.98 
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 The charge to re-think and reconceive God is the end result of Heidegger’s 
extensive musings over Nietzsche’s considerations of God’s death in The Gay Science. 
Far from it being a call of destruction that signals the end to any further theological 
pursuits, Nietzsche’s announcement that God is dead becomes an important catalyst for 
theological discourse. The empty space left by God’s absence forces theology to take 
stock and articulate the qualities of a truly divine God, who is able to credibly encounter 
early 21st century humanity. The concern then becomes one of determining how the re-
thinking and reconceiving of God takes place. A very preliminary sketch was just 
provided by Jantzen as she cautioned in passing against nostalgia for the old God as an 
important component in the project of re-thinking and reconceptualization. In greater 
detail below, it will be shown that nostalgia is ineffectual for such a project and so what 
is truly called for is poetic remembrance. It is important first, however, to render a fuller 
exposition of how this critical re-thinking is to take place by expanding on Heidegger’s 
analysis of Nietzsche. For this it is necessary to return to the dramatis personae 
employed by Nietzsche to announce God’s death who were the original source of 
inspiration for Heidegger’s reflections. Once the how aspect necessary to properly re-
think God is established and the relevance this has to the work of the venturesome poet 
discussed earlier in this chapter, it will be possible to bring this endeavor to a close. 
 By re-visiting the market place characters and their varied interests and reactions 
to the news of God’s death, it will become clear that searching for God is directly related 
to the task of re-thinking God. The lead role of course goes to the madman who clamors 
into the market place with the dual purpose to seek God through honest inquiry and to 
announce that God is dead. Supporting his performance are those Nietzsche dubs as the 
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bystanders, who while caught up in the usual commerce of the market place are 
harangued by the madman’s questions and proclamations concerning God. Heidegger 
interprets these Nietzschean characters in such a way that their differing attitudes become 
object lessons of how to think and how not to think as well as how to re-think and not to 
re-think. 
 Proper thinking and re-thinking necessary for the reconceptualization of God are 
directly related to the commitment and desire one has to search for God. On the one hand, 
there is the madman whose vociferous search Heidegger warns should not go unnoticed; 
“it can be enough for us simply to ponder for once what the madman says about the death 
of God and how he says it… the madman ‘cries incessantly: I seek God! I seek God!’”99 
On the other hand are the bystanders who express their complete lack of interest in the 
madman’s search by derision and snide remarks, so depicted by Nietzsche: “Has he 
[God] got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he 
hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? Emigrated? — Thus they yelled and 
laughed”100 For Heidegger, these hecklers are unable to take the madman’s search for 
God seriously because they are unwilling and unable to engage in genuine thinking. 
They, according to Heidegger, “are no longer able to seek God. They can no longer seek 
because they no longer think. Those standing about in the market place have abolished 
thinking and replaced it with idle babble.”101  
The madman is held up as worthy of emulation. He takes seriously God’s death and 
absence as a call to embark on a search for God that is driven by authentic thinking. And 
it is only this kind of thinking that can in turn spawn the theological re-thinking necessary 
to reconceptualize the absent God. Far from being a raging lunatic heralding a new age of 
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supercilious atheism, the madman of Nietzsche’s market place scene represents a 
committed yearning for God whose radical thinking is reminiscent of a prayerful plea for 
God in the likeness of Psalm 130. Heidegger ponders, “Has a thinking man [the madman] 
perhaps here really cried out de profundis?”102 When introducing the figure of the 
madman earlier, a conscious effort was made to expose Nietzsche’s particular 
understanding of the madman’s affliction. His madness was described by Nietzsche as 
Irsinn, “the eruption of arbitrariness in feeling, seeing, and hearing, the enjoyment of the 
mind’s lack of discipline, the joy in human unreason.”103 
This definition has a tremendous bearing in coming to terms with the radical nature of the 
madman’s thinking. Influenced as it is by madness as Irsinn, the madman’s thinking does 
not always stay within the boundaries of typical thinking. Therefore Heidegger’s 
assessments of Nietzsche’s madman are most accurate when he connects the madman’s 
thinking with an impassioned searching. If God is dead, the void of Her absence can only 
be filled by re-thinking who God truly is. This type of thinking is marked by a 
willingness to go beyond the usual parameters imposed upon thinking in order to search 
for God on uncharted paths with a variety of possible articulations. This thinking could 
lead to a prayerful expression, as noted by Heidegger in the madman’s de profundis 
lament for the absent God. Whatever precise form the articulation may take, it is clear 
that any thinking that supports searching for God and remaining open in turn to Her 
reconceptualization will be characterized as beyond the pure dictates of reason. This is 
not a plea for mindless irrational thought in the search for God, but rather an invitation to 
be open to the reality that God’s implacable absence — so expressed by Her death — will 
challenge thinking beyond its usual limits as it struggles to meaningfully articulate a 
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replacement and so reestablish God’s presence. This is Heidegger’s reaction to the 
madman’s thinking that gave way to a pious search for God. Humanity will not be able to 
join the madman in his thinking search that is expressed as an incessant cry — “I seek 
God! I seek God!” — until it willingly embraces new ways of thinking: “Thinking begins 
only when we have come to know that reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-
necked adversary of thought.”104 
Any time the matter of thinking arises in the grand Heideggerian schema, it is important 
to bear in mind that Being is immediately implicated. As a result, the theological 
excitement generated by the possibility of a new thinking that can effectively confront the 
assertion of God’s death must be properly channeled. Without such direction, there is the 
possibility of reckless theological application that ignores the integrity of Heidegger’s 
overall project. To avoid any mis-application at present, it can be recalled that the 
important relationship between Being and thinking was addressed in chapter one. Though 
it would be impossible to review all the fine points presented there, it is important now to 
recall Heidegger’s insistence that the true merit of any thinking comes from the extent to 
which it thinks Being in response to Being’s call. Therefore it is fully acceptable for 
thinking to be led beyond the pale of reason so long as this movement was initiated by 
Being’s prompting and in turn leads to a deeper understanding of Being. Two remarks 
from Heidegger cited in chapter one will provide the necessary foundation to develop the 
current interest in modes of thinking consonant with the madman’s thinking, which 
ultimately drives his search for the absent, dead God. Heidegger writes: 
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[t]hat Being itself, and the manner in which Being itself, strikes a 
man’s thinking, that rouses his thinking and stirs it to rise from Being 
itself to respond and correspond to Being as such.105 
 
[T]hinking is not a means to gain knowledge. Thinking cuts furrows 
into the soil of Being.106 
 
Remaining on this general level of the relationship between Being and thinking, an 
additional critique fully developed in chapter one and mentioned in the introductory 
section of this chapter is also worthy of recollection. According to Heidegger, Western 
philosophy has not been successful throughout its long history at cultivating a thinking 
that was consistently attuned to Being’s call or appeal. Heidegger describes this 
phenomenon as the “forgetfulness of Being” (Seinsvergessenheit): 
Nowhere are we confronted by a thinking that thinks the truth of 
Being… The history of Being begins, and indeed necessarily, with the 
forgetting of Being… Being is not coming into the light of its own 
essence. In the appearing of whatever is as such, Being itself remains 
wanting. The truth of Being falls from memory. It remains forgotten.107 
 
While it is not feasible to re-examine the details of Heidegger’s “forgetfulness of Being” 
brought forth in chapter one, it is fitting now to appreciate the dynamic of 
forgetting/remembering that is involved in the thinking of Being. Before attempting any 
theological probe that resonates with the searching thinking of Nietzsche’s madman, a 
firm footing must be established on two broad Heideggerian foundations. First, any novel 
thinking that transcends the boundaries of reason will have an affinity with the thinking 
of the madman’s search for God as long as it remains devoted to Being. Second, as 
thinking within the formal confines of philosophy has failed to maintain this devotion and 
has been plagued by an enduring “forgetfulness of Being,” any new thinking will in some 
way break out of this amnesia by embracing a newly cultivated sense of remembering. 
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 Maintaining a devotion to Being will not prove to be too difficult or unfamiliar. It 
has been a constant emphasis throughout this work that Being must remain at the 
forefront of any Heideggerian investigation. Those theologically motivated investigations 
find ultimate guidance and hope by adhering to Heidegger’s very familiar schema which 
unequivocally establishes Being’s importance: 
Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. 
Only from the essence of the holy is the divinity to be thought. Only in 
the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the 
word “God” is to signify.108 
 
At the same time, it will not be anything exceedingly difficult or new to explore forms of 
thinking beyond reason which involve remembering. A connection was made as early as 
chapter one between thinking and memory, where Heidegger’s philological exercises 
gave way to an appreciation of the deep expression of piety that is possible when 
someone thinks commemoratively from the heart. But more recently in this chapter the 
essential law of poetic activity was shown to be inextricably linked to remembering. The 
poet lives her vocation to the fullest when she thinks with one accord what has been and 
what is coming. This temporal aplomb requires a thinking that is an innovative 
expression of remembrance, since it is not only limited to recalling the past but 
effectuates a harmony among all three temporal modalities — past, present and future. In 
his interpretation of Hölderlin, Heidegger expressed this temporal feat accomplished by 
remembrance as follows: “we experience what-has-been, returning in the remembrance, 
swinging out beyond our present, and coming to us as something futural. All at once this 
remembrance must think of what has been, as something which is not yet unfolded.”109 
This temporal adroitness of the poet was then placed in the relief of yet another 
Hölderlinian concern of great interest to Heidegger — the needy time of the gods who 
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have fled and the gods who are yet to arrive. Integrating these two poetic concerns leads 
to the following question: Can the remembrance of the poet effectively address the 
present challenge of godlessness, since the gods of the past are gone and the gods of the 
future have yet to come? This in turn has direct bearing on the novel expressions of 
remembering that will take thinking beyond reason and be able to direct the madman’s 
search for the dead God. With this important connection made between the first and 
second parts of the chapter, this project finds itself in a favorable position to formulate a 
conclusion. In the remaining pages, an existential-phenomenological examination of 
remembering will ensue in order to show the theological resolution to the crisis of 
godlessness which preoccupies Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin and Nietzsche. This will 
involve a final theological application of Heidegger’s thinking. As with past attempts at 
application, all due caution and care will be exercised in order to achieve a mutual respect 
for the work of Heidegger and the discipline of theology. In the end it will be clear that 
remembering as conceived by Heidegger is the thinking which effectively accompanies 
the search for an absent Deity, whether expressed as Hölderlin’s fled gods or gods yet to 
come or as Nietzsche’s dead God. In its ultimate expression, according to Heidegger, 
remembering becomes a greeting of the holy. 
 
 
Remembering-Thinking: A Thankful Gesture that Receives the Greeting of the Holy 
 
 In order to fully comprehend Heidegger’s definitive articulation of remembering 
as a greeting of the holy, it will be necessary to appreciate the steps of development that 
lead to this conceptualization. The first stage that must be acknowledged is the close 
connection that Heidegger makes between thinking and remembering. At a preliminary 
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level, Heidegger is able to lay the groundwork for this connection by recourse to one of 
his familiar and beloved tacks — etymology. J. Glenn Gray, who translated several of 
Heidegger’s later works, explains how German more than English lends itself to 
Heidegger’s connection. Gray writes: 
The German word for memory is Gedächtnis which is derivative of the 
verb denken, to think; nearly all the associated words such as andenken, 
to commemorate or memorialize, keep to the intimate kinship of 
thinking and remembering, as we do not in English.110  
 
 Beyond the etymological linkage, Heidegger further establishes the close 
relationship between thinking and remembering based on their mutual capacity for 
“gathering” (die Versammlung). American Continental philosopher Edward Casey, who 
writes extensively on the phenomenological approach to remembering, sees the function 
of gathering as the more substantive basis for Heidegger’s close association of thinking 
with remembering. He explains: 
No one has recognized this fecund filiation between thinking and 
remembering more profoundly than Heidegger, who states 
categorically (at the beginning of What is Called Thinking?) that 
“memory is the gathering of thought”…[Heidegger writes:] “When we, 
in thinking, are gathered and concentrated on the most thought-
provoking, then we dwell where all recalling thought is gathered. The 
gathering of thinking back into what must be thought is what we call 
the memory.”111  
 
 The constraint of space heads off any temptation to fully explore the nature of 
gathering and to point out the many ways it is used by Heidegger.112 Nonetheless, it is 
sufficient for the purpose at hand to appreciate that the connection made between 
thinking and remembering on the basis of gathering enables forward movement along the 
stages of Heidegger’s development from remembering to greeting. Gray offers a succinct 
explanation of gathering that well serves this current aim: 
Throughout his long life Heidegger’s central concern was to discover 
what thinking is and how to accomplish it. Though there are many 
kinds of thinking, to be sure, the kind he came to recognize as 
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appropriate to his purposes is a recollective or “gathered” kind, in 
German ein andenkendes Denken. Simply stated, recollective thinking 
involves a concentrating of our minds upon a subject matter in such a 
way that we belong wholly to the matter of thought.113 
 
Depicting Heidegger’s gathering that takes place in thinking-remembering as an effective 
means to achieve undistracted concentration and focus is a point of invaluable worth and 
will be revisited at key points in the ensuing argument. However, the way in which Gray 
sees this effort of concentration and focus as taking place in the mind will have to be 
qualified and greatly expanded in order for Heidegger’s thought on remembering to 
realize its fullest potential for theological application as a greeting for the holy. 
 On the one hand, being aware that the remembering-thinking which Heidegger 
envisions is best characterized as a gathering builds upon and enhances the remembrance 
of the poet. According to Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin addressed earlier in the 
chapter, the remembering poet consummates her poetic vocation by thinking with one 
accord what has been and what is coming. She actualizes this during the present needy 
time of fled gods and anticipated gods, and so by extension it is a remembering-thinking 
with one accord about the past gods who have been and the future gods who are coming. 
As it was firmly advanced above, this poetic remembrance is indicative of an 
extraordinary temporal accomplishment — the harmonization of past, present and future. 
And in light of the most recent discussion, it could be stated with ease that this thinking 
with one accord, this harmonization of past, present and future is a gathering. 
 However, to thoroughly appreciate the advance ushered in by Heidegger’s 
remembering as connected to thinking as gathering, there needs to be a realization that 
something more is at stake than striking a balance among the three temporal modes. In 
order to truly dwell in the needy time of the past gods who have left and the future gods 
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who are still to arrive, it is not enough that remembrance acknowledges the temporal 
aspects involved and deftly affects their reconciliation. That is why it is important here to 
bear in mind that Hölderlin’s remembering poet, who operates during this needy time of 
godlessness, is complemented by Nietzsche’s market place madman, who desperately 
seeks after the God who is dead. It then becomes clear that Heidegger’s remembering-
thinking as a gathering transcends any temporal harmonization and comes to be 
appreciated as possessing the powers to directly confront the matter of godlessness with 
commitment and resolve. This gathered remembering-thinking thus goes beyond reason 
and any tidy abstraction such as those related to attaining temporal equilibrium among 
past, present and future. Heidegger’s desire to push remembering beyond the temporal 
provides strong evidence that he is promoting a more phenomenological understanding of 
memory. A clear echo of Heidegger’s efforts sounds in the more recent scholarship of 
Casey, whose work was mentioned earlier. By submitting remembering to a rigorous 
phenomenological investigation, Casey is able to unshackle memory from its more 
customary interpretations. Thus he and Heidegger are in alignment when they suggest 
that remembering’s deeper capacities are realized when it goes beyond operating 
exclusively within and for the temporal. Casey offers this challenge: “But we may say 
more radically that memory involves something more than the purely temporal in its own 
makeup.”114 
 That there is “something more” than the temporal in Heidegger’s estimation of 
remembering can be seen in those reflections on Hölderlin’s poem “Remembrance” in 
which he forges a relationship between remembering and greeting (das Grüßen). In some 
of these passages Heidegger is very clear and direct that remembering and greeting 
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should be recognized as interchangeable. At one point he observes that “Remembrance is 
a kind of greeting,” and a few paragraphs later he states, “Greeting is a re-thinking (An-
denken).”115 But beyond these equation-like formulations, the real character of 
Heidegger’s intent to devise an expanded notion of remembering beyond the temporal 
comes through in those places where greeting and its varied interactions with 
remembering are given greater elaboration. For instance, a digression proves telling as 
Heidegger closely examines a line where Hölderlin explicitly exhorts the gesture of 
greeting. In the first stanza of “Remembrance” Hölderlin writes, “But go now and 
greet/The beautiful Garrone,/And the gardens of Bordeaux.” At one point in his ensuing 
reflection, Heidegger alludes to the relevance of a line from another work by Hölderlin 
titled “The Wanderer.” In this elegy Heidegger makes special note of the fact that a 
traveler greets, in a remembering-thinking way, a gristmill and courtyard that he 
encounters on his journey: 
The mill and the courtyard are thought of. The daily work and the 
dwelling-place of the country man are greeted…The mill greeted in the 
foreign land still continues to be a reminder of the homeland.116 
 
It is worth noting how the traveler’s gesture of greeting invokes a remembering-
thinking that goes beyond temporal concerns and brings about a deeper sense of 
experiential attunement. No doubt that when the tourist greets the gristmill and courtyard 
he sees on his trip he is “reminded” of past encounters with these places at home. 
Likewise, future encounters are anticipated upon his return home. However, the greeting 
experience is not confined to a past memory or a future expectation. Instead, greeting in 
this instance invokes reminding which is a very specialized type of remembering-
thinking. Even though, according to Casey, “reminders themselves constitute a subset of 
remembering,”117 they still engender that gathered sense of remembering-thinking which 
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brings about a sense of experiential attunement with a degree of focus and level of 
concentration that is still difficult to match. Despite the fact that reminding is not exactly 
the same as remembering, it nonetheless possesses all the force of gathering — even 
beyond the gathering of the temporal modes — when allied with the gesture of greeting. 
Casey observes: 
In this way reminding … draws things together. It is a force of unusual 
unifying power … Reminding brings together and unifies the disjecta 
membra of human experience: past, present, and future, duty and 
desire, the forgotten and the remembered.118 
 
Heidegger’s final thoughts on the implications of the traveler’s greeting the 
gristmill and the courtyard are similar to Casey’s observations. Even though Heidegger 
does not make the fine distinction between reminding and remembering, the tourist’s 
gesture of greeting nevertheless becomes an experience of heightened integrative 
awareness. Following is Heidegger’s description of the force of remembering as 
occasioned by greeting: 
Even the most inconspicuous word and every “image” which seems to 
be formed only as a “poetical” embellishment, is a greeting word. It 
speaks in commemoration (Andenkend) and thinks back on the foreign 
which has been, and on the homeland which is coming, in their original 
belonging-together.119 
 
 It should now be clear that Heidegger’s incorporation of the gesture of greeting 
into any instance of remembering-thinking succeeds in stretching the capabilities of 
memory beyond any exclusive functioning in temporal affairs. It cannot be denied that 
greeting includes the well-established gathering function of remembering-thinking and 
will always include the possibility of a focused harmonization of past, present and future. 
However, there are other possibilities for focused concentration that will touch human 
experience at levels beyond the abstract and cerebral where the temporal accord is mainly 
achieved. And it is these possibilities that are of greater theological interest. 
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Acknowledging and confronting Hölderlin’s needy time of godlessness with a searching 
zeal that is on par with Nietzsche’s madman requires an experiential engagement that no 
doubt includes the cognitive but must also claim the entire person. To finally arrive at 
Heidegger’s belief that greeting is the main organ of communication used by the holy, it 
is necessary to first comprehend that any remembering-thinking associated with such 
greeting is an expression of the entire person. It can be recalled from discussions earlier 
in the chapter that Heidegger assigns a distinctive role to the holy vis-à-vis the gods or 
God. The holy acts as a regulatory medium through which access to the gods/God is 
controlled. Despite the many sound theological critiques that could be leveled at this 
aspect of Heidegger’s thinking, it is necessary for this project to attempt careful 
theological applications. As a result, if the holy and God are intimately linked in the later 
Heidegger, then the greeting of the holy during this time of godlessness must be 
welcomed and received with the concentrated experiential awareness and attunement that 
comes only with a greeting which expresses a remembering-thinking of the entire person.  
 In order to establish the possibility of a fitting greeting to receive the greeting of 
the holy, the entire preceding argument was devoted to making a case for a remembering-
thinking associated with such a greeting that goes beyond temporal concerns. The most 
important outcome of this argument was that the expanded remembering-thinking would 
in turn be appreciated as impacting human experience in its entirety — mind and body. It 
becomes of utmost importance at this final stage in the current effort to appreciate that 
the later Heidegger’s remembering-thinking is not by default beyond mental experience 
because it is expressive first and foremost of something beyond temporality. Instead, 
there is a more immediate link that has tremendous bearing on the nature of the greeting 
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that will be best suited to receive the greeting of the holy and thus allow for a much 
needed greeting of the gods/God in this godless time. Casey is able to express well the 
implications that result from fostering deeper notions of remembering-thinking: “If 
remembering were a sheerly temporal phenomenon — and even allowing for a more 
capacious, less linear notion of time — it would remain disembodied.”120 
 For Heidegger remembering-thinking is never disembodied. With all due respect 
for J. Glenn Gray and the contribution he made by translating several of Heidegger’s later 
writings, issue must now be taken with a portion of his insight discussed earlier. Gray 
was cited above for the clarity he offered in explaining the close tie that exists between 
thinking and remembering in Heidegger’s thought. After the valuable insight to pay 
attention to the original German for its ability to reveal the connection between thinking 
(denken) and remembering (andenken), Gray suggests that thinking as “gathered” best 
expresses the deep affinity that Heidegger envisions between thinking and remembering. 
Gray wrote: “a recollective [‘gathered’ kind] of thinking [ein andenkendes Denken] 
involves a concentrating of our minds upon a subject matter in such a way that we belong 
wholly to the matter of thought.”121 The gathering that takes place in Heidegger’s 
remembering-thinking goes beyond the ability to concentrate human experience at a 
cognitive level alone. In the time of divine elusiveness and even divine absence, it is a 
remembering-thinking that is fully embodied as a greeting that will be most hospitable to 
the greeting of the holy. Such a hospitable exchange of greetings will lessen the effects of 
anxiety associated with godlessness and moreover will successfully conduct the search 
for the fled gods/dead God. 
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 Careful attention to the unmistakable embodied nature of Heidegger’s estimation 
of remembering-thinking will leave no doubt of its devotional qualities — qualities best 
suited for a greeting that will greet the greeting of the holy with a reverential hospitality. 
During the 1951-52 winter semester and the 1952 summer semester Heidegger taught a 
series of courses devoted to the question of Being in dialogue with pre-Socratic 
philosophy and Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the will. These lectures have been brought 
together in the published work titled What is Called Thinking? In the second part of this 
course series Heidegger asks the question, What is thinking?, and recommends that one 
must be aware that there are really four questions in play when attempting to formulate 
any sort of response: 
The ambiguousness of the question, “What is called thinking?” 
conceals several possible ways of dealing with it. Getting ahead of 
ourselves, we may stress four ways in which the question can be 
posed.122 
 
For the present purposes, only the third manner of asking the question and its related 
response will be pursued. With clarity and expedience this will show that the greeting 
associated with the remembering-thinking necessary to adequately greet the greeting of 
the holy in this godless time of search and yearning is indeed a fully embodied greeting. 
In addition, it will show how this remembering-thinking is beyond reason, or what 
Heidegger calls “representational” thought, which was the first requirement called for to 
address the current state of divine elusiveness. The crux of Heidegger’s third way of 
attempting to arrive at an understanding of genuine thinking is basically a plea for 
qualifications that any true thinker must possess. In drafting such a résumé Heidegger 
suggests the following guidelines: 
“What is called thinking?” says further, in the third place: what are the 
prerequisites we need so that we may be able to think with essential 
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rightness? What is called for on our part in order that we may each time 
achieve good thinking?123 
 
 In order to formulate the ultimate attribute of the authentic thinker, Heidegger 
makes use of an expression from the pre-Socratic philosopher  Parmenides — “One 
should both say and think that Being is” (chre to legein te noein t’ eon emm enai.). In 
typical Heideggerian style, this phrase receives an extensive yet purposeful reworking. 
While issue could be taken with Heidegger’s re-translation of Parmenides’ saying, 
sympathy for any license is easily cultivated when his overall intent is considered. As 
always, Heidegger in the broadest sense is attempting to advance the question of the 
meaning of Being. With the help of Parmenides, he is given an opportunity for such 
advancement with regard to thinking. And so it is the aim of achieving a philosophically 
enriched approach to thinking that motivates his re-translation project: 
Now we must translate Parmenides’ saying… we shall attempt the 
translation along the way of the one question: “What calls on us to 
think?”124 
 
 Without getting into the finer points of the translation, it is important at present to 
at least pay attention to Heidegger’s choice to focus on two words. These become for him 
the key to addressing the third question concerning thinking which strives to identify the 
indispensable characteristic of a true thinker. Parmenides’ admonition that “One should 
both say and think that Being is” will realize its greatest potential and expose the depths 
of thinking only if there is a careful and creative translation of the Greek verbs to say 
(legein) and to think (noein). Heidegger does not question the accuracy of any previous 
translation; he instead offers a challenge to ask what the words as typically translated 
really mean. In this way the meaning more in keeping with Parmenides’ intent will be 
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captured and most importantly the meaning for thinking as conveyed by their interactive 
dynamic will break through. Heidegger explains: 
The Greek verbs legein and noein, according to the dictionary, are here 
translated correctly. The dictionary informs us that legein means to 
state, and noein to think. But what does “stating” mean? What does 
“thinking” mean?125  
 
For Heidegger the translation that allows for the true meaning of legein to come 
forth is one that stretches the connotations of “to say” and “to state” to a point where “to 
lay before”, “to lay out” and “to lay to” are included: “the Greeks understand stating in 
the light of laying out, laying before, laying to, and for this reason call that ‘laying’ 
legein.”126 On the other hand, Heidegger believes that the true meaning of noein is 
attained by a translation that pushes the connotative boundaries of “to think” so that it is 
better rendered as “to perceive:” “We shall proceed more cautiously, translating noein 
with ‘perceive,’ rather than say ‘thinking’…”127 And it is the outcome of Heidegger’s 
development of the richness of “to perceive” that will have a lasting impact on coming to 
terms with the embodied nature of the greeting which accompanies the remembering-
thinking and worthily greets the greeting of the holy. Heidegger exposes the depth of to 
perceive as follows: 
In noein, what is perceived concerns us in such a way that we take it up 
specifically, and do something with it. But where do we take what is to 
be perceived? How do we take it up? We take it to heart… Noein is 
taking something to heart.128 
 
 Heidegger’s translation of noein as taking something to heart would seem to be 
the final word in any attempt to establish the embodied nature of remembering-thinking 
and its related gesture of greeting. Indeed, this translation will prove to be indispensable 
in the effort to move remembering-thinking as envisioned by Heidegger beyond a 
gathering or concentrating operation of the mind. But in the rush to firmly establish the 
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extent to which a fully embodied remembering-thinking greets the greeting of the holy, 
there are other valuable aspects to this embodied comportment that could be easily 
overlooked. That is why it is important to keep in mind the integrity of Heidegger’s 
translation project. In order to discover the qualifications that any true thinker should 
possess, there are two words in Parmenides’ expression that must be plumbed for all of 
their potential meaning — legein and noein. Thus, one cannot rest content with the 
promising bodily connotations that arise from a translation of noein that yields “taking 
something to heart.” Instead legein and the connotative expansions made by Heidegger’s 
translation must be appreciated in tandem with noein in order to arrive at the fullest 
understanding of the character traits which belong to the serious thinker. Heidegger 
provides the following gentle reminder of the necessity to preserve the dynamic 
relationship that obtains between legein and noein in order to respond adequately to his 
third out of four possible ways to probe the meaning of thinking: 
The third way is intent on arriving at what is needed, and thus required 
of us, if we are ever to accomplish thinking in an essentially fitting 
manner. No one knows what is called “thinking” in the sense of the 
third question until he is capable of legein te noein te.129 
 
 To be counted as a genuine thinker, therefore, one’s attributes must include the 
dual capacity to let something lie before her and to take something to heart. Only by 
respecting Heidegger’s belief that these two interrelated traits must be possessed by 
anyone who wants to “accomplish thinking in an essentially fitting manner” can there be 
a prudent extension of his thinking. Most specifically, the theological application now 
being advanced concerning the embodiment of the remembering-thinking greeting that 
greets the holy can now be fully exposed on a firmer footing. In other words, in trying to 
make theological connections with Heidegger’s assertions that the holy is greeted by a 
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remembering-thinking embodied in the gesture of greeting, it is not enough that this 
bodily experience has been interpreted as “taking something to heart.” To arrive at the 
full embodied comportment of the greeting that greets the holy, it cannot merely be a 
matter of glomming on to a part of human anatomy. While this certainly takes the 
remembering-thinking which engenders the greeting gesture beyond the mind, it does so 
by resorting to an equally delimiting physicalism. Thus, there is a need to fall back on the 
way Heidegger achieves the full embodied comportment that accompanies genuine 
thinking at the most general level — by allowing the thinker to exercise her double 
capacity for legein (letting things lie before her) and noein (taking things to heart). 
 The full bodily comportment of thinking overall is conveyed by the interaction of 
legein and noein when the total effect of Heidegger’s translating project is understood. 
Not only does he offer some novel ways to interpret legein and noein as they appear in 
Parmenides’ saying about Being, but he also believes that the very relationship between 
these words is most telling. Robert Mugerauer agrees that more can be learned from 
Heidegger’s translation project about thinking if one steers away from an isolated focus 
on the individual words and realizes that their real force comes through in their 
interaction. Mugerauer illustrates the scope of Heidegger’s  project: 
In short, Heidegger translates legein as letting-lie-before us and noein 
as taking-to-heart. He goes on to explain four essential aspects of his 
ongoing translation… In the fourth place… we see that legein 
determines noein. This means both that “noein unfolds out of legein” 
(that is, taking to heart is not any kind of grasping what lies before us, 
but is in the manner of letting come what lies before us) and “noein is 
kept within legein” (that is, the heart, into which things are taken, itself 
belongs within the gathering where that which lies before us is kept 
safely).130 
 
 Even though Mugerauer’s analysis remains at a general level, the succinct way 
that he is able to portray Heidegger’s contention that real thinking requires not only a 
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body but a fully embodied comportment has tremendous bearing on the theological 
implications of the gesture of greeting. It was well established that, for Heidegger, 
thinking is on equal footing with remembering. Furthermore, it was shown that this 
remembering-thinking is akin to greeting. If everything that Mugerauer has unearthed 
concerning Heidegger’s belief that remembering-thinking in general requires a fully 
engaged bodily comportment, then the same requirement pertains to the gesture of 
greeting. And it is this type of greeting that offers the greatest theological potential, since, 
as will be shown below in greater detail, this greeting is the optimal gesture to receive the 
greeting of the holy in this difficult (needy) time of a Nietzschean God seeking against a 
Hölderlinian back-drop of godlessness. 
 Though Mugerauer’s presentation of Heidegger’s description of the relationship 
between legein (“letting-lie-before-us”) and noien (“taking-to-heart”) makes no attempt 
to extend the general traits of thinking to a remembering-thinking greeting that greets the 
holy, the analysis nonetheless does lead to a better understanding of an extension of 
similar concern that Heidegger makes himself. In other terms, what Mugerauer is able to 
identify without getting lost in the density of Heidegger’s translation exercise is the fact 
that real thinking (at its most general level) requires a tandem ability on the part of the 
thinker to let something lie before her and to take something to heart. What this in 
essence becomes on further inspection is a modification of the bodily aspect of thinking. 
Noein, as taking something to heart, is modified by its interaction with legein, since 
“Noein unfolds out of legein and “noein is kept within legein.” Removing the 
Heideggerian jargon from these modifications allows for an appreciation of the fully 
engaged bodily comportment that accompanies thinking. Moreover, the very nature of 
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this comportment as a gesture of hospitable receptivity that embraces without grasping 
and keeps safe without confining makes Heidegger’s further expansion on noein fully 
understandable and most suitable for the current theological attempt at a further extension 
of Heidegger’s notion of greeting. 
 After stating that the trait of noein in genuine thinking means taking something to 
heart, Heidegger goes on to connect this to memory, which is none too surprising since it 
has been well established that thinking and remembering enjoy a kindred relationship for 
him. However, the connection to memory does have a surprising and fortuitous twist 
when he further links it by way of etymology to the Old English noun “thanc” which is 
redolent with imagery of prayer and devotion. Heidegger explains: 
Noein is taking something to heart. The noun to the verb noein, which 
is noos, nous, originally means almost exactly what we have explained 
earlier as the basic meaning of thanc, devotion, memory.131 
 
Thanc has already been discussed in a very passing way in chapter one, but now it 
deserves a closer look because of its ability in Heidegger’s estimation to provide the 
ultimate basis for appreciating the devotional quality behind any genuine effort of 
remembering-thinking. This in turn allows for a smooth and well-grounded theological 
extension. Since remembering-thinking is synonymous with greeting for Heidegger, then 
the greeting that most suitably greets the greeting of the holy is a fully embodied gesture 
that comports the necessary reverence — it takes the greeting of the holy to heart and 
keeps it safe but never in a manipulative or “grasping” way. In other words, the greeting 
that greets the holy’s greeting is a receptive embrace that allows the holy to be the holy. 
 Thanc has the ability to achieve such lofty ends, because in its deep and long-
standing etymological relationship with remembering-thinking the notion of heartfelt 
gratitude becomes its definitive articulation. Heidegger traces the etymological course 
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which leads to this expression of thanksgiving, and in the end it becomes hard to 
distinguish genuine remembering-thinking from thanking: 
The Old English thencan, to think, and thancian, to thank are closely 
related; the Old English noun for thought is thanc or thonc — a 
thought, a grateful thought, and the expression of such a thought; today 
it survives in the plural thanks… Is thinking a giving of thanks?132 
 
The suggestion that thinking immediately and simultaneously implies thanking 
encourages strong speculation about the possible place of prayer being included in this 
line of reasoning. What is most astonishing, however, is that the idea of prayer or 
devotion as having a place here is not exclusively found in voices eager for theological 
interpretation. Rather, Heidegger himself establishes the connection, which in turn makes 
it even easier and more credible to advance the theological extension being attempted 
here regarding the greeting of the holy. Heidegger’s most compelling case to join 
thanking with prayer is made when he emphasizes thanking’s relationship to the memory 
aspect of the remember-thinking dynamic. He argues: 
Both memory and thanks move and have their being in the thanc 
[heart]. “Memory” initially did not at all mean the power to recall… 
Originally, “memory” means as much devotion: a constant 
concentrated abiding with something…133 
 
 While this lends firm support to the argument that Heidegger himself would 
endorse most attempts to connect the efforts of remembering-thinking thanking to the 
disposition of prayer, an even stronger endorsement from him is evident when he 
delineates the exact focus of this prayer and devotion. To put this in another way, it is just 
not to some generic "something" that this remembering-thinking thanking abides with a 
prayerful constancy and concentration. Instead, all efforts of this remembering-thinking 
thanking are focused upon the holy. With this in place, it then becomes possible to 
execute without hesitation the specific theological application being advanced here 
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concerning the greeting that greets the holy. First, however, it is necessary to allow 
Heidegger the opportunity to specify the focal point of any devotional remembering-
thinking thanking: 
In its original telling sense, memory means as much as devotion (An-
dacht). This word possesses the special tone of the pious and piety (des 
Frommen und der Frömmigkeit), and designates the devotion of prayer 
(des Gebetes), only because it denotes the all-comprehensive relation of 
concentration upon the holy and the gracious. The thanc unfolds in 
memory, which persists as devotion.134 
 
 An enlightened recourse can now be made to Heidegger’s reflections on 
Hölderlin’s poem “Remembrance” which inspired this chapter’s quest to discover the 
thinking beyond reason that most adequately confronts the age of godlessness and 
searches nonetheless for the elusive Deity. More specifically and of greater relevance for 
the current discussion, it is here that Heidegger closely reflects upon the greeting and the 
holy. As he ponders over the poem’s opening line Heidegger exploits the nautical favor 
granted to the northeast wind: 
The northeast blows, 
Of winds the dearest 
To me, because of a fiery spirit 
And a good voyage it promises to mariners. 
 
It has already been established in an earlier section of this chapter that the sailor and the 
poet share much in common in Hölderlin’s works. Therefore, the northeast wind is as 
dear to the sailor as it is to the poet. The Hölderlinian basis for the nautical and poetic 
affection for this air current is explained by Del Caro: 
The northeast wind is beloved by the sailors for its favorable direction, 
beloved by the poet because it comes to the aid of sailors — which is to 
say, it comes to his aid as well when we follow Hölderlin’s established 
association between sailor and poet.135 
 
What Heidegger does is to make the most of the way that the northeast wind aids 
the travel of the sailor and extends it to the good effects that it also has on the work of the 
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poet, the sailor’s alter-ego. The next lines of the poem indicate how the northeast wind 
steers the course of journeying seafarers in directions that ensure optimal destinations. 
With sails that harness the gust of the northeasterly winds, the sailors are able to “greet” 
the beautiful Garrone river and the Bordeaux gardens: 
But go now and greet 
The beautiful Garrone, 
And the gardens of Bordeaux 
 
When extended to the poet, an equally favorable outcome results from her reception of 
this inspirational breeze. According to Heidegger: 
The northeast wind is never just the messenger through whom the poet 
sends his greetings. The northeast itself is welcomed before all else, 
because this wind, through its blowing, makes clear for the poet the 
location and time of his poetic vocation… The poet, standing in the 
blowing of the northeast wind, is the one greeted by the greeting of the 
holy. That is why he must welcome this wind which exposes him to his 
essential vocation. That is why the poet sends his greeting through this 
wind to what-has-been. He thinks of what-has-been in his thinking of 
what-is-coming. That is the holy…136   
 
Besides the excitement that this passage engenders as Heidegger makes explicit reference 
to the greeting and the holy, it also provides important context and continuity for the 
developing argument. For instance, the mythical quality of the northeast wind was just 
presented as an important means to ensure that both the sailor and the poet fulfill 
essential goals of their respective callings — the sailor arrives safely at desired 
destinations in a direct and timely fashion while the poet thinks with one accord about the 
past and future. It will be recalled how earlier in the chapter the poet fulfilled her 
vocation through remembrance, a remembering-thinking that “swings-out” beyond the 
present to simultaneously and harmoniously think about what-has-been in the past and 
what-is-coming in the future. The passage offers a further point of context and continuity 
when it states that a gesture of greeting complements the remembering-thinking that 
brings about the fulfillment of the poet’s vocation. It is advantageous to put aside for a 
  
 376
moment the otherwise welcome allusions to the holy that arise in conjunction with the 
greeting. By paying attention exclusively to how the poet fully realizes her calling, it 
becomes obvious that the ability to bring together past and future at this moment requires 
not only an abstract remembering-thinking but a gesture as well. In other words, the poet 
at the defining point in her vocation engages in a cognitive remembering-thinking that is 
fully expressed in the embodied gesture of greeting. This complements the more general 
treatment above concerning remembering and greeting. There the main thrust of the 
presentation was to show Heidegger’s belief that remembrance and greeting share a very 
close bond and likeness. From there it was possible to appreciate remembering as 
operative beyond temporal matters. With remembering-greeting the human person not 
only marks time in an abstract sense, viz. the past as past, but experiences a heightened 
attuned awareness in the present that engages her entire existence. 
 With these loose ends concerning the poet’s vocation brought together in context 
and with continuity, it is now possible to return to the main interests at hand concerning 
the greeting and the holy. At the most basic and unspecified level, it is Heidegger’s 
contention that the poetic vocation is lived to the utmost when the poet engages in a 
remembering-thinking that is complemented by a gesture of greeting. When more 
specificity is given about the nature of this poetic encounter, then another element is 
discovered as being instrumental to the poetic calling — gratitude. When the poet greets 
the greeting of the holy, it goes without saying that this is an encounter driven by a 
remembering-thinking. But ultimately this remembering-thinking embodied in a greeting 
is effective only if it is accompanied by a marked level of thanking. The poet greets the 
greeting of the holy by virtue of her remembering-thinking, but never with a sense of 
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pride or smugness that she controls the nature and extent of the encounter. Instead, the 
poet is humbled by the holy encounter and moved to an expression of wonder and 
thanksgiving. Heidegger writes: “The poem shelters the astonished thanks for the wonder 
of being greeted by the holy…”137 
 The way is now paved to bring the current effort of theological application to a 
fitting conclusion. It was determined earlier in a broad sense that remembering-thinking 
is related to thanking. This dynamic of remembering-thinking thanking was seen to have 
a devotional or prayerful objective since it permitted a concentrated focus on the holy. 
However, since this remembering-thinking thanking is rooted in legein and noein its 
focus upon the holy is best seen as a delicate embrace of the holy that is ever respectful of 
the holy’s initiative and prerogative — it takes the holy to heart and keeps it safe there. 
When this general understanding of the remembering-thinking thanking is joined with 
what has been presented about greeting, then the thinking beyond reason has been 
discovered that will most effectively confront the time of godlessness (as announced by 
Hölderlin) and will lead the related search for the God who has died (as proclaimed by 
Nietzsche). Greeting at the most basic level is a form of remembering-thinking. As an 
embodied gesture it takes remembering-thinking beyond abstract, temporal concerns and 
becomes an experience of heightened attunement in the present. When greeting is 
appreciated in a more specific way with regard to its relationship to the poet, then it is 
seen as the gesture which welcomes the greeting of the holy. Finally, whether seen in this 
more poetic capacity or at a very general level, greeting as the embodiment of 
remembering-thinking is always an expression of gratitude. The immediate implication of 
a thankful greeting is a gift. David Farrell Krell believes that gift becomes the focal point 
  
 378
for Heidegger’s remembering-thinking thanking that greets in order to take something to 
heart and keep it safe: “Heidegger appeals to the language of gift-giving and bestowal to 
describe the gathering of thinking.”138 Heidegger himself explains how the notion of gift 
is the obvious and natural basis for a remembering-thinking greeting of thanks, as he 
writes: 
When we give thanks, we give it for something. We give thanks for 
something by giving thanks to him whom we have to thank for it. The 
things for which we owe thanks are not things we have from ourselves. 
They are given to us. We receive many gifts, of many kinds.139 
 
 Any encounter with the holy must be viewed as a unique kind of gift. As a result, 
the fitting comportment for such encounters is a gesture of greeting that welcomes the 
overture of the holy with a deep sense of gratitude and in a remembering-thinking way 
takes to heart and keeps safe the effects of the experience. Encounters with the holy will 
remain possible in this age of godlessness, but they must always be perceived as 
gratuitous. For Heidegger, it is Hölderlin’s poet who faithfully lives out her calling and 
greets the gift of the holy greeting by a remembering-thinking that forever remains 
grateful. In this way the current between needy time of godlessness, expressed as the 
gods who have fled and the gods who are yet to arrive, will find some semblance of hope 
for a promised return. Likewise, the search for the dead God undertaken by Nietzsche’s 
madman in The Gay Science will find direction and hope with the realization that there 
will be encounters with the holy along the way. As long as the madman gratefully greets 
these encounters with a remembering-thinking that takes to heart and keeps safe that 
which results from such holy overtures, he will move ever closer to finding the absent 
God. 
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Reprise 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And at the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
 
— T.S. Elliot  
Little Gidding 
 
 
Chapter One 
 
In revisiting chapter one in order to render an evaluation about its effectiveness to 
achieve its intended goals, it becomes clear that it was successful. This is not to imply 
that the chapter could not have realized its purpose by means of some other strategy or 
that its manner of proceeding exhausted every possible avenue of exploration. Instead, by 
fastening upon Heidegger’s chief concern — the question of the meaning of Being — and 
selectively exposing the various creative ways he attempted to address this concern, 
chapter one was able to cultivate a meaningful appreciation of Heidegger’s unique place 
in Western thinking. 
Not only did the chapter successfully expose Heidegger’s distinctive contributions 
to Western philosophy, it also laid an important foundation for the successful attainment 
of the overall goals of the current work. It would be reckless and counterproductive to 
cull through Heidegger’s later writings and with the discovery of any mention of God, the 
gods, or the holy conclude that he has issued an equivocal statement of worth for 
theological endeavors. Chapter one negates any such facile attempts of rapprochement 
between theology and the later Heidegger and thus respects the integrity of the work of 
the discipline and the person. 
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The key to appreciating Heidegger is by developing a sense of why and how he, 
as a philosopher, approaches the question of the meaning of Being. Once this sensibility 
is in place, then it becomes possible to advance carefully and cautiously theological 
speculations with credibility. What did chapter one unearth regarding Heidegger’s 
creative approach to Being? The first requirement necessary to ask anew the question of 
the meaning of Being is to dismantle the very structure that has misguided this question 
for 2,500 years — Western philosophy/metaphysics. What was most debilitating about 
the method used by metaphysics to study Being was its choice to focus on beings. These 
entities were seen as the avenue to Being because they had a tangible reality and 
presence. Thus, beginning with Plato and Aristotle a bias is established that favors beings 
and things which permeates all of Western thought for centuries. The age of technology 
becomes a defining point that shows how this philosophical bias found articulation 
beyond its more abstract concerns. Much of technology devotes its energy to the 
domination and manipulation of nature and things with little regard for a larger context. 
The impoverishment of the meaning of Being and any resultant deleterious side 
effects could have been avoided, according to Heidegger, if more exclusive attention had 
been devoted to Being itself. The pre-Socratic philosophers were the more authentic 
practitioners of philosophy and provide the answer to a revitalized philosophy that 
properly rethinks the meaning of Being. They fostered an “attuned correspondence with 
Being.” As esoteric as this may sound, Heidegger believes that all philosophers had this 
ability but nonetheless turned a deaf ear to Being’s call. This was clearly the case in the 
way that philosophers traditionally treated the ontological difference — the formal 
concept that delineates the distinction between Being and beings. While acknowledging 
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this distinction and counting the ontological difference among its conceptual rubrics, 
philosophy ignored the potential offered by the distinction itself and opted to devote 
fullest attention to beings (what is present) to the detriment of Being (the event of 
presencing). As seen in chapter one, it was Heidegger’s recommendation to accept 
wholeheartedly the dynamic of distinction between Being and beings. By a meditative-
recollective “step back” (Schritt zurück) into the mysterious region of the differing dif-
ference between Being and beings an attuned correspondence will be effected between 
Being and the willing philosopher. The most important result of the intimacy created 
between the philosopher and Being is her sensitized awareness that Being has a 
mysterious self-concealing dimension which ironically puts it in proximity with 
nothingness (das Nichts). The philosopher who willingly accepts Being’s tendency to 
conceal itself as it reveals itself as well as Being’s affinity with the nothing will 
experience a genuine re-thinking of the meaning of being in ranks with the pre-Socratics. 
They were the first to enjoy an attuned correspondence with Being and were not afraid to 
take ownership of the deeper mysteries of Being as famously articulated by Heraclitus’ 
aphorism, “Being loves to hide itself.” 
It becomes clear from the foregoing that any attempt to apply Heidegger to 
theology must be well grounded in his revisionistic approaches to the question of the 
meaning of Being. As tempting as it is from a theological perspective to quickly apply the 
mysterious operations of Being to the transcendent nature of God, this would be a “false 
step” in the words of John Macquarrie. This is the case primarily because Heidegger 
himself disallows any such simplistic interchangeability between Being and God. Instead 
of equating Being with God, which would then give license to a neat overlay of all of 
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Being’s characteristics upon God and vice-versa, Heidegger gives primacy to Being. This 
however does not establish an implacable barrier between Being and God, but rather 
establishes a priority from which any advancement about Being may redound to God but 
only in a refracted and indirect way — “Only from the truth of Being can the essence of 
the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of the divinity to be 
thought. Only in the light of the essence of the divinity can it be thought or said what the 
word ‘God’ is to signify.” 
Thus, an exciting area of further research that chapter one offers is to probe more 
deeply the theological impact of understanding God through the prism of Being. At the 
most basic level it could be asked whether or not it is beneficial for theology to concern 
itself with Being in order to arrive at a meaningful articulation about the nature of God. 
Essential to this expansion would be a thorough examination of past attempts to wed 
Being and God. Did these reflections yield an enriched understanding of God or was the 
result merely the abstract God of the philosophers — before whom humanity can neither 
sing or pray? It would also be important to contextualize any expansion in the current 
mindset of postmodernity. Most instructive along these lines would be the work of the 
philosopher Jean-Luc Marion. He is a part of the recent “theological turn” in French 
phenomenology and has advanced a controversial argument for a God free of all 
categories of Being. In God without Being (University of Chicago Press, 1991), Marion 
challenges the premise of both metaphysics and neo-Thomist theology that God must be 
and recommends locating God in the realm of Christian love. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 The efforts of the second chapter derived their inspiration and motivation from the 
insight of Hugo Ott. He counseled that Heidegger could only be fully understood when 
his origins are taken into consideration. This might seem at first glance to be counter 
productive to the overall mission of the current project with its sights set on the writings 
of the later Heidegger and the impact they have on the theology of God. However, the 
return to Heidegger’s beginnings leads to some surprising theological discoveries that can 
be seen as foundational and abidingly formative to Heidegger’s lifelong philosophical 
endeavor. Late in his career Heidegger acknowledges that his early theological interests 
left a deep impact on his philosophical work. The chapter cited this glowing admission 
that surfaced during an exchange between Heidegger and a Japanese professor in the 
early 1950s. At one point in their discussion of hermeneutics and language, professor 
Tezuka observes that Heidegger is “at home in theology,” to which Heidegger tellingly 
responds, “Without this theological background I should have never come upon the path 
of thinking. But origin always comes to meet us from the future.” While due caution must 
be exercised so as not to over romanticize this acknowledgment in order to promote a 
theological agenda, the chapter pointed out how scholarly consensus accords the 
statement legitimacy as a genuine moment of self-disclosure for Heidegger. Plaudits from 
commentators aside, the chapter took great lengths to go back and investigate for itself 
the theological origins to which Heidegger pays homage. What the investigation revealed 
was that Heidegger’s personal engagement with Christianity could best be described as 
tumultuous, ambiguous, and even inconsistent throughout the earliest phases of his 
career. 
  
 388
 However, one point during those early years stood out as a moment of stability in 
Heidegger’s relationship with Christian theology when he taught a course titled 
“Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” (hereafter IPR) in the winter semester 
of 1920-21 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau. What was seen to be the force of 
stabilization in Heidegger’s interaction with theology was the presence in the course of 
yet another formative influence — phenomenology. Heidegger teaches the course as a 
philosopher at the high point in his relationship with Edmund Husserl, the founder of 
phenomenology. Thus, the methodology and thematic interests of phenomenology are 
palpable throughout the course. Ultimately, the Parousia emerges in the course as the 
focal point for the early Christian experience as clearly articulated in Paul’s 
correspondence to the church at Thessalonica. And while Heidegger found it necessary to 
modify the phenomenology he learned from Husserl in order to make it more effective at 
fully exposing the depths of the primal Christian experience (Urchristentum), the positive 
influence of phenomenology is undeniable. Not only did phenomenology allow 
Heidegger to have a balanced interaction with theology during the short time that he 
offered the IPR course, but more importantly, the topics that came to the fore because of 
the phenomenological influences became lasting topics of concern throughout the 
remainder of his career. For instance, challenges surrounding the issues of 
intersubjectivity and temporality appear again and again in Heidegger’s texts. Despite the 
expansions and nuances that take place in these areas, the impact that phenomenology 
had upon the early Heidegger as he formulated his thoughts on the early Christian 
experience of the Parousia abides. Heidegger maintained that the factical life experience 
of the first Christians was a temporalized struggle best expressed by the Thessalonians 
  
 389
who lived each day under the daunting uncertainty of the when of the Parousia with 
vigilance and preparedness. Moreover, it was the special bond (Mitgang) that existed 
between them and Paul that enabled this early Christian community to live their faith 
with a special temporal awareness that fully integrated past, present and future. They 
confronted the daily present challenges cognizant of their past heritage with a sense of 
hope in Jesus’ futural Second Coming. 
 The main reason for devoting a chapter to a point in Heidegger’s life where 
theological concerns are most blatantly addressed was to show that a continuity exists 
throughout Heidegger’s long and prolific career. This is necessary because of the 
tendency to bifurcate the works of Heidegger according to the accepted division of the 
early and later periods. While it is within the bounds of scholarly consensus to accept that 
a turning (die Kehre) took place in Heidegger’s emphases which lends credence to an 
early and later division, this work has repeatedly argued for a continuity after the so-
called turn — the early and later Heidegger are distinct but not separate! No where is this 
more evident than in the way that certain issues which arose in the IPR course of the 
early 1920s find reformulation decades later. Why this is most relevant for the current 
endeavor is because the issues in question are not just treated early on and revisited at a 
later time in a generic way, e.g. temporality. Instead, the blatant theological treatment that 
these issues receive earlier with the help of phenomenology resurface but in a less 
obvious way. For instance, the young Heidegger has no qualms about addressing the 
temporalized struggle of the early church to live the between time of Jesus’ 
resurrection/ascension and his return. Later, Heidegger is seen making veiled theological 
references, but doing so by using the same themes to confront similar challenges. As was 
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seen in chapters three and four, the post-turn Heidegger capitalizes on the realm of the 
between and the temporal aplomb of the poet to synthesize past, present and future. This 
realm and the poetic activity become elements for authentic rooted human dwelling that 
measures itself against the Godhead and also for effectively confronting the needy 
between time of godlessness — the gods/God who have fled and the gods/God who are 
yet to arrive. Thus, this chapter successfully achieved an important goal to show that the 
very early Heidegger’s explicit interests and approach to the early Christian experience of 
God resurface in his later writings, but in a generalized and non-committal way where 
humanity is vexed by elusive encounters with gods, the Holy, God, the Sacred. 
 Though this chapter opens several avenues for further reflection, one area that 
was briefly touched upon throughout and minimally addressed in the closing pages that 
deserves closer examination is faith. In the sections of the IPR course covered here 
Heidegger fails to acknowledge the importance of the virtue of faith for the 
Thessalonians who live the temporalized struggle associated with the Parousia. However, 
if it were possible it would be a worthy and exciting venture from a theological 
perspective to closely examine the IPR course in tandem with a later text where 
Heidegger explicitly discusses faith. In the 1927 essay “’Phenomenology and Theology,” 
Heidegger identifies Christianity with faith. As a result the proper roles of philosophy and 
theology get circumscribed vis-à-vis the life of faith. Philosophy is best seen as 
“atheistic,” according to Heidegger, since it is beyond its competency when addressing 
matters of faith. Theology, on the other hand, is best suited to cultivate the exercise of 
faith and fully illuminates the vicissitudes of the experience in a scholarly way. As a 
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result of this weighty responsibility, theology must be continually self-critical to ensure 
that its advancement of faith does not become ineffectual or stale. 
 The ability to examine the work where Heidegger closely discusses the matter of 
faith in tandem with the IPR course would be greatly facilitated by the recent publication 
in English of the entire contents of the IPR course (The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 
Indiana University Press, 2004). Not only would this particular exercise benefit from the 
availability of the full English rendering of the course, but also any recourse to these 
lectures for varied theological pursuits in the future will be greatly enhanced. This 
chapter’s analysis relied on the limited availability of English translations and 
paraphrases of only certain sections of the IPR course. As a result, it was necessary to 
consult the original German on a regular basis. 
 
Chapter Three 
 
 What is most striking when returning to chapter three is the realization that it is 
the point where the thesis of the dissertation realizes a sustained articulation. By 
selectively focusing on pertinent writings and utterances of the later Heidegger it 
becomes clear that there is a pronounced openness (be it ever so tentative and implicit) 
toward the ultimate theological concern — God. The chapter was successful throughout 
in respecting the tentative and implicit nature of this openness. To ensure that a 
theological dialogue takes place with Heidegger on points that enjoy a thematic 
consistency in his later corpus, it was necessary often times to counsel against hasty 
theological applications. In other words, what the chapter demonstrated was the need to 
postpone what might appear to be an immediate source of theological gratification when 
reading the later Heidegger with a sympathetic eye. 
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 For instance, at one point a well-known staple of the later Heidegger was 
discussed — the Fourfold (das Geviert). The Fourfold permits Heidegger, in a most 
general way, to expand upon the understanding of world. He insists that whatever world 
one encounters and however that world in each case may be structured, it can always be 
understood in terms of four basic ontological regions: heaven, earth, gods and mortals. 
While theological appetites are easily whetted by Heidegger’s mention of gods as co-
constitutive of world, a first recommendation to postpone immediate theological 
gratification comes when interest is diverted to the greater importance of the relational 
dynamic in and among the regions of the Fourfold. Mortals, for example, are said to be in 
the Fourfold only when they “dwell” in accordance with the unique relational demands 
required by the other three regions — heaven, earth, gods. Finally, then, it would seem 
that the theological conversation is ready to begin on a well-grounded Heideggerian 
footing. All that needs to be done in order to proceed is to focus on what he says about 
the mortal-gods dynamic. However, as simple and attractive as this route may seem, yet 
another detour was recommended which would lead to a more profound and lasting 
Heideggerian conversation with theology about God. Pursuing the mortal-earth dynamic 
actually proved to be the more productive route. 
 Not only does Heidegger give primacy to the mortal-earth dynamic among the 
others in the Fourfold, but by carefully examining this dynamic the importance of the 
earth also comes to be appreciated. Earth, for the later Heidegger, becomes expressive of 
what remains hidden and mysterious. This was shown in the way that earth functions in a 
work of art. Using van Gogh’s painting of a pair of peasant shoes as an example, 
Heidegger asserts that any artwork exhibits both a worldly and earthly character. The 
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worldly aspect allows the purveyor of the work to perceive that which is most apparent 
and obvious. On the other hand, the earthly quality “shelters” the hidden meaning of the 
work and so invites innumerable encounters that allow the work to gradually and slowly 
reveal itself — though never completely. 
 By exposing these implications of earth in the later Heidegger and coupling them 
with the mortal-earth dynamic of the Fourfold, the theological ramifications become 
clearer. Humans (mortals) dwell on the earth and the earth itself is always a reality that 
shelters the hidden, therefore, humans dwell in the fullest sense with mystery. All due 
caution must be exercised at this point not to make a neat theological connection between 
Heidegger’s recommendation to dwell comfortably in mystery and theology’s assertions 
to live with God. However by allowing the conversation between Heidegger and theology 
to follow along the lines established by key concepts consistently advanced by the later 
Heidegger, the conversation can continue. In other words, it was not enough to feel 
contented that Heidegger mentions the gods as one aspect of the Fourfold. That unto 
itself leads nowhere. Instead, by focusing on the mortal-earth dynamic of the Fourfold the 
issue of human dwelling on earth led to an appreciation of the affinity between humanity 
and mystery. This in turn allows for pursuing what Heidegger means by mystery. 
Therefore in another section of the chapter Heidegger’s notions of meditative thinking 
were treated. One of the requirements of meditative thinking is “openness to the 
mystery.” This is not only coincidentally related to proper human dwelling on the earth 
but is actually instrumental in restoring this dwelling, so compromised by the alienating 
effect of technology’s dominance, to a deeper sense of being “rooted” upon the earth. 
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 The conversation ensues with the natural question from theological quarters as to 
whether or not Heidegger’s “openness to mystery,” replete as it is with salutary effects, is 
tenable as an openness to God. It was asserted in the chapter that Heidegger’s openness to 
the mystery was a theological intimation at best. While such openness for him had the 
promise of restoring rooted human dwelling upon the earth, a more solid theological 
connection that implicates God is made by turning attention to the way Heidegger 
qualifies dwelling. In another place of the later writings Heidegger insists that humans 
dwell “poetically” on earth and that furthermore to dwell poetically means “to stand in 
the presence of the gods.” 
 To stand in the presence of the gods does not mean, however, that the encounter 
will be one marked by full disclosure. Instead, there will be an inexpressible dimension to 
the encounter. This only gets conveyed by Heidegger if he is allowed to explain that the 
poet takes a “measure” of the human-divine encounter. The chapter showed that when the 
poet measures or gauges humanity’s relationship to the Godhead there will be alternating 
opportunities for presence and absence. Allowing the conversation to reach this point 
shows that Heidegger, in very indirect ways, can concur with mainline theological tenets 
such as God’s immanence and transcendence. 
 The mention of poets and poetic activity to accomplish lofty ends in the 
Heideggerian schema is no incidental reference. The chapter began by suggesting that the 
poet would be most effective during the current “needy time” of the gods’/God’s 
heightened elusiveness. It is a “between” time since the old gods have fled and the new 
gods are yet to arrive. That the poet is able comfortably and effectively to inhabit this 
between time is yet another conversation starter with theology. However, as it was 
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shown, the poet’s ability to inhabit the between is predicated on Heidegger’s well-
established conviction that the between of the ontological difference brings greater 
understanding to the mystery of Being. Again, it is an indirect and often circuitous route 
that leads to meaningful dialogue between the later Heidegger and theology. 
 One possible area of expansion that this chapter invites is a greater study of 
Heidegger’s brief affiliation with the Nazi party and the effect this had on his philosophy. 
As outlined above, the chapter devoted a great deal of attention to the restoration of 
authentic rooted dwelling for contemporary humanity. It was argued that the concepts of 
earth and home, which are instrumental to any such restored dwelling, were beyond the 
confines of any specific geographic place. However in light of the controversy that has 
surfaced with the disclosure of Heidegger’s support of the Third Reich and his 
subsequent silence about his involvement with the regime, there would be divergent 
opinions about Heidegger’s call to become rooted or to dwell authentically in some place. 
Therefore, if time and space allowed, it would be worthwhile to question whether or not 
Heidegger was promoting a nationalism whereby Germany is the only true place where 
true rooted dwelling can be achieved. And if it is this sort of nationalism that allowed him 
to readily embrace the National Socialist movement in Germany, then what effect did it 
have on his philosophy, and moreover how does this impact upon theological 
applications of his philosophy? The writings of Emmanuel Lévinas would greatly 
facilitate this avenue of study. 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Whereas chapter three advanced the tentative and indirect ways that the God of 
theology surfaces in the later Heidegger, chapter four assumes a very different approach. 
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Instead of examining the various texts to find places where phrases associated with God 
occur and then grounding these within the entire Heideggerian program in order to make 
some connection to theological interests, this chapter is more straightforward. It sees a 
direct link between theology’s study of God and the later Heidegger’s abiding concern 
for the current era as marked by a pervasive sense of godlessness. While at first blush 
such an era would seem to have no use for theology, it ironically is an unprecedented 
moment of opportunity for theology. Being a philosopher and not a theologian, 
Heidegger never directly invokes theology as being summoned to a defining moment in 
history. 
Nonetheless the theologian who is open to voices, such as Heidegger’s, which are 
outside the discipline can find in this time of conjectured godlessness a productive 
challenge. As an initial response to such a claim, the theologian might see her task as one 
that merely refutes the outright charge that she lives in a godless period of time. Ample 
manifestations of grace bolstered by traditional theological tenets and the gift of faith 
could be effective in the refutation. The theologian following Heidegger’s prompts will 
assume an entirely different tack. Rather than perceiving godlessness as a threat to be 
quickly checked, it is best to embrace it and work through it in the hope that new ways 
are opened to talk about God. In other words, if there is no God and likewise no assumed 
effectual platform upon which to discuss and present God, then it is incumbent upon 
theology to re-examine its understanding of God in order to arrive at new ways of 
discourse that articulate who God is that are relevant and credible. This chapter was 
successful at inviting theology to journey with Heidegger in the varied ways that 
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godlessness piqued his interests with the intent to deepen and further its work through 
alternative (perhaps for many unusual) means. 
That Heidegger provides alternative or unconventional sources for theology is 
without question. Nonetheless, those who remain open and even tolerant will experience 
a broadening of perspective — not without some related frustration and even pain along 
the way. For instance, an immediate chord of dissonance is struck for mainline 
theological ears when Heidegger’s recourse to the poet Friedrich Hölderlin is examined. 
The chapter indicated that Hölderlin’s manner of addressing the current era of 
godlessness, which captivated Heidegger, was described as a “needy” time that operates 
under a double lack — the no-more of the gods who have fled and the not-yet of the gods 
to come. This can be immediately off-putting for some in theology because of the choice 
of “gods” to address the challenge of godlessness. Heidegger himself, as it was shown at 
different points in the dissertation, was very imprecise in the way that he referenced the 
deity. He can be found using various expressions without consistency, even within the 
same context, to discuss the godly — the holy, gods, God. The advice offered to mollify 
any discomfort that these terms occasion was to keep in mind that Heidegger wrote as a 
philosopher and so was not careful to maintain a vocabulary when treating divine matters 
that would be agreeable to traditional monotheistic conventions. Likewise, in Heidegger’s 
approach to Hölderlin, he is not put off by the very imprecise use of terms that Hölderlin 
employs. As a result, the theologian who desires to learn from Heidegger’s concern for 
godlessness must be open not only to his consistent lack of monotheistic expressions but 
moreover to his willingness to seek out other writers who exhibit a similar inconsistency. 
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With that spirit of openness comes the opportunity to discover the theological 
riches in Heidegger’s exegesis of several Hölderlinian works that expand upon the initial 
claim of double godlessness — the gods who have fled and the gods who have yet to 
come. Heidegger allows Hölderlin to present the poet as the person most suited to 
effectively confront the nothingness of the gods’ double absence. In the overwhelming 
backdrop of this godlessness, the poet exhibits a venturesome spirit. By imbibing the dark 
light wine of the fragrant cup — an essential gesture of commitment to the poetic 
vocation — the poet perspicaciously points out the “traces” of the elusive deities. What is 
most theologically promising in Heidegger’s synthesis of Hölderlin is the fact that the 
poet, despite all the glowing attestations to bring about some sense of the gods’ presence, 
remains a humble mediator between the divinities and humankind. With a sense of 
wonder and humility the poet indicates the bright traces of the fled/coming gods as points 
of contact for humanity that are never at her behest but rather at the initiative and 
discretion of the gods. 
Hölderlin’s intoxicated poet who bravely confronts the dark night of godless 
nothingness to point out the bright traces of the elusive deities is but one alternative and 
unusual source that Heidegger consults in order to confront the issue of godlessness. If 
this stretched theological openness to new levels, the next source will require an even 
greater degree of elasticity. In turning to Nietzsche, Heidegger goes from Hölderlin’s 
intoxicated poet who indicates divine traces to a market place madman in Nietzsche’s 
The Gay Science who concomitantly searches for God and announces God’s death. What 
is most unsettling is the claim that God did not die of natural causes but instead was 
murdered by humankind. Any solace that might be had here because Nietzsche uses the 
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more acceptable expression of God (singular) with uniformity is quickly dashed by the 
outrageous quality of what is being said about God. 
A first line of defense that was recommended in the chapter in order to retain 
theological interest in Heidegger’s recourse to Nietzsche was that Nietzsche is not 
advocating atheism in these passages from The Gay Science. While making no attempt to 
downplay or whitewash Nietzsche’s well known invectives against Christian theology, 
ample scholarly support lends credence to Heidegger’s interpretation that the madman 
invites a search for the dead God as opposed to reveling in God’s demise. If God’s death 
occasions a search then the theological opportunities abound. At the most basic level, the 
search is on for a replacement. As disconcerting as this may be, when presented by 
Heidegger as a philosopher in the backdrop of the history of philosophy, a new 
understanding of God should be sought that replaces the God of metaphysics. Beyond the 
context provided by Western philosophy, the challenge to theology to come up with a 
replacement for a dead God in a less literal way is a charge to take stock of how God has 
been presented. Are there better ways to present God today that should replace or 
enhance the previous and accepted ways in which God was articulated? 
Whether it is Nietzsche’s dead God or Hölderlin’s fled/coming gods, the issue of 
godlessness is best confronted and alleviated according to Heidegger by means of a novel 
commemorative thinking (andenken) that has resonance with prayer. Moreover it is a 
disposition that involves the entire person. Heidegger uses the comportment of greeting 
to express the way in which the remembering-thinking conveys a devotional quality in its 
receptivity to overtures from the elusive deity. He resorts to a particular use of the holy at 
this point in order to indicate the theological possibilities when the gesture of greeting is 
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joined with meditative remembering-thinking. In Heidegger’s schema, the holy permits 
access to God and regulates God’s availability. Essentially, the holy is a dimension on par 
with Being and is God’s dwelling place. It is Heidegger’s contention, with the assistance 
of Hölderlin’s poetry, that the holy sends out greetings which amount to experiences of 
God’s presence. Thus, it becomes imperative that a suitable human greeting receives this 
holy greeting in order to address the overwhelming sense of godlessness. The greeting 
that most effectively receives the greeting of the holy is one that is accompanied by a 
remembering-thinking. This embodied gesture takes the greeting of the holy to heart and 
keeps it safe but never in a manipulative or grasping way. Because all such encounters 
with the greetings of the holy will be received as a gift, gratitude will be added to the 
greeting that greets the holy. Therefore, remembering-thinking thanking embodied as a 
gesture of greeting will receive the greeting of the holy and provide hope to the plight of 
godlessness. 
The discussion of the place of remembering in the overall Heideggerian 
comportment of a remembering-thinking thanking that greets the greeting of the holy 
affords an exciting opportunity for further study. Remembering and memory play such 
significant roles in Christian religious experience that it would be productive to sketch 
out these varied roles against Heidegger’s assertions that remembering/memory possess 
devotional qualities. A possible dialogue partner with Heidegger on this score would be 
Augustine. Throughout the Confessions he develops the unique role that 
remembering/memory plays in forging an intimate relationship between God and 
humans. 
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Appendix-I 
 
“Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” 
Winter Semester: November 1920 — February 1921 
University of Freiburg im Breisgau 
 
Course Outline 
 
 
Part One: (8 lectures) 
 
Introduction to the Phenomenon of Factical Life-experience 
 
Part Two: (16 Lectures) 
 
A Phenomenological Interpretation of Original Christianity in St. Paul ‘s Epistles 
to the Ga/atians and Thessalonians 
 
Section One:  How Original Christianity is a Factical Life-Experience 
 
Section Two:  How Original Christianity, as Factical Life-Experience, is 
Primordial Temporality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Thomas Sheehan, “Heidegger’ s ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,’ 1920-21 ,” The 
Personalist 60 (July 1979). 
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Appendix-2 
 
 
A Winter Evening 
 
Window with falling snow is arrayed, 
Long tolls the vesper bell, 
The house is provided well, 
The table is for many laid. 
 
Wandering ones, more than a few, 
Come to the door on darksome courses. 
Golden blooms the tree of graces 
Drawing up the earth’s cool dew. 
 
Wanderer quietly steps within; 
Pain has turned the threshold to stone. 
There lie, in limpid brightness shown, 
Upon the table bread and wine. 
 
Georg Trakl 
 
 
Ein Winterabend 
 
Wenn der Schnee ans Fenster fällt, 
Lang die Abendglocke läutet, 
Vielen ist der Tisch bereitet 
Und das Haus ist wohlbestellt. 
 
Mancher auf der Wanderschaft 
Kommt ans Tor auf dunklen Pfaden. 
Golden blüht der Baum der Gnaden 
Aus der Erde kühlem Saft. 
 
Wanderer tritt still herein; 
Schmerz versteinerte die Schwelle. 
Da erglänzt in reiner Helle 
Auf dem Tische Brot und Wein. 
 
Georg Trakl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Martin Heidegger, “Language,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstader (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1971), 210. 
 
Martin Heidegger, “Die Sprache.” in Gesamtausgabe Band 12: Unterwegs zur Sprache (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), 30. 
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Appendix-3 
 
 
Remembrance 
 
The northeast wind blows, 
Of winds the dearest 
To me, because a fiery spirit 
And a good voyage it promises to mariners. 
But go now and greet 
The beautiful Garonne, 
And the gardens of Bordeaux 
There, where along the sharp bank 
Runs the path and into the river 
Deep falls the brook, but above 
Gaze out a noble pair 
Of oaks and white poplars; 
 
Still I remember this well, how 
The broad treetops of the elm wood 
Lean over the mill, 
But in the courtyard a fig-tree grows. 
On holidays there too 
Walk the brown women 
On silken soil, 
In the month of March, 
When night and day are equal 
And over slow paths, 
Heavy with golden dreams, 
Lulling breezes drift. 
 
But someone pass me, 
Full of dark light, 
The fragrant cup, 
So that I may rest; for sweet 
Would be slumber in the shade. 
It is not good 
To be soulless with mortal 
Thoughts. But a 
Conversation is good and to say 
The heart’s intention, to hear much 
About days of love, 
And deeds which occurred. 
 
But where are the friends? Bellarmin 
With his companion? Many 
Are shy of going to the source; 
For richness begins namely 
In the sea. They, 
Like painters, bring together 
The beauty of the earth and disdain 
Not the winged war, and 
To dwell alone, for years, beneath 
The leafless mast, where through the night gleam neither 
The holidays of the town, 
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Nor lyre-music and native dancing. 
 
But now to the Indies 
The men have gone, 
There to the windy peak 
On vine-covered hills, where down 
The Dordogne comes 
And together with the magnificent 
Garonne as wide as the sea 
The river flows out. But it is 
The sea that takes and gives memory, 
And love too fixes attentive eyes 
But what remains is founded by the poets. 
 
Friedrich Hölderlin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Martin Heidegger, “Remembrance,” in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, trans. Keith Hoeller 
(Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2000), 103, 105. 
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Appendix-4 
 
The Gay Science 
§ 125 
 
The madman. – Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright 
morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek God!” – As 
many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much 
laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he 
hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated? – Thus they yelled and laughed. 
 The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. “Whither is God?” 
he cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him – you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did 
we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire 
horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving 
now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, 
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through 
an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not 
night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear 
nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet 
of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we 
have killed him. 
 “How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and 
mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe 
this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, 
what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? 
Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a 
greater deed; and whoever is born after us – for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher 
history than all history hitherto.” 
 Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent 
and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into 
pieces and went out. “I have come too early,” he said then; “my time is not yet. This tremendous 
event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and 
thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to 
be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars – and yet 
they have done it themselves.” 
 It has been related further that on the same day the madman forced his way into several 
churches and there struck up his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and called to account, he is said 
always to have replied nothing but: “What after all are these churches now if they are not the 
tombs and sepulchers of God?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 181-182. 
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